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ABSTRACT 
Being and Knowing in Wholeness 
Chinese Chan, Tibetan Dzogchen, and the Logic of Immediacy in Contemplation 
by 
Chinghui Jianying Ying 
Responding to onto-theology, Eliot Deutsch proposes the idea of "knowing 
religiously," stating "religious knowledge doesn't so much have a distinctive or special 
object as it has a unique style or manner ... a reverential knowing that is centered in 
reality." Based on the teachings of Chinese Chan and Tibetan Dzogchen, this dissertation 
builds upon Deutsch's premise to investigate the mechanism of 'im-mediate' knowing, or 
the logic of immediacy, in contemplation and philosophical expression. 
In particular, this dissertation shows that the meaning of one's being lies in 
spontaneous self-or-open awareness rather than in a highest being or transcendental 
divinity. Similar to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's "question-knowing" this open awareness 
has "an original manner of aiming at something," for it inspires one to embrace all but 
reify none. With this non-reifying-yet-all-embracing awareness, one's relationship with 
Being is embodied in a nondual dynamic, in which one unfolds being and knowing in 
wholeness. This holistic relationship is the insight derived from the logic of immediacy. 
It also provides an alternative paradigm to explore the nature of religious knowledge. 
This dissertation also shov/s that the logic of immediacy does not reject nominal 
intermediaries. Rather, it employs them in specific ways so that immediacy is realized 
without the dualistic bondages and conceptual limitations implied by methods of 
mediation. As this understanding is seen via a contemplative perspective, it offers an 
alternative to the sociopolitical perspective in extending our reach beyond the sectarian 
and the historical so that we can better appreciate the nuances of the teachings and the 
values of religious developments. 
Since the complex set of theses regarding the experience and thematization of 
immediacy emerges over time and in conversation with thinkers from different quarters 
of the religious-philosophizing spectrum, the narration of this dissertation starts with an 
origin narrative and an exemplar of the logic of immediacy in Chan. Following the 
footsteps of Chan monks westwards, it delves into the development and teachings of 
sTon mun, a tradition of encounter between Chinese Chan monks and Tibetan tantric 
practitioners. It concludes this tracing of the logic of immediacy with the early teachings 
of Dzogchen which emphasizes spontaneity. 
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1 
Introduction 
I. The Logic of Immediacy in Contemplation and Its Significance 
A. Being and Knowing in Wholeness as an Alternative to Being in Onto-Theology 
Martin Heidegger once wrote that Western philosophy has been dominated by what 
he called "onto-theology," a descendent of Greek philosophy and Christian theology.1 
Under the influence of this onto-theology, religious knowledge in the West naturally has 
been filled with notions centering on a transcendent/highest being and/or God. It is only 
recently that philosophers and religious scholars have started to re-think this onto-
theo-centrality by introducing different religious epistemologies, mostly from the 
teachings of Western mystical or Asian traditions.2 Learning from the Hindu philosophy 
of Advaita Vedanta, Chinese philosophy, and Western mystical traditions, American 
philosopher Eliot Deutsch thus proposes the idea of "knowing religiously"; he writes, 
My general thesis is that religious knowledge doesn't so much have a 
distinctive or special object as it has a unique style or manner. 
Knowing religiously, I shall argue, is a reverential knowing that is 
centered in reality. It involves wonder, openness, insight, and love; it 
brings about a transformation of our ordinary knowledge and the 
achievement of a kind of "unknowing knowing" that issues in a 
liberated creativity.3 
Participating in this conversation on "knowing religiously," this dissertation asks 
Generally speaking, Heidegger considers onto-theology the same as metaphysics. But he also thinks that 
to intermix ontology and theology is problematic at least on two aspects. First, when the philosophical and 
the theological are intermingled, philosophy, as the discourse of dialectic reasoning, is confined by an 
economy of faith, whereas theology, as the discipline of trans-rational faith, is reduced to the order of 
beings. More fundamentally, for Heidegger, onto-theology contributes to the degeneration of Western 
thought and the consequent troubles of technological culture by presuming knowledge regarding the "first 
cause" of philosophy and the "highest being" of theology. For his detailed discussion on the subject of 
onto-theology, see, e.g., Heidegger, Identity and Difference. See also, his Being and Time and The End of 
Metaphysics. 
2
 See, e.g., Westphal, Transcendence and Self-Transcendence and Overcoming onto-theology toward a 
postmodern Christian faith, and the references therein. 
3
 Deutsch, "Knowing Religiously," 22. 
2 
similar questions: Based upon the "Wholly Other" in Otto's sense,4 must religious 
knowledge center on "a distinctive or special object"? As the ultimate concern in 
Tillich's sense,5 must religion be founded upon a metaphysical Godhead? Must the 
meaning of one's wholeness depend upon an objectified or metaphysical highest being as 
onto-theology emphatically underscores? Can there be an alternative? If there is, what 
might it be? How does it offer us something different, and why is it important? 
Learning from the teachings of two Buddhist traditions, namely, Chinese Chan (Ch. 
chart i^f) and Tibetan Dzogchen (Tib. rdzogs chen),6 this dissertation proposes an 
alternative understanding, in which the wholeness of one's being does not necessarily 
depend upon an objectified highest being; rather, it is informed by one's 'im-mediate' 
(i.e., unmediated) knowing. Such a knowing, Chan .and Dzogchen both teach, resonates 
with the suchness of reality and manifests, within the practitioner, qualities similar to 
Deutsch's "wonder, openness, insight, and love" so that the practitioner acts fittingly 
according to the surrounding conditions, yet without being conditioned or confined by 
them. As such, the 'im-mediate' knowing is also the ultimate being. In mutual interfusion 
and permeation, one's being and knowing seamlessly manifest in their natural wholeness. 
Thus, this dissertation builds upon Deutsch's premise of "knowing religiously" to 
investigate the mechanism of the said 'im-mediate' knowing, or what I call the logic of 
immediacy, both in contemplation and in philosophical expression. Generally speaking, 
immediacy, as a contemplative idea, refers to a direct cognition of reality, including the 
4
 For Rudolf Otto's understanding of "Wholly Other," see, e.g., Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 25-30. 
5
 For Paul Tillich's understanding of "ultimate concern" as something based on "God above God," see, e.g., 
Tillich, The Courage to Be, 186-190. 
6
 In the dissertation, transliteration will be given according to its context. Basically, I will try to give 
Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan equivalent terms if the context is applicable. Otherwise, only its applicable 
languages will be given. 
3 
reality of oneself, without any mediation It appears in a form of self-awareness which 
further indicates that one's state of being is imbued in one's knowing as an integral whole. 
Accordingly, as a category of analysis, immediacy also depicts a nondual dynamic, in 
which being and knowing are fully integrated within the unified matrix of subject-object 
reality. This 'nondual dynamic' characterization, as shown later, offers us a hermeneutic 
tool to explore contemplative teachings following the logic of immediacy in a way that is 
philosophically meaningful and cognitively accessible. It also provides a shared paradigm 
for us to compare similar teachings distinctively presented in different religious traditions 
such as our subjects, Chinese Chan and Tibetan Dzogchen. 
I have chosen Chan and Dzogchen for this project not only because of their doctrinal 
emphasis on ideas of immediacy such as suddenness and spontaneity, but also because of 
the historical connection between them, as established by the Dunhuang manuscripts 
discovered at the turn of the 20th century in Northwest China. For, if there is a 
conceptually complex set of theses regarding the experience and thematization of 
immediacy, one would expect this to be a discourse that emerges over time, and in 
conversation with other thinkers from different quarters of the religious-philosophizing 
spectrum of the time. And this is indeed the case. In consequence, the narration of the 
dissertation will start with a development and an exemplar of the idea of immediacy, or 
more precisely, sudden awakening, in Chan. Following the historical footsteps of Chan 
monks westwards, the dissertation delves into the development and teachings of sTon 
mun,7 the "Sudden School" in Tibet, which resulted from the interactions between 
Chinese Chan monks and Tibetan Mahayoga and/or proto-Dzogchen practitioners of the 
7
 sTon mun is a Tibetan transliteration of Chinese term dunman W.f% literally meaning "sudden gate" or 
"sudden school." For its development in Tibet, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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8th-10th centuries. It then concludes this historical tracing of the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation with the early teachings of Dzogchen emphasizing primordial perfection 
and spontaneous presence. 
This narrative strategy is to illustrate the variations of the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation through different case studies. It also tries to show the complex historical 
trajectories of these variations and the way the contemplative participants, Chinese and 
Tibetan, shaped them independently and/or in conversation. What is meant to be 
conveyed via this strategy is that the logic of immediacy in contemplation is not an 
isolated phenomenon. It had emerged, and thus can emerge, with different emphases in 
different times and places. Even though in our study the contemplatives had contact with 
each other, it would be hasty to conclude that there occurred a transplant of ideas. Rather, 
a more probable case is that the different variations of the logic of immediacy, due to 
their contemplative homogeneity and validity as acknowledged by their practitioners, 
came to reinforce one another so as to facilitate the long lasting effect in their respective 
traditions. This understanding, I would argue, further attests to the significance of the 
proposed 'im-mediate' knowing that embodies one's being, or put simply, being and 
knowing in wholeness, as a serious alternative to the onto-theo-centric solution(s) to 
one's existential meaning for religious studies. 
B. Immediacy, Nonduality, and Contemplative Practice 
Yet, generally speaking, the kind of nondual dynamic within the unified matrix of 
reality, which immediacy implies, constitutes a conundrum from the perspective of logic. 
For, as a nonconceptual state, the experience of nonduality is inexpressible even in words, 
not to mention in logic or reasoning; yet this understanding does not prevent practitioners 
5 
from relying on words or reasoning to realize that nondual experience. The question is 
then: How can distinct elements like being and knowing, form and non-form, or the finite 
and the infinite remain differentiable while having the same essence (Ch. yixing —ffe 
Tib. ngo bo gcig), or put another way, be neither many nor one, logically speaking? How 
can opposites or contradictions, which, though they are conceptually incompatible, exist 
in a harmonious, albeit paradoxical, state? Various philosophies and religious teachings 
have been proposed to understand this paradoxically harmonious reality. For example, 
monistic perspectives generally resolve this logical paradox by identifying all opposites 
and overcoming all contradictions metaphysically, namely, collapsing them into a 
Universal Oneness {e.g., Plotinus's idea of "The One") or Infinite God {e.g., Nicholas of 
Cusa's "coincidence of opposites"). Unlike this metaphysical solution, nondual 
worldviews, particularly Buddhist teachings, provide different understandings to different 
oppositional categories. In her Meeting the Great Bliss Queen, Anne C. Klein identifies 
three non-oppositional dyads from Buddhist philosophical discourses.9 She calls them 
ontological nondualism, cognitive nondualism, and evolutionary nondualism, referring to, 
respectively, the relationship between the ultimate and the conventional, between the 
subject and the object, and between one's present unenlightened state and future 
enlightened state. 
Regarding monistic and nondual principles, David Loy understands monism as an 
ontological claim and nonduality as an epistemological description that an awakened 
8
 In her Knowledge and Liberation, regarding the inexpressibility of the ultimate reality which is nondual, 
Anne C. Klein writes, "Since the inexpressibility of the ultimate is said to refer to the inability of words to 
convey a yogi's non-dualistic perception of ultimate reality as it is experienced, there is no contradiction in 
words and thought leading to that experience" (14). For a detailed discussion on the relation between 
reasoning/conceptual thinking and nondual experience from the Tibetan tradition of Gelukba, see Klein, 
Knowledge and Liberation. For a more general discussion on the relation between nonduality and thinking, 
see, Loy, Nonduality, 133-177. 
9
 Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen, 151-158. 
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being experiences.10 Nevertheless, Klein's three types of nondualism strongly suggest 
that Buddhist nonduality consists of both ontological and epistemological aspects. In 
particular, ontological nondualism evidently depicts an ontologically nondual relationship 
between the ultimate sunyata (or emptiness in the Buddhist sense) and the conventional 
appearances. On the other hand, cognitive nondualism and evolutionary nondualism 
involve one's subjective recognition of the nondual states even though underneath both is 
the ontological nondualism. In this way, the three types of Buddhist nondualism not only 
can be integrated as a whole, but also must be realized with epistemological insights. As 
a result, in addition to reasoning that can establish the necessary conceptual foundation, 
Buddhist masters have all instructed that one must practice in contemplation to attain the 
nondual states.11 
Among the contemplative practices, there are methods that employ mediation or 
gradual steps, but there are also traditions, such as Chan, sTon mun, and Dzogchen, 
which insist that immediacy is the key. Thus, they have developed unique language or 
rhetoric whose purpose is to bring forth the epistemological realization of the nondual 
states in the most direct manner possible, and at the same time to recognize the inartificial, 
or natural, character of the path. So, their rhetoric of directness and naturalness, the kinds 
of language, syntax, and categories of analysis by which meditative principles associated 
with sudden awakening and spontaneous presence are communicated, are themselves 
significant both for their religious identities and for carrying out their contemplative 
10
 Loy, "The Lack of Ethics and the Ethics of Lack in Buddhism," 268. 
11
 It is a contentious issue regarding the use of logic or reasoning in the realization of Buddhist awakening. 
Some Buddhist traditions like the Madhyamaka consider the training of logic/reasoning essential to the 
path, whereas some traditions like Chan and Dzogchen consider logic/reasoning at best limiting, if not 
damaging, the path to awakening. For a discussion on the use of logic/reasoning in Tibetan Buddhism, see, 
e.g., Klein, Knowledge and Liberation. See also Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, Ruegg, 
Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective, and Jackson, 
Enlightenment by a Single Means. 
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projects. It is to analyze these elements of the rhetoric doctrinally and contemplatively 
that I delve into the developments and teachings of Chan, sTon mun, and Dzogchen to 
understand the logic of immediacy. 
C. The Philosophical and Contemplative Import Underlying the Logic of Immediacy 
In exploring the contemplative structures underlying their rhetoric of directness and 
naturalness, I will demonstrate that the sudden teaching of Shenhui } f # (684-758), the 
initiator of the debates between the Northern and the Southern Sects in Chan, is meant to 
guide his students to manifest the awakened mind in sympathetic resonance with the 
"equal learning" (Ch. dengxue Up H ) of samadhi-being (or the state of deep 
concentration) and prajna-knowing (or the wisdom of Buddhist emptiness) that artfully 
integrates gradualness into the context of suddenness (see Chapter 2). Moheyan 0M°l?/7 
(c. 8th-9th centuries), regarded as the representative of sTon mun, the Chan tradition in 
Tibet, on the other hand, teaches his disciples to directly access, with their spontaneous 
self-awareness, the mind-source (Ch. xinyuan i&M) in the simultaneous embrace of the 
conventional and the ultimate (see Chapter 4). Finally, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes 
(c. 832-943), probably the first Nyingma master historically known to us to 
systematically present the Dzogchen teachings, instructs practitioners to experience the 
"great wholeness" (Tib. thig le chenpo), the reality of all being in its totality and myriad 
diversity, in the spontaneous presence of their reflexively open awareness, an "artful 
endeavor" that requires the practitioners' skillful effort done in accord with the principle 
of spontaneity (see Chapter 5). Together, these contemplative structures convey the 
message that the logic of immediacy does not reject nominal intermediaries. Rather, it 
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employs these so-called "intermediary tools" such as gradual cultivation, conventional 
means, and skillful effort in specific ways so that immediacy is realized without the 
dualistic bondages and conceptual limitations implied in their original contexts, i.e., the 
contexts of gradualness, conventionality, and effort. Fundamentally, in the logic of 
immediacy, nothing of (or in) one's knowing is intermediary if one does not make it so; it 
is how "a tool" is employed rather than what it appears as that truly defines what it is. 
Not only will my investigation demonstrate the contemplative structures underlying 
the respective teachings of suddenness and spontaneity, but I will also show that these 
teachings contemplatively take the goal of the path as the practice. This idea of taking the 
goal as the path is how the great Tibetan contemplative and doxographer, Klong chen pa 
(1308-1364), defines afruitional vehicle (Ch. guosheng JUiH; Tib. 'bras bu'i thegpd). 
In Indo-Tibetan Buddhist discourses, a tradition or vehicle (Skt. yana; Ch. sheng iH; Tib. 
thegpd) derived from the sutra, or a sutric tradition or vehicle, is always characterized as 
a causal vehicle (Ch. yinsheng Hffl; Tib. rgyu'i thegpd), whereas a tantric tradition or 
vehicle is considered a fruitional vehicle.13 Generally speaking, in Buddhist tantric 
discourses, a fruitional vehicle that recognizes one's primordial perfection and directly 
aims at that consummation is considered more effective, in time and in fruition, than a 
causal vehicle that relies on gradual development to achieve one's spiritual maturity. 
The questions however are: Are all sutric vehicles only causal? Or do we need better 
understandings regarding their contemplative nature individually to make such a strong 
conclusion? More significantly, if one only considers sutric traditions causal without 
For a discussion on the meanings of "vehicle" in Buddhist context, see, e.g., Jeffrey Hopkins's 
introduction to Dalai Lama's Kalachakra Tantra: Rite of Initiation, 24. 
13
 See, e.g., Longchen Rabjam, The Precious Treasure of Philosophical Systems (translated by Richard 
Barron), 127-260; Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha-Nature, 131-138; and Sobisch, Three-Vow Theories in 
Tibetan Buddhism, 367-369 and footnote 771. 
9 
further analysis, is it possible that one may misinterpret the contemplative significance of 
sutric traditions, especially those having similar characteristics as a fruitional vehicle? To 
better address these questions, based on the three doctrinal systems aforementioned, I will 
demonstrate that Chan, sTon mun, and Dzogchen are all fruitional vehicles embodying 
the logic of immediacy in contemplation with different emphases, even though the former 
two are considered sutric traditions, whereas the last one is a tannic tradition. As a result, 
it facilitates the understanding of the similarities among the three traditions and gives us a 
more delicate treatment on the use of causal and fruitional vehicles as categories of 
analysis for Buddhist studies. 
To add to Deutsch's "knowing religiously," I will also show that the contemplative 
structures of the three fruitional traditions under investigation all characterize the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation as a holistic dynamic between being and knowing, a kind of 
"mutual interfusion" between ontology and epistemology. This "mutual interfusion" 
essentially integrates the above three types of Buddhist nondualism in Klein's typology 
into a wholeness that embraces the various facets of nonduality in their suchness. Thus, 
this embracing wholeness depicts a holography of nondual relationships with respect to 
objects, between self and other, and between one's present self and future ideal. Yet, 
these nondual relationships, I argue, are all embodied in the nondual dynamic of one's 
ontology and epistemology, in which being and knowing are wholly integrated; being 
knows, and knowing is. In this ultimate relationship of ontology and epistemology, all 
opposites and contradictions are resolved in a unique manner of knowing, in which the 
spontaneous presence of one's original awareness or open awareness is the ultimate being. 
In this way, there can be no "abstract truth" divorced from one's subjective engagement, 
10 
yet as this original/open awareness, these traditions unequivocally state, resonates with 
the suchness of reality, it will therefore not lead to cultural or moral relativism.14 
To be sure, scholars have questioned the efficacy of the idea of immediacy for 
contemplation. For example, in the case of Chan, Bernard Faure and T. Griffith Foulk 
have argued that its subitism, or the doctrine of sudden awakening, is "less ... a depiction 
of concrete practice and more ... an effort to distinguish Ch'an from other schools."15 
That is to say, for these scholars, not only does the Chan idea of immediacy lack 
contemplative significance, but it is also sectarian, i.e., a rhetoric which seeks "to win 
prestige and adherents [for the Chan Sect] within the sanghci and to gain notice and 
patronage from the state and lay elite."16 In addition to this sectarian issue, other authors 
have argued, out of ethical concerns, that the idea of immediacy, especially in the form of 
spontaneity, is problematic, and can give rise to laxity as well as antinomian behaviors 
disguised as spontaneous actions.17 
Nonetheless, my study will show that while the contemplative teachings centered on 
the principle of the fruitional vehicle all acknowledge the manifestation of an effortless 
quality, a spontaneous aroma, this effortlessness, usually realized through a set of via 
negativa or "negative paths,"18 is not meant to be inactive, antinomian, or to negate 
something logically (even though they might be abused or misunderstood as such). 
14
 For discussions on issues related to cultural or moral relativism, see, e.g., Norris, Reclaiming Truth; 
Hunt, Beyond Relativism; Levy, Moral Relativism: A Short Introduction; and Moser and Carson (eds), 
Moral Relativism: A Reader. 
15
 Halperin, Out of the Cloister, 243 (footnote 25). For their arguments, see, e.g., Faure, The Rhetoric of 
Immediacy, 53-78 and T. Griffith Foulk, "Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice in Sung Ch'an Buddhism," 
147-208. Also, see Halperin, Out of the Cloister, 7-12 and Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, 
171-179. 
16
 Halperin, Out of the Cloister, 243 (footnote 25). 
See, e.g., Barnard and Kripal (eds), Crossing Boundaries; Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 59-63; and 
Stone, Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, 92-93; 218-228; 
358-359. 
18
 These "negative paths" include non-action, no-thought, non-conceptualization, non-grasping, non-
examination, and non-abidance, to name just a few. 
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Rather, it is a special kind of contemplative effort Anne C. Klein and Geshe Tenzin 
Wangyal Rinpoche call "artful endeavor,"19 through which one's original nature, 
particularly in the form of self-awareness, can spontaneously manifest itself, just as the 
sun naturally comes out of the clouds or a mirror always reflects brightly with its innate 
luminosity. It is with this spontaneous self-awareness that the contemplative teachings 
under investigation, I would say, echo the message of Deutsch's "knowing religiously," 
stressing religious knowledge as having a reverential knowing that is centered in reality 
and creatively transforms our ordinary knowledge with wonder, openness, insight, and 
love. 
Such an understanding of what religious knowledge is distinctly brings out the 
significance underlying our investigation of the logic of immediacy in contemplation, for 
it highlights an alternative paradigm to understand religious knowledge. Rather than 
depending on an objectified or transcendental highest being, this alternative paradigm 
tells us that the meaning of one's being lies in one's unique manner of knowing, which, 
in our particular case, is a unique form of self-awareness, i.e., one's spontaneous self-
awareness or open awareness. Similar to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's "question-knowing, 
which by principle no statement or 'answer' can go beyond and which perhaps therefore 
is the proper mode of our relationship with Being, as though it were the mute or reticent 
interlocutor of our questions,"20 this open awareness has "an original manner of aiming 
at something," for it inspires one to embrace all but reify none. With this non-reifying 
and all-embracing awareness, the proper mode of our relationship with Being is 
embodied in an open and dialogic dynamic, in which one unfolds one's being and 
19
 See Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 87-118. 
20
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (translated by Alphonso Lingis), 129. 
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knowing in wholeness. It is this new relationship, i.e., the relationship between being and 
knowing, that not only is the insight of our investigation of the logic of immediacy but 
also provides an additional paradigm through which we explore the nature of religious 
knowledge. 
II. Historical Studies of Chan and Dzogchen: A Contemplative Perspective 
In addition to the above philosophical and contemplative issues, to weave together 
the complex historical tapestries of how Chinese and Tibetan Buddhists shaped their 
ideas of immediacy within their broader socioreligious contexts, I will also present two 
historical studies from a perspective that highlights their contemplative concerns as these 
Chinese and Tibetan Buddhists developed their traditions. The first study, also the point 
of departure of the dissertation, is to show a historical grounding for the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation by tracing how the distinguishing features of Chan 
Buddhism, most notably, sudden awakening, emerged under the mutual influence of 
Chinese indigenous and imported foreign dhyana or meditative teachings. As a point of 
connection, the second study deals with the historical interactions between Chinese Chan 
monks and Tibetan Mahayoga or proto-Dzogchen practitioners at the borders of 
Tang-Song China and Tibet of the 8th-10th centuries. Not only do these studies provide 
the historical contexts that ground our discussion of the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation in time and space, they also have their own merits, for they provide an 
alternative interpretation to, and even a necessary extension of, historical studies done 
only from the sociopolitical perspective that may overlook the spiritual or religious 
efficacy in the development of a religious tradition. 
As a preparation for our studies, below, I will introduce some background materials 
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and the methodology used. As my tracing of the development of Chan Buddhism will be 
self-explanatory (in Chapter 1), I will thus give an overview of the three perspectives 
regarding the relationship between Chan and Dzogchen to contextualize our discussion of 
the development and teachings of sTon mun (in Chapters 3 and 4). Inspired by these 
perspectives, I will then introduce the categories of the disseminator and the recipient to 
discuss the development of a religious tradition. My particular interest is to highlight how 
certain recipients incorporate new teachings and/or practices with special concerns to the 
contemplative project of their tradition. Even though these recipients may later become 
the disseminators, since their contemplative concerns have already shaped their tradition, 
it would still be significant to focus on how these early recipients shape the contemplative 
elements of their tradition. This methodology is what I call the contemplative perspective 
that will be applied to the two historical studies outlined above. 
A. Three Perspectives on the Relationship between Chan and Dzogchen 
Owing to the newly discovered Dunhuang manuscripts at the turn of the 20th century 
in Northwest China, the interactions between Chinese Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism 
in general and Chan and Dzogchen in particular have received considerable academic 
attention in recent years. Since Tibetan Buddhism was in its early formation during the 
8th-10th centuries, modern scholars have mostly studied the subjects in terms of how 
Chinese disseminators and/or teachings shaped the Tibetan traditions. 
Thematically, the topics of related scholarly research generally include the following: 
(1) the development and teachings of Tibetan Chan, referred to as sTon mun {i.e., the 
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Sudden School) or Cig car ba (i.e., the Simultaneists) by scholars,21 (2) the syncretic 
interactions between Chan and Tantra in Dunhuang,22 and (3) the historical and doctrinal 
relationships between Chan and Dzogchen.23 These topics essentially are intertwined, 
because sTon mun, a descendant of Chan, eventually disappeared in Tibet and its 
disappearance coincided with the emergence of Dzogchen, which has led some scholars 
(such as Giuseppe Tucci and Ueyama Daishun)24 to suggest that Dzogchen was, at least 
in part, a re-contextualized form of Chan/sTon mun. Thus, I will focus on the relationship 
between Chan and Dzogchen to review the new findings pertaining to our subject matter. 
In general, regarding the relationship between Chan and Dzogchen of the 8th-10th 
centuries, there exist three major perspectives among modern scholars. The first basically 
states that Chan had a direct influence on Dzogchen, especially in terms of its teachings 
on the mind-nature (Ch. xinxing >LVl4) and the instantaneous nature of awakening. For 
21
 See e.g., Demieville, Le Concile de Lhasa; Obata, "Kodai chibetto ni okeru tonmonpa (zenshu) no 
nagare Sf^f- ^ 7 h IZ.&I1 ^WVMiW^)^^tl (The Development of the Sudden School (Zen 
School) in Ancient Tibet)"; Okimoto, "Tonko shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu bunken no naiyo WrfSLiHi. 
£ > f " ^ 7 h SaWMSCM^^i^- (The Contents of Tibetan Chan Literature Recovered from Dunhuang)"; 
Kimura, "Tonko shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu bunken no seikaku S^iUfUl©-?"^ 7 h ~SCW^~5Cffl.<£> 
'[4f§ (The Characteristics of Tibetan Chan Literature Recovered from Dunhuang)"; Kimura, "Tonko 
shutsudo chibetto-bun shahon Stein 709 WtfM.HH.? ^ 7 h ^ ^ l ^ Stein 709 (The Dunhuang Tibetan 
Manuscript Stein 709)"; Karmay, The Great Perfection, 86-106; Broughton, "Early Ch'an Schools in 
Tibet"; Gomez, "The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana: Fragments of the 
teachings of Mo-ho-yen"; Faber, "A Tibetan Dunhuang Treatise on Simultaneous Enlightenment: The 
dMyigs su myedpa tshul gcig pa'i gzhung"; Otokawa, "New Fragments of the rNal 'byor chenpor bsgom 
pa'i don from Tabo;" and Ueyama, "The Study of Tibetan Chan Manuscripts Recovered from Tun-huang: 
A Review of the Field and its Prospects." 
22
 See e.g., Meinert, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs chen: Preliminary Remarks on Two Tibetan 
Dunhuang Manuscripts" and van Schaik and Dalton, "Where Chan and Tantra Meet: Tibetan Syncretism in 
Dunhuang." 
23
 See e.g., Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts: Part II; Barber, "The Unifying of rDzogs-pa chen-po and Ch'an"; 
Tanaka and Robertson, "A Ch'an Text from Tun-huang: Implications for Ch'an Influence on Tibetan 
Buddhism"; Guenther, "'Meditation' Trends in Early Tibet"; Karmay, The Great Perfection, 86-103, 216; 
Germano, "Architecture and Absence in the Secret Tantric History of the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen)," 
217; and Norbu, Dzog Chen and Zen. 
24
 Not only modern scholars but also early Tibetan Buddhists have proposed similar ideas. According to 
Samten Karmay, these early Tibetan Buddhists include "certain segments of the Tibetan Buddhist 
orthodoxy, from the king of mNga'-ris, lHa Bla-ma Ye-shes-'od, to the Sa skya pa and the dGe lugs pa" 
(Karmey, The Great Perfection, 89). For Sa-skya Pandita's argument, see Jackson, Enlightenment by a 
Single Means, 72-78; 91-121. 
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example, in his Minor Buddhist Texts: Part II, Giuseppe Tucci forcefully argues that 
Dzogchen had a genetic relationship to Chan. Delving into the famous Council of Tibet 
(c. 792-794)25 and Nyingma texts such as the Blonpo bka'i thangyig (The Chronicle of 
Ministers) section of the bKa' thang sde Inga (The Five Chronicles), Tucci finds 
Dzogchen's doctrines of the pure mind and its instantaneous nature of awakening to 
exhibit a close affinity with their parallel elements in Chan. He thus concludes that 
Dzogchen accepted and preserved these Chan ideas after their alleged expurgation, which 
Various studies on the issues surrounding this famous Sino-Indian Buddhist controversy culminating in 
the debate or debates in the Samye monastery have emerged in the last couple of decades. Many aspects of 
this historical event have been clarified by two pioneering works, namely, Paul Demieville's Le Concile de 
Lhasa (1952) and Giuseppe Tucci's Minor Buddhist Texts: Part II (1958); other works include Houston, 
Sources for a History of the bSam yas Debate; Pachow, "A Study of the Twenty-Two Dialogues on 
Mahayana Buddhism"; Imaeda, "Documents tibetains de Touen-houang concernant le concile du Tibet"; 
Yanagida, "The Li-tai fa-pao chi and the Ch'an Doctrine of Sudden Awakening;" Gomez, "Indian 
Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment"; and also the bibliography therein. 
There have been different theories proposed and it seems that many historians have inclined to the theory 
that there was probably more than one debate held in the Samye monastery over a period of several years. 
According to Demieville, the debate took place from 792 to 794 CE, but Pachow argues that there is strong 
evidence to indicate that the debate took place in 781 or between the years of 780 to 782 CE (Pachow, "A 
Study of the Twenty-Two Dialogues on Mahayana Buddhism," 39). Regarding the issue of who actually 
won the debate, Tibetan Buddhist historians have uniformly claimed that the Chinese representative was 
roundly defeated and that the king issued a decree confirming the superiority of Indian Buddhism and 
urging Tibetan Buddhists to follow the teachings of the Madhyamaka School (Wangdu and Diemberger 
(trans), dBa' bzhed, 79-89; Karmay, The Great Perfection, 4-5). However, among modern historians, it is 
still an unsettled issue; according to Demieville, Chinese accounts of the controversy clearly indicate that 
Moheyan won the debate and was authorized to stay in Tibet to continue his teaching (Demieville, Le 
Concile de Lhasa, 42, 170) and D. Ueyama has proposed that Moheyan won a debate with Santaraksita in 
writing but later was defeated by KamalasTla and then banished to China (see Karmay, The Great 
Perfection, footnote 9 on page 87). 
Regarding other issues related to the debate, see also Wayman, "Doctrinal Disputes and the Debate of 
bSam yas"; Roccasalvo, "The Debate at bSam yas: Religious Contrast and Correspondence"; R. Jackson, 
"Sa skya pandita's Account of the bSam yas Debate: History as Polemic"; van der Kuijp, "On the Sources 
for Sa skya Pandita's Notes on the Bsam yas Debate" and "Miscellanea to a Recent Contribution on/to the 
bSam-yas Debate"; Faber, "The Council of Tibet according to the sBa bzhed"; Broido, "Sa-skya Pandita, 
the White Panacea and the Hva-Shang Doctrine"; Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of 
Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective, 63-92 and "On the Tibetan Historiography and Doxography of 
the 'Great Debate of bSam yas'"; D. Jackson, "Sa-skya Pandita the 'Polemicist': Ancient Debates and 
Modern Interpretations" and "Birds in the Egg and Newborn Lion Cubs: Metaphors for the Potentialities 
and Limitations of 'All-at-once' Enlightenment"; D. Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means; Sven 
Bretfeld, "The 'Great Debate' of bSam yas: Construction and Deconstruction of a Tibetan Buddhist Myth"; 
Huang and Liu, "Sangye lunzheng zhong de 'dasheng heshang jian': 'Dunru' shuo de kaocha fJUftiiatf*11)11 
W r^C^fl] j^Mj : r$MAj tWm^ ('The View of Heshang Mahayana' in the Debate of bSam yas: An 
Investigation of the 'Sudden Entrance' Teaching)."; and Shen, "Xizangwen wenxian zhong de Heshang 
Moheyan ji qi jiaofa: Yige chuangzao chulai de chuantong ^M'XSM,x¥^l^\°iMW^l'SlMWC/ii'- ~f@ 
M\¥k\¥i$ffiiWWi (Hva shang Mahayana and His Teaching in Tibetan Literature: An Invented Tradition). 
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Tibetan historians claimed to have happened after the Council of Tibet. 
The second perspective basically states that while they both could trace a shared 
heritage back to Indian Buddhism, Chan and Dzogchen were innovatively developed by 
the Chinese and the Tibetans in their respective socioreligious contexts. Therefore, these 
traditions should be studied independently. In various degrees, scholars who hold this 
view have all criticized Tucci's claim to be inconclusive and even faulty primarily on two 
accounts. First, they argue that the ideas that Tucci found in Dzogchen and identified as 
inherited from Chan could actually come from Indian Buddhism, namely, the siddha 
movement. For these scholars, there is simply no sufficient evidence to conclude what 
Tucci concluded. Secondly, they challenge the reliability and even the authenticity of the 
text, i.e., the Blonpo bka'i thangyig, from which Tucci derived his conclusions. Based 
on Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts and early Nyingma texts such as the bSam gtan mig 
sgron {The Lamp for the Eye ofDhydna), they argue that sTon mun, the Chan tradition in 
Tibet, had been considered a distinct vehicle from Dzogchen even in the formative period 
of Dzogchen identity. As a result, they should be treated as different vehicles.27 
Generally, the third perspective presents a more complicated picture regarding the 
relationship between Chan and Dzogchen. David Germano points out that while Tucci's 
claim may be insufficiently demonstrated and Dzogchen further came to be "tantricized" 
in the later spread of Tibetan Buddhism,28 historical evidence does support that early 
26
 For his detailed argument, see Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts: Part II, 60-68. Those who have similar 
views to Tucci's include Ueyama Daishun, Jeffrey Broughton, and A. W. Barber; see Ueyama, "Chibetto-
yaku Tonga shinshu yoketsu no kenkyu f1 ^ y h |R r ^Hfa J C T K H ^ J ©W^S (A Study of the Tibetan 
Version of Tunwu chen tsung yao chtieh)"; Broughton, "Early Ch'an Schools in Tibet"; and Barber, "The 
Unifying of rDzogs-pa chen-po and Ch'an." 
27
 For more detailed arguments, see, e.g., Kvaerne, '"The Great Perfection' in the Tradition of the 
Bonpos," 384-385; Karmay, The Great Perfection, 86-106; Tanaka and Robertson, "A Ch'an Text from 
Tun-huang: Implications for Ch'an Influence on Tibetan Buddhism," 71-78. 
28
 For a more detailed discussion on the "tantricized" development of Dzogchen, see, e.g., Germano, "The 
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Dzogchen could have been directly influenced by Chan teachings. Particularly, he argues 
that the influence might have happened outside of Tibetan cultural domains, e.g., at the 
border area of Dunhuang, and/or in the years before sTon mun and Dzogchen were 
recognized as distinct vehicles in the bSam gtan mig sgron. As a result, Germano writes, 
"Given their striking similarities as well as the references to Chan in Nyingma literature, 
it would be very odd if the Great Perfection [i.e., Dzogchen] was not significantly 
influenced by its dialogues with Chan, even if its original genesis and primary impetus is 
to be located elsewhere."29 
As a matter of fact, recent studies using Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts have 
confirmed that early Tibetan Buddhists did syncretically integrate Chan ideas with proto-
Dzogchen and/or Mahayoga tantric teachings. Following the footsteps of her Japanese 
predecessors, Carmen Meinert identifies two Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts, i.e., the 
Lung chung (or Small Treatise) in ITJ 689 (two folios) and the commentary in PT 699 
(five folios),30 as a Tibetan commentary on the Lung chung, a Chan treatise expounding 
the nature of mind. In her research, she demonstrates that the commentary in PT 699 
presents a unique Tibetan interpretation of Chan teachings, in which Tibetan 
commentator(s) took ideas from other Tibetan traditions, specifically the "not-yet-
systemized" Dzogchen, to elucidate the Chan doctrine of mind-nature as well as its 
Funerary Transformation of the Great Perfection (Rdzogs chen)." 
29
 Germano, "Architecture and Absence in the Secret Tantric History of the Great Perfection (rdzogs 
chen)," 217. 
30
 Since most of the Dunhuang manuscripts either do not have titles or consist of collections of several 
texts or are fragmentary, these manuscripts are usually identified with their catalogue numbers. Most of the 
Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts are collected in the Pelliot collection in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris 
and in the Stein collection in the British Library in London. I have followed Sam van Schaik's convention 
to denote the former PT and the latter ITJ. Thus, PT 699 refers to Item 699 in the Pelliot collection, 
whereas ITJ 689 refers to Item 689 in the Stein collection. As a note, over the years scholars have preferred 
to refer to the manuscripts in the Stein collection with the prefix "Stein Tibetan" or ST. But as these 
manuscripts all have the prefix IOL Tib J., I thus follow Schaik's convention (van Schaik, "The Early Days 
of the Great Perfection," 166 and footnote 2 therein). 
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corresponding contemplative practice. As a result, they created a syncretic teaching 
between Chinese Chan and Tibetan Dzogchen. 
Rejecting Carmen Meinert's reading of the commentary in PT 699 as a Dzogchen 
interpretation of the Lung chung given in ITJ 689, Sam van Schaik and Jacob Dalton 
contend that the commentary in PT 699 should be better understood as a Mahayoga 
tantric commentary on the Chan teachings of the Lung chung, especially when taking into 
consideration the same author's works given in the Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts PT 
626 and PT 634. Having analyzed a group of five Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts, van 
Schaik and Dalton conclude that the philological and doctrinal similarities of these 
manuscripts are significant enough to convince them that these manuscripts were 
composed by the same author. Hence, when taking the Mahayoga tantric elements, 
particularly the three samadhis in the development stage (Skt. utpattikrama; Tib. bskyed 
rim), clearly emphasized in the other manuscripts, van Schaik and Dalton insist that the 
commentary in PT 699 undoubtedly presents an interpretation of "a Chan text in terms of 
Mahayoga ritual techniques."32 
B. Methodology: A Perspective Sensitive to the Concerns of the Contemplative 
Given the above three perspectives, we know that Chan teachings were being 
circulated among early Tibetan Buddhists. And, more importantly, it seems that whether 
Chan teachings were syncretically integrated with the "not-yet-systemized" Dzogchen, or 
with the Mahayoga tantra, it is clear that in either case Tibetan Buddhists, the recipients, 
rather than Chan masters, the disseminators, were the ones who created the innovative 
31
 For her detailed argument, see Meinert, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs chen: Preliminary Remarks 
on Two Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts." 
32
 Van Schaik and Dalton, "Where Chan and Tantra Meet: Tibetan Syncretism in Dunhuang," 68. 
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assimilation within their broader tantric context. This understanding effectively tells us 
that there could be a "recipient's perspective" in terms of looking at the development of a 
religious system or tradition. 
Now, the questions are: What can we learn from this recipient's perspective? Is there 
really a need to create the two categories of the recipient and the disseminator in terms of 
understanding the development of a religious tradition? Can we really separate them in 
the process? Put another way, aren't the recipient and the disseminator working together 
in shaping the development? More importantly, how does the recipient's perspective help 
our two historical studies, namely, tracing the evolution of the distinguishing features of 
Chan Buddhism and investigating the interactions between Chan monks and Tibetan 
tantric practitioners? 
As two categories, the disseminator and the recipient could have different concerns. 
Generally speaking, in the beginning of a tradition's formation, as the disseminators aim 
at spreading their teachings, they would focus more on how to communicate their ideas, 
pay more attention to legitimacy, and thus have a more sectarian consciousness. On the 
other hand, as the recipients try to figure out what it is exactly that they are receiving, 
they would focus more on how to apply the ideas to practice, care more about the 
contemplative effectiveness of the teachings, and thus be more willing to go beyond 
sectarian boundary so as to integrate as many insights from similar teachings as possible. 
Put simply, the disseminators would be more doctrinal, authoritative, and sectarian, 
whereas the recipients would be more practical, inclusive, and less sectarian-oriented. 
To be sure, the above characterizations of the disseminator and the recipient are not 
absolute. This is not only because in reality it is very possible for a practitioner to play 
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the roles of the disseminator and the recipient simultaneously and/or under different 
scenarios, but also because there exist different subsets within each group. That is to say, 
not only can a practitioner be a disseminator, a recipient, or a combination of the two, but 
he or she can also be a pandita or doctrinally oriented scholar, a contemplative or 
practically oriented yogi, or a combination of the two. Thus, the line that separates the 
disseminators and the recipients is moving and flexible, a fact that will be evident in our 
historical narratives. However, since their concerns do highlight different messages, both 
in terms of content and methodology, I would argue that it is still useful to treat them as 
different categories and apply them to the exploration of religious development. 
Content-wise, the aforementioned recipient characteristics would be even more 
prominent if the recipients are also the contemplatives, for these contemplative recipients, 
due to their special interest in practice, would incorporate new ideas with unique 
concerns to the contemplative project of their tradition. Even though the recipients may 
later become the disseminators, since their contemplative concerns have been taken into 
consideration to shape their tradition in its formative period, these unique concerns, 
arguably, would be significant and even carried further into the later development of the 
tradition. It is with this understanding that the contemplative perspective that derives 
from the contemplative recipients, I believe, can offer a vantage point to better illuminate 
the subjects of our historical studies, i.e., the contemplative elements embedded in the 
distinguishing features of Chan teachings and the contemplative similarities and/or 
differences between the teachings and practices of Chan/sTon mun and Dzogchen. 
Methodologically, different perspectives, in effect, present different "attitudes" as to 
understanding, in our case, the development of a religious tradition. Since the "attitude" 
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of the contemplative recipients is usually more practical and less sectarian-oriented than 
that of others, religious traditions stressing hands-on practices and exhibiting syncretic 
elements like our subjects, Chan in China and sTon mun in Tibet, would be ideal 
candidates for examination from such a perspective. In addition, because this recipient's 
perspective is more sensitive to the contemplative concerns of the participants that shape 
the spiritual elements of their tradition, I believe, it would offer an alternative angle or 
interpretation to, and even a necessary extension of, studies performed only from the 
sociopolitical perspective, which, without concerning spiritual or religious efficacy, may 
one-sidedly33 characterize the development of a religious tradition like Chan only as "the 
outcome of the 'will to orthodoxy.'"34 As demonstrated later, when the concerns of the 
contemplatives are taken into account, the development of a religious tradition, such as 
the emergence of Chan in developmental negotiations (Chapter 1) and the disappearance 
of sTon mun in syncretic assimilation (Chapter 3), is not just a religious sect rising or 
falling in power, but religious participants seeking their presence through the means of 
negotiation and assimilation. This understanding effectively helps us to include as well as 
extend our reach beyond the polemic, the sectarian, and the historical so that not only can 
we better appreciate the spiritual nuances of teachings under investigation, but we will 
better recognize the values of various changes the historical movement of a religious 
tradition (e.g., rising or falling in power) may yield. 
Certainly, I am not suggesting that studies done from the sociopolitical perspective are all one-sided. 
Rather, I am suggesting that even studies done with particular emphasis on the sociopolitical agenda of the 
religious participants should also take their spiritual or religious concerns into account, for religious 
practitioners, after all, are religiously oriented even though they do usually have sociopolitical agenda as 
well. Given this understanding, an ideal case would be to include as many insights from various 
perspectives as possible and bring these insights into a dialogue with each other so that a tapestry with 
vibrant and diverse patterns/details can be discovered. 
34
 Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 4. 
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III. A Brief Summary of the Dissertation 
It should be thus clear that this dissertation discusses philosophical, contemplative, 
religious, and historical issues in the exploration of the idea of immediacy based on the 
teachings of Chan, sTon mun, and Dzogchen. As its narration follows a historical 
trajectory, I therefore divide the main contents of the dissertation into two parts, starting 
with an origin narrative and an exemplar of the idea of immediacy based on the teachings 
of Chinese Chan, and continuing with an encounter narrative and variations of the idea of 
immediacy based on the teachings of sTon mun and Tibetan Dzogchen. In the end of the 
narration, I then offer some conclusions and final thoughts to complete the journey. As a 
note, all translations of the primary materials in the dissertation, Chinese and Tibetan, are 
my own unless otherwise indicated. 
A. An Origin Narrative and an Exemplar of the Logic of Immediacy: The Case of 
Chinese Chan 
As a historical grounding for our investigation of the logic of immediacy, Part I 
begins with an origin narrative that addresses the question of how the idea of immediacy 
emerges over time. Setting out to find the distinguishing features of Chan Buddhism that 
underscore the significance of immediacy for contemplation, especially in the forms of 
suddenness and spontaneity, Chapter 1, "How Chan Became Chan," presents a 
historical study that discusses how chart, as meditative teachings or practices to develop 
samadhi (or deep concentration), became Chan, a school known to the later generations 
as the tradition of sudden awakening.35 I do so by tracing the evolution of early Chinese 
35
 More specifically, it is usually said that Chan is "a special transmission outside the scriptures; not 
dependent upon words and speech, [it] directly points at the mind [so that one] sees into one's nature and 
attain Buddhahood (f^rSOf* • ^ £ > C ¥ • ~MMX.'b ' M&J&&V 
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dhyana teachings recorded in the biographies of chart or dhydna monks (Ch. chanseng 
|lp{ff), and argue that when early Chinese dhydna monks conceptually and practically 
brought chart out of the traditional Buddhist context of the Three Studies,36 they, with 
that very act, set chart onto the path of becoming Chan. 
This transformation, I will demonstrate, was inspired by a mutual development 
between Chinese dhyana monks' understanding of original or innate awakening (Ch. 
benjue $ ^ ) and the mind-nature teaching of Bodhidharma ^-^.M.0- (d. 536?). 
Eventually, this mutual development between the local and foreign chan teachings gave 
rise to the formation of Chan Buddhism. In the formation, I will also demonstrate, due to 
their contemplative concerns, Chan adepts developed the three distinguishing features 
that essentially characterize the teachings and practices of Chan as the special 
mind-to-mind transmission outside the scriptures, the tradition of sudden awakening via 
the direct seeing of one's true nature. 
To probe into the meaning of this origin narrative of Chan Buddhism seen from the 
contemplative perspective, I reflect upon the question of searching for a "pure" practice 
to realize a "pure" Chan. As my narrative is intentionally sensitive to the contemplative 
concerns of the practitioners, I contend that their pursuit for a "pure" Chan was neither to 
establish a doctrinal system or a school that is "uncontaminated by its relationship to 
history";37 nor an endeavor trying to bring back an idealized past or to bring forth a 
transcendent realm. Rather, it was to a significant degree a path of negotiations, on which 
Chan practitioners were trying different ways to mediate the tensions caused by the 
36
 The Three Studies are (1) sila or observance of the precepts, (2) samadhi or deep concentration, and (3) 
prajna or wisdom. 
37
 Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 182. 
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differences among themselves and/or between traditional Buddhist views and their 
innovative teachings. 
As a spiritual exercise, the goal of such mediation was aiming at developing a 
unique style of self-awareness so that the practitioners could enjoy freedom without 
stagnation or bondage and at the same time act according to their socioreligious 
conditions. In this way, the origin narrative of Chan development, informed by the 
contemplative concerns of the participants, not only demonstrates how the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation came to being in Chan (thus grounding the idea of 
immediacy in history), but also provides an alternative reading to historical studies 
performed from the sociopolitical perspective that has dominated the field. 
As an exemplar of how to put the idea of immediacy to practice, Chapter 2, 
"Sympathetic Resonance and 'Equal Learning'," delves into the sudden teaching of 
Shenhui, the Chan master who "first championed the doctrine of sudden 
enlightenment,"38 and explores its underlying contemplative structure. Based on 
Shenhui's oral and written teachings given in three Dunhuang Chinese manuscripts, I will 
show that, due to his uncompromising insistence on the unconditional (Ch. fei yuanqi # 
IUE) and ubiquitous (Ch. bian yiqie chu M~"WM) nature of one's awakened mind, 
Shenhui advocates his sudden teaching which, instead of using dialectical approaches, 
employs the sympathetic resonance of wunian A t ^ or "no-thought" to lead the 
practitioner to spontaneously realize the holistic being of the awakened mind. 
Yet, this sudden teaching of Shenhui's is more complicated than it appears, for it 
entails, I will demonstrate, a unique integration of sudden awakening and gradual 
38
 McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism," 231. 
25 
cultivation. Effectively, this unique integration demonstrates that not only must the logic 
of immediacy in contemplation paradoxically involve gradualness, but it must integrate 
the gradualness in the context of suddenness so that the logic of immediacy can be 
artfully implemented without the dualistic or conceptual faults implied by the idea of 
gradualness. In addition, Shenhui's unique integration also gives rise to a practice that 
requires its practitioner to maintain a holistic state of awareness in the manner of 
"no-thought" while participating in all activities with the wise discernment of "original 
wisdom" (Ch. benzhi 2^ 3=?). In this way, with a liberated state of mind, the practitioner 
acts according to his or her own specific conditions without being defined or imprisoned 
by them. 
Further analysis shows that under the contemplative structure of Shenhui's sudden 
teaching lies a nondual dynamic, in which being and knowing are integrated into a 
wholeness that inextricably embraces the principles of nonduality and spontaneity. 
Shenhui explains this as the "equal learning" of samadhi and prajna. Depicting a mutual 
interfusion and permeation of ontology and epistemology, this wholeness of 
samadhi-be'mg andprajna-knowing hermeneutically embodies Shenhui's suddenness in a 
practice of the fruitional vehicle. Thus, together with his integration of suddenness and 
gradualness, Shenhui's "equal learning," which implies a nondual, holistic dynamic of 
being and knowing, provides an essential piece of the puzzle for our project of 
understanding the mechanism underlying the logic of immediacy in contemplation. 
B. An Encounter Narrative and Variations of the Logic of Immediacy: The Cases of 
sTon mun and Tibetan Dzogchen 
Following the historical footsteps of Chan monks westwards, Part II begins with an 
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encounter narrative that depicts a "conversation" between practitioners of immediacy 
from different quarters of the religious-philosophizing spectrum. Specifically, Chapter 3, 
"sTon mun as a Tradition of Encounter," presents a historical narrative of connection 
which tries to find clues that may link Chan and Dzogchen. I do so by taking the 
contemplative recipient's perspective to investigate the syncretic development of sTon 
mun, a tradition resulting from the interactions between Chan monks and Tibetan tantric 
practitioners of the 8th- 10th centuries. Based on certain Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts 
and early Nyingma texts,39 I explore the syncretic development of sTon mun through a 
structural analysis of how early Tibetan Buddhists carried out their works of translation, 
compilation, and interpretation in relation to Chan teachings. 
In the analysis, I will show that not only was sTon mun syncretic in nature, but that 
the Tibetan practitioners of sTon mun considered the contemplative teachings and 
practices of Chan and proto-Dzogchen compatible; in other words, they all follow the 
similar principles of suddenness and spontaneity. Consequently, trying to include as 
many insights from similar traditions as possible, these practitioners integrated the two 
teachings, which, on the one hand, created a unique syncretic integration and, on the 
other hand, led to the absorption of sTon mun, thus its disappearance, within the broader 
tantric milieu of Tibet. In the framework of Wilfred C. Smith's idea of a cumulative 
religious tradition,40 the disappearance of sTon mun as an independent tradition in Tibet 
can thus be seen as a result of the continuous creation process of the Dzogchen tradition. 
39
 The Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts used include Tibetan translations of Chan texts (e.g., PT 116/8, PT 
823/1, ITJ 710/2), compilations of Chan treatises (e.g., PT 116 and ITJ 709), and original Tibetan 
compositions (e.g., PT 116/5, PT 626, PT 634, PT 699, PT 818, and ITJ 709/9), whereas the early Nyingma 
texts referred include gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's bSam gtan mig sgron and Vimalamitra's Cig 
car 'jug pa mam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don. As noted above, various Dunhuang manuscripts are 
collections of several texts. So, PT 116/8 refers to the 8th text identified in the manuscript PT 116, PT 823/1 
refers to the 1st text in the manuscript PT 823, etc. 
40
 See Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 139-153. 
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In effect, this understanding ironically makes the disappearance of sTon mun a 
possible link connecting Chan and Dzogchen historically and contemplatively. It also 
informs us that the specifics concerning the connection of religious traditions may be 
obtained through the disappearance of an associated tradition, especially under the 
condition when the traditions of encounter bear similar insights and practices, and the 
recipients are more concerned with realizing their contemplative or soteriological goal(s) 
rather than preserving sectarian boundaries. As a result, the contemplative recipient's 
perspective employed in our encounter narrative provides not only an alternative to but 
also an extension of the sociopolitical perspective usually taken in the field, for it deepens 
our appreciation of the philosophical and contemplative nuances of the associated 
traditions as well as helps us to go beyond the historical so that we can better recognize 
the values of changes in the historical movements of religious traditions. In our case, one 
unique value that can be inferred from the disappearance of sTon mun is that variations 
of the logic of immediacy in contemplation have been developed independently in 
different times and places. 
Continuing the encounter narrative and introducing variations of the idea of 
immediacy, Chapter 4 entitled "Oneness or Wholeness?" examines the teachings of 
sTon mun. It explores the contemplative significance of simultaneity or simultaneous 
access (Tib. cig car 'jug pa) propounded by sTon mun and discusses two different 
understandings that, on the one hand, reveal the various philosophical and contemplative 
layers embedded in the idea of simultaneity and, on the other hand, illustrate the 
possibility of reading distinctively the idea of immediacy by practitioners of different 
philosophical or contemplative orientations. 
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The first rendition is given by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in his bSam gtan mig 
sgron. Basically, gNubs chen considers sTon mun a causal vehicle (Ch. yinsheng Hilt; 
Tib. rgyu 'i theg pa) derived from the sutras of definitive meaning (Tib. nges don) and 
interprets its sudden teaching as a direct access to the unborn ultimate without alternation 
(Tib. re mos). But this direct access without alternation (of sTon mun), for gNubs chen, is 
eventually a oneness or monism, for it collapses everything into one truth, namely, the 
ultimate truth. Thus, it is a mistaken understanding and misses the nonduality or 
inseparability of the ultimate and the conventional. In this way, the sTon mun suddenness 
without alternation ironically ends up in a conceptual alternation that separates in 
actuality what isn't separate. Here, gNubs chen's reading of the sTon mun suddenness or 
simultaneity significantly indicates that the logic of immediacy in contemplation, if 
misunderstood philosophically, can result in an incomplete cognition of reality at best, if 
not a distorted one. 
In contrast to gNubs chen's rendition, I present an alternative understanding of the 
sTon mun simultaneity based on Dunhuang Chan manuscripts. I show that the 
simultaneity of sTon mun is actually an access to the all-encompassing mind-source (Ch. 
xinyuan >^}J§), which, though it contains both the two truths, is referred to as the 
"ultimate meaning" (Ch. shengyi HHH; Tib. don dam pa) by Moheyan. I surmise that it 
was this ambiguous reference that led gNubs chen to interpret the simultaneity of sTon 
mun as a oneness. Thus, building upon this new understanding, I analyze the difference 
between oneness and the wholeness that derives from the sTon mun teaching of the 
all-encompassing mind-source and that gives rise to the sTon mun understanding of 
nonduality and spontaneity. 
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I further show that the all-encompassing wholeness of sTon mun simultaneously 
embraces the two truths in a way through which the two truths interfuse each other to 
establish a nondual dynamic. Philosophically, the nondual dynamic of the two truths also 
implies a nondual, holistic dynamic of being and knowing similar to the one given in 
Shenhui's sudden Chan. However, contemplatively speaking, unlike Shenhui's 
integrating gradualness in the context of suddenness, the wholeness of the sTon mun 
simultaneity asks its practitioner to engage the conventional in the manner of the ultimate 
while embodying the ultimate in the conventional. Thus, in addition to what we learned 
from Shenhui's sudden Chan, in which the logic of immediacy in contemplation is said to 
require its practitioner to artfully employ gradual cultivation, the sTon mun simultaneity 
tells us that the logic of immediacy in contemplation demands of its practitioner to 
engage all conventional phenomena, but the engagement must be done in the manner of 
ultimacy so that the practitioner realizes the logic of immediacy without falling into the 
bondage of conventionality. As this demand takes the whole as the path, it consequently 
places sTon mun in the camp of the fruitional vehicle within the suric traditions just as 
Shenhui's sudden Chan. As a result, together with Shenhui's sudden Chan, the two 
understandings of the sTon mun simultaneity demonstrate, philosophically and 
contemplatively, the various layers underlying, as well as the variations of, the idea of 
immediacy. 
Tracking the traces left by sTon mun and further demonstrating other innovative 
manifestations of the idea of immediacy, Chapter 5, "Spontaneous Presence and Open 
Awareness," presents the early teachings of Tibetan Dzogchen codified by gNubs chen 
Sangs rgyas ye shes in his bSam gtan mig sgron. Following gNubs chen's exposition, I 
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begin the chapter examining the main teachings of Dzogchen that emphasize primordial 
perfection (Tib. ye nas rdzogs pa) and spontaneous presence (Tib. Ihun gyis grub pa). In 
the discussion, we see that Dzogchen, literally meaning "great perfection" or "great 
completeness," teaches that all phenomena are a dynamic display (Tib. rtsat) within the 
wholeness of "primordial basis" (Tib. gdodma'igzhi or simply gzhi). As such, they are 
always in the state of perfection that can only be directly experienced in the spontaneous 
presence of one's self-arisen reflexive awareness (Tib. rang byung rang rig) or open 
awareness (Tib. rig pa). 
Thus, with a unique emphasis on the principles of primordial perfection and 
spontaneous presence, gNubs chen's Dzogchen depicts a fruitional path on which one 
resumes one's original Buddhahood (Tib. yang sangs rgyas) in the wholeness of 
primordial basis and open awareness exhibiting a nondual, holistic dynamic of being and 
knowing seen also in the cases of Shenhui's sudden Chan and the simultaneity of sTon 
mun. In this resumption, we see, what one needs is neither laxity nor arduous effort but a 
delicate presence of spontaneity that allows the pracitioner to have a kind of "skillful 
effort" to traverse the path. But, similar to the spirit of Shenhui's integrating gradualness 
in the context of suddenness and the sTon mun engaging the conventional in the manner 
of ultimacy, the Dzogchen inclusion of "skillful effort" must be realized in the context of 
spontaneity so that the logic of immediacy in contemplation is actualized without the 
deviation of purposeful effort. 
To further understand the teachings, I summarize and examine the nine Dzogchen 
views or principles presented by gNubs chen. These nine principles essentially point to 
the same essence (Tib. ngo bo 'dra ba). But, as gNubs chen has explained, due to the 
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different capacities of ordinary people and the different skillful means of the teachers, 
different presentations are needed and understood as the dynamic display of the 
primordial basis. Emphasizing ideas such as non-referentiality, spontaneity, self-nature, 
bliss, nonduality, wholeness, and suchness/just-is-ness, not only do these Dzogchen 
principles provide important characteristics to facilitate our understanding of Dzogchen 
as a whole, but they also concur with and further extend what we learn from Shenhui's 
sudden Chan and sTon mun regarding the logic of immediacy in contemplation. Yet, 
different from Shenhui's integration of suddenness and gradualness and the sTon mun 
simultaneous embrace of the ultimate and the conventional, gNubs chen's presentation of 
these Dzogchen principles especially brings a unique aroma of simplicity and naturalness 
(or spontaneous presence) to the logic of immediacy in contemplation. 
With respect to the nine Dzogchen principles, gNubs chen also reminds us, even 
though the primordial basis has innumerable names, these names are simply designations. 
As designations, they shouldn't be reified or pursued. Rather, they only have provisional 
functions to help the practitioner neutralize or let go of all grasping. In this way, gNub 
chen essentially turns philosophical principles into instructions for contemplative practice. 
This practical aspect of Dzogchen is particularly illustrative in gNubs chen's explication 
of early Dzogchen methods for letting the mind be (Tib. bio bzhag) in its natural state. In 
essence, these early Dzogchen practices, unlike their later counterparts, do not stress a 
fixed set of ritual or procedures such as how to sit or visualize the deity step by step. 
Instead, they place an unequivocal emphasis on how Dzogchen followers should at all 
times act in accord (Tib. mthun pa 'i spyod pa) with the "ascertained principles" (Tib. 
thag chodpa 7 don) of Dzogchen in the manner of neither-grasping-nor-relinquishing. In 
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such a way, the contemplatives embody a Dzogchen living practice that not only takes all 
phenomena as the path to enlightenment but also actualizes the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation as spontaneous presence, the central feature of gNubs chen's Dzogchen 
teachings. 
C. Conclusions and Final Remarks 
To complete this journey of investigating the logic of immediacy in contemplation, 
Chapter 6, "Conclusions and Significance for the Study of Religion," first summarizes 
the findings of our investigation of the histories and teachings of the three Buddhist 
traditions, particularly juxtaposing them in relation to the logic of immediacy. It is shown 
that while all three traditions converge on the idea of interfusing being and knowing, 
ontology and epistemology, into an unbounded field of wholeness, they also bring 
different emphases out of the logic of immediacy in contemplation. Fundamentally, these 
different emphases inform us that the key to understand the logic of immediacy does not 
lie in Bernard Faure's proposal, namely, to "think out the intermediary."41 Rather, it lies 
in understanding the manner through which the intermediary is engaged. Here, I argue, 
the methodological nuance is that what is applicable to cultural critique may not be 
applicable to contemplative studies. Implicitly accepting only dualistic epistemologies, 
scholars like Bernard Faure and Steven Katz prejudge the impossibility of "pure (i.e., 
unmediated) experiences'''42 and thus potentially project preconceived sociopolitical 
concerns onto the contemplative dimension. 
Not only has our investigation of the logic of immediacy revealed new resources to 
Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 66. 
42
 Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," 26. 
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redefine the meaning of intermediaries such as gradual cultivation, conventional means, 
and skillful effort, but it has also shown that the logic of immediacy is one of the defining 
characteristics of the fruitional vehicle. Nonetheless, we learn, immediacy is not what the 
Buddhist vehicle of fruition is all about, for a direct access based on a mistaken 
understanding of reality only accesses an incomplete fruition, if not a distorted one. To 
access the complete and perfect fruition, the logic of immediacy must be in accord with 
such fruition. In that way, the logic of immediacy in contemplation is how the fruitional 
vehicle carries out its principle of taking the fruition as the path. During our investigation, 
it is shown individually that each of the three teachings expounds its own philosophy of 
how to directly access the complete and perfect fruition (i.e., a sympathetic resonance 
with one's awakened mind; a simultaneous access to one's all-encompassing mind-source; 
a spontaneous presence of the primordial basis in one's open awareness). Consequently, I 
conclude that the three teachings of Shenhui's sudden Chan, sTon mun, and gNubs 
chen's Dzogchen, albeit associated with distinctive sutric and tantric traditions, are all 
fruitional vehicles embodying the logic of immediacy in contemplation. 
Secondly, the significance of the contemplative perspective for the study of religion 
is discussed. As this perspective is sensitive to the concerns of the contemplatives, not 
only does it highlight such elements in the development of a religious tradition, but it is 
also able to ferret out subtle distinctions such as the hidden philosophical and/or 
contemplative import of ideas like immediacy and spontaneity, which other perspectives 
may not be able to provide, or even worse, may intentionally neglect. Accordingly, with a 
deepened contemplative understanding, what seems to be for the purpose of polemics or 
sectarianism from the sociopolitical perspective may have a completely different 
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meaning. For example, when the contemplative structure of Shenhui's sudden Chan is 
correctly understood, not only is his criticism against a particular meditation practice of 
the Northern Chan not polemic or "self-aggrandizing," but it offers a genuine warning to 
practitioners to look out for mistaken or one-sided understandings of Buddha's teachings. 
Similarly, with the aid of a contemplative lens, the two interpretations of sTon mun 
simultaneity are discernibly seen to reveal the subtle philosophical layers embedded in 
the idea of immediacy. Furthermore, when the concerns of the contemplatives are taken 
into account, the establishment of Chan in developmental negotiations and the 
disappearance of sTon mun in syncretic assimilation are not just different religious sects 
rising or falling in power, but different groups of practitioners or concerned people 
seeking a presence with different insights. In these ways, the contemplative perspective 
helps us to include as well as extend our reach beyond the polemic, the sectarian, and the 
historical so that we can better recognize the spiritual nuances of teachings under 
investigation as well as the values of various changes the historical movements of 
religious traditions may yield. 
On the last stop, I bring the reader back to the "issue" of departure, i.e., building 
upon Deutsch's proposition of "knowing religiously" to find an alternative to 
onto-theo-centric paradigms for religious studies. Essentially, learning from the histories 
and teachings of Chan, sTon mun, and Dzogchen, what I propose is twofold. The first is 
to offer a new paradigm to understand the nature of religious knowledge, whereas the 
second reflects upon the application of the logic of immediacy as a way to vitalize our 
everyday experience. 
Due to the influence of onto-theology, religious studies based on Western traditions 
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regard religious knowledge ultimately as the relationship between oppositional categories 
such as the unconditional and the conditional, the infinite/divine and the finite/mortal, or 
the sacred and the profane. To resolve the "tension" between these opposite categories, 
Western studies of religion have mostly resorted to relegating the conditional to the 
unconditional, the finite to the infinite, and the profane to the sacred. Even when these 
"opposites" coincide, it is always the unconditional, the infinite, and the sacred that are 
privileged. So, the conditional, the finite, and the profane have sins, must atone, and 
accept grace. Such understanding values a distant metaphysical or transcendental realm 
over the immanent or the im-mediate, and thus risks degrading or dejecting the finite 
existence of living beings. As an alternative, I argue, the wholeness that embraces the 
principle of nonduality offers a new paradigm to resolve the tension between these 
oppositional categories. 
Specifically, going beyond the above ontological and/or reductionist solutions, the 
discussed wholeness brings the seemingly metaphysical categories into a holistic field, in 
which ontology and epistemology, being and knowing, are thoroughly interfusing in a 
dynamic of nonduality. With this nondual interfusion of being and knowing, immediacy 
is immanent. So, there is no need for conceptual intermediaries, and the so-called 
"oppositional categories" are regarded as demonstrating epistemic diversity while having 
no ontic fixity or rigidity. Given this understanding, similar to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's 
ideas of the visible and the invisible, the finite could be known as an appearance or 
embodiment of the infinite in a particular temporal-spatial continuum, and the infinite 
could be considered the openness or indefiniteness of the finite in the unbounded 
wholeness of reality. In this way, these "opposites" are neither one nor two, a nondual 
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pair constantly and mutually informing each other in the wholeness of reality, of which 
both are expressions further attesting to the multiplicity in its totality. This solution that 
involves both ontology and epistemology, I believe, effectively presents a new paradigm 
for religion or religious studies to understand the nature of religious knowledge, in which 
one explores the possible relationships between being and knowing expounded by the 
tradition under investigation. In our case, as the logic of immediacy dictates, being and 
knowing are nondually integrated into a wholeness that is dynamically embodied in the 
spontaneous presence of self-or-open awareness. 
Ideologically, it is to manifest this spontaneous presence of open awareness that 
one regards the logic of immediacy as religious knowledge for everyday life. Similar to 
Merleau-Ponty's "question-knowing" that has an "original manner of aiming at 
something," the logic of immediacy asks its practitioner to participate in the changing 
world with a spontaneous and open knowing directly aiming at the nature of reality. Here, 
not only is the direct aiming "the proper mode of our relationship with Being," but also it 
is an artful endeavor that must involve gradual cultivation, conventional means, as well 
as skillful effort in their proper contexts. As if it were to climb an ascending spiral, the 
spontaneous and open knowing of the direct aiming, with the power of gradual 
cultivation, conventional means, and skillful effort, pervades one's "view," that is, the 
holistic being of one's "knowing and seeing." Here, the logic of immediacy is crucial, as 
it sets not only the compass for the practitioner to find the "nine-story platform" rather 
than some "dirt mound and barbarian tomb," but also the context for all the 
"intermediary" practices to be employed without the dualistic and conceptual bondages 
and limitations implied in their original contexts (i.e., in the contexts of gradualness, 
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conventionality, and arduous effort). 
As one follows the logic of immediacy to simultaneously embrace suddenness and 
gradualness, ultimacy and conventionality, effort and spontaneity, one deconstructs their 
boundaries and interfuses them into an integral whole. This existence in total integration 
is, on the one hand, the state of consummation and, on the other hand, a tapestry of 
wholeness, on which myriad categories of analysis or fields of knowledge are woven 
together to form its diverse and vibrant patterns which we call "everyday experiences." In 
this way, the logic of immediacy grounds one's existential consummation in everyday 
life, but it grounds the consummation with a vitalization that is rooted in one's "unique 
style or manner" of knowing, namely, a subjective engagement that is directly in and of 
the being. Here, the reality is not so much characterized by the statement, "I think, 
therefore I am." Instead, it is that "I am a knowing," a knowing that is ever-lively in 
openness and love as long as one does not limit it with habitual tendency or conceptual 
reification. Insofar as it is ever lively, this open and compassionate knowing also helps its 
practitioner untangle habitual tendency and conceptual reification. In mutual interfusion 
and permeation, the logic of immediacy makes a disentanglement a no-entanglement, 
with which everything unfolds itself in non-abiding becoming. 
PARTI 
An Origin Narrative and an Exemplar of the Logic of Immediacy: 
The Case of Chinese Chan 
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Chapter 1. How Chan Became Chan: 
From Early Chinese Dhyana Teachings to the Distinguishing Features of 
Chan Buddhism 
Immediacy, or more precisely, sudden awakening (Ch. dunwu $MM) can be said to 
be a hallmark of Chan Buddhism. To unfold the complex set of theses related to the idea 
of immediacy, we begin with a historical study that discusses how the idea of immediacy 
emerges over time. Setting out to find the distinguishing features of Chan Buddhism that 
underscore the significance of suddenness and spontaneity for contemplation, Chapter 1 
thus presents an origin narrative that discusses how the idea of sudden awakening became 
the central tenet of Chinese Chan. In effect, this narrative, on the one hand, grounds the 
idea of immediacy in history and, on the other hand, illustrates the philosophical 
principles underlying the logic of immediacy in contemplation. As the narrative is 
informed by the contemplative concerns of Chan adepts, it also provides an alternative 
reading of the early Chan history, for such history has been mostly studied from the 
sociopolitical perspective in the past.1 
Generally speaking, scholars of early Chan history, including Hu Shi &$)M, John 
McRae, and Bernard Faure, consider Shenhui ^ H " (684-758), the initial proponent of 
Huineng's H | £ (638-713) "Southern Sect" (Ch. nanzong ^JTK), the catalyst who made 
the members of the Chan School (Ch. chanzong | f ^ ) consciously formulate the 
teachings of subitism {i.e., sudden awakening).2 However, they also agree that Shenhui 
was not the first one advocating such doctrine in Chan, for subitist teachings can also be 
founded in the Dongshan (or "East Mountain") Teaching (Ch. dongshan famen J^ILLDS 
1
 See e.g., Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy; Halperin, Out of the Cloister, Welter, Monks, Rulers, and Literati; 
Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission; and Cole, Fathering Your Father. 
2
 See e.g., McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism." 
40 
H) established by Daoxin Mff (580-651) and Hongren %M (601-674), the fourth 
and fifth patriarchs of the Chan School, and continued by Shenxiu | $ ^ (6067-706), 
who traditionally has been recognized as the representative of the "Northern Sect" (Ch. 
beizong Jb^)-3 Nonetheless, according to the general view of Chan practitioners, it was 
Bodhidharma liJIIjilJ? (d. 536?) who brought the teaching of sudden awakening 
originally taught by the historical Buddha on Vulture Peak (Skt. grdhrakuta-parvata; Ch. 
lingjiu shan SMli i) from India to China in the second half of the fifth century. 
Accordingly, the early history of Chan Buddhism is a multifaceted subject 
consisting of various points of view, each of which contributes certain pattern(s) to the 
composite tapestry of Chan. To better understand this composite picture with respect to 
the contemplative concerns of Chan practitioners, which past studies have not 
emphasized much, this chapter thus depicts an origin narrative of Chan subitism by 
tracing the evolution of early Chinese chart | J | or dhyana teachings so as to uncover the 
deeper meaning of chart, to which Chan, as a meditative tradition, owes its name. Here, 
before going further, it should be worthwhile noting the difference between chart and 
Chan in my presentation. As later discussion will show, the Chinese term chart is derived 
from the Sanskrit term dhyana. Thus, I use it to refer to general meditative teachings and 
practices either applicable to all Buddhist schools or before the emergence of Chan 
Buddhism in China. Yet, I use Chan only to refer to teachings, practices, or practitioners 
pertaining to the Chan School or Chan Buddhism. Consequently, a chart or dhyana 
3
 See, e.g., McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, Chapter II; Faure, 
The Will to Orthodoxy, 1-5; Du and Wei, Zhongguo chanzong tongshi tf?WiWMWk$L (The General 
History of Chinese Chan School), Chapter 2, eps., 84-89; and Yang, Tang wudai chanzong shi MTL{XWTK 
$_ (The History of Chan School in the Tang and Five Dynasties), Chapter 3. 
41 
monk/practitioner is a person who practices dhyana but not necessarily Chan, and he or 
she may belong to any Buddhist school. 
In the following narrative depicting how chan became Chan, I argue that when 
Chinese chanseng $pf!f or dhyana monks, the contemplative recipients of Indian 
meditative teachings, conceptually and practically brought chan out of the traditional 
Buddhist context of the Three Studies (Skt. siksa-traya; Ch. sanxue H H ; Tib. bslab pa 
gswri), they, with that very act, set chan onto the path of becoming Chan. This 
transformation, I will demonstrate, was inspired by a mutual development between 
Chinese dhyana monks' understanding of original or innate awakening (Ch. benjue ^ j t ) 
and the mind-nature (Ch. xinxing 'LV|4) teaching of Bodhidharma. Eventually, this 
mutual development between the local and foreign chan teachings gave rise to the 
formation of Chan Buddhism. In the formation, due to their contemplative concerns, 
Chan adepts developed the three distinguishing features that essentially characterize Chan 
as the special mind-to-mind transmission outside the scriptures, the tradition of sudden 
awakening via the direct seeing of one's true nature. To further probe into the meaning of 
this origin narrative of Chan Buddhism seen from the contemplative perspective, I then 
reflect upon the question of searching for a "pure" practice to realize a "pure" Chan to 
conclude this chapter. 
I. Chan in Its Early Socioreligious Contexts 
Historically speaking, Chinese chanfa llp/ife or dhyana teachings have gone through 
various transformations, which not only have influenced the meditation practices of 
Chinese Buddhists, but also inspired the formation of a unique practice system, namely, 
42 
the Chan School. This Chan School has had great impact not only on the development of 
Chinese Buddhism. Its influence on Eastern Asian Buddhism has also been prevalent, if 
not ubiquitous. In the last centuries, the teachings of Chan have also emerged onto the 
stage of World religions. Yet, what is chanfa, from which Chan Buddhism obtains its 
name? How did the early Chinese Buddhists understand it? Primarily based on the 
"Dhyana Practice" sections (Ch. xichan pian H$pH) of Huijiao's M&. (497-554) 
Gaoseng zhuan jUjffl'fll (Biographies of Eminent Monks; hereafter the Biographies) and 
Daoxuan's MM. (596-667) Xu gaoseng zhuan WiMi^iW (Continued Biographies of 
Eminent Monks; hereafter the Continued Biographies),4 I delve into the various 
transformations of Chinese dhyana teachings that led to the formation of Chan Buddhism 
and present them in the following five parts: (a) chan as an approach to samadhi, (b) chan 
as an approach to reality, (c) developments of dhyana lineages and practice styles, (d) 
local and foreign influence on the development of chan, and (e) chan in early Tang: clues 
from Daoxuan's comments. 
A. Chan as an Approach to Samadhi 
Etymologically speaking, the Chinese term chan is an abbreviation of chan-na i^pSP, 
the Chinese transliteration of Sanskrit term dhyana, which Kumarajlva fttHPHiff" 
(344-413) translated as "contemplative practice" (Ch. siwei xiu SftiflfE) and Xuanzang 
"IC5^ 1 (602-664) later translated as "quiet reflection" (Ch. jinglv jf^lSt). As it generally 
refers to meditation practice, early Chinese Buddhists have understood it as the practice 
4
 Huijiao's Biographies was finished around the year of 530 and can be found in T. 50 (2059): 322c-423a. 
Daoxuan's Continued Biographies was finished in the year of 645 and appended in the year of 665 before 
his death. It can be found in T. 50 (2060): 425a-707a. 
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of "focusing the chaotic mind"5 or "concentrating one's mind quietly on one object and 
thoughtfully reflecting upon it."6 In so doing, one can abandon afflictions such as the 
Five Coverings (Skt. pancavarana; Ch. wugai E H , Tib. sgrib pa Inga)1; thus, it is also 
called qi 'e IflU (literally, "abandoning the vice"). 
As a cause, the practice of chan can give rise to the virtues of wisdom, miraculous 
powers or clairvoyance (Skt. abhijnd; Ch. shentong ^ j B ; Tib. mngon par shes pa), Four 
Immeasurable Minds (Skt. catvari-apramdnana; Ch. si wuliangxin HMit'CjS Tib. tshad 
med bzhif, and so forth, so, it is also known as gongde conglin J^WWiffi (literally, 
"virtue-forest"). Furthermore, since it can bring one to deep concentration, it is also 
called ding /£[. In Chinese Buddhism, chan and ding are usually put together to refer to 
generic meditation practice. Subsequently, in the Dasheng yizhang ;^i|| |j:lp: {Chapters 
on the Meaning ofMahaydna [Teachings]) written by Huiyuan jHHK 523-592), it is said, 
[With respect to the name of chan,] there are various aliases. In short, 
there are seven: First it is called chan $p. Second, it is ding /£. 
Third, it is samadhi HB^. Fourth, it is samapatti lESI- Fifth, it is 
samdhita £ ^ H . Sixth, it is samaiha i|fIfSftJ?,. Seventh, it is 
vimoksa $$$$,; also known as renunciation [from afflictions] ^ j ^ . 
The so-called chan is its Chinese term. Here [in China] it is [literally] 
translated as contemplative practice. It is also known as the forest of 
5
 Nagarjuna, Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra (Dazhidu lun JZ^gS.t$i, translated by Kumarajiva), T. 25 
(1509): 180cl3-14; rJtt#SL'[J • j 
6
 Maitreya, Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yuqie shidi lun iljftDffiifel^, translated by Xuanzang), T. 30 (1579): 
467c7-8; r Jft-mst - Sl^fiff • lE^SE • j 
7
 The Five Coverings or Five Obscurations are the five kinds of affliction that cover or block off one's true 
mind-nature, thus resulting in the nonarising of wholesome deeds. They are greed M.Wt, anger BUsfe, 
dullness f§^t, agitation |^'[§, and doubt H. 
8
 The Four Immeasurable Minds are four kinds of altruistic concern developed through four meditation 
practices, namely, (1) the immeasurable mind of kindness MMM'L' that bestows joy or happiness to all 
sentient beings; (2) the immeasurable mind of compassion ^S^SM'^ that saves others from suffering; (3) 
the immeasurable mind of joy SM.il ' lJ developed by seeing others freed from suffering; and (4) the 
immeasurable mind of impartiality ^MM't? that rises above all dualistic discriminations. 
44 
virtues.9 
Clearly, from the above passage, we know that there have developed various 
meanings of chan, but early Chinese Buddhists {i.e., before the emergence of Chan 
Buddhism) have mostly understood chan as an approach either to quiet the mind so as to 
see causal conditions more clearly or to develop samadhi concentration so as to give rise 
to prajha wisdom. Regarding this, it is evident in Huijiao's Biographies. In the general 
conclusion of his "Dhyana Practice" section, Huijiao writes, 
The so-called chan is [an approach] making myriad things wondrous. 
Thus, there is nothing it does not touch upon; there are no situations it 
cannot examine. However, to touch upon things and examine 
situations, it requires [one to have] stillness so as to have clarity. It is 
like when the waves in the pond rest, the fish and rocks [in it] will be 
clearly seen. When the mind-water is transparent, there is nothing 
being covered anymore.10 
Therefore, how can chan help us to examine all situations with lucidity? It is when the 
practitioner quiets his or her mind in stillness that everything will appear clearly without 
distortion. However, this idea of practicing chan to quiet one's mind, according to 
Huijiao's understanding, is only a foundation for other Buddhist practices such as the 
development of wisdom. Huijiao quotes Laozi ^-f- and Dazhidu lun ;A; 11? JiS" g$j 
(Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra) to explain that the establishment of a foundation is like 
using exercise to make one's body healthy and strong. When one is healthy and strong, 
one can then go out and perform beneficial deeds. In Buddhist terms, only after the 
practitioner has quieted the mind with the work of samadhi or meditative concentration 
9
 Huiyuan, Dashengyizhang, T. 44(1851): 718a4-8; f &WPf¥\ ' H&^Ttai ° — &UW ° — £ & £ ° H 
10
 Huijiao, Gaosengzhuan, T. 50 (2059): 400b 16-19; r i?- t i l# • ^ H ^ f f i f ^ a " ' S ^ M ^ W ' i&M^ 
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can the practitioner realize the teaching ofprajna wisdom and thus help liberating other 
sentient beings and fulfill the activities of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.'' 
In terms of transmission, according to Huijiao's Biographies, Chinese chart 
teachings and practices were gradually systematized only after their related scriptures 
were translated by monk translators including An Shigao iSriSrU (c. 2nd century) and 
Dharmaraksa r^^fesjl (c. 3rd century).12 What An Shigao translated include Yinchiru 
jing I^ JYJFAIM, Anban shouyi jing iSrl&Tf Jf!M (Anapanasmrti-sutra), and Shi 'er men 
jing +—P'fll (Dvadasamukha-sutrd). These scriptures mostly represent the dhyana 
and abhidharma {i.e., meditative and philosophical) teachings from the Buddhist school 
of the Sarvastivada, a tradition belonging to the Theravada. Under this system, chart or 
dhyana practice is to develop samadhi, whereas abhidharma is for the study of prajhaP 
Here, samadhi is the basis to obtain prajna, but it also is the method to give rise Xo prajna. 
Therefore, with this understanding, chart effectively is an approach or a methodology 
to develop samadhi or deep concentration, with which one then obtains wisdom to 
know the causes of afflictions, untie karmic knots, and eradicate suffering, thus attaining 
liberation. In the Biographies, Huijiao hence states, 
Thus, Four Immeasurable Minds and Six Miraculous Powers arise 
from chan. Eight Renunciations and Ten Fields rely on ding [an alias 
of chan] to realize. Consequently, we know that chan-ding has great 
11
 See Huijiao, Gaosengzhuan, T. 50 (2059): 400M9-23. 
12
 For an introduction to the development of Chinese Buddhism in this early period, see, e.g., Ziircher, The 
Buddhist Conquest of China, 18-43 and Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 21-53. 
13
 In An Shigao's system, under the rubric of dhyana, it includes meditative approaches such as Four 
Dhyanas E3|f, Four Immeasurable Minds H M s ' l l s Four Absorptions H ^ S , and Five Antidotal 
Contemplations Eff'^ffi- Under the rubric of abhidharma, it includes fundamental Buddhist teachings 
such as Four Noble Truths E3I=§¥, Five Aggregates Ep#, Six Objects A A, Noble Eightfold Path AIE 
M, Twelve Links of Dependent Co-origination + Z H ^ , and Eighteen Fields +AI?--
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In the early years of its dissemination, chart, as an approach to develop samadhi, has 
been emphatically associated with abhijna or clairvoyance. In his Biographies, Huijiao 
writes, 
The function of chan, when it is shown, belongs to [the realm of] 
abhijna. Consequently, it can place the three thousand [worlds] in the 
size of a pore; it can make four oceans into curds; it can [enable one 
to] pass through stonewalls without any obstruction; it can hold up 
everyone without a single one being left behind.15 
Given this understanding, early Chinese Buddhists did not have any problem accepting 
miraculous events performed by chan monks who had developed deep concentration. So, 
we see records describing how chan monks Sengguang \^^t (c. 4th-5th centuries) and 
Tanyou JUMX (c. 4th-5th centuries) overpowered the gods, or how Xuangao ~£M 
(402-444), another renowned chan monk, resurrected after his death.16 Yet, even though 
dhyana practice may bring such extraordinary abilities, if chan practitioners attach 
themselves to these abilities and are under the influence of desires without wisdom, early 
Chinese Buddhists understood that as only obtaining a "firebug torch" (Ch. yingjue HJH) 
and abandoning the light of sun and moon.17 Such behavior is a trap for the practitioners 
and will not lead to Buddhahood. 
14
 Huijiao, Gaosengzhuan, T. 50 (2059): 400b23-25; * Mk • E # / N f f i • &WMSB ° AP&+A • H S ^ 
15
 Huijiao, Gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2059): 400c3-5; rWM^M ' M1±WM ° i & ^ T ^ ^ L ' H>§g£ 
16
 For their biographies, see Huijiao, Gaoseng zhuan; particularly, for Sengguang's §£$t biography, see T. 
50 (2059): 395c5-25; for Tanyou's ft 1ft biography, see T. 50 (2059): 395c26-396bl6; for Xuangao's £ 
M biography, see T. 50 (2059): 397a3-398bll. 
17
 See Huijiao, Gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2059): 400c7-10. 
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B. Chan as an Approach to Reality 
Besides the Theravada teachings translated by An Shigao, under the effort of 
translators like Lokasema ^MMWk (c. 2nd century) and Dharmaraksa zr^glt (c. 3rd 
century), various Mahayana scriptures were also translated into Chinese in these 
formative years of Chinese Buddhism. Particularly, their translations of the 
prajnaparamita sutras had positive and close interactions with Daoist xuanxue ~£^jk or 
"abstruse study" in the period of Wei and Jin dynasties WLUt (220-420), which in turn 
made prajnaparamita teaching very appealing to Chinese Buddhists.18 Generally 
speaking, prajnaparamita teaching deconstructs language and penetrates appearances. It 
can be said that the "deconstructing property" of the prajnaparamita teaching had 
inspired chan practitioners at the time to come up with innovative ideas, especially in 
terms of transcending the understanding that chan practice is only used as an antidote to 
habitual tendency or as an approach to develop samadhi. 
Therefore, under the inspiration of prajnaparamita teaching and Mahayana dhyana 
teaching from the scriptures like Bozhou sanmei jing fS fa H H?fc IM 
(Pratyutpannasamadhi-sutra) and Shoulengyan sanmei jing | f $jy f§ H £fc M. 
(Surangamasamadhi-sutrd), chan practice was gradually developed and transformed into 
an approach for one to directly realize nirvana and attain the truth of Buddhist reality. 
Consequently, after asking Kumarajlva to translate some of the Mahayana dhyana 
scriptures, in his preface to the Guanzhongchu chanjing | | cf3 fcB $1M. (The Chan 
18
 For an introduction to the development of Chinese Buddhism in this period of Wei and Jin dynasties, see, 
e.g., Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 44-159 and Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 57-120. For a 
detailed study on the interaction between Daoist xuanxue and Buddhist prajha teaching, see, e.g., Yang, 
Bore yu xuanxue M S P I ^ ^ {Prajha and Abstruse Study). 
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Scripture Translated in Guanzhong), Sengrui ftfiX (c. 4th century) writes, "The teaching 
ofchan is an initial gate to the Way; it is also the essential path to nirvana."19 
Also, Xie Fu itfSfc (c. 4th century), a renowned xuanxue scholar and hermit, directly 
pointed out the difference between Mahayana dhyana practice and that of sravaka and 
pratyekabuddha. In his preface to the Anban shouyijing, Xie Fu writes, 
A Bodhisattva deeply realizes the root of being and penetrates the 
nonbeing of causes and conditions. Having realized the root, [he 
understands that] every being is empty by itself. Having penetrated 
the nonbeing, [he understands that] every causal condition is 
constantly serene. Empty by itself, so one does not exit being to enter 
nonbeing. Constantly serene, so one does not exhaust conditions to 
return to the void. Abiding in the principle, [he understands that] 
being is not something to bind [oneself]. Because of nonbinding, so 
there is nothing to be liberated. If there is someone who apprehends 
this principle from the mind and realizes the law of being, then one 
will not rely on the outer to quiet the inner, and one will not depend 
on dhyana to achieve wisdom. So, it is said that avaivartika [one who 
has realized the state of non-retrogression] does not follow the Four 
Dhyanas.20 
Subsequently, he concludes, 
Therefore, a Bodhisattva who practices dhyana is not for the sake of 
guarding the serenity. Rather, he attunes the mind to traverse the 
profound reality.21 
Accordingly, later Mahayana chan practitioners, due to their deep understanding of 
emptiness (Ch. kong 3?) and existence (Ch. you ^f), realized that reality has neither 
outer nor inner; it is always serene and lucid. So, unlike early chan practitioners who 
"[relied] on the outer to quiet the inner, and ... [depended] on dhyana to achieve 
19
 Sengyou flfi^ (445-518), Chu sanzangjiji tB—JiiitElfl {Collection ojNotes on the Translation of the 
Tripitaka), T. 55 (2145): 65a20; r*f>£# • faM^M ' >JB>I£>«S1£ • j 
20
 Ibid, T. 55 (2145): 44al8-23; F # g l ^ • WMM^- ' f§HI£*R • 3 t * # ' W ^ S ^ • f#M# ' HH 
nm • § £ $ • *m*mA*s • %&& • ^mrnxm^. ° am • m^mm • %mwi • mmmm ° 
21
 Ibid, T. 55 (2145):44a26-27; rft&a±f?*f ' # S ^ S • ffiS'^SJII? • j 
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wisdom," they directly grasped the ultimate principle to attune their minds to the ultimate 
reality (Ch. shixiang Hf^). In this way, instead of being an approach to develop 
samadhi, chart, under the influence ofprajhaparamita teaching, was transformed into 
an approach to directly access reality and realize the truth of Buddha dharma. 
However, after surveying the "Dhyana Practice" section of Huijiao's Biographies, it 
is evident that this Mahayana understanding of the dhyana practice was clearly not the 
mainstream at the time. Yet, we will find out later that this Mahayana dhyana 
understanding, together with the tathagatagarbha or Buddha-nature doctrine made 
popular in the period of South-North dynasties j ^ j t l i (439-581), had established a firm 
theoretical foundation for the later Chan sudden awakening teaching.22 In fact, around 
this time, Daosheng M^L (355-434), one of the four great students of KumarajTva, had 
already proposed the idea of sudden awakening based on his understanding of the 
Mahaparinirvana-sutra in this early stage of Chinese chan development.23 Even though 
it was not completely accepted by other Buddhist practitioners and caused much 
controversy at the time, nonetheless, it still greatly influenced the development of the 
later Chan School emerging some two centuries later.24 
C. Developments o/Dhyana Lineages and Practice Styles 
In terms of practice institutionalization, the many dhyana scriptures translated by 
For an introduction to the development of Chinese Buddhism in the period of South-North dynasties, see, 
e.g., Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 180-285 and Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 121-183. 
23
 For a discussion of Daosheng's sudden awakening, see, e.g., Lai, "Tao-sheng's Theory of Sudden 
Enlightenment Re-examined" and Gong, "Cong Daosheng de dunwu xueshuo fengxi zaoqi chan de 
yuandun yu cidi guannian de youlai f£M£ft®1§¥ie$Miff¥$*f W H ^ I I ^ K & t o f i * (From 
Daosheng's Theory of Sudden Awakening to Analyze the Origins of the Ideas of Subitism and Gradualism 
in Early Chan)." 
24
 For a discussion of Daosheng's possible influence on the development of Chan, see, e.g., Gong, "Cong 
Daosheng de dunwu xueshuo fengxi zaoqi chan de yuandun yu cidi guannian de youlai." 
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KumarajTva and others during the period of Wei and Jin dynasties had allowed chart, as 
well as other Buddhist, practitioners to realize the importance of a systematic structure 
for the dhyana practice and the need for qualified dhyana teachers. That is the reason 
why Sengrui criticized early dhyana teaching to be "without a systematic structure and 
without a lineage; even the discipline for the practitioners was also lacking,"25 and 
Huiyuan H H (334-416) dispatched his students to the West (i.e., Central Asia) to look 
for appropriate teaching.26 And, Zhiyan ^ H (350-427) even traveled in person to 
Kashmir to invite Dhyana Master Buddhabhadra {%%X$$1?M. (359-429) to come to 
China to teach dhyana. 
As a matter of fact, at the time chan practitioners came to understand charts 
hands-on nature and gradually formed the understanding that "one who learns the Way in 
the mountains, without a master, will never be able to realize the Way."28 Hence, they 
realized that dhyana practice could not rely on words only. It was more important to have 
a master who could directly instruct the disciple. As a result, chan practitioners began to 
form chan groups and lineages, which, I would argue, unintentionally yet unavoidably 
led to the later formation of the Chan School. Put another way, one can say that the 
emergence of chan groups emphasizing lineages significantly facilitated the chan 
practitioners to develop a consciousness which differentiated themselves from other 
Buddhist practitioners. This early consciousness effectively contributed to the formation 
of Chan, even though its real differences from other Buddhist schools emerged much 
25
 Sengyou, Chu sanzangjiji, T. 55 (2145): 65a21-22; ' g p f f g i g ' 5lM%5k • P#2#cgWJ$ntfc • j 
26
 For an account of Huiyuan's biography, teachings, and community, see, e.g., Zurcher, The Buddhist 
Conquest of China, 204-253 and Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 103-112 
27
 For an account of Buddhabhadra and his lineage, see e.g., Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, 
33-40. 
28
 Sengyou, Chu sanzangjiji, T. 55 (2145): 65a26; r AftLil^M > MMM^^WL ° s 
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later in actuality. 
Regarding this development, in the "Dhyana Practice" section of his Continued 
Biographies, Daoxuan describes it as follows: 
After this [Kumarajiva translated the dhyana scriptures], [dhyana 
practice] existed with many lineages. Tanying ftf£ [c. 4th-5th 
centuries] and Daorong MMk [c. 4th-5lh centuries] worked hard in the 
north of Huai River. Zhiyan and Huiguan W;W> [c. 4th-5th centuries] 
diligently promulgated [the teachings] in the east of Yangtze River. 
Among the assemblies in the mountains, Huiyuan['s group] was the 
model. Among the maverick-like practitioners, Sengqun flfll^ [c. 
4th-5th centuries] appeared to be the most unique.29 
From this, we know that at the time there existed many chan lineages, and they occupied 
places covering some or most of the present day Henan M^t, Anhui %£Wt., Jiangxi >I 
H, Jiangsu /IIS, and Zhejiang /Jff>JC areas (i.e., most of the Central and Southeast 
China). As for their practice styles, one was gathering together as a community in the 
mountains while the other was living by themselves and wandering like mavericks. The 
so-called "assemblies in the mountains" are like the one established by Huiyuan, who 
founded a forest monastery (Ch. conglin daochang WLWM.WO) and formed a fellowship 
to practice the Buddha dharma together in the Lushan fi[_U of Jiangxi. On the other 
hand, the so-called "maverick-like practitioners" are like Sengqun, who built a hut in 
Huoshan30 HLL[ and lived by himself "in poverty with integrity, eating vegetables and 
reciting sutras."31 Evidently, even after the formation of the Chan School, these two 
styles of chan practice have always existed side by side.32 
29
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 It is located in the present day Anhui Province. 
31
 Huijiao, Gaosengzhuan, T. 50 (2059): 404a2-3; r>f M^fW ' MMMI ° JI 
32
 Of course, this is not saying that these two styles of chan practice are only observed by Chan adepts. 
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The dissemination of chart practice, even in the chaotic wartime of Wuhu S4§ 
(304-439) and South-North dynasties (439-581), was not obstructed. In fact, the people 
displaced by the wars ironically even helped its propagation. Part of the reason was that 
the government could not effectively relocate these displaced people so that many of 
them became monks and nuns. According to the study done by Du Jiwen fi l l ip! and 
Wei Daoru MMM, from 477 CE to 534 CE, in the nation of North Wei i\M alone, 
Buddhist monasteries increased from 6,478 units to some 30,000 units, and monks and 
nuns increased from 77,258 to some 2 millions.33 The increased numbers not only were 
amazingly large, but because the increased number of monasteries was not proportional 
to that of the increased monastic members,34 many monks and nuns became wanderers. 
In traveling, due to their easy portability (in comparison to sutra study and exegesis), 
chan practice and surra recitation naturally became their choice of cultivation. As a result, 
it gave rise to the tendency in later chan development that chan practitioners, while 
considering sutra study or exegesis only as a supplement, focus primarily on sitting 
meditation and sutra recitation,35 which to an extent characterize the initial stage of the 
Chan School and facilitate it to distinguishing itself from other schools of Chinese 
Indeed, advocates of other Buddhist schools including Tiantai f?5•£} and Huayan ^ f | also perform these 
two styles of practice. 
33
 See Du and Wei, Zhongguo chanzong tongshi, 57. 
34
 The number of monasteries was increased by about 4.5 times, whereas the number of monastics was 
increased by about 25 times. 
35
 According to Du and Wei's Zhongguo chanzong tongshi, in his Luoyang qielan ji /^^flHlMIB (A 
Record of Buddhist Monasteries in Luoyang), Yang Xuanzhi %Wi&2- (c 6th century) depicts a story of how 
King Yama judged monks to emphasize the importance of sitting meditation and sutra recitation. In the 
story, the monks who practiced sitting meditation and recited sutras diligently ascended to the heavens, 
whereas the monk who expounded the sutras with arrogance and pride was sent to a "black house" (Ch. 
heishe H ^ ; implying the hells). With this story, Du and Wei further argue that there were two competing 
tendencies of Buddhist practice at the time, one emphasizing sutra exegesis and monastery construction and 
the other emphasizing sitting meditation and sutra recitation. For them, the competition between the two 
camps, due to its strong intensity and lasting struggling, had facilitated the chan monks to form an 
independent school named after their main practice, i.e., chan (Du and Wei, Zhongguo chanzong tongshi, 
58). 
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Buddhism. 
D. Local and Foreign Influence on the Development o/Chan 
During the South-North dynasties, many more Mahayana sutras were translated into 
Chinese. Particularly, they include those expounding the teaching of tathagatagarbha or 
Buddha-nature such as the Lankavatara-sutra, Dasheng qixing lun ~j\ f|t j|E fg Sm 
(Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana), and Foxing lun \%'\^.tm (Treatise 
on Buddha-Nature). Various studies have demonstrated that these scriptures have made 
great impact on Chinese Buddhism that in turn influenced greatly the development of 
Eastern Asian Buddhism.36 Doctrinally, the teaching of tathagatagarbha advocates that 
each and every sentient being is equally endowed with the Buddha-nature that "neither 
increases a bit in the saint nor decreases a bit in the ordinary." 
This teaching of innately existent Buddha-nature can be said to be reminiscent of 
traditional Chinese theories of mind-nature (Ch. xinxing sixiang ;(yf4n!li£I) that have 
been prevalent and influential among the educated since the time before the Han 3t 
dynasty (206 BCE-220).38 As a matter of fact, it is arguable that these Chinese theories 
of mind-nature have made concrete impact on Chinese Buddhists in terms of the way 
they understood Buddha-nature. For example, terminologically, Buddha-nature and 
mind-nature have become synonyms, and soteriologically, realizing Buddhahood has 
36
 For related studies, see, e.g., Suzuki (trans), The Lankavatara Sutra, and Suzuki, Studies in the 
Lankavatara Sutra; Hakeda (trans, with commentary), The Awakening of Faith Attributed to Asvaghosa, 
and Lai, "The Chan-ch 'a ching"; and King, Buddha Nature. 
37 r ££^m > 4 M i " j 
38
 Regarding traditional Chinese theories of mind-nature, for an account of Mencius's J6-p (372-289 
BCE) xingshan shuo tSf§i& or "the thought expounding human nature inclining towards goodness," see, 
e.g., Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 51-60. For an account of Xunzi's Irj-f1 (313-238 BCE) 
xing'e shuo f41§i& or "the thought expounding human nature inclining towards wickedness," see, e.g., 
Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 128-135. 
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become the same as realizing one's pure mind-nature. From this perspective, it can be 
said that Chinese understandings of mind-nature have inspired Buddhist contemplatives 
to innovatively uncover the praxis aspects of tathagatagarbha so as to develop original 
approaches of realizing it.40 In this way, in addition to the aforementioned factors of 
genealogical consciousness and different practice emphasis, the emergence of Chan could 
also be said in part as a result of certain chart contemplatives attempting to develop direct 
and experiential relationships to classic Buddhist ideas like tathagatagarbha, in which 
sudden awakening to one's tathagatagarbha, Buddha-nature, or pure mind became the 
hallmark of Chan Buddhism; more on this unique Chan development will be discussed 
later. 
Not only by the effort of local chart practitioners but also through the new teachings 
brought in by various foreign translators and dhyana masters, Chinese chart teachings 
have been developed further. Especially around the end of the fifth century and the 
beginning of the sixth century, there have been various influential dhyana masters 
including Buddha W$L or Bhadra $$% Ratnamati WlffiM^, and Bodhidharma, who 
were all teaching in China.41 According to Daoxuan's Continued Biographies, at the time 
For a study of the interaction between the Confucian theory of mind-nature and the Buddhist teaching of 
Buddha-nature, see, e.g., Lai, Foxueyu ruxue f$HHf|fl|l {Buddhistic Study and Confucianism), 42-97. 
40
 According to Robert Buswell's study, during the 6th and 7* centuries, owing to the debates concerning 
philosophy/theory and practice, there were Buddhist practitioners attempting to "reveal the praxis aspects 
of tathagatagarbha and amalavijnana" and trying to transform them "from abstract philosophical theories 
into pragmatic tools of practice" (Buswell, The Formation ofCh'an Ideology in China and Korea, 11). For 
Buswell, the Vajrasamadhi-sutra was part of that project. 
41
 (1) Dhyana Master Buddha/Bhadra came to China during the period of North Wei J t H (386-534). 
According to his biography in Daoxuan's Continued Biographies, Emperor Xiaowen of North Wei JtfSt^ 
~>C$P ( r. 471-499), in honor of Dhyana Master Buddha/Bhadra, particularly built a monastery for him in the 
then capital. Later, after moving the capital to Luoyang, the Emperor built another monastery for him in 
Songshan fUlil. which later became the well-known Shaolin si C}fffl^f. For a more detailed account of 
Dhyana Master Buddha/Bhadra's biography, see Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060); 551 a21 -
551b26. (2) Dhyana Master Ratnamati came to Luoyang in the year of 508. According to the brief account 
of his biography in Daoxuan's Continued Biographies (under Bodhiruci's ^ J S i j f t ^ biography), 
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the practice of chanfa {i.e., dhyana teachings) had not just been restricted to the area of 
Central China; rather, it had been propagated to all of China. There were independent 
wandering chart monks,42 and there were also four main chart systems gradually 
emerging. These systems were: (1) the Chou-Shi $f|lf system that advocated the 
traditional abhidharma-dhyana teaching and was led by the disciple of Dhyana Master 
Buddha/Bhadra, Sengchou ftf |H (480-560), and the disciple of Dhyana Master 
Ratnamati, Sengshi {HU (476-563), in Eastern and Northern-Central China; (2) the 
Bodhidharma system that was led by Dhyana Master Bodhidharma in the area of Central 
China and expounded the meditation teaching of Mahayana biguart M H or 
"wall-contemplation"; (3) the Tiantai ^ c ? system that was led by the disciples of Huisi 
Hjg (515-577), namely, Zhicui %D5g (c. 6th century) and Zhiyi ^ g g (538-597), in 
Southern China and promoted the teaching of Tiantai zhiguan ihfH or "calming-insight"; 
and (4) the Huizan WM. system that was led by Dhyana Master Huizan IJJIff (536-607) 
in Northwestern China and taught the practice of strict asceticism (Ch. toutuo xing Bl P2 
Ratnamati was particularly well versed in the teaching of dhyana, and under the royal command, together 
with Bodhiruci, they translated scriptures including Vasubandhu's Shidi lun -f"Jfe!# (Dasabhumi-
vyakhyana); see Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060); 429a5-9. (3) According to his biography in 
Daoxuan's Continued Biographies, Dhyana Master Bodhidharma came to China during the years of Liu 
Song IflJ^ (470-478), but other accounts have him come to China during the years of Liang Putong p£|f 
j l period (520-526). Traditionally, he has been attributed as the founder of Chinese Chan, however, when 
Daoxuan was writing his biography, the name of the Chan School was not yet existent; see Daoxuan, Xu 
gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060); 551b27-551c26. For a more detailed discussion on Bodhidharma, see, e.g., 
McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, 15-19; Adamek, The Mystique 
of Transmission, 138-144; and the references therein. 
42
 In his Continued Biographies, Daoxuan writes, "As to [the cases of] Huiyue's MM stroking a tiger's 
whiskers, Daoshun's M ^ observing [one's next life through] the shadow of a cow, Zhitong's ^ j l 
inducing miraculous events, and Sengting's ffi/il overpowering powerful bandits, [these wandering chan 
monks] had integrity like that of iron stones and aspiration as high as the skies. I will make my effort to 
record their merits for later generations so as to elaborate the virtues [of the practice] (S^DllSiSlJ^fEfe 
J | )" (Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060): 597al0-13). 
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From Daoxuan's description of these four systems and their teachings, we can make 
the following observations about the chanfa at the time. First, even though the name 
chanzong }WTK or "Chan School" had not yet existed, the existence of chart systems 
emphasizing genealogies was already evident. This phenomenon, as suggested above, 
facilitated the development of a genealogical consciousness that eventually led to the 
formation of Chan as an independent tradition. In fact, at the time when Daoxuan was 
writing his Continued Biographies, i.e., around the second half of the seventh century, 
what Bodhidharma taught had been called under the name of One-Vehicle Sect of South 
India (Ch. nan tianzhu yisheng zong M^JZI—I^TK) , 4 4 which surely can be stated as a 
precursor of the later Chan School. 
Secondly, we know that by the time of the sixth century, chan teachings and 
practices had been developed to exist in various forms. Among them, Sengchou and 
Sengshi taught the practices of mindfulness meditation (Ch. nianchu chan ^iSflp) and 
nine-stages calm abiding (Ch. jiu ci tiaoxin A ^ t l ' l j ) that went back to the times of An 
Shigao and KumarajTva. There was also the innovative Mahayana biguan teaching of 
Bodhidharma that instructed the practitioner to firmly abide in the principle of nondual 
True-nature (Ch. zhenxing 3114) and to further reinforce this understanding with the 
43
 See Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060): 596b29-597al8. For a study of this particular history, 
see, e.g., Jan, "Zhongguo zaoqi chanfa de liuchuan he tedian: Huijiao, Daoxuan suozhu xichan pian yanjiu 
^W^RWkttiMM^O^&~-MM • MM.W\M r H * i M j W% (The Dissemination and Characteristics 
of Chinese Early Chan Teachings: A Study of the "Dhyana Practice" Sections by Huijiao and Daoxuan)." 
44
 The name, One-Vehicle Sect of South India, appears once in the biography of Fachong )£cJ$ (Daoxuan, 
Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060): 666a3-666c24), where Daoxuan describes Fachong's study of the 
Lankavatara-sutra from the disciples of Huike |§"of (487-593), a disciple of Bodhidharma and the 2nd 
patriarch of the Chan School. Daoxuan reports that they "expounded [the Lankavatara-sutra] based on the 
[principle of] One-Vehicle Sect of South India (ffiMzfcfzL— M'MMiL)" (Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 
50 (2060): 666b5-6). 
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Four Practices (Ch. sixing IZHfr) of daily living. Moreover, there was also the 
still-developing ziguan teaching of Tiantai that incorporated samatha and vipasyana with 
the Perfect Teaching of Tiantai (Ch. tiantai yuanjiao ^^\B\%k) expounded in the Mohe 
zhiguan 0|°Jih.lK {The Great Calming and Insight) by Zhiyi. 
Thirdly, even though chan teachings were diversified, some were prosperous while 
others were declining. For instance, the teachings of Sengchou and Sengshi declined 
drastically in the early years of Tang dynasty (c. early-7th century); the ascetic practices 
of Huizan that advocated a balanced training of the Three Studies had almost disappeared 
after the death of Huizan's major disciple Zhichao J&a (571-641); and the zhiguan 
teachings of Tiantai gradually became part of the Tiantai School (Ch. tiantai zong ^ o 1 
^ ) . Only the teachings of Bodhidharma, after Daoxin and Hongren's efforts, came to 
flourish among the Buddhist practitioners and eventually led to the establishment of the 
Chan School. 
Fourthly, in the developments of these chan systems, due to their emphasis of 
transmission from the master to the disciple and for the purpose of assuring the 
continuation of their teachings, chan practitioners to an extent helped develop the 
production of sectarian texts. So, Sengchou wrote a text called Zhiguan fa lbHHS; 
{Methods of Calming and Insight), which unfortunately has been lost, and Bodhidharma 
wrote a treatise called Erru sixing lun ZlAElfrt^ {Treatise on the Two Entrances and 
Four Practices; hereafter the Two Entrances and Four Practices), which has been a 
constant inspiration for his later Chan descendents. Due to the practical nature of 
meditation training, I argue that these sectarian chan texts, in the minds of chan 
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contemplatives, would not only have the function of maintaining their own genealogies 
and teachings, but also serve as a reminder of their masters' oral instructions, thus 
facilitating a unique Chan understanding, namely, Chan has been passed on from the 
mind of the master to the mind of the disciple outside the doctrinal scriptures; more on 
this unique Chan development will be discussed later. 
E. Chan in Early Tang: Clues from Daoxuan's Comments 
From the comments in the "Dhyana Practice" section of Daoxuan's Continued 
Biographies, we can also get a glimpse of chan practices in the early 7th century of Tang 
dynasty. First, we can clearly see that Daoxuan's idea of chan teachings was in line with 
that of traditional Buddhists. That is to say, he considered dhyana and prajna to have 
their respective functions; in his Continued Biographies, he writes, "Detaching from the 
scattering is the function of concentration learning; seeing through the confusion is the 
work of realizing wisdom."45 In this way, he firmly rooted his understanding of dhyana 
and prajna in the traditional context of the Three Studies. Consequently, he strongly 
praised the teachings of Sengchou and Huisi for they advocated either "easily 
understood" teachings or the teachings that required "one to extensively study the 
scriptures and familiarize the precepts so as to return to single-mindedness and control 
discursive thoughts."46 Nevertheless, his comments on Bodhidharma's teachings at best 
can be said to have a mixed, if not critical, feeling. On the one hand, he praised that 
Bodhidharma's Mahayana biguan as "a supreme feat. Educated laymen flocked to pay 
Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060): 597b20; r%£§Lfe^2.#l ' BMMMZ-M ° j 
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him homage, as if it were a market day."47 But on the other hand he also stated that 
Bodhidharma's "abstruse principle is hidden and impenetrable ... [and because it is] 
hidden and impenetrable, ... one cannot understand it by reasoning."48 Thus, in 
Daoxuan's opinions, practitioners who could really grasp Bodhidharma's teachings were 
few.49 
In several places, Daoxuan vehemently criticized some of his contemporary chart 
practitioners. In one place, he claimed that some chart practitioners did not spend enough 
effort on the study of the scriptures. They not only had not reflected upon what they had 
learned and thus deviated from the meaning of the definitive teaching (Skt. nitartha; Ch. 
liaoyi jiao TUffc; Tib. nges don). They also had made egoistic mistakes such as 
"indulging themselves in worldly concentration and considering it the practice of true 
emptiness [or siinyata]."50 Daoxuan further pointed out that there were some 
practitioners who lived together in the mountains, but did not understand the precepts. 
Thus, they "used axes and knives, and did not avoid the work of farming; [they] prepared 
food, cooked, and ate leftovers without shame."51 To a degree, this way of "chart living" 
can be said a prototype of the Chan forest monastery that became the standard in the later 
Chan School, but in the eyes of the Vinaya Master Daoxuan, it was a violation of the 
monastic codes set by the historical Buddha. 
In another place, Daoxuan's criticisms seemed to be a warning against early sudden 
awakening teaching. He writes, 
47
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 Daoxuan writes, "But, [Bodhidharma's] words were difficult to understand. Those who could master 
[his teaching] were only a few (^ffnfisgHf! • MWM.&T (Ibid, T. 50 (2060): 596cl0). 
50
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There were some practitioners who were hasty in nature and lax in 
practice; [they] did not befriend the wise and study the right surras. 
Upon hearing a teaching they called themselves the master and 
declared that the Five Abiding Afflictions had long been eradicated, 
the Ten Grounds had been realized, the Dharma-nature had already 
been seen, and the Buddha wisdom had already been obtained."52 
Clearly, this description could be seen as a sudden awakening idea. But, for Daoxuan, 
these people were only "restricted by conditions to abide their minds and falsely speaking 
to have clarity and quietness."53 They were "attaching [themselves] to the appearances 
and running their minds" to the degree that they "did not perceive the mind's movement" 
and "did not recognize scattering thoughts."54 Even though they considered themselves 
chart practitioners, they actually did not know the real meaning of chart. As a result, not 
only did they bring upon themselves the contempt of orthodox Buddhists, but worldly 
people also considered these chart practitioners "ignorant old men."55 Regarding this, 
Daoxuan was extremely sad. Therefore, he concluded the "Dhyana Practice" section with 
a reminder to emphasize the importance of understanding dhyana and prajna properly, 
for Buddhist practitioners ought to have both to truly embrace the ultimate and the 
conventional.56 
The above glimpse of chart practices in the early Tang provided by Daoxuan's 
comments can be revealing. Clearly, we see from Daoxuan's criticisms that a certain 
group or groups of chart practitioners, who perhaps could be called proto-Chan 
practitioners, were crossing boundaries on the doctrinal and practical planes; they only 
focused on meditation practice, they lived together and farmed to support themselves, and 
52
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 See Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060): 597b20-21. 
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they seemed to advocate a certain proto-sudden awakening teaching. On the condition 
that Daoxuan did not specify that they were the descendents of Bodhidharma, we can 
only conjecture that there were some indigenous chart practitioners who perhaps followed 
a form of chart teachings derived after the long-term transformations of Chinese chart or 
dhyana teachings, even though it had not been well received by their contemporary 
Buddhists. 
While they might not be the direct dharma heirs of Bodhidharma, these indigenous 
chart or proto-Chan contemplatives could still be members of Daoxin and Hongren's 
group,57 as Daoxuan did not associate his contemporaries, Daoxin and Hongren,58 with 
Bodhidharma's lineage directly. In any case, it is certainly true that, in the early Tang, 
there was Bodhidharma's profound Mahayana biguan teachings, and there was also the 
indigenous proto-Chan practices that resulted from the various transformations of 
Chinese chart teachings over a period of more than five centuries, which I have described 
in some detail above. Given these facts, I believe that the Chan School would be more 
properly characterized as a tradition gradually emerging out of the interaction between 
these two forces, a fruition of their mutual influence. In this way, my view of the 
formation of the Chan School can be said an integration of the tradition's view {i.e., Chan 
as being brought to China by Bodhidharma) with modern scholars' conclusions (i.e., 
Chan as a result from the sinicization of Buddhism). 
As mentioned earlier, the teaching and community established by Daoxin and Hongren is referred to as 
Dongshan Teaching (Ch. dongshan famen j^ l l l /SH or East Mountain Teaching). For an introduction to 
this teaching and community, see, e.g., McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an 
Buddhism, 30-43; 118-147 and Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 152-159. 
58
 Their dates are as follows: Daoxuan: 596-667, Daoxin: 580-651, and Hongren: 601-674. 
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II. The Formation of Chan Buddhism: Locating Its Distinguishing Features 
Doctrinally, the chan under the mutual influence of Chinese dhyana teachings and 
Bodhidharma's Mahayana biguan or mind-nature (see below) teachings was not the 
traditional dhyana anymore. That is to say, it has gone beyond its traditional function 
within the context of the Three Studies, in which dhyana is the base and the method to 
give rise to prajha. Correspondingly, under the said mutual influence, chan moved onto 
the path of becoming Chan. In the process, three intertwined features became evident to 
distinguish Chan as a school different from other Buddhist schools and characterize it as 
the special mind-to-mind transmission outside the scriptures, the tradition of sudden 
awakening via the direct seeing of one's true nature. Below let me try to account for the 
development of each of the three distinguishing features and associate them with our 
subject matter, i.e., the logic of immediacy in contemplation. 
A. From Innate Awakening to Chan as Buddha's Mind 
Doctrinally and contemplatively, what was the source of inspiration for the earlier 
Chinese dhyana monks to move chan out of the traditional Three-Studies context and 
present it as an approach of sudden awakening to Buddhahood? From the above historical 
description, we see that Chinese chanfa went through a transformation from being an 
approach to develop samadhi to being an approach to realize the truth of Buddhist reality 
when it was under the influence of Buddhist prajnaparamita and Daoist xuanxue 
teachings in the period of Wei and Jin dynasties. Thus, as early as the end of the 4th 
century and the beginning of the 5th century, contemplatives like Xie Fu had 
characterized Mahayana dhyana practice as "attun[ing] the mind to traverse the profound 
reality." In addition, after reading the Mahaparinirvdna-sutra, Daosheng was inspired to 
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propose the idea of "sudden awakening to achieve Buddhahood" (Ch. dunwu chengfo $Ji 
fUl^ cfSj)- Even though it was not accepted by most of his contemporaries, according to 
recent studies, Daosheng's idea of sudden awakening had influenced the subitism of the 
Northern Chan School particularly through the contemplative teachings expounded in the 
Lahkavatara-sutra and the Dasheng qixing lim.59 
As a matter of fact, following Buswell, I would argue that the tathagatagarbha and 
amalavijhana teachings taught in scriptures like the Lahkavatara-sutra (translated around 
the mid-5th century) and the Dasheng qixing lun (translated around the mid-6th century) 
played the role of crucial catalyst for the emergence of Chan identity. In particular, its 
doctrine of original or innate awakening (Ch. benjue $ J | ) inspired chan contemplatives 
to further innovate Mahayana meditation into an approach of directly realizing one's 
innately awakened nature. This innovation is clearly demonstrated in Buswell's study of 
Chan ideology, where he analyzes the teachings of the Vajrasamadhi-sutra and contends 
that this "apocryphal" scripture can be "seen as an attempt [of certain chan adepts] to 
reveal the praxis aspects of tathagatagarbha and amalavijnana, transforming them from 
abstract philosophical theories into pragmatic tools of practice."60 
Furthermore, these certain chan adepts, though like most of other Mahayana 
practitioners at the time, understood the innate awakening of tathagatagarbha not only as 
a philosophical doctrine but also as a practically realizable soteriological goal. But, unlike 
59
 According to various studies, Daosheng's sudden awakening is built upon gradual learning, that is, when 
ignorance (Ch. mi ^) is gradually eradicated, sudden awakening can then be possible; see e.g., Lai, 
"Tao-sheng's Theory of Sudden Enlightenment Re-examined" and Gong, "Cong Daosheng de dunwu 
xueshuo fengxi zaoqi chan de yuandun yu cidi guannian de youlai." Applying the idea of family 
resemblance, Gong argues that Daosheng's teaching had at least indirect impact on the subitist teaching of 
Northern Chan. For his arguments, see Gong, "Cong Daosheng de dunwu xueshuo fengxi zaoqi chan de 
yuandun yu cidi guannian de youlai," 241-245. 
60
 Buswell, The Formation ofCh 'an Ideology in China and Korea, 77. 
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other Mahayana practitioners, they also considered that this soteriological goal ought to 
be realized directly or im-mediately via contemplative practices. Consequently, as 
Buswell also writes, "The notion that enlightenment is immanent in the mundane 
world ... ultimately fostered the evolution of new meditation techniques, such as 
no-thought, [in Chinese Buddhism, especially in the Chan School]."61 These new 
meditation techniques had no direct analogues in Indian Buddhism, and more 
significantly, they went beyond the context of the Three Studies for the chart of these 
methods was not the dhyana to accompany prajna anymore, but the innately awakened 
mind (Skt. bodhicitta; Ch. putixin ??St>L>; Tib. byang chub kyi sems) that enfolds all the 
Three Studies. In this unique expression, these pro-Chan adepts conceptually and 
practically turned chart into an approach of sudden awakening, which essentially 
qualified chart as an independent vehicle to Buddhahood, thus forming a school after it 
called Chan. 
In this process of developing new meditation techniques to realize one's innate 
awakening, Bodhidharma's teaching was equally influential. Not only did Bodhidharma 
come to China when Chinese Buddhist practitioners were attempting to "reveal the praxis 
aspects of tathagatagarbha and amalavijnana," but he was also one of the Indian masters 
to advocate the tathagatagarbha teaching.62 According to Daoxuan's Continued 
Biographies, Bodhidharma transmitted to Huike the Lankavatara-sutra and told him, "I 
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 Even though some modern scholars have suggested that the connection between Bodhidharma and the 
Lankavatara-sutra was added later, I would argue that doctrinally the teaching of Buddha-nature is evident 
in the Two Entrances and Four Practices of Bodhidharma. Perhaps, it is dubious to "[make] an exclusive 
attachment on his [Bodhidharma's] part to a single sutra, ... especially any attachment to a particular 
translation of it" (Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 148). However, that is a non-issue for me, as I am arguing 
Bodhidharma's connection with the teaching of tathagatagarbha or Buddha-nature mainly based on his 
teaching in the Two Entrances and Four Practices. That is to say, whether he was connected to the 
Lankavatara-sutra does not prevent me from putting my arguments forward. For a more detailed discussion 
on Bodhidharma's connection with the Lankavatara-sutra, see Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, Chapter 6. 
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have observed China. Only this sutra is [suitable]. If you follow it, you can certainly help 
the world."63 The fact that Bodhidharma expounded the teaching of tathagatagarbha can 
also be seen from his Two Entrances and Four Practices. In it, Bodhidharma clearly 
stated that all beings, both the ordinary and the enlightened, possess the same True-nature 
that is evidently another name for the tathagatagarbha or Buddha-nature.64 
More importantly, Bodhidharma taught the method of ningzhu biguan / H f i l t t l or 
"firmly abiding in wall-contemplation" to enter this True-nature. While biguan can be 
literally interpreted as meditating in front of a wall, Daoxuan's description of 
Bodhidharma's teaching that "thus setting the mind at ease is called biguan"65 indicates 
the possibility of interpreting biguan as "an immediate recognition of the 'True Nature' 
itself," which has been argued by various scholars recently. 66 According to 
Bodhidharma's Two Entrances and Four Practices where he presents the idea of biguan 
or "wall-contemplation," one can certainly understand how this interpretation comes 
about: 
Let one discard the false and return to the True, [thus] firmly abiding 
in wall-contemplation; there is neither self nor other; the ordinary and 
the enlightened are one and the same. Firmly abide [in here] without 
wavering and never [again] follow after other teaching. This is in 
deep accordance with the Way, [without conceptualization,] serenely 
without [any] doing. This is called entering [the Way] via principle 
63
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 There exist various versions of Bodhidharma's Two Entrances and Four Practices, some shorter and 
some longer. For consistency, I have used the one in Daoxuan's Continued Biographies, T. 50 (2060): 
55 lc07-23. For a more critically edited recension, see Yanagida, Daruma no goroku: Ninyu shigyo roku 58 
0<7)|§iS: — AESfrfij {The Recorded Sayings of Bodhidharma: The Treatise on the Two Entrances and 
Four Practices). For an English translation, see e.g., McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of 
Early Ch 'an Buddhism, 102-105. 
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 In fact, this characterization of biquan as "an immediate recognition of the 'True Nature' itself is 
Carmen Meinert's; see Meinert, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen," 295. In addition, Adamek 
characterizes biquan as "an embodiment of the realization of the principle of nondual true nature" (Adamek, 
The Mystique of Transmission, 141). For other interpretations, see McRae, The Northern School and the 
Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, 112-115. 
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(emphasis added). 
From the above passage, evidently, it is to discard the false and return to the True 
that one firmly abides in biguan. Here biguan has nothing to do with sitting in front of a 
wall, but it is to return to one's True-nature so that one is in deep accordance with the 
Way, and this is taught by Bodhidharma as entering the Way of Buddhahood via the 
principle of the teaching (Ch. jiejiao wuzong ffifcfj^ Tj?). This interpretation is also 
supported by the Tibetan translation of biguan. In the bSam gtan mig sgron (The Lamp 
for the Eye of Dhyana), a lO^-century Tibetan text written by Dzogchen Master gNubs 
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes,68 the Chinese term ningzhu biguan is rendered into Tibetan as 
lham mer gnas or "abiding in luminosity," in which one "rest[s] in the naturalness of the 
True Meaning [i.e., one's awakened nature], without conceptualization, at peace without 
action."69 
Thus, Bodhidharma's biguan is to set the mind at ease by discarding false 
conceptualization and returning immediately to one's True-nature which is one's 
immanently awakened mind. In this way, Bodhidharma's chan-teaching (Ch. chanjiao 
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 For a more detailed discussion of the text and its author, see Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 57.6-58.2. For comparison, below is the 
translation of the quoted Two Entrances and Four Practices passage from the bSam gtan mig sgron: 
"Having abandoned the conceptualization and returned to the True, if one abides in luminosity (lham mer 
gnas), there is neither self nor other; the ordinary and the noble are one and the same. If one abides [in it] 
steadily without change, from then on one does not pursue after the words and teachings. This is to rest in 
the naturalness of the True Meaning, without conceptualization, at peace without action. This is Entering to 
the Meaning (yang dag pa la phyogs zhing rtog* pa spangs te/ lham mer gnas na/ bdag kyang med gshan 
yang med/ ma rabs dang 'phags pa mnyam shing gcig ste/ mi 'gyur bar brtan par gnas na/ de phan chad yi 
ge dang bstan pa'i rjes su mi 'brang ngo/ 'di ni yang dag pa'i don gyi rnal du phab pa rnam par rtog pa med 
pa/ zhi** zhing bya ba med pa ste/ de ni don la 'jug*** pa'o)" (gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam 
gtan mig sgron, 57.6-58.2); * the original has rtogs pa, but from the context, it should be rtog pa; ** the 
original has zhing, but from the context, it has been changed to zhi; *** the original reads mi 'jug, but from 
the context, it does not make any sense to have the negation. Thus, the negation mi has been taken out of 
the final translation. 
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$p|&) is not the dhyana traditional Buddhists had recognized, but an epistemological 
insight into the immanence of one's awakened mind, the tathagatagarbha, that ultimately 
warrants his dhyana to attaining the fruition of sudden awakening via the direct seeing of 
one's True-nature. According to Daoxuan, at the time the entire nation had been greatly 
preoccupied by producing exegeses of Buddhist scriptures, thus people often slandered 
Bodhidharma upon hearing his dingfa /|[>£ or "teaching of concentration."70 Even 
though Bodhidharma's new teaching was not completely accepted by contemporary 
Buddhists,71 his chan-teaching certainly was passed on to his disciples including Sengfu 
fgglj (464-524) and Huike fgaf (487-593).72 
Historically, Huike, revered as the second patriarch of the Chan School, was still 
being persecuted and his teaching was dismissed as "devil's speech" (Ch. moyu Ml§),73 
nonetheless, he survived these hardships by living among the common people and 
composing folk songs to propagate his chan ideas.74 It seems that in these early years of 
Chan's dissemination, early or proto-Chan practitioners were trying to find ways to 
mediate the tensions between traditional Buddhist views and their innovative teachings. 
70
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 The fact that Bodhidharma was not completely accepted by his contemporary practitioners may be 
further supported by the alleged incidents given in some of the early Chan histories, in which various 
monks were trying to kill Bodhidharma by poisoning; see, e.g., Du Fei's tfcfjtfj (c. 7th-8th centuries) Chuan 
fabaoji W)ffK$c!, (Annals of the Transmission of the Dharma-Jewet) that was completed around the year 
of 713 and Baotang school's f^/H^? Lidai fabaoji HSf^/SKIS (Record of the Dharma-Jewel Through 
the Generations) that was completed around the year of 780. The Chuan fabaoji can be found in Yanagida, 
Shoki zenshu shisho no kenkyu WWtWM'li.Hi^ffi^ (A Study of Early Chan Historiographical Texts), 
560-572, and a brief introduction of the text can be found in McRae, The Northern School and the 
Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism, 86-88. For the Lidai fabao ji, it has been studied extensively by 
Wendi Adamek; see Adamek 2007, The Mystique of Transmission. For the account of the poisoning 
incidents, see her translation in Section 4 (Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, 310-313). 
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 For an introduction to Senfu's and Huike's lives, see, e.g., McRae, The Northern School and the 
Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, 19-23. 
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 This description is given in Huike's biography of Daoxuan's Continued Biographies, which can be 
found in Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng zhuan, T. 50 (2060): 551c27-552cl. 
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In this sense, unlike Faure's understanding that "the 'will to orthodoxy' ... characterizes 
all of early Chan,"75 I would argue, on the doctrinal front, mediating the tensions 
between traditional Buddhist and innovative Chan teachings characterizes the 
development of early Chan. This marginal status of early Chan was still existent even 
after Daoxin (580-651) and Hongren (601-674), the fourth and fifth patriarch of the 
tradition, established probably the first Chan community in Huangmei MM-16 Although 
Shenxiu (6067-706), one of Hongren's ten great disciples, brought Chan to the national 
stage, according to Mario Poceski, it was not until Mazu JSffl. (709-788) and his 
followers who finally integrated Chan into the Buddhist mainstream and reinforced its 
distinct identity.77 
In this long history of mediating their distinct identity, Chan masters have taught 
various contemplative techniques to realize one's awakened mind. In addition to 
Bodhidharma's biguan briefly introduced earlier, these techniques include Daoxin's 
shouyi ^f— or "guarding the one,"78 Hongren's shouxin ^f'\j~ or "guarding the mind," 
Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 4. 
76
 Nowadays, Huangmei MW is a county in the very eastern part of the Chinese province of Hubei Mit, 
where it also meets the provinces of Anhui ^ ® and Jiangxi )X\S-
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 In his Ordinary Mind as the Way, Mario Poceski argues that, contrary to the traditional view as a 
revolutionary movement that rejected mainstream mores and teachings, the Hongzhou Sect ^ j l i ^ 
succeeded largely because of its ability to mediate tensions between traditionalist and iconoclastic Chan 
tendencies; Poceski writes, "In their unifying and stabilizing roles, Mazu and his followers furthered the 
integration of Chan into the Buddhist mainstream, even as, paradoxically, they also reinforced their 
tradition's distinct identity. They presented an inclusive and expansive version of Chan as a tradition within 
Buddhism, putting forward their teachings as the essence of Buddhist spirituality. As a result, they nudged 
the Chan school toward a central course, away from antinomian extremes such as those of the Baotang 
school in Sichuan or the divisive sectarianism epitomized by Shenhui's (684-758) acrimonious campaigns 
against the Northern school. In that sense, the rise of the Hongzhou school represented a consolidation and 
maturation of the Chan movement, a culmination of its evolution during the Tang period" (5-6). Following 
this, Poceski continues, "The Hongzhou school's successful growth was largely predicated on its ability to 
mediate tensions arising from its engagement with established teachings and traditions. This is to say, its 
success in becoming the dominant tradition of Chan depended primarily on its capacity to balance 
adherence to established norms and ideals, on the one hand, with the need to forge an identity by selecting 
and reformulating aspects of received traditions on the other" (6; emphasis added). 
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 As the idea of shouyi or "guarding the one" originates from Daoism, for a discussion of the Daoist 
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Shenxiu's kanxin f^f/[> or "viewing the mind," Huineng and Shenhui's wunian Ml& or 
"no-thought," and Mazu's pingchang xin ^P^L^ or "ordinary mind," to name just a 
few.79 Even though they have some nuanced differences, these methods all have one 
common feature, namely, an immediate recognition of one's innately awakened mind and 
the realization of this awakened mind in constant contemplation or in spontaneous 
presence. As a result, the Chan School has come to be epitomized by the adage, "Chan is 
Buddha's mind."80 
As Buddha's mind, Chan certainly goes beyond the chart derived from dhyana. In 
fact, it essentially embraces all that Buddhist teachings have entailed. Hence, regarding 
the Three Studies, Huineng teaches, "The mind that has no transgression is the sila of 
Self-nature; the mind that has no agitation is the samadhi of Self-nature; the mind that 
has no ignorance is the prajna of Self-nature."81 Similarly, Shenhui teaches, "That the 
deluded mind is not being activated is sila. That one has no deluded mind is samadhi. 
That one knows the mind has no delusion is prajna."82 In this way, Chan, as Buddha's 
mind, embraces all the Three Studies, and moreover, according to John McRae's study, 
the Northern Sect has used the device of guanxin shi fH'I^IP (or "symbolic exegesis of 
the mind") to turn all of Buddhist teachings "into an allegory for the practice of the 
practice of "guarding the one," see, e.g., Kohn, "Guarding the One." 
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 For Daoxin's shouyi and Hongren's shouxin, see, e.g., McRae, The Northern School and the Formation 
of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, Chapter VI, particularly 136-138 and 140-144; also Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 
70-72. For Shenxiu's kanxin or guanxin fSt'Cs see, e.g., McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of 
Early Ch'an Buddhism, Chapter VII, particularly 215-218; also Fause, The Will to Orthodoxy, 58ff. For 
Shenhui's wunian, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. For Mazu's pingchang xin, see Poceski, Ordinary 
Mind as the Way, 182-186. 
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'contemplation of the mind'." 
In the contemplation, or more precisely manifestation, of the awakened mind, Chan, 
as Buddha's mind, is both the path (i.e., as an approach to the direct seeing of one's 
awakened mind) and the fruition (i.e., as the Buddha or awakened mind). From the above 
discussion, this unique expression of Chan is the result obtained from the efforts of many 
chart contemplatives over a long period of time, in which Chinese dhyana monks' 
contemplative understanding of tathagatagarbha and Bodhidharma's mind-nature 
contemplation have categorically set up the doctrinal parameters of this expression. In the 
above origin narrative that gives rise to this Chan expression, I believe that the various 
interactions and transformations described not only provide a historical context or 
grounding for the emergence of the logic of immediacy in contemplation. They also 
demonstrate the basic philosophical principles, most notably, the innateness and the 
all-pervasiveness of the awakened mind, that warrant the possibility of sudden awakening. 
To better understand how these philosophical principles warrant this idea of immediacy, 
in the next chapters I will delve into the teachings of Chan and Dzogchen to perform the 
intended task. 
B. From Training in Religious Settings to Realization in Spontaneous Living 
Closely related to the above doctrinal parameters, another connection, which is 
related to practice style, has also contributed to the formation and even consolidation of 
the Chan School.84 As described in the historical section, early chart monks either 
83
 McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, 198. 
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 Here, I am reminded of the formation and consolidation of Mahayana Buddhism. As various scholars 
have argued, the formation of the Mahayana owed much to a reformist request of a different life style 
within the monastic context, namely, "a reactionary critique of sedentary monasticism in favor of a return 
to wilderness dwelling" (Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the Forest and the Formation of the Mahayana, xxi); for 
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gathered together to form a group in the mountains or lived by themselves in their huts to 
practice. Due to the wars in the period of South-North dynasties (439-581), the number of 
mendicant monks and nuns increased drastically and most of them became chart 
practitioners. Because of their living styles, among these mendicant contemplatives a 
chart living that emphasized meditation practice and sutra recitation gradually developed. 
I believe that it was due to the influence of this kind of chart living that, by the time when 
Daoxuan was writing his Continued Biographies, some chan practitioners had lived 
together and "used axes and knives, ... farm[ed], ... prepared food, cooked, and ate 
leftovers without shame." 
Essentially, Daoxuan's criticisms of the life style described are, as we noted above, 
derived from the Vinaya's perspective. In the Vinaya, it is said that monks and nuns 
should avoid the use of any tools for killing. They should also avoid the work of farming 
in order to prevent themselves from accidentally killing small insects or worms. As for 
food, they should beg enough alms just for a day. Thus, there should be no leftovers. 
Therefore, it is naturally understandable that Daoxuan, a Vinaya master, would criticize 
the violation of these Vinaya rules by using axes and knives, farming, and eating 
leftovers. 
Yet, why did those chan practitioners violate the Vinaya rules? Did they, as 
Daoxuan suggested, simply not know the precepts? While it is certainly believable that 
some of the mendicants who were displaced and uneducated common people did not 
probably study the Vinaya, there were also educated practitioners among these chan 
contemplatives who had chosen this style of chan living to practice the dharma. Then, the 
his detailed argument and other related arguments and references, see Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the Forest 
and the Formation of the Mahayana, 40-43; 64-84. 
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question becomes: Why did they choose a living style that would bring them criticism 
and controversy? 
While it is impossible to understand their exact reasons due to the lack of 
information, it seems that there are clues left to argue a possible case, in which these 
practitioners, out of their contemplative concerns, were trying to integrate the precepts as 
well as other aspects of Buddhist practice into the realization of one's Buddha-nature (or 
innately awakened mind) in daily living. In the process of this contemplative integration, 
social reality was also taken into consideration. That is, during the chaos of wartime, 
when begging for alms was not possible and patronage from the government and/or the 
laity was considerably reduced, the option of farming would possibly became a necessity, 
which in turn required the use of axes and knives, cooking, and so forth. 
So, what were the clues for this possible case? First, as discussed in the previous 
subsection, proto-Chan contemplatives taught the teaching of directly realizing one's 
awakened mind as the soteriological goal. As the awakened mind, noted above, pervades 
everything and consolidates all teachings, when one realizes this awakened mind, one 
realizes everything, including the Vinaya precepts, thus giving rise to ideas such as 
one-mind precepts (Ch.yixinjie —>[>#£)> formless precepts (Ch. wuxiangjie fit^g^;) or 
Buddha-nature precepts (Ch. foxing jie fi$f4#5c).85 Probably, it was also due to this 
understanding that when Huike expounded the essence of Bodhidharma's mind teaching, 
"those who were stuck with the literal meanings criticized [him] vehemently."86 Yet, the 
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 In Chan, these ideas can been found in the teachings of the Northern Sect, Huineng's Platform Sutra, 
and the Baotang Sect ^Hf^f, to name just a few. For a study on the one-mind precepts in Chan, see e.g., 
Faure, "The Concept of One-Practice Samadhi in Early Ch'an," 116-117. For a study on the Buddha-nature 
precepts and formless precepts in Chan, see, e.g., Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 111; 113-118 and Adamek, 
The Mystique of Transmission, 197-204. 
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understanding that the awakened mind pervades all went deeply in the minds of early 
Chan practitioners. Huiman H^iii (c. 6th-7th centuries), a grand-disciple of Huike, 
emphasized, 
All Buddhas speak the mind, letting [the practitioner] know that the 
appearances of the mind are delusory phenomena. Nowadays, [some] 
have reinforced [the attachment to] the appearances of the mind, 
which not only deeply goes against the intention of the Buddhas but 
also increases disputation. That is in extreme contradiction with the 
Great Principle. 
Even though we are not sure what or who Huiman was referring to as reinforcing 
one's attachment to the appearances of the mind, his living style as a mendicant monk for 
most part of his life suggests that he might follow the precepts informed by "their spirits" 
that underscore the inner quality of the practitioner's realization, rather than confined by 
"their appearances" that only require the outer accordance of the practitioner's physical 
behaviors. That is to say, for Huiman, in the spirit of one-mind precepts and formless 
precepts, to emphasize the holding-up of the precepts only by their outer accordance with 
the practitioner's physical behaviors "deeply goes against the intention of the Buddhas" 
and "is in extreme contradiction with the Great Principle," for it only reinforces one's 
attachment to the appearances without realizing the nature of one's awakened mind. 
Practically, to live up to the precepts by "their spirits" is to enact them in one's daily 
living, rather than just practicing them in their religious settings. Essentially, this is 
equivalent to realizing one's awakened mind through one's everyday actions. Thus, in his 
Two Entrances and Four Practices, after stating the teaching of entering the Way via 
principle, Bodhidharma also gives the teaching of entering the Way via practice (Ch. 
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xingru f rA). Here the Chinese term xing fx (translated as practice) is really in the 
sense of applying the teaching to one's daily actions. Thus, the Four Practices (Ch. sixing 
E9ff) in the xingru can be read as Bodhidharma's instructions to his disciples on how to 
live one's everyday life according to the dharma so that one can enter the Way of 
Buddhahood (or realize one's awakened mind) via these practices. 
For Bodhidharma, these four methods of daily practice in the xingru embrace all 
other practices.88 While each practice has its own aspect of emphasis, their ultimate goal 
is to lead the practitioner to live in accord with the dharma and ultimately realize one's 
True-nature, the awakened mind, through one's moment-by-moment actions, hence the 
name entering the Way of Buddhahood via practice. Although in his teaching 
Bodhidharma does not specif}' the connection between the Four Practices and the Vinaya, 
the fact is that the Four Practices, in their essence, require Chan practitioners to integrate 
the outer accordance of their precepts upholding with the inner quality of their realization, 
for the upholding of the Vinaya should be a natural part of their everyday life. As a 
continuation, early Chan masters further developed ideas such as one-mind precepts, 
Buddha-nature precepts, or formless precepts briefly mentioned earlier to consolidate the 
Vinaya into their contemplative practices. However, when the idea of "formless precepts" 
was reinforced with the social reality of food shortages due to the war, the work of 
farming naturally became their choice, and from farming, using axes, cooking, and eating 
In his Two Entrances and Four Practices, Bodhidharma writes, "Entering [the Way] via practice [refers 
to] Four Practices that encompass all other myriad practices (ffAESfr' iHfrl°J§t)" (Daoxuan, Xu gaoseng 
zhuan, T. 50 (2060): 551cl2). These Four Practices are (1) the practice of the retribution of enmity (Ch. 
baoyuan xing $SSfj). (2) the practice of adapting to conditional arising (Ch. suiyuan xing IS^fr ) , (3) 
the practice of the absence of craving (Ch. wusuoqiu xing ISSFJfJfcfr), and (4) the practice of accordance 
with the dharma (Ch. chengfa xing fUScfr)- For a discussion on the meaning of these four practices, see 
e.g., McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, 108-110. 
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leftovers would naturally follow. 
The need for early Chan monastic members to work for sustenance can be seen in 
the life story of Daoxin as well. In the early Chan history of Chuanfabaoji fl|)£H!£ 
{Annals of the Transmission of the Dharma-Jewel),90 it is said that Daoxin used to urge 
his disciples: 
Make effort to diligently sit [i.e., meditate]. Sitting is the root. Work 
for three or five years and obtain food to cure the disease of hunger. 
One should then sit [behind] the closed door. Do not read sutras. Do 
not speak to people. (Emphasis added).91 
Thus, in Daoxin's time, proto-Chan practitioners were practicing meditation while 
working to sustain themselves. By Hongren's time, this practice of working and sitting 
seemed to be a standard as the author of Chuan fabao ji described Hongren as having 
"often worked hard in labor so as to show his consideration to the serving laborers"92 and 
blending himself in the ones who do "life-sustaining work in the daytime and sit in 
concentration until dawn in the night."93 In another early history of the Chan School, 
Lengqie shizi ji W M ffi ~M §5 (Record of the Masters and Disciples of the 
As a matter of fact, historically speaking, since the early years of Chinese Buddhism, Chinese 
monasteries had been given land by the government as their source of income. Originally, local farmers 
would be farming the land. On the one hand, local farmers earned their living, whereas on the other hand 
the monasteries would then be supported. Yet, during wartime when people were either summoned by the 
government to fight the war or displaced because of its turmoil, due to the shortage of manpower, it was 
natural for the monks to start to farm the land themselves if they could go beyond the bondage from the 
Vinaya rules. For a more detailed discussion on the economy of the Buddhist monastery in China, see e.g., 
Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society: An Economic History from the Fifth to the Tenth Centuries, 94-141. 
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 The Chuanfabaoji by Du Fei f±§ii (c. 7th-8th centuries) was completed around the year of 713. A 
version of the text can be found in Yanagida, Shoki zenshu shisho no kenkyu WMW^^L^^ffi^Z {A 
Study of Early Chan Historiographical Texts), 560-572, and a brief introduction of the text can be found in 
McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, 86-88. 
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Lankafvatara-sutraJ),94 it is said that Hongren was able to manage the monastic labor 
work so that all the practitioners could be sustained.95 
Evidently, the Chan essence of the above Simultaneous Practice of Sitting and 
Working (Ch. zuozuo bingzhong ^fpMJfi) was expanded to every action in life. As the 
author of Lengqie shizi ji described Hongren to have taught, "The four gestures [i.e., 
walking, standing, sitting, and reclining] all are the places of the Way. The three actions 
[i.e., the actions of one's body, speech, and mind] all are the activities of the Buddha. 
Because stillness and motion are of nonduality; speech and silence are in constant 
oneness."96 In this way, Bodhidharma's teaching of entering the Way via the practices 
was indeed implemented in the daily living of early Chan communities. 
To be sure, Hongren's understanding of entering the Way of Buddhahood via one's 
ordinary actions of everyday life clearly was not only due to social realistic demands. 
Rather, I would argue that it was most probably due to his understanding of the teachings 
in a unique Chan fashion. In short, this Chan understanding is that as every action is a 
manifestation of one's awakened mind, it is naturally possible for one to realize the 
awakened mind through one's everyday ordinary actions. Thus, in effect, this 
interpretation provides, on the one hand, an implementation of realizing one's awakened 
mind in its spontaneous presence and, on the other hand, an extension of realizing one's 
awakened mind from being confined within religious trainings to every action of one's 
doing. Seen from this contemplative perspective, the development of the Chan School in 
its early years can be considered as trying to extend the realization of one's awakened 
94
 A version of Lengqie shizi ji can be found in T. 85 (2837): 1283a-1290c. For a study on the author and 
textual tradition of Lengqie shizi ji, see Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, Chapter 5 and Chapter 7. 
95
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mind not only through one's religious trainings but also through the spontaneous 
presence of the awakened mind in daily living, or put another way, one's spontaneous 
living.97 
That is to say, from Bodhidharma's Four Practices to Daoxin and Hongren's 
Simultaneous Practice of Sitting and Working; and to later Huineng's Practice of No 
Thought (Ch. wunian xing $&1&fj), Mazu's Ordinary Mind as the Way (Ch. pingchang 
xin shi dao ^ ^ ' I ^ M M ) , and later Chan masters' shouting, striking, facial gesturing, and 
so forth; contemplatively, I argue, these Chan practices can be seen as forming a unique 
evolving feature of realizing one's awakened mind through one's daily ordinary actions 
or spontaneous living. Accordingly, this evolving feature has given rise to the famous 
adage that "Walking, standing, sitting, and reclining all are Chan."98 Here, not only have 
the four classic postures of Indian Buddhism been transformed from their usual 
mindfulness context99 to the manifestations of the awakened mind, but the Chan in the 
adage is clearly not the dhyana of the Three Studies it originally comes from; rather, this 
Chan is the spontaneous living inspired and actualized by one's awakened mind. 
Thus, similar to Chan as Buddha's mind, Chan, as spontaneous living, is both the 
fruition (for spontaneity is a hallmark of Buddhahood) as well as the path Chan 
contemplatives artfully strive for. Even though the formation of this distinguishing 
feature had caused some controversy noted above, this fact only further testifies to my 
above argument that mediating the tensions between traditional Buddhist and innovative 
97
 In this practice of spontaneous living, there are no exhortations to do this or not to do that. The Chan 
practitioners simply act according to need and respond as spoken to. Such a spontaneous living is the 
fruition as well as the path its practitioners artfully strive for. 
98 ffi&tm.^mm- • J 
99
 That is to say, traditionally, the four postures are considered as the places where Buddhist practitioners 
train their mindfulness; see, e.g., Thera, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, 63-64 and Analayo, 
Satipatthzna, 136ff. 
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Chan teachings characterizes the formation of Chan identity. In addition, in this process 
of mediation, what Chan adepts had developed under the mutual influence of Chinese and 
Indian contemplative teachings not only further consolidated Chan as an independent 
school, but also demonstrates another historical context for the appearance of the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation. As such, Chan as spontaneous living informs us about 
another important philosophical principle, namely, spontaneity, for the realization of 
sudden awakening in contemplation. In the chapters that follow, the various aspects 
between spontaneity and immediacy will be further explored through the teachings of 
Chan and Dzogchen. 
C. From Oral Instructions to a Special Transmission Outside the Scriptures 
Intertwined with the aforementioned two features, i.e., Chan as Buddha's mind and 
Chan as spontaneous living, existed another distinguishing feature of genealogical 
development for the appearance of Chan identity. As described in the historical section, 
even before the formation of the Chan School, various chan groups were already existent. 
These chan groups had their own lineages, for the idea that "without a master, [one] will 
never be able to realize the Way" had been prevalent among the chan monks since the 4th 
century onwards. Thus, they sought qualified teachers. As described earlier, in the 
process, genealogies came to be formed and sectarian manuscripts came to be written. By 
the time of early Tang, Bodhidharma's system bad already obtained the name of 
One-Vehicle Sect of South India. 
The emphasis on genealogy first came because of the hands-on nature of dhyana 
practice. Written words alone could not pass on experience and satisfactorily answer 
questions arisen from practitioners' experiential circumstances. Hence, they needed oral 
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instructions to help them to deal with these experiential issues. As oral instructions being 
written down, dhyana practice manuals came to become important companions to the 
practitioners to keep their practices going. Be that as it may, the importance of finding a 
master could have never been replaced. Thus, for dhyana practice, a master's oral 
instructions would always be more important than the written words. 
I would argue that the importance of a master's oral instructions among Chinese 
Buddhist contemplatives reached its apex when the practice of realizing one's awakened 
mind came to be expressed in a unique Chan fashion, not only because of its novelty but 
also because of its abstruse meaning. Daoxuan's description of Bodhidharma's teaching 
could shed some light here; he writes, 
[Bodhidhar]ma's teaching follows the principle of emptiness; its 
abstruse principle is hidden and impenetrable ... [because it is] 
hidden and impenetrable, so one cannot understand it by reasoning.100 
As Bodhidharma's mind-nature teaching cannot be understood by reasoning alone, one 
needed to not only practice it oneself but also be guided in the process so as to achieve its 
goal. This personal guidance, I believe, would not only reinforce the importance of 
genealogical transmission but also foster the awareness of "a mind-to-mind transmission 
outside the scriptures"101 for it was the master or patriarch who passed on the teaching 
and gave quintessential instructions to continue the transmission of the lineage. Thus, as 
early as the end of the 7th century, early Chan practitioners already had the idea that 
"those who enter this [Chan] tradition only pass on the transmission through the minds 
[of masters and disciples]." 
100
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The importance of passing on the transmission through the minds of masters and 
disciples has also been recognized in another early Chan history, Chuanfabaoji, where it 
is said, "If one does not realize the unsurpassable vehicle which is passed on through the 
minds [of masters and disciples], how can one really enter the true suchness?"103 So, in 
this way, this understanding was further developed in later Chan literature, where we see 
statements like, "It [i.e., Chan] is called a special transmission outside the scriptures, [for] 
it only transmits the mind seal [by] pointing at one's mind [so as to lead one to] see [into 
one's] nature and become a Buddha"104; or "The mind seal of all the Buddhas has been 
passed on from one patriarch to the next patriarch. It is called a special transmission 
outside the scriptures for it only takes this most superb quintessence."105 
However, the question is: How do we understand this mind-to-mind transmission 
outside the scriptures in the Chan tradition? Put another way, how can a transmission be 
passed on from one mind to another? Here, Robert Sharf s research on the notion of 
"sympathetic resonance" (Ch. ganying WM. ° r xiangying t@0) in Chinese cosmology 
can bring us some enlightening clarity.106 Since sympathetic resonance means "objects 
belonging to the same category or class spontaneously resonate with each other just as do 
two identically tuned strings on a pair of zithers,"107 the mind-to-mind transmission 
the Tang zhongyue shamen shi faru chanshi xingzhuang M^^&f^W/iiPSW^fj^k {Epitaph for the 
Tang [Dynasty] Sramanna of the Central Peak, Dhyana Master Shi Faru). The epitaph was written for 
Dhyana Master Faru }£&U (638-689), a disciple of the fifth patriarch Hongren. According to modern 
studies, it is one of the earliest documents that record the genealogy of the Chan School. For an 
introduction to the epitaph, see, e.g., Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, 161 and McRae, The 
Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, 85-86. 
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between masters and disciples can thus be possible precisely because they share the same 
awakening nature, which, in effect, places them to the same category.108 As a result, the 
master's stimulus can bring about the disciple's response, thus effecting a mind-to-mind 
transmission that is outside the scriptures.109 
Doctrinally and contemplatively, several other reasons also had contributed to the 
almost inevitable awareness of a mind-to-mind transmission outside the scriptures for the 
Chan School. First, because the principle of Bodhidharma's mind-nature teaching, i.e., 
the quintessence of one's awakened mind, is hidden and impenetrable, Chan 
contemplatives could not understand it by reasoning. Therefore, it is only with the help of 
the master's stimulus that the disciple grasps it with sympathetic resonance, thus 
effecting the special mind-to-mind Chan transmission outside the scriptures.110 In 
addition, because the realization of one's awakened mind transcends words and letters, 
the master takes recourse to daily living so that the disciple realizes its ineffable essence 
through the liveliness of living, thus also effecting the special mind-to-mind Chan 
transmission outside the scriptures. Furthermore, spontaneity is devoid of discursive 
thoughts. As a result, the master employs various spontaneous skills in means, such as 
shouting, striking, or facial gesturing, to stimulate the disciple to come to the realization 
of his awakened mind in the context of daily living, thus effecting the special 
This idea of sympathetic resonance certainly is not limited to the Chinese. Similar ideas can be found, 
for example, in the Indie idea of "Sea! of Sambhu." For a discussion on the Indie idea of "Seal of Sambhu," 
see, e.g., Muller-Ortega, "On the Seal of Sambhu." 
109
 As Sharf has noticed, Zongmi also employed this idea of sympathetic resonance to account for the 
patriarchal succession in Chan; see Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism, 131-132. 
'
10
 Indeed, this principle of a mind-to-mind transmission between the master and the disciple is essentially 
the same as that of a tantric initiation where the master initiates the disciple into the tradition with the 
stimulus of the master and the resonance of the disciple; for a discussion on the various meanings of 
initiation in the tantric context, see, e.g., Jeffrey Hopkins's introduction to Dalai Lama's Kalachakra 
Tantra: Rite of Initiation, 66-91 and for a procedure of tantric initiations, see, e.g., Hopkins's introduction 
to Dalai Lama's Kalachakra Tantra: Rite of Initiation, 101-130. 
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mind-to-mind Chan transmission outside the scriptures as well. Given this understanding, 
it is easier to see why, in his Chuan fabao ji, Du Fei (c. 7th-8th centuries) writes, "Ever 
since Bodhidharma, regarding demonstrating the Way, the masters have all used various 
skillful means to [lead the disciples] to realize the mind. They have spoken according to 
conditions without bonding [themselves] to fixed doctrines."1'' In this way, intertwined 
with the two distinguishing features of Chan as Buddha's mind and Chan as spontaneous 
living discussed above, Chan also came to be the tradition that does not rely on written 
words but embodies the mind-to-mind transmission outside the scriptures. 
Historically, the special transmission through the minds of Chan adepts has been 
expressed in the form of Chan patriarchal genealogies.112 This historical expression 
evidently consolidated Chan practitioners together as an independent group and 
contributed to the establishment of a unique Chan identity that led to the establishment of 
the Chan School in Chinese Buddhism. In the process of this establishment, Chan as a 
special mind-to-mind transmission outside the scriptures emphasized uncompromisingly 
the indispensability of a master's oral instructions to the practice of the disciple. This 
emphasis further brought about other distinguishing features of the Chan School, such as 
the prevalence of patriarchs' yulu §§H< or "recorded sayings" and the practice of 
111
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 Various scholars have made important contributions to this subject. Particularly, Japanese scholars like 
Yanagida Seizan $PEBI§I-U have demonstrated the constructive nature of such patriarchal genealogies in 
Chinese Buddhism; see e.g., Yanagida, Shoki zenshu shisho no kenkyu and Tanaka, "Zenshu toshi no hatten 
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Chan development; see, Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 1-12. Tracing the "mystique of transmission," 
Wendi Adamek has explored a much more complex web of ideas influencing the formation of Chan 
patriarchal genealogies, one of which is "to establish a true Dharma within the Dharma and a true Sarigha 
within the Sangha" (Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, 157). 
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gong'an -£-^? or "public cases" in the ensuing triumphant years of the tradition."3 
Contemplatively, Chan as a special mind-to-mind transmission outside the scriptures 
also informs us another important philosophical principle underlying the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation, that is the idea of sympathetic resonance. In sympathetic 
resonance, when objects, or beings, belong to the same category or class, they 
spontaneously resonate with each other without any mediation whatsoever. Thus, given 
this idea of sympathetic resonance, not only is the im-mediate transmission between the 
master and the disciple sanctioned, but the sudden awakening of the disciple is also. In 
Chapter 2 where Shenhui's sudden teachings are discussed, we will see exactly how the 
idea of sympathetic resonance plays an essential role in Shenhui's teachings as the path to 
realize the fruition of sudden awakening. 
III. The Search for a "Pure" Practice to Realize a "Pure" Chan 
From tracing the transformations of Chinese chan teachings to exploring the 
distinguishing features of Chan Buddhism, I have presented an origin narrative of Chan 
identity seen from a perspective sensitive to the contemplative concerns of the 
participants. In the narrative, I have argued that the expression of Chan identity came to 
being as a result of the mutual influence between Bodhidharma's mind-nature teachings 
and the various transformations of Chinese dhyana teachings over a period of five 
hundred years. Hence, the path of Chan to its formation was really a path of negotiations, 
on which early Chan contemplatives tried various ways to mediate the tensions caused by 
the differences among themselves and/or between traditional Buddhist views and their 
" For a detailed discussion on the histories and meanings of yulu and gong'an (or koari) in Chan/Zen 
Buddhism, see, e.g., Steven Heine and Dale S. Wright's three edited volumes, The Koan, The Zen Canon, 
and Zen Classics; see also McRae, Seeing Through Zen. 
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innovative teachings. 
Paradoxically, in negotiating their differences, early Chan contemplatives further 
reinforced their group identity, in which three distinguishing features came to best 
characterize their emerging school. These three features include: Chan as Buddha's mind, 
Chan as spontaneous living, and Chan as a special mind-to-mind transmission outside the 
scriptures. In addition to being the characteristics of the new school, these three features, 
for Chan practitioners, converge contemplatively on achieving the soteriological goal of 
directly realizing one's awakened mind or sudden awakening, thus making the new 
school to be known as the tradition of sudden awakening via the direct seeing of one's 
true mind-nature. As a result of this convergence, the three distinguishing features of 
Chan Buddhism provide a context for us to understand not only some of the philosophical 
principles underlying the logic of immediacy in contemplation but also the deeper 
meaning of the negotiations in which early Chan adepts participated. As the former will 
be discussed in the later chapters, I would like to devote the remaining pages of this 
chapter to the latter. 
Let me start this reflection with some questions. First, when considering their 
"negotiations" as converging contemplatively on the soteriological goal of sudden 
awakening, one naturally wonders why these early Chan practitioners were doing so. One 
possible reason emerging from our presentation of the three distinguishing features is that 
they considered sudden awakening not only the final fruition but also an indispensable 
part of the path, thus developing teachings, practices, and even the idea of patriarchal 
transmission around it and subsequently giving rise to the said convergence. In this way, 
sudden awakening embodies both the fruition and the path that leads to it. Yet, in making 
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sudden awakening the embodiment of both their goal and path, what were the early Chan 
contemplatives trying to do? Were they trying to illustrate some special message with 
their unique expression? Were they searching for a "pure" practice to realize a "pure" 
Chan that is "uncontaminated by its relationship to history,"114 as some scholars have 
suggested? Or, were they simply expressing what they realized via their awakening 
experiences? 
As a result of negotiations, the formation of Chan identity surely was not 
"uncontaminated by its relationship to history," at least in terms of its form. That is to say, 
as a social phenomenon, a "pure" Chan that has not changed in form with respect to 
historical or socioreligious conditions did not and will not exist, for everything is 
dependently arising and will change according to its changing conditions. Thus, in the 
above presentation, we see that since early on Chinese chan teachings had gone through 
various transformations, and different Chan teachings and practices were also proposed 
by different Chan masters. However, as a religious or spiritual exercise, a "pure" Chan 
could exist, but it could only exist in its "spirit" or formless form. Accordingly, even 
though the "negotiations" of early Chan practitioners exhibited a wide spectrum of 
differences, they also converged contemplatively on the idea of sudden awakening to 
one's own awakened mind that is formless, ever-present, and all-embracive. 
In this sudden awakening to the awakened mind, as we will see in the later chapters, 
the goal is to develop a unique style of self-awareness so that the practitioners can enjoy 
freedom without stagnation or bondage and at the same time act according to their 
socioreligious conditions. As Chan contemplatives try to manifest this all-embracive 
awareness, they can certainly be exposed to conceptual deviations, or in Bernard Faure's 
114
 Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 182. 
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term, "deviationist risks," such as intellectualism, frozen systemization, and 
ontic-hypostatization. However, even if they are under such risks, they do not need to 
develop any "scapegoat mechanism"115 to exorcize such conceptual deviations or 
dualistically heterodox ideas, not only because such development is itself a conceptual 
deviation but also because the best "exorcist" of dualistic heterodoxies is one's 
primordially self-awareness that, by nature, "transcendfs] discriminating thought and 
dualism, even while he freely responds to things and engages in everyday events, without 
hindrance or confusion."116 In this sense, the "pure" Chan illustrated with the idea of 
sudden awakening is to ask its practitioners to have a unique style of knowing that is 
similar to Eliot Deutsch's notion, a knowing that is centered in reality and involves 
wonder, openness, insight, and love. 
Given this understanding, I argue that early Chan contemplatives' pursuit of a 
"pure" practice to realize a "pure" Chan was neither to establish a doctrinal system or a 
school that is uncontaminated by its relationship to history, nor an endeavor trying to 
bring back an idealized past or to bring forth a transcendent realm that cannot be 
contaminated by anything at all. Rather, it was a message from the experiences of Chan 
masters to ask their followers to participate as fully and openly as possible in their 
everyday lives with their vitalized awarenesses so that they could eventually reveal their 
True-nature without any mediation. As such, I am reminded of Matthew Kapstein's 
thoughtful reflection on the study of religious experience; he writes, 
115
 In his conclusion to The Will to Orthodoxy, Bernard Faure writes, "By assigning the role of scapegoat to 
the Northern school, which thus became the emblematic figure of heterodoxy, one could succeed in 
limiting in time and space those deviationist risks (intellectualism, quetism, secularization) to which Chan 
is constantly exposed" (182). For his discussion on this "scapegoat mechaism" in the Chan tradition, see 
also Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 49. 
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Philosophical reflection on religious experience goes wrong when it 
treats its topic primarily as the concern of a denaturalized 
epistemology; religious experience should be considered, rather, in its 
connection with the ways of "spiritual exercise," or of the 
"technologies of the self," as elaborated within specific life-worlds.117 
Thus, the study of Chan teachings, or religious knowledge in general, I would also argue, 
goes wrong if it only considers its topic as the concern of sociopolitical or religious 
institutional struggle for power. Rather, it should be balanced with its existential or 
contemplative transformation effect that, after all, is the higher goal as elaborated within 
its specific worldview. I believe it is with this understanding in mind that my above 
narrative of the pursuit of a "pure" Chan via the various negotiations of early Chan 
contemplatives would be best contextualized and appreciated. 
It is true that religious knowledge has sociopolitical significance, as any knowledge 
would. Thus, it can certainly be used (or rather abused) by individuals or institutions to 
fulfill personal or sectarian purposes; such examples can be undoubtedly found in the 
history of every religion. Nonetheless, if we treat religious knowledge, similar to Eliot 
Deutsch, not as having "a distinctive or special object", but as having "a unique style or 
manner" of knowing, religious knowledge such as the teaching of a "pure" Chan could 
inspire its practitioners to manifest an awareness of "wonder, openness, insight, and 
love," while maintaining a mind of tranquility that is centered in reality.118 In such a way, 
the boundary of the abuser and the abused, and any dualistic categories for that matter, 
could be "vitalized" and even deconstructed, for their ways of knowing have been 
vitalized with a lively awareness. Perhaps, such a lively awareness is the best 
wonder-making gift one can obtain from any religious knowledge including the teaching 
117
 Kapstein, "Rethinking Religious Experience: Seeing the Light in the History of Religions," 281. 
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 For Eliot Deutsch's idea, see his paper entitled "Knowing Religiously" in the edited volume, Knowing 
Religiously, by Leroy Rouner. The quotations are in Deutsch, "Knowing Religiously," 22. 
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of a "pure" Chan. 
In this way, the above reflection on the pursuit of a "pure" practice to realize a 
"pure" Chan can therefore be seen as to revealing the deeper meaning of the negotiations 
through which early Chan contemplatives centralized the idea of sudden awakening to 
one's own awakened mind. As a result, the origin narrative of Chan development 
presented in this chapter not only demonstrates how the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation came to being in Chan. Since the perspective taken is more sensitive to the 
contemplative concerns of the participants that shape the spiritual elements of their 
tradition, it thus also provides an alternative reading, as shown above, to studies of Chan 
teachings and history only performed from the sociopolitical perspective. Those studies, 
without concerning spiritual or religious efficacy, may one-sidedly characterize the 
development of a religious tradition like Chan as "the outcome of the 'will to 
orthodoxy,'"119 a result of a religious sect rising through power struggle. 
"
9
 Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 4. 
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Chapter 2. Sympathetic Resonance and "Equal Learning": 
The Contemplative Structure of Shenhui's Sudden Teaching 
Recognized by some modern scholars as the Chan master who "first championed the 
doctrine of sudden enlightenment,"1 Shenhui } $ # (684-758) undoubtedly serves as a 
fine exemplar for furthering our understanding of the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation following the historical study of Chan formation in the previous chapter. 
Even though his life and teachings have been examined by various scholars, the 
contemplative structure of his sudden teaching, in my opinion, has not been thoroughly 
and/or fairly explored.2 Accordingly, my discussion in Chapter 2 not only will contribute 
to our investigation into the idea of immediacy but also will provide an alternative, i.e., 
contemplative, reading of Shenhui's legacy that has been mostly discussed from the 
sociopolitical perspective in the past. 
Indeed, to an extent, ever since he decided to "set straight the orthodoxy" (Ch. ding 
zongzhi JSTK if) in the wuzhe da hui M M ^ # or "unrestricted great assembly" of 732 
CE at the Dayun si ^ft^f of Huatai ffiiS (northeast of Luoyang }&PH), Shenhui was 
destined to be a controversial person. As the initiator of the debates between the Northern 
and the Southern Sects in Chan,3 he has been "portrayed ... as an extremist [by 
Adamek], ... as a precocious rationalist revolutionary (in Hu Shi's representation) or as a 
self-aggrandizing opportunist (a coloring that emerges in studies by Faure and McRae)."4 
Thus, various studies have only focused on understanding the polemic effects of 
1
 McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism," 231. 
2
 See e.g., McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism"; 
Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, 89-100; and Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, 171-179. 
3
 For related issues, see, e.g., Peter N. Gregory's edited volume, Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to 
Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, particularly Luis Gomez's "Purifying Gold: The Metaphor of Effort and 
Intuition in Buddhist Thought and Practice." 
4
 Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, 138. 
90 
Shenhui's "campaign" against the Northern Sect.5 
However, the question remains: Is Shenhui's sudden Chan purely rhetorical without 
involving any practice of ongoing spiritual training, as some scholars have suggested? 
My investigation below suggests otherwise. Based on his oral and written teachings given 
in the three Dunhuang manuscripts,7 namely, (1) Heze heshang wenda za zhengyi ffiM 
fOilfnlii^tlftii (hereafter Zhengyi)* (2) Nanyang heshang dunjiao jietuo chanmen 
zhiliao xing tanyu W%ft±MWRW&TeiM.~7&?§B (hereafter Tanyu),9 and (3) 
Putidamo nanzong ding shifei lun l f ^ M J ? J ^ ^ £ l i : l ^ t r a (hereafter Shifei lun), I 
delve into Shenhui's sudden teaching and reveal its underlying structure for 
contemplation. As a result, I argue that Shenhui's sudden Chan did not just impact later 
Chan rhetorically as other scholars have suggested,'' but it provided a logic of 
5
 For example, (1) among other issues, Bernard Faure analyzed that Shenhui's division of Chan into the 
"Northern School" and the "Southern School" had the effect of placing the Northern School as a scapegoat 
for heterodoxy in the development of early Chan; see Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 47-52 and Faure, 
The Will to Orthodoxy, 182. (2) Scholars like Tanaka Ryosho, John McRae, and Bernard Faure have 
amended Shenhui's implied criticism that the teachings of the Northern School were all gradualist in nature; 
see Tanaka, Tonko zenshtt bunken no kenkyu SWU }$ ^  >£ K ^ W5£ (A Study of Dunhuang Chan 
Manuscripts), McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch 'an Buddhism, Chapter VII, and 
Faure, The Will to Orthodoxy, Chapter 4. (3) John McRae and Bernard Faure have also explored the impact 
of Shenhui's "campaign" on the formation of later Chan teachings, especially on the avoidance of dualistic 
formations and the employment of the rhetoric of immediacy; see McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of 
Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism" and Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 11-78. 
6
 See e.g., McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism." 
7
 For these three Dunhuang texts, I have mainly relied on Hu Shi's collection and recension for my study; 
see Hu, Shenhui heshang yiji ffil^ftlfnsWM {A Collection of Monk Shenhui's Writings). Occasionally, I 
have also used Lin Junfu's compilation, Heze Shenhui dashi yulu ffiMfflik^.'Sfisu&k (The Recorded 
Sayings of Master Heze Shenhui) for some revisions. For a more detailed bibliographical reference on these 
Dunhuang texts, see e.g., the bibliography of Wendi Adamek's The Mystique of Transmission under the 
corresponding entries. 
8
 This title can be translated as Miscellaneous Dialogues of the Venerable of Heze. 
9
 This title can be translated as The Platform Address of the Venerable of Nanyang on Directly 
Comprehending the Nature According to the Chan Approach of Emancipation in the Sudden Teaching. 
10
 This title can be translated as Treatise Determining the True and False about the Southern School of 
Bodhidharma. 
11
 Regarding the rhetorical impact of Shenhui's sudden teaching, John McRae writes, "In combination with 
his doctrine of subitism, the very heat of Shen-hui's criticism of gradualism had a rhetorical impact of the 
highest significance: by publicly criticizing one faction's meditation teachings he made all the members of 
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immediacy for contemplation and a way to realize sudden awakening, which Shenhui 
insisted to be the orthodoxy and orthopraxy inherited from the past patriarchs from 
Bodhidharma H J i g g E (d. 536?) down to his master Huineng jg$= (638-713) and 
which was carried further by the "descendents of the Southern School" such as Mazu's 
Hffl (709-788) Hongzhou School (Ch. hongzhou zong )MWTK), Shitou's ~BHi 
(700-790) Shitou School (Ch. shitou zong HHSTK), as well as the later "Five Houses" 
(Ch. wujia TiM) of classic Chan.12 
I. No-Thought: Sympathetic Resonance with the Awakened Mind 
So, how did Shenhui's sudden teaching have such an impact on the development of 
Chan, especially when some earlier studies have criticized his sudden teaching as 
inconsistent or rhetorical? Moreover, in his The Rhetoric of Immediacy, Bernard Faure 
goes further to argue a general skepticism on the teaching of sudden awakening; for 
the growing Ch'an school more aware of the external expression—the packaging, if you will—of their 
ideas and modes of practice. After Shen-hui, Ch'an masters learned to protect themselves from criticism by 
avoiding dualist formulations. ... This imposition of the avoidance of dualistic formulations, which I call 
the rule of rhetorical purity, was one of Shen-hui's most important areas of impact on Chinese Ch'an" 
(emphasis added; McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an 
Buddhism," 258). 
12
 The Five Houses are (1) Guiyang School >MPTK, (2) Linji or Rinzai School WMTK, (3) Caodong or 
Soto School W^ITT?, (4) Yunmen School HHTT?, and (5) Fayan School /'SUTJ?. For a history of and an 
introduction to these schools, see, e.g., Du and Wei, Zhongguo chanzong tongshi ^ B ^ ^ S i {The 
General History of Chinese Chan School), Chapter 5; Yang, Tang wudai chanzong shi U S E f ^ l ? ^ ^ 
(The History of Chan School in the Tang and Five Dynasties), Chapter 8; Cleary, The Five Houses of Zen; 
and Dumoulin, Zen Buddhism: A History, 211-242. 
13
 In his "Purifying Gold," Luis Gomez argues that, in the polemic context of Shenhui's attempt to draw 
the line that separates his type of Chan from that of the Northern School, one can "discover the 
complexities and inconsistencies of his position" (74); see also Gomez, "Purifying Gold," 74-86. In his 
"Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism," John McRae concludes 
the paper with the following words, "Just as Shen-hui's major effort was propagandistic, his major impact 
lay in the realm of rhetoric and mythopoeia. In addition to establishing a standard of rhetorical purity, he is 
responsible for the addition of many new anecdotes regarding Bodhidharma and the early patriarchs to the 
early Ch'an library. In the process Shen-hui helped make the theory of the transmission of the dharma 
much more concrete and precise, even though he did not significantly alter the conceptual basis of the 
theory" (258); see also McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an 
Buddhism," 250-251; 253-255. 
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Faure, sudden awakening is perfectly aporetical since there is no way leading to it, and 
thus, sudden awakening cannot be the result of an empirical progress, but essentially a 
"by-product" of one's spiritual practice.14 
To be sure, for Shenhui, sudden awakening is definitely not a "by-product." Even 
though it is aporetical, because one cannot reason it out through dialectics, there still exist 
contemplative practices to empirically realize it. Put another way, I would say that, for 
Shenhui, it is exactly because there is no intentional or dialectical way leading to one's 
awakened mind (Skt. bodhicitta; Ch. putixin m§>QiS Tib. byang chub kyi sems) that one 
needs to realize it through the idea of immediacy, or more precisely, the contemplative 
practice of "sympathetic resonance" (Ch. xiangying ^§0,)-
A. Sympathetic Resonance: An Access to the Unconditional and Holistic Being of 
Awakened Mind 
Essentially, Shenhui's logic of immediacy or suddenness in contemplation is 
predicated on his understanding of what the true nature of one's awakened mind is, which, 
we will see from below, is completely in line with the philosophical principles underlying 
the idea of immediacy discussed in the previous chapter. Specifically, for Shenhui, one's 
awakened mind is not only innate (Ch. benju ^ M ) or unconditional (Ch. fei yuanqi ffi 
^^E) but also ubiquitous or all-pervasive (Ch. bian yiqie chu M—tUlS)- Because it is 
unconditional, one's awakened mind can only be directly revealed with "effortlessness" 
(Ch. wuzuo Mf1=) via the practice of sympathetic resonance, for any intentional effort is 
conditional and thus incompatible with one's awakened mind. In this revealing of one's 
awakened mind, one can only be awakened rather than become awakened, for one's 
1
 See Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 44-47. 
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awakened mind involves no becoming in essence even though its manifestations may 
change with conditions.15 In this sense, one's awakened mind is actually an awake mind 
at all times. It is only to follow the traditional designation that I refer this awake mind as 
the awakened mind throughout the dissertation. 
Moreover, for Shenhui, the all-pervasive property of one's awakened mind dictates 
that the practitioner maintain this being awakened in effortlessness in all actions, namely, 
not just in the Buddhist practice of meditation but in all of one's everyday actions and 
experiences. In this way, Shenhui's suddenness teaches the practitioner to live as a 
holistic being, in which one abandons any thought of intentionality to become awakened, 
but to directly be awakened with effortless sympathetic resonance, not just in meditation 
but in all actions. Here, the directional course of intentionality is replaced by the holistic 
embracing of sympathetic resonance in effortlessness. 
Let me elaborate Shenhui's suddenness further with his own words. In his Zhengyi, 
Shenhui teaches, 
Not through gradual steps to understand but due to [the mind's] 
nature is the meaning of sudden awakening. [To realize that] one's 
mind is originally empty and tranquil is [the meaning of] sudden 
awakening. That this mind does not dwell [on anything whatsoever] 
is [the meaning of] sudden awakening.16 
Clearly, from this passage, for Shenhui, suddenness is warranted, and even dictated, 
because of the true nature of one's awakened mind. And, this awakened mind is, in 
15
 In discussing the subitist interpretations of tathagatagarbha praxis, Robert E. Buswell also argues this 
point; he writes, "The Tathagatagarbha premise that enlightenment was inherent in the mind of each and 
every sentient being led to the conclusion that one need only accept—that is, believe fully in—that claim in 
order to realize one's enlightenment. Tathagatagarbha praxis as it was conceived in East Asian Buddhism 
thus results not in the person becoming enlightened (and thus changing his fundamental nature) but simply 
being enlightened (merely accepting that fundamental nature)" (Buswell, The Formation ofCh 'an Ideology 
in China and Korea, 143). 
16
 Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 130; r^Efefefc/Wft¥ • UBWi ' » f g f l • g > f r f f i # E # £ & T O 8 1 § • 
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essence, empty and tranquil. It does not dwell on anything whatsoever, but like empty 
space, it exists constantly and permeates ubiquitously. It is an indivisible whole beyond 
reasoning and conditional arising (Skt. pratityasamutpada; Ch. yuanqi HJjl£; Tib. 
rten 'brel), and is called the "suchness-body" (Skt. dharmakaya; Ch. zhenru shen ~Mjfl}M", 
Tib. chos sku) of the Buddha.17 This understanding of Shenhui's is not unique and can be 
even said to be a mainstream of the Buddhist world in the Tang dynasty. What is unique 
is that Shenhui conflates this understanding of the awakened mind with sudden 
awakening. For Shenhui, since one's awakened mind is an indivisible whole beyond 
reasoning and conditional arising, it cannot be realized through gradual steps.18 Rather, it 
can only be realized through the gate of suddenness, particularly, the work of sympathetic 
resonance.19 
In Chinese cosmology, the idea of sympathetic resonance indicates that those who 
belong to the same category or lei M. can "spontaneously resonate with each other just 
as do two identically tuned strings on a pair of zithers."20 Thus, for Shenhui, suddenness 
17
 In his Tanyu, Shenhui teaches, "Just be aware that the original substance is tranquil and empty of any 
[substantial] things whatsoever. It does not abide [on anything] either. Same as the empty space, it 
permeates ubiquitously. It is the suchness-body of the Buddha ({I g & ^ f U J H • QLWR^ ' JfM&M ' 
^ | H ] j t ^ . MM^fM ' §.mn%l%>M$UM)"(Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 240). 
18
 For Shenhui, if something that is conditionally arisen, then it belongs to the realm of gradualness. Thus, 
in his Zhengyi, when a lay official asks him, "If [one's awakened mind] is not based on conditional arising, 
how does it know?" Shenhui replies, "On this original substance that is empty and tranquil, it is 
self-endowed with prajha awareness that knows. It does not rely on conditional arising. If it is based on 
conditional arising, then it has gradual sequence ( 2 £ £ 3 g ^ ± • ^Wpt5*§W& • >Ffxti& ° S i T $ t S ' 
SP^-^H)" (Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 113). 
19
 In his Zhengyi, Shenhui takes the following position on his advocacy of suddenness: "Now I do not 
speak of Five Vehicles but [directly] entering into Buddha's knowing and seeing. Based on the meaning of 
this sutra, it only demonstrates the gate of suddenness. Only instantaneous sympathetic resonance is 
allowed [i.e., is feasible]. Indeed, it can never be [realized] via gradual steps (^ ? ES^ @ £ ^ • Df£"B A{j$£n 
JL • mm$m • p.mmn ° « # - ^ * M • nmmmmnuu, shenhui heshangyiji, my 
20
 Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism, 83. For a more detailed discussion on the notion of 
sympathetic resonance in Chinese cosmology, see Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism, 82-88. 
For indie ideas of resonance such as the "Seal of Sambhu," see, e.g., Muller-Ortega, "On the Seal of 
Sambhu." 
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only comes from the practitioner realizing that one's own mind is, in essence, tranquil, 
empty of any inherent existence, and not dwelling on anything whatsoever. This 
realization essentially puts its practitioner in the same category as the Buddhas. 
Consequently, the practitioner can have "instantaneous sympathetic resonance" (Ch. 
yinian xiangying — l&fflM) with the state of Buddhahood and thus "enter" the realm of 
Buddha's knowing and seeing (Ch. fo zhijian f$j£DM)-21 
B. No-Thought: The Dhyana of the Tathagata as Sympathetic Resonance 
Yet, for Shenhui, what does sympathetic resonance really mean? In his Zhengyi, 
Shenhui explains, 
The meaning of sympathetic resonance is to see [the state of] no-
thought. To see [the state of] no-thought is to realize one's self-nature. 
To realize one's self-nature is to grasp nothing [whatsoever]. Because 
of grasping nothing, it is the dhyana of the tathagata.22 
So, for Shenhui, sympathetic resonance is really a way to realize the dhyana of the 
tathagata (Ch. rulai chan ^D^liO, particularly attained by attuning oneself to "see [the 
state of] no-thought," to "realize one's self-nature," and to "grasp nothing [whatsoever]." 
This is because any intention of grasping is conditional, thus deviating oneself from the 
effortlessness or spontaneity of sympathetic resonance. It is only when one goes beyond 
all dualities, neither "activates thought" (Ch. zuoyi j^M) nor "non-activates thought" 
(Ch. bu zuoyi ^ f f M)> can the practitioner realize sympathetic resonance in its 
This entering is an entering that comes from the manifestation of one's innate awakening. Thus, it does 
not involve any sense of becoming but the manifestation of one's innate being. 
22
 Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 131-132; r f f i f f i«^ ' §BUfc& • [ H M ^ # • ] t I 7 § t t • [ 7 § t £ f ' ] 
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effortlessness. In this way, Shenhui's suddenness, in effect, is really asking the 
practitioner to be in the state of effortlessness, a hallmark of Buddhahood, through his or 
her sympathetic resonance with the awakened qualities of the Buddha. 
Moreover, among the awakened qualities of the Buddha, Shenhui particularly 
emphasizes wunian te^ or "no-thought." For him, suchness (Ch. zhenru S^Q) is the 
root of wunian. Accordingly, Shenhui, following his master Huineng, makes wunian the 
principle (Ch. zong TK) of his system.24 However, what is Shenhui's wunian? In short, 
non-activating thought is wunian?5 But, Shenhui does not stop there. For him, wunian 
asks the practitioner to not give rise to dualistic thoughts so that the "fundamental 
wisdom" or "original awareness" (Ch. benzhi ^H1) of one's awakened mind, empty and 
tranquil by nature, can manifest to "know" (Ch. zhi £fl) the world.26 
This original awareness that knows is not conditionally arisen. It is the nature of the 
awakened mind. In fact, for Shenhui, this original awareness that knows is ultimate 
reality (Ch. shixiang IjfflEJ).27 I believe that it is due to this understanding that in his 
Thus, Shenhui clarifies, "All cultivators, the mind does not have [the colors of] green, yellow, red, white, 
or black, nor does it have [the movements of] entering, exiting, coming, or going and [the ideas of] far, near, 
front, or back; it neither activates thought nor non-activates thought. As such, it is sympathetic resonance 
tfc)" (Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 133). 
24
 In his Tanyu, Shenhui states, "Suchness is the substance of wunian [i.e., no-thought]. Because of this 
meaning, [I] establish 'wunian' as the principle (M^Q^Ult^^ ' K M i © • i t rMlkj ^ T K ) " (HU, 
Shenhui heshang yiji, 240-241). 
25
 Hu, Shenhui heshang yiji, 101; ""^Rfcg • B P U M ^ ° j 
26
 On wunian's relation with dualistic thoughts, Shenhui states, "Transcend both being and nonbeing, and 
[the idea of] Middle Way is also lost. That is wunian ( W i s S t S • tPMJFtl^ ' WxkMlS)" (Hu, Shenhui 
heshang yiji, 145). When the mind is in the state of wunian, for Shenhui, "The mind naturally has nothing. 
This mind of having nothing is, by nature, empty and tranquil. On this empty-and-tranquil substance, it is 
self-endowed with original awareness that knows as its illuminating manifestation ('|j|tJ$K$3 ° SfJ$R$3'lj ' 
mt^m' %&m±. • gm*gmmmmmr(Hu, shenhui heshangyiji, 102). 
27
 In his Zhengyi, Shenhui once teaches, "On this substance of wunian, it is self-endowed with the life of 
awareness. This life of original awareness is the ultimate reality ( f t t ^ f l J ^ . g^J^jj'tfp - ^ ^ ^ p B P M ^ f f l ) " 
(Hu, Shenhui heshang yiji, 101). 
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Chanyuan zhu quanji duxu }WMWit^M::ffi^f {Prolegomenon to the Collection of 
Expressions of the Chan Source), Zongmi ^ ^ (780-841)28 characterizes Shenhui's 
teaching as follows: 
All the sages have said that everything is dreamlike. Thus, deluded 
thoughts are fundamentally tranquil. Conditional objects are 
fundamentally empty. The mind that is empty and tranquil [is 
endowed with] spiritual knowing that is not concealed [i.e., utterly 
lucid]. It is this empty-and-tranquil knowing that is your true nature. 
Be it deluded or enlightened, the mind, by nature, is self-aware. It is 
not born out of conditions, nor does it arise due to circumstances. The 
single word of knowing [is] the gate of myriad wonders.29 
In this way, Shenhui's wunian is not just the state of no-thought, but the basis (Ch. ben 
:$) to present the original awareness or "spiritual knowing" (Ch. lingzhi M^D) of one's 
awakened mind, which is "the gate of myriad wonders" (Ch. zhongmiao zhi men 1$M}~Z-
f"5). As a result, in his Zhengyi, Shenhui characterizes wunian as the "omniscient 
awareness" (Ch. yiqiezhi ^W"§i),3° and in the Shifei lun recorded by Dugu Pei ®M>fP 
(c. lih-%th centuries), Shenhui acclaims, 
For one who sees wunian, six faculties have no defilements. One who 
sees wunian reaches [the realm of] Buddha's knowing and seeing. 
One who sees wunian is named the ultimate reality. One who sees 
wunian [realizes] the unsurpassable truth of the Middle Way. One 
who sees wunian simultaneously realizes virtues as many as the sands 
of the Ganges. One who sees wunian can develop all dharma. One 
28
 An important Buddhist scholar-monk in the Tang dynasty, Guifeng Zongmi ^EM^TX^^ (780-841) has 
been recognized as the fifth patriarch of the Huayan School (Ch. huayan zong ^ ^ ^ ) as well as a 
patriarch of the Heze Sect (Ch. heze zong ffiM-Tri) of Southern Chan. He left a number of important 
records on the Buddhist teachings and history in Tang China, and is thus considered by modern scholars 
one of the most important figures in East Asian Buddhism. For a study of Zongmi and his teachings, see, 
e.g., Gregory, Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism. 
29
 Zongmi, Chanyuan zhu quanji duxu, T. 48 (2015): 402c27-403a2;r If fejtU^' §f S U M ° $&lk^-M ' 
30
 In his Zhengyi, at one place Shenhui characterizes wunian as follows: "Wunian is one thought. One 
thought is the omniscient awareness (fiE^gPM—^ ' — ^ BPII—WW)" (Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 145). 
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who sees wunian encompasses all dharma.31 
With its myriad wonders, for Shenhui, the original awareness accompanied by the 
state of wunian empowers its practitioner to participate in all worldly phenomena with 
one's ordinary senses and still keep the mind in the state of complete openness and 
tranquility. So, Shenhui asserts, "one [who] sees wunian, even though still operating with 
[one's ordinary senses of] seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing, remains in constant 
openness and tranquility. That is, at once, the simultaneous equalness of sila, samadhi, 
and prajna replete with myriad practices."32 This is reminiscent of the wunianxing fib^ 
f l or the "practice of no-thought" in Huineng's Platform Sutra fJIM where Huineng 
teaches, 
[E]ven though you see all things, you do not attach to them, but, 
always keeping your own nature pure, cause the six thieves to exit 
through the six gates. Even though you are in the midst of the six 
dusts, you do not stand apart from them, yet are not stained by them, 
and are free to come and go. 
In such a neither-grasping-nor-relinquishing way, Huineng and Shenhui ask their 
followers to accord with the Buddha dharma in their daily activities in the manner of 
wunian that ultimately and instantaneously puts them in the same category as the 
Buddhas. As a result, the contemplatives reveal their own true self-nature in sympathetic 
resonance. Shenhui insists that, since one's awakened mind, by nature, grasps nothing 
and is nongraspable, no intentional approaches can lead one to it. Consequently, he 
31
 Hu, Shenhuiheshangyiji, 309; r H & t ^ # • / N ^ I M ^ • JUfc&# • f#ft#f#DM • ! .#&&# • £ & W 
32
 Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 241; r g j y * ^ # • i H H * » • M^M ' gPiS/E*-Bf^# • Mft 
mm • j 
33
 Liuzu tanjing, T. 48 (2007): 340c20-22; ' &—tyfe • - T l — W£ • ffl—KJS5 ' ^fM—WM ' ftJf g 
t± ' { ^ / N ^ / N P I ^ m • K-/NJS41 • ^ f t^lfe ' f S S 4 " j The translation is taken from Yampolsky, 
The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, 153. 
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directs his followers to suddenness with the sympathetic resonance ofwunian. In the state 
of no-thought, the practitioner spontaneously and effortlessly manifests his or her own 
awakened mind in its holistic (or all-inclusive) state of being. 
II. A Holistic Practice: Shenhui's Integration of Sudden Awakening and Gradual 
Cultivation 
For Shenhui, even though there are no intentional approaches that can lead one to 
one's awakened mind, the sympathetic resonance of no-thought is an empirical practice 
with which one artfully, rather than arduously, cultivates oneself for realization. I argue 
that this "artful endeavor"34 of Shenhui's wunian lies in his unique integration of sudden 
awakening and gradual cultivation. With this integration, I argue, Shenhui's sudden Chan 
essentially conveys that the logic of immediacy in contemplation must paradoxically 
involve gradualness, but it must integrate the gradualness in the context of suddenness so 
that the logic of immediacy can be artfully implemented without the dualistic or 
conceptual faults implied by the idea of gradualness. 
A. Gradual Cultivation within the Context of Sudden Awakening 
Based on Zongmi's reading, some scholars have interpreted Shenhui's teaching of 
sudden awakening and gradual cultivation as "sudden enlightenment followed by gradual 
cultivation"; their interpretations consider Shenhui's sudden enlightenment as an initial 
instantaneous experience of enlightenment insight, with which the practitioner further 
34
 Here, I am borrowing the term "artful endeavor" from Anne C. Klein and Geshe Tenzin Wangyal 
Rinpoche, which they discuss in their Unbounded Wholeness regarding the practice of Dzogchen. Even 
though the specific contents of their artful endeavor are not necessarily the same, both Shenhui and 
Dzogchen emphasize the inappropriateness of arduous effort, as effort is incompatible with the awakened 
mind (Shenhui) and open awareness (Dzogchen). For a detailed discussion on artful endeavor, see Klein 
and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 110-116. 
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cultivates himself or herself so as to achieve the final realization. I argue that, for 
Shenhui, sudden awakening and gradual cultivation must be integrated in a way so that 
sudden awakening does not just bring an initial instantaneous experience of insight, but it 
actually serves as a constant guiding principle, or more precisely, an innate principle, for 
gradual cultivation. In this way, Shenhui's gradual cultivation must be integrated in the 
context of sudden awakening rather than follow after it. As it is integrated in the context 
of suddenness, Shenhui's gradual cultivation must be in-spirited with suddenness so that 
it effectively traverses no stages but only takes its goal as the path, thereby avoiding the 
dualistic or conceptual mediation implied in the usual gradualist models of realization. 
To understand his unique integration of sudden awakening and gradual cultivation, 
Shenhui's response to Monk Zhide !&%§. (c. 8 century) is exactly what we need. In the 
Zhengyi, Zhide wonders why Shenhui only emphasizes sudden awakening and does not 
permit gradual cultivation. So he asks, "Is it not true that one takes gradual steps to 
ascend a nine-story platform?" To that Shenhui responds, 
[I am] just afraid that what is being ascended is not a nine-story 
platform but a dirt mound and barbarian tomb. If it is actually a 
nine-story platform, this is the meaning of sudden awakening. Now 
[if one is to] establish gradualness in the suddenness, this is like 
ascending a nine-story platform via gradual steps. However, it is not 
permissible to establish gradualness in the gradualness.36 
The above response of Shenhui's strongly suggests that his sudden awakening is to 
correctly locate the "nine-story platform "37 that symbolizes the path to Buddhahood. 
For example, Peter Gregory has interpreted Zongmi's understanding as a three-staged model of the path: 
(1) initial insight, (2) gradual cultivation, and (3) final enlightenment; see Gregory, "Sudden Enlightenment 
Followed by Gradual Cultivation," 283. See also McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden 
Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism," 253-255. 
36
 Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 130; r&:Sr?TS# • ^ J & A « £ £ • S H S # ± * £ ^ • S » J i A J I £ £ • 
itmwmm • ^mn^minnm^ • ww&wzs • mmmm • ^timfmizmm • J 
37
 It is interesting that Shenhui used a "nine-story platform" to symbolize the path to Buddhahood. Did he 
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That is to say, it is when the nine-story platform is correctly found that one can then 
gradually climb it to the top, thus giving rise to Shenhui's integration of gradual 
cultivation within the context of sudden awakening. On the other hand, if one starts from 
gradualness, metaphorically speaking, for Shenhui, it is setting the compass in a wrong 
direction so that one can only find some "dirt mound and barbarian tomb." Having found 
the wrong place, no matter how one arduously makes the gradual steps, one will still be 
on the "dirt mound" and never get to the top of the "nine-story platform," i.e., the state of 
ultimate awakening. Thus, Shenhui uncompromisingly insists that it is not permissible to 
talk about gradualness in the gradualness. 
B. The Revelation of Sudden Awakening for Gradual Cultivation: Taking the Goal 
as the Path 
In the context of integrating gradual cultivation into sudden awakening, Shenhui 
further explains what he really means by sudden awakening to Zhide, 
(1) [With respect to everything,] the simultaneous understanding of 
its theoretical principle and [phenomenal] insight is called sudden 
awakening. (2) Not through gradual steps to understand but due to 
[the mind's] nature is the meaning of sudden awakening. (3) [To 
realize that] one's mind is originally empty and tranquil is [the 
meaning of] sudden awakening. (4) That this mind does not dwell [on 
anything whatsoever] is [the meaning of] sudden awakening. (5) That 
one realizes, through the phenomena, the mind that grasps nothing is 
[the meaning of] sudden awakening. (6) That one knows all the 
phenomena as such is [the meaning of] sudden awakening. (7) That 
one hears [the teaching of] sunyata but does not attach to the 
emptiness, nor grasps non-emptiness, is [the meaning of] sudden 
awakening. (8) That one hears [the teaching of] atman but does not 
attach to the self, nor grasps selflessness, is [the meaning of] sudden 
imply that there exist specifically nine stages or nine hierarchical vehicles for the path? Or was he referring 
to something else? While there is no particular evidence for us to ascertain what he meant exactly, the 
significance of number nine in Chinese culture may indicate that Shenhui chose nine to represent the 
highest achievement simply because of cultural reference. Historically, the number nine has been 
associated with the emperor whose robe is often ornamented with nine dragons, and Chinese mythology 
states that the dragon has nine children. 
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awakening. (9) That one does not abandon birth and death [i.e., 
samsara] to enter nirvana is [the meaning of] sudden awakening.38 
This series of nine explanations of what sudden awakening means, I would argue, 
points out, for Shenhui, not only what the "nine-story platform" is, but also how to climb 
it. As my interpretation below will clearly show that these nine explanations collectively 
illustrate both the theoretical (i.e., what) and the practical (i.e., how) aspects of the 
"nine-story platform," they do not actually correspond to the "nine stories" of the 
platform. This interesting correspondence is purely coincidental. 
Then, how should we construe the above nine explanations with respect to the 
"nine-story platform"? Generally speaking, Shenhui's nine explanations of sudden 
awakening can be divided into three parts, namely, an integration (Explanation 1), a 
section on the theoretical aspect (Explanations 2-4), and a section on the practical aspect 
(Explanations 5-9). Among them, in the previous section I have used the theoretical 
reasoning of Explanations 2-4 to argue that Shenhui's insistence on sudden awakening is 
predicated on the nature of one's awakened mind that is indivisible and holistic, and thus 
realizable only in the sympathetic resonance of wunian. Given this understanding, as the 
"target" of sudden awakening, Shenhui's "nine-story platform" can then be ascertained to 
be the true nature of one's awakened mind. Put another way, the "nine-story platform" is 
Shenhui's analog as a symbolic embodiment of the indivisible wholeness of one's 
awakened mind. 
But, how does one climb this indivisible "nine-story platform" of one's awakened 
38
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mind? In the integration of Explanation 1, Shenhui clearly identifies that everything 
consists of its "theoretical principle" (Ch. // §[) and "phenomenal insight" (Ch. zhi ^), 
which must be simultaneously realized to make his sudden teaching complete.39 This 
integration of theoretical principle and phenomenal insight is the doctrinal basis for 
Shenhui to integrate subitism with gradualism, for the theoretical principle of suddenness 
has to be actualized by the phenomenal or practical insight of gradual cultivation, just as 
the "nine-story platform" of one's awakened mind, though it is indivisible in principle, 
paradoxically does have "nine-stories" in phenomenon, which can and has to be climbed 
to get to the top. 
Naturally, one wonders next: What then are the "nine-stories" for Shenhui? From 
the above practical section of Explanations 5-9, I argue that the "nine-stories" represent 
all phenomena and all activities in which the practitioner participates. Thus, they include 
everything ranging from mundane phenomena to the Buddhist teachings of siinyata and 
atman, or put another way, everything between and including samsara and nirvana. 
Given this all-inclusive "nine-story platform," for Shenhui, the key lies in a unique 
attitude or manner, which the practitioner manifests to climb the "nine stories." Take 
Explanation 5, "That one realizes, through the phenomena, the mind that grasps nothing 
is [the meaning of] sudden awakening," as an example (Explanations 6-9 can be analyzed 
similarly). Here, what Shenhui directs his audience to do is that as one interacts with all 
39
 Traditionally, Chinese Buddhists had understood the relationship between li 5jt and zhi If to be "// 
attained via the guidance ofzhf (Ch. liyou zhidao BJEfiisliO- While it cannot be verified definitely that 
Shenhui was the first to advocate the idea of simultaneous understanding of li and zhi, he must be one of 
the first precursors. In his commentary to the Avatamsaka-sutra, Chengguan >§tl (738-839), the fourth 
patriarch of Huayan School (Ch. huayan zong IjIJit^:), also proposes the idea of simultaneous 
understanding of //' and zhi to interpret Daosheng's theory of sudden awakening, in which, for Daosheng, li 
is indivisible; see, Chengguan, Dafangguangfo huayan jing suishu yanyi chao ^ ^ M f ^ ^ M I S I S B i t ^ S 
%y (An Exegetic Commentary to the Avatantsaka-sutra), T. 36 (1736): 0440c. 
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worldly phenomena, one should always take the guiding principle that one's awakened 
mind grasps nothing as the attitude or manner, so that one develops no conceptual 
grasping or reification in the interaction, thus reflexively realizing the awakened mind 
that grasps nothing. 
In other words, what Shenhui essentially asks the practitioner to do is to "embody" 
the true nature of the awakened mind in his or her present awareness while going through 
each activity in everyday life. If the practitioner is able to embody that innately guiding 
principle when participating in an activity, he or she is then climbing the indivisible 
"nine-story platform." On the other hand, if the practitioner cannot manifest the guiding 
principle in his or her present awareness, then all he or she does is just an ordinary action 
without the meaning of climbing the "nine-story platform." Consequently, the so-called 
"climbing" is actually a constant awareness of, or in Shenhui's terms, a sympathetic 
resonance with, the innately guiding principle, one's awakened mind, that is taken as both 
the path and the goal, a Chan feature we have discussed in the previous chapter. 
Accordingly, from the above, the gradual cultivation within the context of sudden 
awakening, for Shenhui, is to perform all everyday activities in the unique manner of 
wunian, a sympathetic resonance with one's awakened mind. This sympathetic resonance 
of wunian, both the path and the goal, is not just "an initial instantaneous experience of 
enlightenment insight," as other scholars have understood. Instead, it is an "awakening 
via understanding" (Ch. jiewu HPflf) that should be artfully or effortlessly revealed 
within the context of everyday life. As it is a sympathetic resonance, this "awakening via 
understanding" is not a conceptual understanding. Rather, it is an "embodiment" of one's 
awakened mind manifesting as one's present awareness. 
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In this way, Shenhui's sudden awakening, in effect, is to reveal a holistic state of 
awareness, i.e., one's original awareness or spiritual knowing discussed previously, from 
which the practitioner cannot deviate even for a single moment and with which the 
practitioner furthers his or her spiritual practice by transforming the "awakening via 
understanding" to the "awakening via realization" (Ch. zhengwu Ufa-) in gradual 
cultivation. Even though there seems to be a distance between these two awakenings, this 
distance, for Shenhui, is not traveling from one state to another state, but within the 
indivisible "nine-story platform," i.e., the holistic being of one's awakened mind. 
In contrast, when Shenhui's teaching of sudden awakening is (mis)understood only 
as an instantaneous experience of insight, or even worse, as a rhetoric for the purpose of 
sectarianism or proselytism, his entire sudden teaching would be unfortunately dismissed 
as having no or little significance for ongoing spiritual or contemplative practice; his 
genuine concern regarding other teachings, particularly those of Northern Chan, would be 
considered only as a polemic criticism. But, the above analysis that highlights his unique 
integration of sudden awakening and gradual cultivation, I believe, not only provides an 
alternative interpretation of Shenhui's teaching, but also reveals an underlying structure 
for understanding, what I have called, the logic of immediacy in contemplation. This 
unique logic, in Shenhui's system we have learned so far, not only takes the goal as the 
path, but more specifically asks its practitioner to employ the sympathetic resonance of 
wunian or "no-thought" and thus manifest one's original awareness to live a holistic life, 
empathetically and effortlessly. In this way, Shenhui's sudden Chan informs us that not 
only does the logic of immediacy in contemplation involve gradualness, but it must 
integrate the gradualness in the context of suddenness so that the logic of immediacy can 
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be artfully implemented in contemplation without the dualistic or conceptual implications 
underlying the gradualist teachings. To further explore this logic, let us now journey 
deeper into the world of Shenhui's sudden enlightenment. 
C. Shenhui's "EqualLearning" 0/Samadhi and Prajna 
In the Buddhist context, Shenhui also associates his integration of sudden awakening 
and gradual cultivation, or the logic of immediacy in contemplation, with the "equal 
learning" (Ch. dengxue UNP) of samadhi and prajna. To understand the significance of 
this "equal learning," one has to understand how Shenhui construes the inner relationship 
between samadhi and prajna. It is evident from the teachings where Shenhui reinterprets 
the Three Studies of sila, samadhi, and prajna as the three aspects40 of the awakened 
mind that while he considers samadhi to be rooted in the essence or substance (Ch. ti iff) 
of one's awakened mind, he considers prajna as its function or manifestation (Ch. yong 
^3). So, he states, 
What is called samadhi [is] that the substantiality [of one's awakened 
mind] is not graspable. What is called prajna [is] that [the mind] is 
able to see the nongraspable substantiality that is utterly lucid and 
forever tranquil and is endowed with wondrous manifestations as 
many as the sands of the Ganges. This is the equal learning of 
samadhi and. prajna. ' 
This "equal learning" of samadhi and prajna, as the nondual relationship of 
substance and manifestation, is readily seen in Shenhui's analogy of a lamp and its light, 
where he explains, 
40
 In his Tanyu, Shenhui defines, "That the deluded mind is not being activated is sila. That one has no 
deluded mind is samadhi. That one knows the mind has no delusion is prajna ($'O-^FE^I^flK ' M-S'L^ 
%,%. ' Kl'bM^ZiMW;)" (Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 229). 
41
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Samadhi is not different from prajna. Prajna is not different from 
samadhi. They are just like a lamp and its light that are not separate 
from each other. When the lamp is, it is the substance of [its] light. 
When the light is, it is the manifestation of the lamp. ... Samadhi and 
prajna are similar as well. When samadhi is, it is the substance of 
prajna. When prajna is, it is the manifestation of samadhi.42 
Here, similar to the way he integrates the "theoretical principle" of sudden awakening 
with the "phenomenal insight" of gradual cultivation analyzed above, Shenhui establishes 
the "equal learning" of samadhi and prajna based on the inseparability of substance and 
manifestation. As the substance, samadhi must be unconditional and ever-present, 
whereas as the manifestation, prajna can be conditional.43 Yet, ultimately, both samadhi 
and prajna must be spontaneously revealed from, or more precisely, in, the 
"self-suchness" (Ch. ziru §#]]) of the awakened mind. Thus, Shenhui explains, 
That [the mind] does not activate thoughts and is empty of any 
[substantial] things whatsoever is called right samadhi. That [the 
mind] is able to see that [the mind] does not activate thoughts and is 
empty of any [substantial] things whatsoever is called right 
prajna. ... Why is it so? It is because of the self-suchness of the 
[awakened mind's] nature. This is the equal learning of samadhi and 
44 
prajna. 
In the "self-suchness" of one's awakened mind, Shenhui further elaborates, samadhi 
is the substance of tranquility, from which a "spontaneous awareness" (Ch. ziran zhi § 
%$%=:) that is capable of knowing its own substance of tranquility emerges as prajna. 
Understanding this inseparable, or nondual, relationship is the quintessence of the "equal 
42
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 So, in his Tanyu, Shenhui expounds, "It is necessary to rely on conditional sTla and conditional prajna to 
reveal unconditional sTla and unconditional prajna. But, with respect to samadhi, it is not so, [for 
conditional samadhi] only results in the fruition of human and deva. It is not in sympathetic resonance with 
the unsurpassable bodhi [i.e., awakening] (HffWff^ " # P £ S ' HM1=[5ft " Mf!=]a§ " SLIU^^ ° S 
&%&M ' B P M A ^ H S • ^mM±Mmffimr (Hu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 229). 
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learning" of samadhi and prajna. To implement this "equal learning" that manifests 
one's spontaneous awareness, Shenhui specifically asks his followers to cultivate their 
"wise discernment" (Ch. shanfenbie H ^ M ) and "non-activation of thought" (Ch. bu 
qinian ^ $ £ ^ ) or "no-thought" (Ch. wunian M ^ ) with all sense faculties; in his Tanyu, 
Shenhui instructs his followers, 
If the eye sees form, wisely discern all forms and do not follow the 
discernment to activate [thoughts]. [Thus,] in form one obtains 
easiness; in form one obtains liberation replete with the samadhi of 
form objects. [If] the ear hears sound, wisely discern all sounds and 
do not follow the discernment to activate [thoughts]. [Thus,] in sound 
one obtains easiness; in sound one obtains liberation replete with the 
samadhi of sound objects. [If] the nose ... [If] the tongue ... [If] the 
body ... [If] the mind ... In this way, that [one employs] all sense 
faculties with wise discernment is the original prajna. That one does 
not follow the discernment to activate [thoughts] is the original 
samadhi. 
As the quality of original prajna, one's "wise discernment" naturally arises from his 
or her spontaneous awareness. However, if one follows the discernment and develops 
more thoughts, this spontaneous awareness will disappear in the sense of "folding" itself 
into one's dualistic consciousness that gives rise to conceptual or deluded thoughts. In 
this way, the spontaneous awareness can also be characterized, in Pramana or Buddhist 
epistemological terms, as a direct perception (Skt. pratyaksa pramana; Ch. xianliang Ji, 
i t ; Tib. mngon sum). Yet, unlike the direct perception of a sense consciousness in 
Pramana that only occurs in the first thought, in Shenhui's system, the direct perception 
45
 In his Tanyu, Shenhui teaches, "Non-abiding is tranquility. The substance of tranquility is called 
samadhi. From this substance there exists a spontaneous awareness that is capable of knowing its own 
substance of tranquility; that is called prajna. This is the equal [learning] of samadhi andprajna (MfiHlx 
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of one's spontaneous awareness in all sense faculties continues as long as the samadhi of 
"no-thought" abides firmly. In this way, the direct perception from Shenhui's "equal 
learning" of samadhi and prajna is never separate from mundane phenomena, whereas 
the direct perception of Pramana either exists as first thoughts or continues only as the 
nondual cognition of the ultimate, sunyata. 
As one's spontaneous awareness is never separate from mundane phenomena, the 
practitioner can and should take all mundane phenomena as the opportunity to cultivate 
oneself. Following this reasoning, Shenhui thus advocates, 
The [Vimalakirtinirdesa-]siitra says: "Do not separate [oneself] from 
the dharma of the Way and present [oneself] in all the phenomena of 
common people." When participating in the myriad actions of the 
world, not activating any [dualistic] thought with respect to any 
phenomenon is the simultaneous cultivation of samadhi and prajna 
that are not separate from each other.47 
In this way, the simultaneous cultivation of samadhi and prajna effectively gives 
rise to a constant practice that requires its practitioner to maintain a holistic state of 
awareness in the manner of "original samadhi" or "no-thought," while participating in all 
activities with the wise discernment of "original prajna" or "spontaneous awareness." In 
the paradigm of sudden awakening and gradual cultivation, the constant practice derived 
from the simultaneous cultivation of samadhi and prajna is a holistic practice, in which 
sudden awakening reveals the innate principle in the form of samadhi to guide gradual 
cultivation, whereas gradual cultivation shown in terms of the wise discernment of prajna 
is a constant practice that only takes its goal as the path. In this way, Shenhui's "equal 
leaning" of samadhi and prajna, accompanied by his integration of sudden awakening 
47
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and gradual cultivation, distinctively offers us an artful implementation for the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation, as it requires its practitioner to engage in a holistic practice, 
in which the practitioner artfully, rather than arduously, cultivates himself or herself to 
attain awakening. 
D. A Holistic Practice in Which "Knowing and Seeing" Pervade One's Being 
Contemplatively, what underlies this artful, holistic practice derived from Shenhui's 
"equal learning" is the recognition that as soon as one abides in the state of no-thought, 
there will be a spontaneous awareness pervading all that one acts, speaks, and thinks. 
Historically, this idea not only contributed to the development of a Chan feature, namely, 
Chan as spontaneous living discussed in the previous chapter, but also facilitated a unique 
Chan understanding, in which one's "view" or literally "knowing-seeing" (Ch. zhijian £Q 
.PL) is one's practice.48 What Chan master Yongjue Yuanxian ^JKjcIf (1578-1657) 
teaches in his Guanglu Kiel (or Recorded Sayings) best illustrates this unique 
understanding; he says: 
Some said that the Chan School only emphasizes the view [literally 
knowing-seeing] but not the practice. [It is because they] don't know 
that the meaning of only emphasizing the view is that, other than the 
view, there is no other practice. If there is still other practice, then its 
view is still not the ultimate. This is like in a dark room. When a 
lamp is lit, the only thing that is important is for the lamp to 
illuminate brightly. How can there be the need to dispel the darkness? 
If there is still darkness to dispel, then the light is not fully 
48
 The Chinese term zhi-jian ^DM is composed of two characters, namely, zhi &D and jian ^ . This 
Buddhist term has usually been translated as "view," as it signifies what one's understanding is regarding a 
certain teaching or a phenomenon. Literally, zhi £• means to know and jian ^ means to see. Thus, 
zhi-jian £D.IL can also be understood as "to know by seeing," "the knowledge obtained through seeing," or 
simply "knowing and seeing," which I have used below. 
I l l 
illuminating [the room] yet. 
But how does one's "view" (in terms of "knowing and seeing") fill the room with all 
its "lightness"? Master Yongjue further explains, 
One must truly contemplate on, and examine, one's own foothold 
until the sense of sacrality and secularity is extinguished and the 
empty space destroyed. [Therein,] there is not even awakening to 
obtain, not to mention affliction; there is not even nirvana to obtain, 
not to mention birth and death [i.e., samsara]. This is called the true 
view and it is also the true practice too.50 
Thus, the true view, and the true practice, that Yongjue tries to explain, is to contemplate 
on and examine one's own "foothold" until all dualities have been transcended. This 
"foothold" in Chan represents one's original nature. Thus, what Yongjue means by true 
"view" (Ch. zhi-jian £dM) is to truly "know" (Ch. zhi £•) and "see" (Ch. jian M) into 
one's own being so that one meets face-to-face with one's original nature without any 
mediation whatsoever. 
Given this gloss of the Chinese term "view" or zhi-jian £flM informed by 
Yongjue's commentary, the equivalent of view and practice signifies that one's "knowing 
and seeing" is one's practice. Learning from Shenhui's teachings, we know that this 
"knowing and seeing" must be holistic so as to pervade "all that one acts, speaks, and 
thinks," i.e., one's entire being. Therefore, Shenhui requires his followers to engage in a 
constant practice, in which the practitioners try to embody the awakened mind in their 
present awareness as the guiding principle so that they go through each activity in 
Yongjue heshang Guanglu 3<ftfDfcdJKJ§ (The Recorded Sayings of Master Yongjue), X. 72 (1437): 
439a23-439b2; rgctf ^ H f i H & J I • ^ ffi&JI • *fcl • m t l f l J t ^ J ^ ' J ^ H ^ h ' WmMM^L • 
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everyday life with the wise discernment of that spontaneous awareness. 
In this living practice of Shenhui's, there are no exhortations to do this or not to do 
that. The practitioners simply act according to need and respond as spoken to. Such a 
spontaneous living is the fruition as well as the path its practitioners artfully strive for. 
Practically, such notion can also be understood as an attempt to "bridge the gap between 
everyday actions and experiences on one hand and religious acts and functions on 
another,"51 as Mario Poceski insightfully informs us based on his analysis of a similar 
practice, namely, the "ordinary mind" teaching of Mazu. As a result, Shenhui's teachings 
have the effect of expanding the domain of Chan practice to include "such routine acts as 
eating and putting on the robes."52 In the expansion,53 what is important is the "manner" 
the practitioner takes, the "knowing and seeing" that derives from his or her spontaneous 
awareness and that infuses his or her whole being without any discriminating thought or 
dualism. 
Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 186. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 As some scholars have noticed (see e.g., McRae, "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment 
in Early Ch'an Buddhism," 255 and Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 59-62.), this expansion of the 
domain of Chan practice may have the effect of blurring the line between the clergy and the laity, thus 
facilitating the dissemination of Chan among the unordained on the one hand but undermining the rationale 
behind monastic life on the other. Yet, as Poceski has argued for the case of Mazu's "ordinary mind," for 
Mazu, the spontaneity of the "ordinary mind" must "be realized within the confines of established monastic 
mores and institutions," thus enabling its practitioner "to function in specific socioreligious surroundings 
without being defined or imprisoned by them" (Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 186.). I would argue 
that, for Shenhui, the spontaneity of his "equal learning" must exhibit similar properties, as its adept must 
wisely discriminate the surrounding conditions he or she is in, while not giving rise to dualistic thoughts so 
as to be "defined or imprisoned by them [i.e., the surrounding conditions]." In this way, the spontaneity of 
Shenhui's suddenness actually has the effect of making any line of division flexible while asking its 
practitioner to act accordingly without any dualistic thoughts, which, on the one hand, prevents the 
practitioner from any antinomian behavior and, on the other hand, expands the domain of Chan practice 
into everyday life. To put the argument another way, for Shenhui, perhaps, the only "robe" that matters is 
the "robe" of one's awakened mind, the True Dharma, that all practitioners, be they ordained or unordained, 
can don, as long as they prove themselves worthwhile by being in the same category as the enlightened 
patriarchs. Otherwise, the practitioners of "no-thought" must employ their prajna to wisely discriminate 
their own surrounding conditions for appropriate actions while keeping the samadhi of nonactivating any 
dualistic thoughts as their guiding principle. In this way, Shenhui's integration of sudden awakening and 
gradual cultivation transcends all boundaries but at the same time requires its practitioners to act according 
to their own "specific socioreligious surroundings without being defined or imprisoned by them." 
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Like an ascending spiral, this "knowing and seeing" that infuses one's being 
elevates oneself through everyday actions and experiences with the wise discernment of 
one's spontaneous awareness while firmly centering oneself at the embodiment of one's 
awakened mind. Yet, since this so-called elevation is an ascent within the indivisible 
wholeness of one's awakened mind, its movement exhibits no change in nature. Rather, it 
only changes the practitioner's perspective, specifically, from a partial, dualistic 
perspective to a holistic, nondual perspective. With this all-encompassing, gestalt vision, 
the practitioner naturally realizes that one's soteriology lies in the present moment with 
one's ever-lively present awareness to experience the everyday reality in its wholeness. 
In this way, the practitioner, on the one hand, tries to spontaneously manifest the true 
nature of one's holistic awakened mind and, on the other hand, prevents oneself from 
falling into passivity, indifference, or the wild spontaneity of an indulgent and 
rationalizing ego.54 
One may argue that the idea of an ascending spiral is a result of mediation, and 
hence it is in contradiction with the logic of immediacy. A Chan adept would probably 
answer that the so-called ascending spiral is a result of conceptualization. In reality, it 
does not exist. As for the individual "moments" of ascending, it is how one does in each 
"moment" that renders it to be a mediation or not, but not what one does. That is the 
reason why Shenhui integrates gradualness in the context of suddenness and why a Chan 
54
 This understanding is significant, for it gives another perspective to look at the ethical concern 
associated with the teaching of spontaneity. It is well known that spontaneity worries some with its 
implication of amorality (see, e.g., Barnard and Kripal (eds), Crossing Boundaries; particularly, its Part 
One sets up the contexts and parameters of related issues). However, does spontaneity necessarily imply 
amorality? The case I have presented seems to suggest otherwise. Rather, the practitioner takes his or her 
surrounding conditions into consideration as he or she interacts with others. In addition, in realizing the 
holistic being of one's awakened mind, the practitioner is aware of conditions and chooses to interact with 
others in ways that also bring realization to others. Thus, I would argue that the ethics of spontaneity is not 
fixed in social terms, but presents itself in the mutual benefit of each other's self-realization. 
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practitioner would always "try" to embody the awakened mind in his or her present 
awareness as the guiding principle. If one always tries to sympathetically resonate with 
the true nature of the awakened mind (through one's "knowing and seeing") when doing 
things,56 the idea goes that one will eventually unfold one's being im-mediately and 
spontaneously, just as after shooting at the bull's eye without thinking, one will 
eventually hit the target.5' 
Moreover, as one tries to sympathetically resonate with the nature of the awakened 
mind in each moment, it is surely not in the manner of holding on to an ideology, but to 
vitalize one's "knowing and seeing" in each moment, which synchronously vitalizes 
one's being even on a relative level (e.g., in terms of vitalizing the sensitivity and 
flexibility one exhibits when engaging in activities). In this momentarily synchronous 
vitalization, there is no mediation between one's knowing and one's being, for they 
interfuse each other to the effect that they co-arise in wholeness, and in this co-arising 
wholeness of being and knowing, the practitioner rests, or more precisely acts, 
spontaneously in the suchness of reality with his or her full awareness. At this point, 
ascending spiral or not is really not the concern, for from the perspective of the 
all-encompassing wholeness, the practitioner embraces all, absolute and relative, with 
one's openness, insight, liveliness, and tenderness. Such is what the "knowing and 
It is done in the manner of trying without the idea of trying. In other words, it is simply, "Just do it." It is 
only to indicate that the practitioner is still on a relative level that this rhetoric is used. 
56
 This is to stay in the context of suddenness while performing gradual cultivation. 
57
 Chan master Dahui Zonggao ^ H T K I P ; (1089-1163) instructed his students, "When a thing comes, one 
responds spontaneously, just like after learning shooting [at the bull's eye] for a long time, one will 
eventually hit the target (#J5f5BPJS - %}X^MXX*¥ WH)" (Dahuipujue chanshiyulu JKMMKWMWi 
£§ (The Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Dahui Pujue), T. 47 (1998A): 941bl). In Tibetan Dzogchen, 
there is also a similar analogy for this direct practice. It is said that this direct practice is like directly seeing 
the gold: "So, it is like to see the gold by just seeing the gold itself rather than looking at the dirt (de bas na 
gser blta 'dod pa la bong ba bstan pas mi mthong gi/ gser nyid bstan pas ngo shes pa ltar)" (gNubs chen 
Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 296.4). 
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seeing" pervading one's being can bring about for its practitioner. 
III. Being and Knowing in Wholeness: The Insight Underlying Shenhui's Logic of 
Immediacy in Contemplation 
An interesting question to ask here is: What really underlies the wholeness of being 
and knowing which the contemplative structure of Shenhui's sudden teaching evidently 
underscores? Particularly, how does Shenhui's "equal learning" of samadhi and prajha 
support this holistic dynamic, and what does this dynamic really imply, contemplatively 
and soteriologically? Since his "equal learning," contemplatively speaking, also takes the 
goal as the path, a defining characteristic of the fruitional vehicle (Ch. guosheng ^ffi; 
Tib. 'bras bu 'i thegpa), how does this "equal, learning" transform Shenhui's sudden Chan 
into a practice of the fruitional vehicle? 
These questions are important, because not only can they offer us an essential piece 
of the puzzle for our project of understanding the logic of immediacy in contemplation, 
but they also validate Chan as a fruitional vehicle within the sutric traditions. I believe 
that some scholars of the past, mainly due to the reason that Chan is a sutric tradition, 
automatically put Chan in the camp of the causal vehicle (Ch. yinsheng Hffl; Tib. rgyu 'i 
theg pa) without further analysis, and as a result, they misunderstood the teachings of 
Chan.58 This issue of Chan being a fruitional vehicle within the sutric traditions will be 
also discussed in the later chapters. 
For example, Chogyal Namkhai Norbu considers Chan/Zen one of the causal vehicles derived from 
sutric Buddhism, whose fundamental method, he has argued, is renunciation (see Norbu, Dzog Chen and 
Zen, 22.). However, from my presentation, it should be clear that renunciation is not a defining 
characteristic of Chan Buddhism. What Chogyal Namkhai Norbu classifies for Chan/Zen is purely due to 
his understanding that sutric traditions and causal vehicles are mutually inclusive. Such a classification 
without further analysis is problematic, as my analysis has demonstrated. I will discuss this issue more in 
the later chapters. 
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A. Shenhui's "Equal Learning" as an Artful Endeavor of the Fruitional Path 
Earlier we have presented that Shenhui relies on the idea of sympathetic resonance 
to implement his fruitional practice in contemplative terms. As a Chan contemplative 
directly attunes oneself to the samadhi of wunian (i.e., "no-thought") via the embodiment 
of the awakened mind in his or her present awareness, the contemplative effectively 
transforms him/herself to be in the same category as the Buddhas. On this path of directly 
manifesting the ultimate fruition, the contemplative naturally reveals his or her original 
awareness endowed with the prajna of spontaneous insight to participate in all everyday 
actions and experiences. 
Here, how does Shenhui's "equal learning" of samadhi and prajna make 
sympathetic resonance possible, thus giving rise to his fruitional practice? Essentially, 
what this question asks is: How can a fruitional practice be philosophically possible? 
What is the philosophical mechanism that supports the contemplative practice of taking 
the goal as the path? Regarding these questions, I believe that a possible answer lies in 
Shenhui's understanding of "equal learning" not only as the equal practices of samadhi 
and prajna but also as the nonduality between them. This nonduality contemplatively 
establishes a delicate dynamic that practically gives rise to Shenhui's artful endeavor to 
realize his fruitional path. 
But how are samadhi and prajna nondual in Shenhui's system? As we know from 
the above presentation of the "equal learning," for Shenhui, not only are samadhi and 
prajna the natural expressions of one's awakened mind, but they also correspond to the 
substance (Ch. ti jfit) and the manifestation (Ch. yong $\) of the awakened mind, 
respectively. As such, samadhi, as the wunian-state of one's awakened mind, is the 
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substance of prajha, whereas prajha, as the original awareness of one's awakened mind, 
is the manifestation of samadhi. To expound this important relationship, Shenhui uses the 
analogy of a lamp and its light; he explains, 
Samadhi is not different from prajna. Prajha is not different from 
samadhi. They are just like the lamp and its light that are not separate 
from each other. When the lamp is, it is the substance of [its] light. 
When the light is, it is the manifestation of the lamp. When the light 
is, it is not different from the lamp. When the lamp is, it is not 
different from the light. When the light is, it is not separate from the 
lamp. When the lamp is, it is not separate from the light. When the 
light is, the lamp is. When the lamp is, the light is. Samadhi and 
prajha are similar as well. When samadhi is, it is the substance of 
prajha. When prajha is, it is the manifestation of samadhi. When 
prajha is, it is not different from samadhi. When samadhi is, it is not 
different from prajha. When prajha is, samadhi is. When samadhi is, 
prajha is. When prajha is, prajha is not. When samadhi is, samadhi 
is not. This is the simultaneous cultivation of samadhi and prajha that 
are not separate from each other.5 
So, like a lamp and its light, not only are samadhi and prajha not separate from each 
other, but they are not different from each other, for they co-exist to sustain each other. 
That is to say, as the lamp exists in terms of its light and vice versa, so do samadhi and 
prajha. Therefore, Shenhui says, "When the light is, it is not different from the lamp. 
When the lamp is, it is not different from the light. ... [Similarly, w]hen prajha is, it is 
not different from samadhi. When samadhi is, it is not different from prajha.'''' However, 
even though they are not different from each other, samadhi and prajha cannot be 
collapsed into one, for one is the substance and the other is its manifestation; they are 
cognitively different. Thus, it is with the above understanding that samadhi and prajha 
59
 Uu, Shenhui heshangyiji, 243; r ^ H « § • * * # ! £ • *DiSKiS^^ffi*« • S P i ^ B f ^ J ! > IP 
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are nondual, particularly, in the sense that they are neither one nor two (Ch. buyi buer ^f 
Soteriologically, the nonduality between samadhi and prajna in Shenhui's "equal 
learning" creates a delicate dynamic that makes the practice of taking the goal as the path 
possible; essentially it makes the goal and its path nondual. This dynamic, however, 
would not exist if Shenhui makes samadhi and prajna into a oneness, for there is no 
"kinetic energy" in the sameness, and without such energy, there can be no dynamic. On 
the other hand, when samadhi and. prajna are neither one nor two, a certain subtle energy 
that enables the movement, a delicate dynamic, within the indivisible wholeness of one's 
awakened mind is implicit. In that way, it is possible for Shenhui to talk about gradual 
cultivation within the context of sudden awakening and for Zongmi to interpret Shenhui's 
awakening as to transforming an "awakening via understanding" into an "awakening via 
realization," while keeping both awakenings within the holistic state of one's awakened 
mind.60 
Furthermore, for Shenhui, the subtle energy derived from the nonduality between 
samadhi and prajna, (and the nonduality of the goal and its path), cannot be grasped with 
one's intentional effort, for the conceptuality of any intentional effort "strains" the 
effortlessness of the awakened mind, thus straining the said subtlety too. Rather, the 
subtle energy can only be utilized when the practitioner spontaneously instills a 
60
 Following this argument, I believe that not only does the delicate dynamic derived from the nonduality 
between samadhi and prajna make gradual cultivation to be possible within the context of sudden 
awakening, but it also does not reject the skillful means of gradualism within the context of subitism. Thus, 
in the delicate dynamic between samadhi and prajna, subitism does not reject skillful means, does not 
collapse the two levels of ultimate and conventional truths into one, but consists in seizing them 
simultaneously in a way like that of a lamp and its light. This understanding of Chan's subitism is very 
different from that of Bernard Faure's. Basically, Faure's understanding of Chan's subitism is that it 
reduces the conventional to the ultimate and rejects the use of skillful means; see Faure, The Rhetoric of 
Immediacy, Chapter Three (53-78). 
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no-thought state in his or her present awareness so that the practitioner participates in all 
activities without stagnation and confusion while deeply abiding in the state of complete 
tranquility. Such an artful endeavor is the virtue of Shenhui's "equal learning" of 
samadhi and prajna and the force to realize his fruitional path. 
B. The Nondual, Holistic Dynamic between Samadhi-Ztewg and Prajna-JST/ioMwig 
To further understand the delicate, nondual dynamic between samadhi and prajna 
that actualizes Shenhui's artful endeavor, one should also recognize that ultimately, the 
nondual dynamic under investigation is really a dynamic stillness, as it occurs within the 
indivisible wholeness of one's awakened mind. But this dynamic stillness, paradoxically, 
is endowed with an infinite liveliness that is associated with the original awareness of the 
awakened mind. To explore its other implications including the aforementioned infinite 
liveliness, let us further delve into the nondual dynamic predicated on Shenhui's "equal 
learning" of samadhi and prajna. 
First, as Shenhui's samadhi and prajna are each other's substance and manifestation, 
samadhi, as the wunian state of one's awakened mind, embodies the substantial-state or 
ontological being of prajna, whereas prajna, as the original awareness of one's awakened 
mind, manifests the appearing-awareness or epistemological knowing of samadhi. Given 
these ontological and epistemological associations, Shenhui's samadhi and prajna can be 
philosophically understood as samadhi-being and /?ra/«o-knowing. This philosophical 
understanding, along with the nonduality between samadhi and prajna, evidently testifies 
to a nondual relationship that consists of both ontological and epistemological aspects, a 
property similar to what is shown in Klein's three types of nondualism but different from 
Loy's characterization of nonduality only as an epistemological description discussed in 
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the Introduction of the dissertation. 
Moreover, since "[w]hen prajna is, samadhi is [and] [w]hen samadhi is, prajna is," 
samadhi-bemg and prajna-knowing therefore reflexively sustain each other. Practically, 
this mutually sustaining dynamic essentially informs us that the original awareness of 
prajna naturally facilitates its practitioner to discern his or her participation in all 
activities without any deluded thoughts, thus spontaneously sustaining the wunian state of 
samadhi, which reflexively sustains the original awareness of prajna. As a result, the 
mutually sustaining dynamic brings about the aforementioned infinite liveliness that 
constantly vitalizes its practitioner's present awareness so as to fulfill the soteriological 
goal of the fruitional path with artful effortlessness.61 
In the nondual dynamic of samadhi-bemg and /7ra/«<5-knowing, there also exists a 
logic of spontaneity. For Shenhui, as samadhi is, prajna is. This terse statement, in his 
contemplative teachings, can be understood as follows. That is, as one abides in the state 
of wunian, one's original awareness spontaneously presents itself to "wisely discern" (Ch. 
shanfenbie Hr^B'J) all that is present. But, for Shenhui, there is more. That is, as prajna 
is, samadhi is too. Here, I believe, Shenhui is telling us that as the spontaneous presence 
of one's original awareness naturally occurs, it effortlessly embodies the state of wunian 
too. Thus, in this reflexive, or more precisely circular, dynamic of samadhi-bemg and 
/?ra/«a-knowing, there is neither beginning nor ending. And, any effort of intentionality is 
incompatible with this circular dynamic, for effort has beginning and intentionality has 
61
 As samadhi-bemg and prajna-knowing correspond to each other's substance and manifestation, their 
reinforcing dynamic also indicates that not only do substance and manifestation have no mediation, but 
they also spontaneously sustain each other. This characterization of the relationship between substance and 
manifestation (or function) is different from that of Bernard Faure's understanding, for he writes, "In a 
sense, Mazu's Chan marked a return to gradualism, since it no longer advocated seeing one's true nature 
im-mediately, but mediately, through its function" (Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 51). Thus, for Faure, 
there is always mediation between substance and manifestation. Yet, such mediation does not exist in our 
reinforcing dynamic between samadhi-being andpra/wa-knowing. 
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direction. Accordingly, one can only embrace this circular dynamic in its wholeness and 
with its own logic of spontaneous presence. Intrinsically, in this spontaneous wholeness 
of samadhi-being andpra/«a-knowing, being knows and knowing is. 
What being knows, together with what knowing is, implies that there exists an 
interpenetrating dynamic between being and knowing, a kind of "mutual interfusion" 
between ontology and epistemology. In Shenhui's contemplative terminology, it is that, 
on the one hand, the wunian state of samadhi-being enfolds epistemological qualities and, 
on the other hand, the original awareness of /?ra/«o-knowing exhibits ontological status; 
they mutually sustain and permeate each other. Given this understanding, Shenhui's 
"equal learning" of samadhi and prajnd actually dissolves the boundaries of samadhi and 
prajna. That is the reason why he teaches, "When prajna is, prajnd is not. When samadhi 
is, samadhi is not." Under this dissolution, or more precisely mutual interfusion or 
permeation, then, what is prajna and what is samadhi! For Shenhui, it can only be their 
"equal learning," a wholeness embracing their nonduality as well as their own logic of 
spontaneity. In this embracing wholeness, samadhi-being and /7ra/«a-knowing cannot be 
collapsed into one. Yet, they cannot be separate from each other, either. This is like a 
lamp and its light, which, even though consisting of a whole, are cognitively different, 
but they can never be separate from each other, both ontologically and epistemologically. 
Furthermore, the mutual interfusion or permeation that occurs between one's being 
and one's knowing essentially integrates the three types of nondualism in Klein's 
typology into an integral whole.62 That is to say, the embracing wholeness of one's being 
and knowing depicts a holography of nondual relationships with respect to objects, 
62
 For Klein's discussion on the three types of nondualism, see Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen, 
151-158. 
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between oneself and others, and between one's present self and future Buddhahood. Put 
another way, as one realizes that samadhi-being knows and prajna-knowing is, objective 
and subjective separations will be dissolved in the non-substantiality of sunyata, thus 
realizing both ontological nondualism and cognitive nondualism. As the nonduality of 
samadhi-being and /?ra/«a-knowing takes one to traverse in the indivisible wholeness of 
one's awakened mind, one realizes that the division between one's present seemingly 
unenlightened state and one's future resumed enlightened state actually comes from a 
mistaken epistemological reification. Having corrected the epistemological mistake, one 
recognizes their nonduality or what Klein refers to as evolutionary nondualism. Thus, in 
the mutual interfusion of one's being and knowing, all opposites and contradictions are 
resolved in a unique manner of knowing or what I call the praj ha-knowing in the sudden 
Chan of Shenhui. As the spontaneous presence of this pra/75a-knowing is nondual with 
the ultimate samadhi-being, the mutual interfusion and permeation of one's being and 
knowing thus distinctively tells us that there can be no "abstract truth" divorced from 
one's subjective engagement. However, since the subjective engagement of one's prajna-
knowing is said to "act according to need and respond as spoken to," such a reality-fitting 
engagement would surely not give rise to the arbitrariness of cultural or moral relativism. 
The mutual interfusion of samadhi-being and prajna-knowing, for Shenhui, takes 
place ubiquitously. Accordingly, Chan practitioners should cultivate themselves firmly 
based on this understanding. So, in his Zhengyi, when a certain official minister asks him, 
"Is an ordinary person like me able to learn your teaching of wunianV Shenhui responds, 
Today I permit Minister to learn this teaching. Even though you have 
not begun to practice, as long as you obtain a realizing understanding, 
due to the transforming power of lastingly immersing [yourself] in 
this realizing understanding, all strong attachments and deluded 
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thoughts will naturally and gradually become diminished.63 
Some may argue that the above response of Shenhui's is for the purpose of 
proselytizing the minister. So, Shenhui deemphasizes the importance of lasting effort on 
this path of spiritual practice. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that, due to the mutual 
interfusion and permeation of one's being and knowing, for Shenhui, the power of one's 
realizing knowing can unmediatedly and spontaneously transform the state of one's being 
and vice versa. This interpretation is also in accord with Shenhui's unequivocal emphasis 
of the spontaneous quality of wunian; it is only through sympathetic resonance that one 
attains the state of wunian, not some arduous effort. Clearly, in another place of his 
Zhengyi, Shenhui points out this effortless spontaneity of realizing knowing: 
All cultivators, for those who are still on the ground of learning, 
when the mind activates thoughts, just illuminate them with [one's] 
awareness. When the mind of activation disappears, the illumination 
of awareness self perishes as well. This is [the state of] wunian.64 
No arduous effort is needed, but not laxity either. Rather, it is the natural power of one's 
awakened mind. With its unconditional spontaneity, there is a delicate balance between 
action and inaction. Attachments and deluded thoughts, even though empty of inherent 
existence, do not disappear of their own accord. Something must be done. If being knows 
and knowing is, does this "something" not lie, unmediatedly and spontaneously, in your 
awareness? 
63
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Chapter 3. sTon mun as a Tradition of Encounter: 
A Missing Link between Chan and Dzogchen? 
Following the historical footsteps of Chan monks westwards, Part II of the 
dissertation begins with an encounter narrative that depicts a "conversation" between 
practitioners of immediacy from different quarters of the religious-philosophizing 
spectrum. This narrative strategy is to illustrate the variations of the logic of immediacy 
in contemplation through different case studies. It also tries to show the complex 
historical trajectories of these variations and the way the contemplative participants, 
Chinese and Tibetan, shaped them independently and/or in conversation. In effect, what 
is meant to convey via this strategy is that the logic of immediacy in contemplation is not 
an isolated phenomenon. It had emerged, and thus can emerge, with different emphases 
in different times and places. This understanding of independent developments 
essentially indicates the significance of the idea of immediacy for the contemplatives and 
signifies a special status for such idea in the history of religious and/or contemplative 
teachings as well. 
In particular, Chapter 3 presents a historical narrative of connection which tries to 
find clues that may link Chan and Dzogchen. I do so by taking the contemplative 
recipient's perspective to investigate the syncretic development of sTon mun1 or Cig car 
ba,2 a tradition resulting from the interactions between Chan monks and Tibetan tantric 
1
 Etymologically, ston is a Tibetan transliteration of Chinese term dun 4fH or "sudden" and mun a Tibetan 
transliteration for Chinese men f^ or "door/gate." Thus, sTon mun, literally "sudden gate" or "sudden 
school," refers to the teachings of suddenness, as opposed to Tsen men (or Tsen man) /IffPI, litereally 
"gradual gate" or "gradual school," that refers to the teachings of gradualness. 
2
 In discussing the development and teachings of Tibetan Chan, scholars have referred to the tradition as 
Tibetan Chan Schools (see, e.g., Broughton, "Early Ch'an Schools in Tibet"), sTon mun (i.e., the Sudden 
School; see, e.g., Obata, "Kodai chibetto ni okeru tonmonpa (zenshu) no nagare ~£j{X'3~'^- V h (££5H"5> 
WfM(WM)^>>m.tl (The Development of the Sudden School (Zen School) in Ancient Tibet)"), or Cig 
car ba (i.e., the Simultaneists; see, e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection) in the past. As I am using gNubs 
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practitioners at the borders of Tang-Song China and Tibet of the 8 -10 centuries. 
Mainly based on Dunhuang manuscripts including Tibetan translations of Chan texts (e.g., 
PT 116/8, PT 823/1, ITJ 710/2), compilations of Chan treatises and oral commentaries 
(e.g., PT 116 and ITJ 709), and original Tibetan compositions (e.g., PT 116/5, PT 626, 
PT 634, PT 699, PT 818, ITJ 689 and ITJ 709/9),3 and some early Nyingma texts such as 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's (c. 832-943) bSam gtan mig sgron (The Lamp for the 
Eye of Dhyanaf and Vimalamitra's (c. 8l century) Cig car 'jugpa mam par mi rtogpa 'i 
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's bSam gtan mig sgron as the primary source for my study, following its 
convention, I will refer to the tradition as sTon mun throughout our discussion. An a note, while ston mun 
is a Tibetan transliteration of the Chinese term dun-men W(T% cig car is believed to be a Tibetan 
translation of the Chinese term dun or suddenness. 
3
 As noted in the Introduction of this dissertation, since most of the Dunhuang manuscripts either do not 
have titles or consist of collections of several texts or are fragmentary, these manuscripts are usually 
identified with their catalogue numbers. Most of the Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts are collected in the 
Pelliot collection in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris and in the Stein collection in the British Library in 
London. I have followed Sam van Schaik's convention (see van Schaik, "The Early Days of the Great 
Perfection") to denote the former PT and the latter ITJ. Thus, PT 699 refers to Item 699 in the Pelliot 
collection, whereas ITJ 689 refers to Item 689 in the Stein collection. As many Dunhuang manuscripts are 
composed of several texts, PT 116/8 thus refers to the 8th text identified in the manuscript PT 116; PT 823/1 
refers to the 1st text in the manuscript PT 823; and so forth. For a description of the Stein collection of 
Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts {i.e., manuscripts identified with the ITJ prefix), see Dalton and van Schaik, 
Tibetan Tantric Manuscripts from Dunhuang: A Descriptive Catalogue of the Stein Collection at the British 
Library. For a description of the Pelliot collection of Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts (i.e., manuscripts 
identified with the PT prefix), see Wang, Facang dunhuang zangwen wenxianjieti mulu faWM$s^ML"$C$C. 
SKIflJlI @ i§ (A Descriptive Catalogue of Dunhuang Tibetan Manuscripts in The Bibliotheque 'Nationale de 
France). 
4
 Probably the first Nyingma master historically known to us to systematically present the Dzogchen 
teachings, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes has been a subject of various studies. Yet, due to the scarcity of 
definitive historical records, the dates of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes and of the composition of the 
bSam gtan mig sgron are still very much in dispute. According to one historical account, gNubs chen Sangs 
rgyas ye shes was born in the year of 832 CE and lived for 111 years (Dudjom Rinpoche, The rNying ma 
School of Tibetan Buddhism, 607-614), but other accounts place his birth year to be 772 CE, the late 10th 
century, and so forth. Accordingly, the composition of the bSam gtan mig sgron has been placed in circa 
the late 9th century (according to the birth year of 112 CE), the first quarter of the 10th century (van Schaik, 
"The Early Days of the Great Perfection," 178), or the late 10th century (Karmay, The Great Perfection, 
102). For early studies of the bSam gtan mig sgron, see, e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection, 86-120; 
Otogawa, "Zenjo tomyo ron kenkyu 1: Zenjo tomyo ron, Mushotoku ippo ron, Daiyuga shushu gi r WtEfT 
mm£w% o) -n$Mnmmrrnm%~)m£^±imMBiMmA (A study of the bsamgummtg 
sgron (1): bSam gtan mig sgron, dMigs su medpa tshul gcigpa 'i gzhung, and rNal 'byor chen por sgom 
ba 'i don)"; "Zenjo tomyo ron kenkyu 2: Dai 5 sho (tonmonpa sho) no kSsei r WMfJ^Msm j 0T5E (2) —1§ 
£ $ (W^WM) ©Wic (A Study of the bSam gtan mig sgron (2): On the Structure of the Fifth Chapter 
(sTon mun cig car 'jug pa)"; and "Zenjo tomyo ron kenkyu 3: Indo, Chugoku, Chibetto no bunken ni 
mirareru zenjoho wo megutte fW&lB^s W% (3) - -f > V\ <fl!> ^ S ' r- (D^MK^hfh 
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bsgom don {The Meaning of the Cultivation of Simultaneous Entrance to the 
Non-conceptuality),5 I explore the syncretic development of sTon mun via a structural 
analysis of how early Tibetan Buddhists carried out their works of translation, 
compilation, and interpretation in relation to Chan teachings. 
In the analysis, I will show that not only was sTon mun, syncretic in nature, but the 
Tibetan practitioners of sTon mun considered the contemplative teachings and practices 
of Chan and proto-Dzogchen compatible; that is, they all follow a similar logic for 
contemplation, i.e., the principles of suddenness and spontaneity. Consequently, trying to 
include as many insights from similar traditions as possible, these practitioners integrated 
the two teachings, which, on the one hand, created a unique syncretic integration and, on 
the other hand, led to the absorption of sTon mun, thus its disappearance, within the 
broader tantric milieu of Tibet. In the framework of Wilfred C. Smith's idea of a 
cumulative religious tradition,6 the disappearance of sTon mun as an independent 
tradition in Tibet can thus be seen as a result of the continuous creation process of the 
Dzogchen tradition. 
?>WlfiLHkfc &> C o X (A Study of the bSam gtan mig sgron (3): A Survey on Meditation Techniques in 
the Literature of India, China, and Tibet)"; Miyazaki, "Zenjo tomyo ron kenmonpa sho nitsuite r ^/tllTf*^ 
nm j /ff f^'MM tC 01/ * T (On the Gradualist Chapter of the bSam gtan mig sgron)"; Dalton and van Schaik, 
"Lighting the Lamp"; Meinert, "Structural Analysis of the bSam gtan mig sgron"; Miyazaki Izumi, "The 
Gradualist Chapter of the bSam gtan mig sgron and the Teaching of KamalasTla." 
5
 Along with Padmasambhava and Vairocana, Vimalamitra has been recognized as one of the first three 
masters who brought the teachings of Dzogchen to Tibet in the end of the eighth century. For an account of 
Vimalamitra's life story, see e.g., Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles, 68-73. For the role 
Vimalamitra may have played in the early history of Nyingma transmissions, see, e.g., Germano, "The 
Seven Descents and the Early History of Rnying Ma Transmissions," 241-248. For a study of Cig car 'jug 
pa mam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don, see, e.g., Gomez, "Indian Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden 
Enlightenment," and Shen, "Wugouyou zunzhe ji qi suozao Dunru wufenbie xiuxi yi yanjiu M^^M-^S. 
^ / f j e ($SA$K53"S!J1i^iHi) W[% (A Study on Master Vimalamitra and his Cig car jugpa rnamparmi 
rtog pa 'i bsgom don)." 
6
 See Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion, 139-153. 
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I. Early Studies and Methodological Concerns 
With the help of Dunhuang manuscripts, both in Chinese and Tibetan, scholars have 
made significant progress in understanding early interactions between Chinese Buddhism 
and Tibetan Buddhism.7 Particularly, because of the discovery of Tibetan Chan 
manuscripts, which are either translated from Chinese sources or originally written in 
Tibetan, the development of Chan in Tibet has been a fruitful area of study since the early 
1970s.8 The subjects of these studies include:9 (1) contents of specific manuscripts, (2) 
teachings of certain Chan masters, (3) Tibetan translations of Chinese Chan texts and 
histories, (4) issues related to the Council of Tibet (c. 792-794), and (5) development and 
teachings of Tibetan Chan School. 
A. What We Know about the Formation of s Ton munfrom Early Studies 
On the development and teachings of Chan in Tibet, as reviewed in the Introduction 
See, e.g., Whalen Lai and Lewis Lancaster's edited volume entitled Early Ch 'an in China and Tibet and 
the references therein. 
8
 As Ueyama Daishun notices in his paper "The Study of Tibetan Ch'an Manuscripts Recovered from 
Tun-huang: A Review of the Field and its Prospects," although studies on Tibetan Chan were done quite 
early in Europe, their importance was not recognized until the 70s. These early studies include: Marcelle 
Lalou, "Document tibetain sur l'expansion du dhyana chinois" (1939), Paul Demieville, Le Coucile de 
Lhasa (1952), Giuseppe Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts II (1958), and R. A. Stein, "Illumination subite on 
saisie simultanee, not sur la terminologie chinoise et tibetaine" (1969). Since the early 70s, studies using 
the Dunhuang Tibetan Chan manuscripts have been dominated by Japanese scholars. For a review of the 
field and its prospects, see Ueyama Daishun's paper entitled "The Study of Tibetan Ch'an Manuscripts 
Recovered from Tun-huang: A Review of the Field and its Prospects" in Lai and Lancaster's edited volume 
Early Ch 'an in China and Tibet. 
9
 For Japanese references on these areas, see Ueyama, "The Study of Tibetan Ch'an Manuscripts 
Recovered from Tun-huang: A Review of the Field and its Prospects." For English references on these 
areas, see, e.g., Lai and Lancaster (ed), Early Ch 'an in China and Tibet; Broughton, "Early Ch'an Schools 
in Tibet"; Gomez, "The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana: Fragments of the 
Teachings of Mo-ho-yen"; Stein, "Sudden Illumination or Simultaneous Comprehension: Remarks on 
Chinese and Tibetan Terminology"; Tanaka and Robertson, "A Ch'an Text from Tun-huang: Implications 
for Ch'an Influence on Tibetan Buddhism"; Faber, "A Tibetan Dunhuang Treatise on Simultaneous 
Enlightenment: The dMyigs su myed pa tshul gcig pa 'i gzhung"; Otokawa, "New Fragments of the 
rNal 'byor chen por bsgom pa'i don from Tabo"; Meinert, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen: 
Preliminary Remarks on Two Tibetan Dunhuang manuscripts"; and van Schaik and Dalton, "Where Chan 
and Tantra Meet: Tibetan Syncretism in Dunhuang." Also, see footnote 25 of the Introduction (of this 
dissertation) for studies on the Council of Tibet. 
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of this dissertation, among the scholars of past studies there exist three major perspectives 
regarding the relationship between Chan and Dzogchen of the 8th-10th centuries. Along 
with the perspectives of a direct influence from Chan to Dzogchen and Chan and 
Dzogchen as the respective innovations of Chinese and Tibetans, the third perspective 
argues for a more complicated relationship, which David Germano synoptically states, 
"Given their striking similarities as well as the references to Chan in Nyingma literature, 
it would be very odd if the Great Perfection [i.e., Dzogchen] was not significantly 
influenced by its dialogues with Chan, even if its original genesis and primary impetus is 
to be located elsewhere."10 
Indeed, recent studies using Dunhuang manuscripts have confirmed that early 
Tibetan Buddhists, especially at the border areas such as Dunhuang and Sichuan, 
syncretically integrated Chan ideas with proto-Dzogchen and/or Mahayoga tantric 
teachings.11 Due to their doctrinal resemblance, these early Tibetan contemplatives were 
probably associated with the tradition of sTon mun or the "Sudden School" that, 
according to gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's bSam gtan mig sgron, started as a 
descendent of Chinese Chan lineages.12 Yet, the teachings and practitioners of sTon mun 
10
 Germano, "Architecture and Absence in the Secret Tantric History of the Great Perfection (rdzogs 
chen),"2\l. 
11
 See Meinert, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen: Preliminary Remarks on Two Tibetan Dunhuang 
Manuscripts" and van Schaik and Dalton, "Where Chan and Tantra Meet: Tibetan Syncretism in 
Dunhuang." Also, see my review of these papers in the Introduction of this dissertation. 
12
 In his bSam gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen clearly identifies that sTon mun was passed down through a 
session of patriarchs from Kasyapa (Tib. 'od srungs) down to Darmodhara or Bodhidarmotara {i.e., 
Bodhidharma HSljliJSE (d. 536?)) and to the seventh Chinese patriarch Hashang Mahayana (i.e., 
Moheyan 0|°r|>j (c. 8th-9th centuries)); see gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 15.2-3. 
This genealogy, according to various studies, was known to Tibetan Buddhists through an early sectarian 
Chan history called the Lidai fabao ji JEft/'SUSE {The Record of the Dharma-Jewel Through the 
Generations) probably written by members of Jingzhong /#/R and Baotang ^M Sects of the Chan 
School in the Sichuan area around the 8th century; see, e.g., Obata, "Chibetto no zenshu to rekidai hoboki 
f 'K-y Y<D^7jkt r l S f t / £ S ! E j (The Zen School of Tibet and Lidai fabao ji)" and Ademak, The 
Mystique of Transmission. 
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were certainly not limited to the Chinese. As a tradition of encounter, since its early days 
sTom mun was syncretic in nature,13 for its followers consisted of Chinese, Tibetans, and 
even Central Asians, and its teachings were thus assimilated from Chinese, Tibetan, and 
Central Asian materials. 
Specifically, on the formation of sTon mun, Japanese scholar Obata Hironobu was 
one of the first to make significant contributions. His paper entitled "Kodai chibetto ni 
okeru tonmonha (zenshu) no nagare (The Development of the Sudden School (Zen 
School) in Ancient Tibet)," even though written in 1976, is still one of the most 
up-to-date papers depicting the possible history and major doctrinal characteristics of 
sTon mun. Since other studies including Broughton's "Early Ch'an Schools in Tibet" and 
Gomez's "The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana" have 
similar conclusions, below I will only summarize Obata's findings to illustrate what we 
know about the formation of sTon mun. 
In particular, based on its doctrinal characteristics, Obata argues that sTon mun, as a 
system representing Tibetan Chan, could not be identified with any single Chan sect in 
China. Rather, building upon the teachings from Moheyan MM'iVJ (c. 8th-9th centuries), 
Bodhidharma ^fStjUIP (d. 536?) and his disciples, the Northern Chan Sect, the 
Southern Chan of Heze Shenhui WM?$# (684-758), and the Jingzhong }§A|A and 
Baotang f^H Sects, sTon mun also included teachings believed to belong to the later 
13
 Although the idea of "a pure religion" that does not change in form with socioreligious conditions is 
problematic, the idea of syncretism is still contentious. For many, not only does it connote a sense of 
mixture, but, to some, it even implies a sense of in-authenticity or contamination. Nevertheless, as far as the 
idea that changes are inevitable goes, a "syncretic" tradition seems to be a natural result in relation to 
historical development. For issues related to syncretism, see, e.g., Steward and Shaw (ed), 
Syncretism/Anti-Syncretism: The Politics of Religious Synthesis and Gort, Vroom, Fernhout, and Wessels 
(ed), Dialogue and Syncretism: An Interdisciplinary Approach. 
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Nyingma School and some unknown Central Asian traditions. Obata mainly attributes 
the formation of this doctrinal syncretism to two currents,15 namely, that of Moheyan, 
who represented the sTon mun position in the Council of Tibet, and that of Jingzhong 
Wuxiang >#^Mffi (684-762) and Baotang Wuchu f^fgfef i (714.774) whose 
teachings, primarily represented in the Lidai fabao ji Mf^/SSftfi (The Record of the 
Dharma-Jewel Through the Generations),,16 were brought to Tibet (from Sichuan) via a 
route through the Kingdom of Nanzhao f^ fHBS (649-902) in as early as the first half of 
the eighth century.17 
In addition, Obata conjectures that it was Moheyan, who, for the purpose of 
legitimization and easy propagation, conveniently adapted the already-present lineage of 
the Baotang School recorded in the Lidai fabao ji to disseminate his sudden teachings to 
his Tibetan followers.18 As a result of this strategic movement, Moheyan not only 
facilitated but also greatly contributed to the establishment of the aforementioned 
syncretism. In the end of his paper, Obata concludes that based on the results of previous 
studies, the teachings of sTon mun after Moyehan were then integrated into the Dzogchen 
teachings of the Nyingmapa.19 
Clearly, it can be said that Obata's approach to the formation of sTon mun, a 
representative of most early studies on the subject, is done purely from the disseminator's 
14
 Obata, "Kodai chibetto ni okeru tonmonpa (zenshu) no nagare," 65. 
15
 Ibid, 77-79. 
16
 An early sectarian Chan history, the Lidai fabao ji was probably written by members of Jingzhong and 
Baotang Sects of the Chan School in the Sichuan area around the 8th century. According to various studies, 
it was probably through the Lidai fabao ji that early Tibetan Buddhists learned the Chan genealogy 
recorded in gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's bSam gtan mig sgron referred to earlier; for detailed studies, 
see Obata, "Chibetto no zenshu to rekidai hoboki" and Ademak, The Mystique of Transmission. 
17
 Obata, "Kodai chibetto ni okeru tonmonpa (zenshu) no nagare ," 61-64. 
18
 Ibid, 79. 
19
 Ibid. 
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perspective. That is to say, he pays most of the attention to those who were disseminating 
the teachings and what lineages and/or traditions they belonged to. Thus, he focuses, on 
the one hand, on Jingzhong Wuxiang and Baotang Wuchu and their teachings in the Lidai 
fabao ji and, on the other hand, on Moheyan and his teachings in the Dunwu dasheng 
zhengli jue ^Mfl^^lftlEBI^ (The Verification of Sudden Awakening in the Mahdydna; 
hereafter Zhengli jue).20 Furthermore, he hypothesizes that it was Moheyan, the Chinese 
disseminator, who initiated the syncretic movement by taking the lineage of the Baotang 
School as his own to help legitimize and propagate his teachings. 
B. Methodology: A Perspective Derived from the Contemplative Recipients 
While Obata's proposal may provide a possible solution to how the teachings of 
sTon mun came together from the various Chinese Chan sources, his approach does not 
resolve the issues related to the other syncretic characteristics of sTon mun such as its 
incorporation of the teachings uniquely found in the later Nyingma School and its 
integration of the mind-nature teaching with proto-Dzogchen ideas or Mahayoga tantric 
visualizations as shown in Dunhuang manuscripts like ITJ 689, PT 699, PT 626, and PT 
634. As discussed in the Introduction, the contents of manuscripts ITJ 689, PT 699, PT 
626, and PT 634 not only confirm that Chan teachings were circulated among early 
Tibetan tantric Buddhists. More importantly, they also demonstrate that it was Tibetan 
Buddhists, the recipients, rather than Chan masters, the disseminators, who syncretically 
integrated Chan ideas with proto-Dzogchen and/or Mahayoga teachings within their 
broader tantric context. This understanding effectively tells us that a methodology that 
incorporates the recipient's perspective not only may be a corrective to approaches like 
20
 Ibid, 11-11. For a study on the Zhengli jue, see, e.g., Paul Demieville, Le Coucile de Lhasa (1952). 
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Obata's that merely underscore the disseminator's perspective. It may indeed be more 
appropriate to take the recipient's perspective to examine the development of a religious 
tradition, such as Chan in China or sTon mun in Tibet, which was first brought in by 
foreign teachers but later developed by local practitioners. 
As presented in the Introduction, generally speaking, the disseminators would be 
more doctrinal, authoritative, and sectarian, whereas the recipients, particularly the 
contemplative recipients, would be more practical, inclusive, and less sectarian-oriented. 
This is because, while trying best to figure out what it is exactly that they are receiving, 
the contemplative recipients, due to their special interest in practice, would pay more 
attention to how to best incorporate new ideas without limiting themselves to sectarian 
boundaries to achieve their contemplative project. Even though the recipients may later 
become the disseminators (suggesting that the line between the two categories is moving 
and flexible),21 since their contemplative concerns have been taken into account to shape 
the tradition, these unique concerns would still be influential and even carried further into 
the later development of the tradition. It is with this understanding that the perspective 
derived from the contemplative recipients can offer a vantage point to better highlight not 
only the contemplative concerns but also the assimilation mechanism that may be at work 
behind the formation of a religious tradition. These highlighted elements have usually 
been undervalued, or even neglected, by studies that only take the disseminator's 
perspective in the past. Yet, as we see that the line separating the categories of recipients 
and disseminators is flexible, thus my presentation below will also try to bring the two 
21
 As noted in the Introduction of this dissertation, not only are the characterizations of the disseminator 
and the recipient not absolute, but in reality it is very possible for a practitioner to play the roles of the 
disseminator and the recipient simultaneously and/or under different scenarios, which is evident in the 
discussion below. 
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perspectives into play. 
Moreover, the contemplative recipient's perspective I will take to examine the 
development of sTon mun will also underscore that at the time when Tibetan 
contemplatives were receiving the teachings of sTon mun, they were also exposed to the 
doctrines of Mahayoga tantras and proto-Dzogchen. Although the syncretic nature of this 
religious milieu complicated, but perhaps also made possible, the process through which 
these Tibetan contemplatives assimilated the teachings, it also demanded their immediate 
and specific responses that shaped their understandings. As a result, depending on their 
doctrinal propensities, different groups or persons would take different strategies to 
organize or integrate the various Buddhist teachings they received to accomplish their 
specific religious and/or contemplative goals. Below I will try to demonstrate that during 
their assimilation, not only did Tibetan contemplative recipients not commit themselves 
to sectarian boundaries, but they further organized these Buddhist tenets and practices in 
at least two different ways, namely, (1) hierarchically classifying the teachings as 
illustrated in gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's bSam gtan mig sgron and (2) 
syncretically integrating the view of sTon mun, mainly its idea of directly accessing one's 
innately awakened mind, with Mahayoga and/or proto-Dzogchen meditative teachings 
and practices as illustrated in the Dunhuang manuscripts of ITJ 689, PT 699, PT 626, and 
PT 634. 
II. The Syncretic Development of sTon mun in Tibet 
Given the above contemplative recipient's perspective, I would like to further 
explore the syncretic development of sTon mun in Tibet by performing a structural 
analysis of how early Tibetan Buddhists carried out their works of translation, 
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compilation, and interpretation in relation to Chan teachings. In the analysis of these 
works, I will show that the effort of Tibetan contemplatives was syncretic in nature, 
indicating that these contemplative recipients, probably due to their practical concerns, 
were not sectarian-bounded. Therefore, they were comfortable to simultaneously practice 
teachings of different sectarian sources including Chan, Mahayoga, and proto-Dzogchen. 
Meanwhile, trying best to understand these newly received teachings, they either 
hierarchically classified these teachings or syncretically integrated them together. In the 
syncretic integration, what made the assimilation possible was that the contemplative 
teachings of Chan and proto-Dzogchen were found compatible. Particularly, they 
followed the similar principles of suddenness and spontaneity for contemplation. In this 
way, sTon mun emerged, developed, and then disappeared in its own syncretic 
integration within the Tibetan broader tantric environment during the 8th-10th centuries.22 
In weaving the composite tapestry of sTon mun's development highlighting the 
syncretic contemplative concerns of Tibetan Buddhist recipients, what needs to be 
recognized however is that a detailed trajectory of sTon mun's historical development is 
still difficult to chart as the primary materials on the subject are too scarce. Accordingly, 
what is presented below are only some of the major characteristics concerning the 
syncretic development of sTon mun primarily depicted based on the literary and doctrinal 
structures of its associated texts. The contents and significance of its contemplative 
teachings will be the subject of our next chapter. 
This broader tantric environment was probably made possible by unregulated traveling yogis after the 
breakdown of the Yarlung government's control (c. 848). On the role unregulated traveling yogis may 
played in popularizing tantric teachings during the "dark period" of Tibetan history, see, e.g., Germano, 
"The Seven Descents and the Early History of rNying ma Transmissions," 258-259. 
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A. The Various Translations of Chan Teachings: A Diversified sTon mun Beginning 
Supported by Tibetan Contemplatives of Different Backgrounds 
Needless to say, translation was the first step Tibetan Buddhist recipients took in 
trying to learn and understand the teachings of a foreign tradition like sTon mun. From 
the many Tibetan translations of Chan-related surras and texts demonstrated below, sTon 
mun could be argued as a tradition with a diversified beginning, in which multiple groups 
of Tibetan contemplatives participated. Yet, how did this diversified beginning 
commence? Who were these early Tibetan practitioners of sTon mun? Why did they 
translate Chinese Chan literature into Tibetan, and why did they choose those specific 
sutras and texts? 
As far as history goes, it can be said that Tibetan Buddhism began in an environment 
of multiple teachings. Since the time when the King Khri srong lde brtsan (r. 755-797) 
first adopted Buddhism, probably in the year of 762, Tibetan practitioners were exposed 
to various Buddhist tenets and practices. Among them, for example, there were the 
teachings of sTon mun, the Simultaneist Chinese Chan, and those of Tsen men, the 
Gradualist Indian Madhyamaka, that comprised the Council of Tibet. There were also the 
teachings of Mahayoga tantras that sparked concerns over their sexual and violent 
practices.23 It was under this kind of religiously thriving environment that, according to 
the early Tibetan history of dBa 'IsBa bzhed {The Annals of sBa Family), Tibetan 
Buddhists first received Chinese Chan teachings from Master Gyim Hwa shang {i.e., 
Jingzhong Wuxiang).24 Most probably owing to his influence, the history book, Lidai 
fabaoji, associated with the Chan School of Jingzhong-Baotang Sects in Sichuan was 
23
 See, e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection, 4-6 and Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, 443. 
24
 Wangdu and Diemberger (trans), dBa' bzhed, 47-52. 
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translated into Tibetan, which greatly facilitated the sudden awakening teaching of Chan 
to be transmitted, perhaps for the first time, in the lands of Tibet in written form.25 
To further understand the Chan teachings expounded in the Lidaifabaoji, according 
to Obata's research, early Tibetan Buddhists also translated the Chan-related surras, such 
as Jingang sanmei jing ^ H | H ^ $ M (Skt. Vajrasamddhi-sutra; Tib. rDo rje'i ting 
nge 'dzin gyi mdo), Fawangjing >£3i!M (Skt. Saddharmaraja-sutra; Tib. Chos kyi rgyal 
po 'i mdo), and Shou lengyan jing H ^ I t l M (Skt. Mahosriisa-sutra; Tib. gTsug tor chen 
po 'i mdo)?6 These sutras are listed in the IDan dkar ma catalogue (c. 824), and, judging 
from their use of nonstandard terminologies, they were probably translated before the 
compilation of Mahavyutpatti that was started in the reign of Khri IDe srong btsan 
(804-815) and finished in the reign of Khri gTsug lde btsan (815-841).27 In fact, the 
colophon of the Chos kyi rgyal po 'i mdo (The Dharma King Sutra) in the Derge Kangyur 
(Tib. bka' 'gyur) says, "The sutra was translated from Chinese in the early years and has 
not been corrected according to the Mahavyutpatti."28 Thus, if Obata's theory on the 
influence of the Lidai fabao ji is correct, it is very reasonable to suggest that these 
Chan-related sutras may have been translated even before the Council of Tibet. In 
addition to their early existence, evidence shows that these sutras were probably well 
received by Tibetan Buddhists at the time, for their records were not only found in the 
See e.g., Obata, "Chibetto no zenshu to rekidai hoboki." 
26
 Obata, "Chibetto no zenshu to rekidai hoboki," 167-170. 
27
 See Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, 441. Some scholars have argued that Mahavyutpatti was 
completed in the year of 814; see, e.g., Kimura, "Tonk5 shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu bunken no 
seikaku Ifc JH ££} ± <£> f- ^ -V V >C?$7??3C®;<7)1±f§ (The Characteristics of Tibetan Chan Literature 
Recovered from Dunhuang)," 443-444. For a detailed study on its compilation, see, e.g., Harada, 
"Mahavyutpatti no seiritu zyozi 'Mahavyutpatti' ©fjScil^fjf (On the Compilation of Mahavyutpatti)." 
28
 Quoted in Kimura, "Tonko shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu bunken no seikaku," 444. 
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peripheral areas like Dunhuang but also in Central Tibet.29 
This early popularity of Chan teachings among the Tibetan practitioners of that 
period could be further supported by the fact that Chan master Moheyan was invited by 
the royal family to teach Chan in Lhasa around the same time (c. the 2nd half of the 8th 
century).30 Judging from the overwhelming number of Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts 
that bear his name and attribute the teachings to him, it is conspicuously evident that 
Moheyan played a pivotal role in popularizing Chan among the Tibetan practitioners at 
the time. However, the popularization of Chan teachings, especially its teaching of 
sudden awakening, also brought about the so-called Council of Tibet, which has usually 
been described as a debate or debates between Moheyan, the representative of Chinese 
subitist or ston mun (i.e., "sudden-gate") position, and KamalasTla, the representative of 
Indian gradualist or tsen men (i.e., "gradual-gate") position. 
Nevertheless, in terms of its content, I argue that the Council of Tibet would be 
better understood not as an instigator of doctrinal controversy but as part of the 
doxographic integration process (which will be discussed more below and which) 
contemporary Tibetan recipients engaged in trying to figure out the teaching and practice 
of sudden awakening or simultaneous access (Tib. cig car jug pa). This argument can be 
validated not only by the Chinese record of the Council, Zhengli jue, but also by the 
many Tibetan contemporary anthologies of catechism on the meaning and practice of 
ston mun or cig car jug pa.31 So, we see that, in the Zhengli jue (and in its Tibetan 
Harada, "Chibetto yakukyo si tilSHHIRHi (A History of Sutra Translation in Tibet)," 443. 
30
 See e.g., Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue, 38. 
31
 As noted early, ston mun is a Tibetan transliteration of the Chinese term dun-men HUH or 
"sudden-gate," cig car 'jugpa is believed to be a Tibetan translation of the Chinese term dun-men (sudden 
gate) or dun-ru $pf A (sudden entrance). 
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translation), there are questions regarding how sudden awakening is possible and 
taught by the Buddha in the sutras. We also see several Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts 
and early Nyingma texts, including an unknown author's dMyigs su myedpa gcig tshul 
gyi sgom don (PT 116/5), sPug Ye shes dbyangs' s rNal 'byor chen por bsgom pa 'i don 
(PT 818 and IT J 705), and Vimalamitra's Cig car jug pa mam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom 
don, in the question-and-answer form detailing the various meanings of cig car 'jug pa or 
"simultaneous access," its practice of non-objectification or non-fixation (Tib. dmyigs su 
myed pa), and its relation to non-conceptuality (Tib. mam par mi rtog pa). Even the King 
Khri srong lde brtsan is said to have requested Dunhuang monk Tankuang §lj!jS (c. 
mid-8th century) for exegesis on related issues.34 
After the Council, perhaps due to the authenticating effect of the inquiries or their 
learned understanding of the teachings for their practice, early Tibetan Buddhists seem to 
request for more Chan teachings. This increased request can be seen from the increased 
volume of written and/or oral teachings of Chan masters being translated into Tibetan. 
For example, not only do we see that the teachings of renowned Chinese Chan masters, 
Over the years, scholars have found multiple copies of the Tibetan translation of the "Old Question" 
(Jiuwen UPaj) section of the Zhenglijue. These copies are in Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts PT 823, PT 
827, and PT 829. For a study of these manuscripts, see, e.g., Imaeda, "Documents tibetains de Touen-houag 
concernant le concile du Tibet" and Okimoto, "Tonko shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu bunken no naiyo 
| 5 : ^ r l i ± © f - ^ > y h3C#7K>Ci£0|*|ir (The Contents of Tibetan Chan Literature Recovered from 
Dunhuang)," 423; and Kimura, "Tonko shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu bunken no seikaku iWJttB:!:© 
f - ^ 7 h ^ C l ^ T K ^ i ^ ^ t t t S (The Characteristics of Tibetan Chan Literature Recovered from 
Dunhuang)," 442-443. 
33
 Dunhuang manuscripts exhibit some unique characteristics of early Tibetan spelling. For example, 
instead of dmigs su med pa, they usually have dmyigs su myed pa. Thus, I have keep their original spelling 
when presenting them. For a discussion on the characteristics of the spelling in the Dunhuang Tibetan 
manuscripts, see, e.g., Ueyama, "Chibettoyaku Tongo shinshuyoketsu no kenkyu "f-^y MR r M^fcf JETT? 
W;/)i j ©Eff^ u (A Study of the Tibetan Version of Tunwu chen tsung yao chueh)," 45-46. 
34
 For the exchange between the King Khri srong lde brtsan and Dunhuang monk Tankuang, see, e.g., 
Pachow, "A Study of the Twenty-two Dialogues on Mahayana Buddhism," and Ueyama, Tonko bukkyo no 
kenkyu Wt.M.i%$fc<£>ffi% (A Study of Dunhuang Buddhism), 32-33. For a translation of the twenty-two 
questions asked by Khri srong lde brtsan, see Pachow, "The Translation: The Twenty-two Dialogues on 
Mahayana by T'an-k'uang." 
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such as Bodhidharma, Wolun f^ fjtj (early 7' century), Heze Shenhui, Jingzhong 
Wuxiang, Baotang Wuchu, Xiangmozang &MMt (early 8th century), and Moheyan, 
were translated from Chinese to Tibetan, but we also see a list of forty-some relatively 
unknown Chan masters, Chinese and non-Chinese, whose sayings or "realizations" (Tib. 
rig pa) were translated into Tibetan as well.35 
How do we construe the above various Tibetan translations of Chan-related sutras 
and teachings? From the disseminator's perspective, these translations could be seen as a 
result mostly from the influence of Moheyan, for historical evidence only supports his 
presence in Tibet, whereas all other Chan masters did not set a foot there. Thus, as 
mentioned earlier, Obata argues that it was Moheyan who made the effort to integrate the 
teachings and created the syncretic tradition called sTon num. Nevertheless, the wide 
spectrum of the teachings and their diverse sources really beg for further explanation. 
Therefore, I propose that, instead of the Chinese disseminators, it was really the 
Tibetan recipients who played the decisive role in the endeavor to translate into Tibetan 
the Chan-related sutras, texts and anthologies expounding the teaching and practice of 
sudden awakening, as well as the oral commentaries of their masters. As my above 
narrative suggested, in the endeavor, the Tibetan recipients of the time went through a 
process of receiving the teachings, understanding/questioning/authenticating these 
35
 We can these Chan masters and their teachings in Dunhuang Tibetan Manuscript PT 116 and in the sTon 
mun chapter of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's bSamgtan migsgron where he quotes the "realizations" 
(Tib. rig pa) of thirty four different shen she, a Tibetan transliteration of Chinese title chanshi $|§fl5 or 
dhyana master, to elucidate the doctrines of sTon mun. For studies of these Chan masters and their 
teachings, see, e.g., Obata, "Pelliot 116 bunken ni mieru shozenji no kenkyu Pelliot. Tib. n. 116 'SCM.\Z.fc 
X.-Sttl^ffi^fift^ (A Study of the Chan Masters Appearing in Pelliot 116)"; Okimoto, "bSam yas no 
shuron (2): Tonko seizo bunken ni okeru sho zenshi bSam yas <7)TKI#(H): Sfc l lHJi&XSi^S^tSt f^ 
ffl (The Religious Debate of bSam yas (2): The Various Chan Masters in the Tibetan Documents from 
Dunhuang)" and "Chibetto yaku ninyu shigyo ron nit suite "f^V b!R rZLAIZ3?Tl$i j ICCH^T (On the 
Tibetan Translation of the Treatise on the Two Entrances and Four Practices)." 
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teachings, and then translating and requesting more Chan teachings. This process 
effectively tells us that these Tibetan recipients were seriously engaged in learning and 
practicing the subitist Chan teachings, and in the process of learning and practicing them, 
it seems that they were not so particularly sectarian-bound, for their sources came from 
various Chan Sects. Yet, these Tibetan recipients seem to know what they were looking 
for, as their translated Chan teachings were mostly aiming at the soteriological goal of 
sudden awakening. This subitist nature of these teachings, I believe, ultimately gave rise 
to gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's characterization of the tradition as sTon mun or the 
"Sudden School." 
Not only were Tibetan recipients seriously involved in the translations of 
Chan-related surras and teachings, but, I would further argue, due to the wide spectrum of 
the translated teachings and their diverse sources, these Tibetan recipients probably 
belonged to different groups and were practicing, translating, and assimilating the various 
sTon mun teachings in their own ways. Thus, we see in the Zhenglijue, Moheyan reports 
that when he was first invited, under the order of the King Khri srong lde brtsan, to teach 
Chan in Lhasa, how he was repeatedly questioned regarding the principles and sources of 
Chan teachings. Nevertheless, after the King acknowledged the teachings, Moheyan also 
reports, the King then dispatched Damomodi (or Dharmamadi) ^ ^ 0 f £ (c. late-8th 
century), along with Moheyan himself, to disseminate the teachings of Chan to the 
Tibetans.36 
In addition, we also see that Lang 'gro dKon cog 'byung nas (c. late-8th century), 
36
 This account is given in Moheyan's second report to the King Khri srong lde brtsan collected in the 
Zhenglijue. It says, "Your Majesty then understood that the principles of Chan I spoke of were right. As a 
result, [Your Majesty] dispatched Damomodi (or Dharmamadi) to disseminate the teachings of Chan [with 
me] together ( g l T 7 f t l E ± ^ f U i S H ^ g J t i E ' ;£»#tgJ«W6l§ISB1fffc)" (Wang, Dunwu dasheng 
zhengli jue, 38). 
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who is revered as one of the twenty-five disciples of Padmasambhava by the later 
Nyingma School,37 is also identified as an adept of the sTon mun tradition by gNubs 
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in the bSam gtan mig sgron. Therein, gNubs chen not only cites 
Lang 'gro's teaching to support the practice of sTon mun but also indicates that 
Lang 'gro wrote a bsGom lung {A Treatise on Meditation) pertaining to the sTon mun 
teachings.38 Moreover, Dunhuang manuscript PT 699, a Tibetan commentary on a Chan 
treatise called the Lung chung {Small Treatise; ITL 689/1), lists Lang 'gro as one of the 
six accomplished practitioners (Tib. grub pa po) who realized the highest achievement of 
"nirvana without remainder of the aggregates" (Tib. phungpo lhag ma ma lus par yongs 
su mya ngag bzla ba'i don) advocated by the Chan treatise.39 
Among early Tibetan contemplatives, Lang 'gro was not the only who practiced 
both sTon mun and Mahayoga (perhaps, proto-Dzogchen too). Lo-tsa-wa sKa ba dPal 
brtsegs (c. late-8* and early-9th centuries), a virtuous teacher of tantric teachings (Tib. 
sngags kyi dge bshes),40 not only translated many important tantric scriptures including 
the Mahavairocanabhisambodhi-tantraAX and possibly the Guhyasamaja-tantra42 as well. 
See, e.g., Dudjom Rinpoche, The rNying ma School of Tibetan Buddhism, 535. 
38
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 150.6 and 169.1. 
39
 Specifically, Dunhuang manuscript PT 699 lists (1) gNubs Nam mkha'i snying po, (2) rLang su Ga ta go 
ba, (3) Lang 'gro dKon cog 'byung nas, (4) dBu na a nang, (5) 'Brom Za sril la, and (6) Mar kong Za rin 
cen as the accomplished practitioners (Tib. grub pa po) of the fruition, nirvana without remainder of the 
aggregates (Tib. phungpo lhag ma ma lus par yongs su mya ngag bzla ba'i don). In the list, only gNubs 
Nam mkha'i snying po and Lang 'gro dKon cog 'byung nas are easily identifiable, and both of them are 
recognized as members of the twenty-five disciples of Padmasambhava (Dudjom Rinpoche, The rNying ma 
School of Tibetan Buddhism, 535). While gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes clearly identifies Lang 'gro 
dKon cog 'byung nas as an adept of the sTon mun tradition, he gives two figures of Nam mkha'i snying po, 
one with the family name of Tshig tsa as a sTon mun adept and the other with the family name of Jo bo 
(identified as the same as gNubs) as a Mahayoga adept. Whether these two figures are the same person is 
still debatable; see also footnote 50 below. 
40
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 200.6 
41
 For a study of this tantra, see Hodge, The Maha- Vairocana-Abhisambodhi-Tantra with Buddhaguhya 's 
commentary. 
42
 See Martin, Unearthing Bon Treasures, 112. 
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He also composed exegetic treatises from the perspective of sTon mun as well. Le'u 
gZhon nu snying po, according to gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's bSam gtan mig 
sgron, also composed a bsGom lung, a treatise on meditation, from the perspective of 
sTon mun.44 In addition to this sTon mun association, he is also reported to be the eighth 
abbot of the bSam yas monastery built by the King Khri srong lde brtsan and consecrated 
by Padmasambhava.45 As the leading teacher of one of the major centers of early Tibetan 
Buddhism, Le'u gZhon nu snying po, according to Samten Karmay's research, belonged 
to a lineage that is highly possible to have "a direct connection with some masters of the 
rDzog chen tradition."46 
Finally, according to the Dunhuang manuscript PT 996,47 there existed a sTon mun 
lineage transmitted from a Central Asian dhyana master named A rdan hver and passed 
down through masters including Hvashang Beusin, Hvashang Man, Tshig tsa Nam 
mkha'i snying po, and sPug Ye shes dbyangs. While Master A rdan hver is said to be 
from Anse, i.e., Persia, Beusin and Man both have the Chinese title of Hvashang or 
Venerable Monk, probably suggesting their Chinese origin. From them, this 
"international" lineage was received by Tibetans, namely, Tshig tsa Nam mkha'i snying 
po and sPug Ye shes dbyangs.48 Some scholars have suggested that Hvashang Man may 
In his bSam gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes quotes sKa ba dPal brtsegs twice in the 
chapter on sTon mun's teachings (132.2 and 151.6). In the first quotation, dPal brtsegs explains six 
paramitas in a fashion of symbolic exegesis similar to Moheyan's explanation of ten paramitas in PT 116, 
171.1-173.2, and the second quotation indicates that dPal brtsegs also composed a treatise on meditation 
(Tib. bsgom lung) from the perspective of sTon mun. 
44
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 150.4. 
45
 Dunhuang manuscript ITJ 689/2 lists gLe'u gZhon nu snying po as the eighth abbot of the bSam yas 
monastery; for a translation of ITJ 689/2, see Karmay, The Great Perfection, 78-79. According to Karmay, 
the two family names, gLe'u and Le'u are the same (78). 
46
 Karmay, The Great Perfection, 76. For a more detailed discussion and a translation of these lists, see 
Karmay, The Great Perfection, 76-80. 
47
 For a study of Dunhuang manuscript PT 996, see Lalou, "Document tibetain sur l'expansion du dhyana 
chinois" and the references mentioned in the footnote 16 of Karmay, The Great Perfection, 88. 
48
 For more detailed biographies of these lineage holders, see PT 996; also Lalou, "Document tibetain sur 
144 
be the same person as Hvashang Moheyan, for Hvashang Man is said to disseminate the 
teachings in the Tsong kha area and, according to the Zhengli jue, Moheyan indeed went 
to Tsong kha after his stay in Lhasa.49 If this theory is correct, since Moheyan clearly 
describes his association with the Northern Chan lineage in the Zhengli jue, it is then very 
plausible to suggest that the "syncretic synthesis" of the above sTom mun lineage was 
produced by the Tibetan recipients. 
While the identity of Tshig tsa Nam mkha'i snying po is still in dispute,50 sPug Ye 
shes dbyangs (c. early 9th century) has been identified as the author of the rNal 'byor chen 
por bsgom pa 'i don, a text consisting of a series of questions and answers concerning the 
teachings and practices of sTon mun briefly mentioned earlier.51 In addition, according 
to two recently found inscriptions, sPug Ye shes dbyangs commissioned two series of 
images of Buddha Vairocana surrounded by eight Bodhisattvas carved on the remote cliff 
walls of Amdo and Chamdo.52 As these images highly suggest that sPug Ye shes 
dbyangs was also a Mahayoga practitioner, it thus effectively puts him in the same camp 
l'expansion du dhyana chinois." 
49
 See Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue, 38. 
50
 The identity of Tshig tsa Nam mkha'i snying po is still in dispute, as one of the twenty-five disciples of 
Padmasambhava is called gNubs Nam mkha'i snying po who has been quoted by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas 
ye shes under the family name of Jo bo (but an interlaced note identifies it as gNubs) as an adept of 
Mahayoga in the bSam gtan mig sgron (278.2). Meanwhile, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes clearly 
identifies Tshig tsa Nam mkha'i snying po as the author of a Cig car 'jugpa'i mdo in the sTon mun chapter 
of the bSam gtan mig sgron (180.3). Based on this description, Karmay has argued that these two Nam 
mkha'i snying pos are not identical "for the simple fact that both have distinctively different family names: 
Tshig tsa and gNubs" (Karmay, The Great Perfection, 98). Yet, Dunhuang manuscript PT 699, a 
commentary on a Chan treatise (ITJ 689/1), includes gNubs Nam mkha'i snying po, along with Lang 'gro 
dKon cog 'byung nas mentioned earlier, as one of the practitioners who have realized the highest 
attainment advocated by the Chan treatise, i.e., nirvana without remainder of the aggregates. Reading PT 
699 as a Mahayoga commentary on the Chan treatise, Lung chung (ITL 689/1), van Schaik and Dalton 
think that PT 699 strengthens the likelihood to identify the two figures as the same person, and they further 
conjecture that Nam mkha'i snying po may have played an important part in both Mahayoga and Chan 
lineages (van Schaik and Dalton, "Where Chan and Tantra Meet," 71 (footnote 39)). 
51
 See PT 996 and the study in Otokawa, "New Fragments of the rNal 'byor chen por bsgom pa 'i don from 
Tabo." 
52
 For details of these two images and associated inscriptions, see Heller, "Early Ninth Century Images of 
Vairochana from Eastern Tibet." 
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as the aforementioned Lang 'gro dKon cog 'byung nas, sKa ba dPal brtsegs, and Le'u 
gZhon nu snying po, who freely crossed sectarian boundaries, especially, that between 
Chan, Mahayoga, and/or proto-Dzogchen. 
Arguably, as these early Tibetan sTon mun practitioners of different backgrounds 
rather freely crossed sectarian boundaries, due to their syncretic practices, it is highly 
possible that they also participated in shaping sTon mun as a diversified and syncretic 
tradition. For that, their many different translations of Chan-related teachings could be a 
demonstrative sign. And, in this process of translation, these early Tibetan recipients, 
probably due to their practical demands, tried their best to understand, i.e., carefully 
question and authenticate, the teachings so that they could further assimilate the teachings 
for their own use. Below let me further elaborate part of this assimilation process with 
their systematic compilations of Chan teachings. 
B. The Systematic Compilations of Chan Teachings 
After questioning and authenticating the teachings, how would a recipient try to 
further understand and assimilate them in a more systematic manner? From the discussed 
contemplative recipient's perspective, I would propose that, owing to their pragmatic 
concerns of putting the teachings into practice, these contemplative recipients would try 
to organize the teachings into more structural formats so that they could practice them 
more systematically. Then, how would they specifically do so? 
A possible way is to compile teachings into reference manuals so that the 
practitioners can refer to them when needed. As means, these manual-like texts would be 
compiled to respond to different needs, and from a contemplative practitioner's 
perspective, they should probably contain the following elements: (a) doctrinal 
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elaborations and commentaries, for instance, in the forms of sutra, saying, or treatise; (b) 
questions and answers on various issues, either to expound or to clarify doctrinal or 
practical issues from the sTon mun perspective; (c) instructions on how to achieve the 
sTon mun objective of cig car jug pa or "instantaneous/simultaneous access" to the 
ultimate awakening; and (d) problems one may encounter and solutions one may apply 
during the practice. To demonstrate this compilation scheme Tibetan contemplative 
recipients may employ to organize and assimilate the Chan teachings, I will analyze the 
content structure of two important Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts, namely, ITJ 709 and 
PT 116, on which various studies have shown their close connection with the teachings of 
sTon mun.53 Since my argument would be sufficiently demonstrated with a structural or 
survey-like analysis of their contents and issues, I will not go into the details of the 
individual texts that comprise the two collections. 
1. Example One: Dunhuang Tibetan Manuscript ITJ 709 
Physically, ITJ 709 is a manuscript of 38 Tibetan folios with 9 different texts 
successively written on either side of the pages.54 Content-wise, it is a collection of 
different doctrines and practices including: (1) teachings from different masters (Texts 1, 
5, and 8), (2) treatises on various themes including samatha and vipasyana (Text 6), (3) 
the nonduality between skillful means (upayd) and prajna wisdom (Text 7), (4) the 
meaning of entering Mahayoga (Text 9), (5) questions and answers on different aspects 
For related studies, see Ueyama, "The Study of Tibetan Chan Manuscripts Recovered from Tun-huang." 
See also Faber, "A Tibetan Dunhuang Treatise on Simultaneous Enlightenment" and the references therein. 
54
 For a detailed description of ITJ 709, see Dalton and van Schaik, Tibetan Tantric Manuscripts from 
Dunhuang: A Descriptive Catalogue of the Stein Collection at the British Library, 302-306. See also 
Kimura, "Tonko shutsudo chibetto-bun shahon Stein 709 |>C^tii±^A^>y h 5 C ^ $ Stein 709 (The 
Dunhuang Tibetan Manuscript Stein 709)." 
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of sTon mun teachings (Texts 3 and 4), and (6) problems arising in meditation (Text 2). 
Unlike the collection in PT 116 which appears to be complete, the collection in ITJ 709 
has missing pages from various texts. As a result, it makes an accurate evaluation of the 
collection more challenging. Even though it might not be as widely circulated as PT 116, 
ITJ 709 is still significant, especially in terms of its bridging role in the early Tibetan 
Buddhists' assimilation of the teachings after the Council of Tibet. Regarding the dates of 
its compilation, textual analysis has suggested that it was probably compiled after the 
Council of Tibet but before the year of 848 when the Yarlung Tibetan government lost its 
control over Dunhuang.56 Yet its material can be traced back to the second half of the 
eighth century, as one of the texts in the collection, bSam gtan gi yi ge or The Book of 
Dhyana, is said to have been written under the order of the King Khri srong lde brtsan.57 
To understand its aforementioned bridging role, the following observations on the 
contents of ITJ 709 are necessarily in order. First, just as its employment of the metaphor 
that the doctor may use different practices according to the patients' different illnesses, 
ITJ 709, as a whole, suggests that the teachings of Indian Madhyamaka or Tsen men, as 
they emphasize gradual cultivation, are for novice practitioners, whereas the teachings of 
Chinese Chan or sTon mun, since they teach sudden awakening, are meant for more 
Specifically, the nine texts are: (1) Moheyan's sudden teachings called bSam gtan cig car jug pa'i sgo; 
(2) a Chan treatise on the problems arising in meditation, bSam gtan gi skyon rnams bstan pa'; (3) a 
collection of questions and answers on various issues from the sTon mun perspective, Tshangs la phan 
sems kyis 'jam dpal la zhus pa; (4) a Chan treatise on some extreme aspects of Chan teachings; (5) Slob 
dpon Byang cub klu dbang's teachings on "viewing the mind" (Tib. sems la bltd); (6) a discussion of 
samatha and vipasyana from the sTon mun perspective; (7) a discussion of the nonduality of means (Tib. 
thabs) and wisdon (Tib. shes rab) from the sTon mun perspective; (8) mKhan po 'Gal na yas's teachings, 
which states that the simultaneous approach to Madhyamaka is the best of all the Mahayana forms of 
contemplation and that there are no methods in the simultaneous approach (Tib. cig car jug pa); (9) bSam 
gtan giyi ge composed under the order of the King Khri srong lde brtsan. 
See e.g., Kimura, "Tonko shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu bunken no seikaku," 460-461. 
57
 The first line of bSam gtan gi yi ge reads "bSam gtan gi yi ge comes to being under the order or "neck 
seal" (Tib. mgur gi phyag rgyd) of King Khri srong lde brtsan" (bsam gtan gi yi ge/ lha btsan po khri srong 
lde brtsan gi mgur gi phyag rgya 'og nas 'byung ba'); ITJ 709, 36r.l (since Dunhuang manuscripts usually 
are written on both sides, 36r.l refers to Line 1 on the recto or front side of page 36). 
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advanced practitioners. Even though the compiler(s) or author(s) of ITJ 709 evidently 
privilege the teachings of sTon mun, their intention of trying to bridge the two doctrinal 
systems in a hierarchical way is conspicuous as well. 
Particularly, in the collection, Text 1 contains Chan master Moheyan's sudden 
teaching. Like other texts attributed to Moheyan, it teaches the approaches of no-mind 
(Tib. myi sems) and non-attention (Tib. yid la myi bya bd) as the simultaneous access to 
the dhydna of the Tathagata (Tib. de bzhin gshegs pa'i bsam gtan cig car jug pa). 
Similar sTon mun teachings can also be found, at least, in Texts 5, 8 and 9, if not the 
entire collection. Meanwhile, with respect to the teachings of Tsen men, Text 4 quotes 
teachings from KamalasTla's Bhdvanakrama explaining the six problems concerning the 
attainment of different samddhis and their eight antidotes. Text 6 even promotes the idea 
of the wisdoms of hearing, thinking and meditating (Tib. thos bsam sgom gsum) and 
details the developmental aspects of samatha and vipasyana. These teachings noticeably 
echo the gradualist model for realization that KamalasTla forcefully puts forth in his 
Bhdvanakrama trilogy. Accordingly, having embraced both sTon mun and Tsen men 
teachings, the compiler(s) or author(s) of ITJ 709 clearly demonstrate the intention of 
trying to bridge these two systems. Thus, similar to Japanese scholar Kimura Ryutoku's 
conclusion, I would also argue that the contents in the texts compiled in ITJ 709, as a 
whole, represent the effort of early Tibetan Buddhist recipients trying to integrate the 
different Buddhist tenets together most probably during or after the Council of Tibet.59 
Secondly, not only as a bridge between sTon mun and Tsen men, but also as a 
58
 See Kimura, "Tonko shutsudo chibetto-bun shahon Stein 709," 11. 
59
 In his "Tonko shutsudo chibetto-bun shahon Stein 709," Kimura Ryfltoku concludes that, as a whole, ITJ 
709 was written from the ultimate position of the sudden school in the attempt to combine the doctrines of 
the sudden and gradual schools after the Council of Tibet (12-13). He observes that this coalescence of the 
two positions is also characteristics of the Blon po bka 'i thang yig and the bSam gtan mig sgron (12). 
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bridge between translation and interpretation, the texts compiled in ITJ 709 collectively 
illustrate the intention of early Tibetan Buddhists trying to make the various teachings 
their own through their innovative compilation scheme. This unique innovation occurs 
not only in terms of coalescing together the two positions of sTon mun and Tsen men, or 
Chinese Chan and Indian Madhyamaka,60 but also through the effort of putting different 
genres of teachings together. 
For example, in Text 2 of the collection, concerning the problems arising in 
meditation, it cites materials from the Samdhinirmocana-sutra, the Bhavanakrama, as 
well as Chan master Shenhui's criticism of the Northern Chan meditation practice. In 
Text 9, it even regards the dhyana of the Tathagata, an idea from the Lahkdvatdra-sutra, 
as the highest practice for Mahayoga tantric practitioners. Even though the text itself does 
not specify any Mahayoga tantric practices, its tantric connection is difficult to deny if 
one takes into consideration other tantric terms in the same document, such as man ngag 
(or quintessential instructions) and dam tshig (or sacred pledges), not to mention the fact 
that some Tibetan contemplatives of that period were crossing the boundaries between 
sTon mun and Mahayoga, as previously discussed. This practice of mingling together 
different genres of Buddhist teachings, Chan and Madhyamaka, sutra and tantra, suggests 
that early Tibetan Buddhist recipients were not confined by sectarian or genre boundaries, 
but freely maneuvered through different teachings, perhaps, as long as they found such 
integration to be meaningful, both doctrinally and practically. 
As a "hybrid" practice manual, ITJ 709 clearly demonstrates the effort of early 
60
 In Text 8 of ITJ 709, there is the idea saying, "There are many doors to the dhyana of the Mahayana. 
Among them, the ultimate one is the simultaneous access to the Madhyamaka. With respect to the 
simultaneous access, there are no skillful methods" (theg pa chen po'i bsam gtan gi sgo yang mang ste/ de'i 
nang na dam pa ni don dbu ma la cig car 'jug pa yin te/ cig car 'jug pa la ni thabs myed de); ITJ 709, 
35v.l-2 (v stands for verso; thus 35vl-2 refers to Lines 1-2 on the verso or back side of page 35). 
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Tibetan Buddhist recipients trying to assimilate the new teachings of the Buddha. Not 
only did they put teachings from different systems together, but they also interlaced 
foreign translations (from both Chinese and Sanskrit) with original compositions. In this 
practice of syncretically integrating various teachings, the compilation of ITJ 709 is 
probably a result of the early stage, as it still contains contrary propositions from different 
texts in the compilation.61 In addition, its bridging of the two positions of sTon mun and 
Tsen men cannot be said to be systematic, especially in comparison to that demonstrated 
in the bSam gtan mig sgron of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes. Be that as it may, ITJ 
709 still opens a window for us to see, albeit partially, the innovative undertaking, in 
which Tibetan sTon mun contemplatives of the 8th-10th centuries tried to understand and 
organize the teachings of their milieu so that they could practice them more structurally. 
As a result of this pragmatic strategy, they syncretically practiced sTon mun side by side 
with other Buddhist teachings, tantric and non-tantric. 
2. Example Two: Dunhuang Tibetan Manuscript PT 116 
Regarding early Tibetan Buddhists' pragmatic integration of the various teachings of 
their time, ITJ 709 is not a singular case. Another Dunhuang Tibetan manuscript, PT 116, 
exhibits similar characteristics but with different emphases. As one of the most important 
documents among the Dunhuang manuscripts for the study of Tibetan Chan, PT 116 has 
been well researched in the past few decades. These previous studies provide the context 
for my reading of PT 116, in which, like that of ITJ 709,1 underscore the significance of 
this compilation in terms of its role in early Tibetan Buddhist recipients' assimilation of 
61
 For example, while Text 1 of ITJ 709 advocates various methods for the practice of "simultaneous 
access," Text 8 definitely states that there are no methods in the "simultaneous access." 
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the sTon mun teachings. 
Physically, PT 116 is a manuscript of 124 Tibetan folios with 9 different texts 
continuously written on either side of the pages.62 Content-wise, it is a manual-like 
collection covering various aspects of sTon mun doctrine and practice. Specifically, it 
includes: (1) two Chan-related Mahayana surras (Texts 1 and 2), (2) a treatise on the 
practice of non-fixation (Tib. dmyigs su myed pa) that includes questions and answers 
defending and expounding sTon mun positions (Text 5), (3) a Tibetan translation of the 
Northern Chan treatise Dunwu zhenzong yaojue $Jf fH J i ^ ^ )£ {An Essential 
Determination on the True Teaching of Sudden Awakening; hereafter Yaojue) that 
explains the meaning and practice of "viewing the unlocalized" (Ch. kan wusuochu ^fM 
$Tl£; Tib. myed pa 'i gnas la blta) (Text 8), (4) the sayings of various Chan masters 
(Texts 6 and 7), (5) instructions on issues including the distinctions between Mahayana 
and Hinayana from the sTon mun perspective (Text 3), (6) the right view (Text 4), and (7) 
the meaning of Dharmadhatu (Text 9).63 It is found that, at least, there are ten other 
Dunhuang manuscripts that correspond in part to the contents and issues discussed in the 
compilation of PT 116.64 This fact, in effect, indicates that the contents and issues of PT 
For a detailed description of PT 116, see Wang, Facang dunhuang zangwen wenxian jieti mulu, 22-23. 
See also Okimoto, "bSam yas no shuron (1): Pelliot 116 ni tsuite bSam yas (D^Sm(—): Pelliot 116 ICO 
t ^ T (The Religious Debate of bSam yas (1): On Pelliot 116)" and Ueyama, "Tonko shutsudo chibettobun 
zen shiryo no kenyu: P. tib. 116 to sono mondai ten I f c H E t i ^ f - ^ y h3tWKf4-©Efl^-P.tib.ll6i: % 
© F D M K (A Study of Tibetan Chan Materials Recovered from Tun-huang: The Issue of P. tib. 116)." 
63
 Specifically, the nine texts are: (1) a Tibetan translation of the Bhadracarlpranidhana; (2) a Tibetan 
translation of the Vajracchedika-sutra; (3) instructions on the distinctions between Mahayana and 
Hinayana, Theg pa che chung gyi khyad bar; (4) a summary of various views, ITa ba mdor bsdus pa 
las byung ba 'i don; (5) a sTon mun treatise on the method of non-fixation, dMyigs su myed pa tshul gcig 
pa'igzhung; (6) Moheyan's sudden teachings, mKhanpo ma hayangyis bsam brtan myi rtogpa'i nang dup 
ha tolphyindpa drug dang/ bcu 'dus pa bshadpa 'i mdo; (7) sayings of various Chan masters, bSam brtan 
gyi mdo sna tshogs; (8) a Tibetan translation of Dunwu zhenzong yaojue >l!fffif JCTF:3O;&, Cig charyang dag 
pa 'i phyi mo 'i tshor ba// rdo rje shes rab spyadpas pha rol du phyin pa 'i chos kyi sgo mo gees pa; and (9) 
instructions on the Dharmadhatu, Chos kyi dbyings nyid bstanpa 'i mdo. 
64
 There are: Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts PT 21, PT 118, PT 813, PT 817, PT 821, PT 822, PT 823, ITJ 
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116 were widely known among the Tibetan Buddhist communities at the time. In addition, 
it has also been demonstrated that the different texts that comprise the collection were 
translated or composed at different times, and they were later compiled together in the 
form of the present document.65 
From the above brief description of the contents of PT 116, we can see that the 
different elements of the collection were not randomly put together. That is to say, its 
compiler(s) had a systematic structure in mind. To demonstrate this systematic 
compilation scheme, let me offer a survey-like analysis of the contents and issues covered 
in PT 116 without going into the details of each individual text. Structurally, even though 
the compilation of PT 116 does not follow exactly the presentation of view, cultivation, 
conduct, and fruition (Tib. Ita ba, bsgompa, spyodpa, and 'bras bu) which later Tibetan 
writers have frequently employed, the document does contain all the four elements. 
Accordingly, the two Chan-realted Mahayana sutras, i.e., the BhadracarTpranidhana and 
the Vajracchedika-sutra, not only identify the right view sTon mun followers adopt, but 
also legitimize their teachings with the authority of the scriptures (Texts 1 and 2). These 
scriptural sources are then subsequently followed by further elaboration and clarification 
of how sTon mun teachings are different from others, presenting them in the forms of 
doctrines, questions and answers, and the sayings of their teachers (Texts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 
9). Afterwards, the practice and fruition from the sTon mun perspective are expounded 
with exegetical treatises and masters' commentaries (Texts 5, 6, 7 and 8), while the 
problems one may encounter during the practice and their antidotes are also explained in 
703, ITJ 706, and ITJ 708. 
65
 For example, according to Kimura Ryutoku, PT 116/5 was probably composed between 824 and 841, 
whereas PT 116/8 was probably translated before 814 (Kimura, "Tonko shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu 
bunken no seikaku," 460-461). 
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the compilation (Text 5). 
The systematic compilation scheme of PT 116 can be further understood through 
noting the close correlation between its view and practice presented in the 
Vajracchedika-sutra (Text 2) and the Yaojue (Text 8), respectively.66 That is to say, the 
Yaojue, which details the Chan practice of "viewing the unlocalized," mainly derives its 
practice from the doctrinal view expounded in the Vajracchedika-sutra. Put more 
specifically, the Chan master Zhida ^ M , the protagonist of the Yaojue, glosses the 
famous Vajracchedika-sutra statement of "Without dwelling on anything, in such a way, 
[a Bodhisattva] gives rise to the mind"67 in an idiosyncratic Chan approach of "symbolic 
exegesis" to obtain his practice of "viewing the unlocalized";68 he explains, 
If the entire mind is absent of [thoughts], it is called the unlocalized. 
If the mind is further not arisen, it is called abiding. As for "give rise 
to the mind" [in it], "should or ought to" refers to "certainty"; "give 
rise to" refers to "view." Thus, "ought to view the unlocalized" is to 
give rise to the mind.69 
66 In fact, its complete title is Dunwu zhenzongjin 'gang bore xiuxing dabianfamen yaojue W^nlk^s&Ml 
ISSf^fT JSfjSj^/zfePI:!?^ (Cig charyang dag pa 'iphyi mo 'i tshor ba// rdo rje shes rab spyad pas pha ml 
du phyin pa 'i chos kyi sgo mo gees pa; An essential dharma gate on the sudden awakening to the true 
teaching that brings one to the other shore by cultivating the vajra wisdom). For a detailed study of the 
treatise, see Ueyama, "Chibettoyaku Tongo shinshu yoketsu no kenkyu - f - ^y MR ''$11©3f^5?££ j <75 
%%% (A Study of the Tibetan Version of Tunwu chen tsung yao chueh)." 
67
 That is r mmm&m&R'b •1 
68
 The Tibetan translation of the Yaoyue translates this Vajracchedika-sutra statement as follows: "[One] 
should develop the mind that dwells in the place of no mental investigation" (brtag du myed pa'i gnas 
la 'dug pa'i sems bskyed pa'i rigs* so); PT 116, 70.3. *the original has "myi rigs so," which clearly is a 
mistake. 
09
 Ueyama, "Chibettoyaku Tongo shinshu yoketsu no kenkyu," 96; r— iJS'ti'M ' &&Mrff ° jE^FlE'O ' 
&ZM&.' ffi£S'll>#; mmn$L • ±mm& • mUmmm • g P £ M ± g ' M i l • j Generally speaking, 
its Tibetan translation follows the Chinese original closely. To contrast, the Tibetan translation is given 
below. 
If the entire mind is absent of mental investigation, it is called a place of no mental 
investigation. If the mind is further not disturbed from that, it is called abiding. As 
for "develop the mind" in it, "should or necessary" refers to "realize"; "develop" 
refers to "view." Thus, "to view the place of no mental investigation," that is to 
develop the mind. 
PT 116, 71.3-72.1; sems so chog brtag du myed na/ de'i mying brtag du myed pa'i 
gnas yin no/ de las yang sems ma gyos na/ de'i mying 'dug ces bya'o/ de'i sems 
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Thereafter, Zhida further explains that, as one views the unlegalized, one sees the true 
nature and thus achieves the Buddhahood.70 
Given the above observations, accordingly, the systematic compilation of the Chan 
teachings presented in PT 116 really can be seen as indicating a successful incorporation 
of Chan or sTon mun teachings by the contemporary Tibetan Buddhist recipients. In 
addition to the compilation's "quasi-systematic" presentation, the success of this 
assimilation endeavor is further supported by the fact that PT 116 contains both 
translations of Chinese materials and original Tibetan compositions, for this integration 
of translations and compositions indeed indicates that early Tibetan Buddhists were not 
only receiving the teachings but also interpreting them. 
With respect to the aspect of receiving the teachings, similar to what has been shown 
in the case of ITJ 709, early Tibetan Buddhist recipients clearly had not developed any 
particular sectarian consciousness, but embraced all Chan-related teachings under the 
rubric of sTon mun. Consequently, Okimoto Katsumi also puts forth a similar conclusion 
stating that, as a whole, PT 116 characteristically represents the view of sudden 
awakening from the perspective of Chinese Buddhism.71 
With respect to the aspect of interpreting the teachings, judging from the existence 
of Mahayoga texts in the collection, Ueyama Daishun argues that, after the Council of 
Tibet, Chan was assimilated (by the Tibetan recipients) as a means to explain the 
Mahayoga position in the Dzogchen teachings. In the process, the representation of Chan 
also changed as it "was entirely wrapped under the umbrella of the doctrine of 
bskyed pa na rigs pa shes bya ba ni rig pa'o/ bskyed ces bya ba ni lta ba'o/ brtag du 
myed pa'i gnas la blta ste/ de'i sems bskyed pa'i rigs so. 
70
 Ueyama, "Chibettoyaku Tongo shinshu yoketsu no kenkyu," 97; °° M14fi£#&jfi ° j Its Tibetan translation 
goes as follows: ngo bo nyidmthong stel sangs rgyas kyi chos lam sgrub bo (PT 116, 72.4-73.1). 
71
 See Okimoto, "bSam yas no shuron I: Pelliot 116 ni tsuite." 
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Dzogchen."72 As a result, Ueyama sees PT 116 as "a collection of Chan literature 
enveloped under the standpoint of Dzogchen teachings."73 In this way, the systematic 
compilation shown in PT 116 can be seen not only as an indicator to a successful 
incorporation of sTon mun teachings in Tibet, but also as a bridging step that shows how 
sTon mun did not disappear but changed its representation via the syncretic integration of 
Tibetan Buddhist recipients at the time. Below I would further argue that the success of 
this syncretic integration was most probably due to the contemplative compatibility 
between the teachings of sTon mun and those of Dzogchen. 
From the above discussion, it should be clear that ITJ 709 and PT 116 demonstrate 
two different strategies early Tibetan Buddhists had employed in understanding, 
organizing, and thus assimilating the teachings of sTon mun. On the one hand, they tried 
to reconcile the two positions of the Simultaneist sTon mun and the Gradualist Tsen men 
in a hierarchical structure, and, on the other hand, they also tried to integrate the 
teachings of sTon mun under the umbrella of tantric teachings, particularly that of 
Mahayoga and/or proto-Dzogchen. Even though these two strategies may not be so well 
developed yet in the two Dunhuang manuscripts, they have been carried further by later 
practitioners and authors, and eventually developed into independent presentations. 
C. The Two Strategies of Interpretation 
The two independent presentations early Tibetan Buddhists developed are what I 
72
 Ueyama, "Chibettoyaku Tonga shinshu yoketsu no kenkyu," 71. 
73
 Ibid. See also Ueyama, "Tonko shutsudo chibettobun zen shiryo no kenyu: P. tib. 116 to sono mondai 
ten." On the connection between Chan and Dzogchen, some scholars even argue that it was due to the 
hermeneutic strategy of interpreting the Mahayoga teachings of Tantric Buddhism from the standpoint of 
Chinese Chan that Dzogchen came into being. See e.g., Hiramatsu, Tukan Issai shugi Ninma-ha no sho h 
<y jj >" —"Kl^fi — ^ " ^ M ^ ^ t (The Chapter on the Nyingma school of Thu'u bkwan's Doctrinal 
Classification). 
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call the presentation of hierarchical doxography and the presentation of syncretic 
integration. While a hierarchical doxography is to arrange various teachings into a series 
of hierarchically ordered classes, a syncretic integration is to assimilate elements of 
different sources into an integral whole. Either case, I would argue, requires the recipients 
to fully understand the teachings so that they can either re-arrange or integrate them in 
their own terms. Through the hermeneutics or interpretation of "in their own terms," the 
recipients then really make something foreign into something of their own. With respect 
to the teachings of sTon mun, early Tibetan recipients, after the initial stages of 
diversified translation and systematic compilation, also came to the stage of strategic 
interpretation. Hermeneutically and historically, these three stages are not always so 
clearly defined. Rather, these stages intertwine with each other so as to reinforce the 
recipients' understanding as well as their assimilation of the teachings. Now, let me direct 
our attention to some early Tibetan writings and Dunhuang manuscripts to demonstrate 
the two presentations early Tibetan Buddhists had participated in, as they re-arranged 
and/or integrated the teachings of sTon mun. 
1. The Presentation of Hierarchical Doxography 
As far as we can tell, since early on Tibetan Buddhists were exposed to, and used, 
doxography in understanding the various Buddhist tenets and practices coming to them. 
In an article on how Tibetans organized tantras during the 8th-12th centuries, Jacob Dalton 
begins by emphasizing the difficulties the Tibetans experienced as they encountered the 
influx of rapidly changing and diverse Buddhist teachings. While these diverse teachings 
brought them confusions, these teachings also inspired their immediate and specific 
responses. Dalton thus writes, "Toward this end, one of the primary strategies they 
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resorted to was doxography arranging the tantras into a series of hierarchically ordered 
classes."74 And, it is evident that early Tibetan Buddhists did not just apply this practice 
of hierarchically arranging different teachings to the tantras, but they also applied it to 
other genres of Buddhist tenets and practices.75 
Historically speaking, Santaraksita and Kamalaslla may be the first teachers who 
introduced the idea of doxography to the Tibetans with their works expounding the 
Buddhist teachings from the Indian Madhyamaka perspective.76 Following their works, 
Ye shes sde, a scholar-translator in the Tibetan court of the late-S^-early-*?* centuries, 
may be the first Tibetan to compose a doxographic treatise entitled ITa ba'i khyadpar 
{Distinctions of the Views) distinguishing the different teachings (or branches) within the 
school of Madhyamaka.77 Moreover, apart from these non-tantric works, the first 
doxographic system written from the tantric perspective in Tibet was probably the Man 
ngag Ita ba'i phreng ba {Garland of the Views: Quintessential Instructions), attributed to 
Padmasambhava and evidently written during his brief stay in Tibet in the end of the 8th 
century.78 Accordingly, it must be against this vibrant yet syncretic religious milieu and 
Dalton, "A Crisis of Doxography," 115. 
75
 Of course, Tibetans were not the only one to do so. Chinese have used the practice of panjiao £lJi£ to 
organize Buddhist teachings according to their understandings. For a more detailed discussion of panjiao in 
Chinese Buddhism, see, e.g., Mun, The History of Doctrinal Classification in Chinese Buddhism: A Study of 
the Panjiao Systems and Gregory, Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism, Part II (93-170). 
76
 These two non-tantric Buddhist doxographic works by Santaraksita amd Kamalaslla are 
Madhyamakalamkara {Ornament of the Middle Way) and Madhyamakaloka {Illumination of the Middle 
Way), respectively. For studies of these two works, see e.g., Blumenthal, The Ornament of the Middle Way: 
A Study of the Madhyamaka Thought of Santaraksita and Keira, Madhyamika and Epistemology: A Study of 
Kamalaslla's Method for Proving the Voidness of All Dharmas. 
77
 For a brief description of Ye shes sde's ITa ba'i khyad par, see, e.g., Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, 
439-440. 
78
 For a brief discussion on the date, authorship, and contents of the Man ngag Ita ba 'i phreng ba, see, e.g., 
Dalton, "A Crisis of Doxography," 132-134. For a more detailed discussion and a translation of the text, 
see, e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection, 137-174. While Dalton thinks that all indications point to the 
reliability of the attribution of the Man ngag Ita ba'i phreng ba to Padmasambhava, thus confirming its date 
of the late-eighth century (Dalton, "A Crisis of Doxography," 132), Karmay considers that the composition 
of the Man ngag Ita ba'i phreng ba "probably belongs to the late ninth or early tenth centuries" (Karmay, 
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their doxographic responses that we come to see how early Tibetan Buddhists tried to 
assimilate the teachings of sTon mun into their hierarchical doxography. 
Among these early Tibetan doxographic systems, the Man ngag Ita ba 'i phreng ba 
puts forth a hierarchical system of seven vehicles (Tib. thegpa) that include, in ascending 
order, three sutra vehicles (Sravaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva), three outer tantra 
vehicles (Kriya, Ubhaya, and Yoga), and one inner tantra vehicle or Mahayoga that 
consists of the three modes (Tib. tshut) of development, perfection, and great perfection 
(Tib. bskyed rdzogs rdzogs chen). Not long after the Man ngag ha ba 'i phreng ba, first in 
the writings of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes and later accepted by the entire Nyingma 
school, the three modes of the Mahayoga are further developed into three distinct 
vehicles, thus resulting in the nine vehicles system (Tib. theg pa rim pa dgu) with 
Mahayoga, Anuyoga, and Atiyoga, another name for Dzogchen, on the top of the system. 
As Dalton insightfully observes in his article, this doxographic development 
demonstrated some uniquely Tibetan concerns; particularly, Dalton writes, "Unlike their 
Indian contemporaries [who focused more on ritual expressions], the Tibetans preferred a 
more properly 'doxographic' approach, organizing the tantras around differences in 
doctrine."79 Arguably, this doxographic approach highlighting the differences among the 
doctrines would greatly facilitate the Tibetan recipients to intellectually understand and 
organize their received teachings. 
In addition, the doxography highlighting doctrinal differences would also help the 
Tibetan contemplatives to put the teachings into practice more accurately, for this kind of 
practical implementation requires differential details which the doxography can properly 
The Great Perfection, 149). 
79
 Dalton, "A Crisis of Doxography," 120. 
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provide. These differential details usually appear as different views and, like the different 
prescriptions a doctor may prescribe to different patients (because of their different 
illnesses), are thus suitable only to practitioners with appropriate capacities. In this way, 
the somewhat "rudimentary" doxography of ITJ 709 that advocates Tsen men and sTon 
mun for beginning and advanced practitioners, respectively, can be seen not only as a 
response to the Council of Tibet but also as part of the doxographic movement early 
Tibetan recipients engaged in to make sense of sTon mun, both intellectually and 
contemplatively, by comparing it against other Buddhist approaches.80 As a result, the 
teachings of sTon mun were compared not only to Tsen men but also to Mahayoga. There, 
it seems that the conclusion, at least for some, was that sTon mun revealed the essential 
meaning of Mahayoga, which, in sTon mun terminology, lies in the teaching and practice 
of simultaneous access.81 Hence, the practitioners of Mahayoga specially familiarized 
themselves with its tenets and practices.82 
Yet, what was the basis for such a conclusion? Was it because the practitioners of 
sTon mun were trying to disguise their teachings under the name of Mahayoga for special 
privilege, which would imply the popularity of Mahayoga at the time? And yet, was 
Mahayoga popular in the end of the eighth century when its practices of sexual yoga (Tib. 
One may even pursue the possibility that it may be due to the doctrinal controversies surrounding the 
Council of Tibet that early Tibetan Buddhists were so much into the doxographic classification that, in part, 
was to clarify misunderstandings arising from similar systems. 
81
 Particularly, I am thinking of the Dunhuang Tibetan manuscript, PT 818 (also ITJ 705), which has the 
title rNal 'byor chenpor bsgompa'i don (literally, "the meaning of the practice in Mahayoga"). Also, in the 
dMyigs su myedpa tshul gcig pa'i gzhung of PT 116 (Text 5), it ends the text saying "The treatise, 
'Non-fixation is the only method,' which has been written simply as an aid for the practitioners of 
Mahayoga to remember the essential meaning, is completed" (dmyigs su myed pa tshul gcig pa'i gzhung 
rnal 'byor chen po rnams la dgos pa'i don dran ba'i rten tsam du bris pa rdzogs s.ho); PT 116, 170.2. 
82
 In the bSam gtan gi yi ge of ITJ 709, it has the following statement, "Therefore, now, while there are no 
reasons to show other [dhyanas], it shows in brief that the practitioners of Mahayoga should specially 
cultivate the teaching of the dhyana of the Tathagata." (da 'dir ni rnam grangs gzhan gi gtan tshigs myi 
smos kyi/ de bzhin gshegs pa'i bsam gtan gyi lung rnal 'byor chen po bas las su bsgom ba nyi tshe mdo 
tsam zhig bstan to); ITJ 709, 36v.3-5. 
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sbyor bd) and violent liberation rite (Tib. sgrol bd) were still controversial and its 
translations were under the strict control of the royal government?83 Or, was it because 
the teachings of sTon mun were somehow used by the Tibetans as a means to explain the 
Mahayoga position, as Ueyama Daishun has suggested? Or, is it possible that, due to 
pragmatic reasons such as their doctrinal affinities and/or contemplative compatibility, 
Tibetan recipients of both sTon mun and Mahayoga employed each other in order to 
reinforce each other's practice? Due to the lack of definitive evidence, all these questions 
cannot be answered with certainty. Nevertheless, I argue that it is still possible to identify 
certain doctrinal affinities and common practitioners between sTon mun and Mahayoga 
to support the above conclusion. 
First, because both traditions emphasized the possibility of sudden awakening,84 it 
is then possible to argue that it was their emphasis of this direct and instantaneous path to 
Buddhahood, a characteristic of the fruitional vehicle, that inspired early Tibetan 
recipients to find the two traditions compatible and thus associate them contemplatively 
together, particularly at the time when sectarian consciousness was not apparent. This 
hypothesis can be further supported by both ITJ 709 and PT 116, as both compilations 
advocate the sTon mun practices of cig car 'jug pa or instantaneous/simultaneous access, 
such as the method of non-fixation and the dhyana of the Tathagata, for the practitioners 
of Mahayoga. Evidently, these Tibetan contemplatives, who did practice both sTon mun 
and Mahayoga, include Lang 'gro dKon cog 'byung nas, Lo-tsa-wa sKa ba dPal brtsegs, 
83
 See e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection, 4-6 and Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, 443. 
84
 In his article, "Mahayoga Texts at Tun-hunag," K. W. Eastman discusses a Dunhuang manuscript, ITJ 
321, a commentary on the Thabs kyi zhags pa pad mo'i phreng ba'i rgyud, one of the eighteen tantras of 
the Mahayoga. In its first chapter, it shows that the ideas of achieving Buddhahood in a single lifetime and 
attaining the state of omniscience at once are an integral part of Vajrayana tradition. Judging from its 
formations, Eastman concludes that these ideas are entirely Indie and special to Vajrayana, even though 
they closely resemble aspects of Chan teachings. See, especially, Eastman, "Mahayoga Texts at 
Tun-hunag," 49-52 and 57. 
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Le'u gZhon nu snying po, Tshig tsa Nam mkha'i snying po, and sPug Ye shes dbyangs, 
about whom we briefly discussed earlier. 
Furthermore, the words of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in the bSam gtan mig 
sgron can also be telling here. In his conclusion to the chapter on Dzogchen, gNubs chen 
points out the differences among various approaches. On the differences between sTon 
mun and Dzogchen, he also indicates their similarities: 
The terminology of sTon mun is similar to that of Dzogchen. While, 
[similar to Dzogchen], it [i.e., sTon mun] teaches [the practices of] 
non-action and non-establishment, having in mind the ground that is 
not arising and completely perfect, it [only] speaks of the ultimate 
truth as the ground that is unborn and empty. If one examines with 
respect to that [i.e., the teachings of sTon mun], there are still [the 
problems of making one's awareness of the two] truths alternating, 
getting accustomed [only] to the state of sunyata, and making effort. 
[Thus,] they [i.e., the Simultaneists of sTon mun] never experience in 
reality the nonduality of [the two] truths. Obscured by their own 
[mistaken] view, they need yet to enter into nonduality.85 
Here, even though gNubs chen ends in pointing out the problems in the view of sTon 
mun from the Dzogchen perspective, he also clearly states that sTon mun and Dzogchen 
have similar terminology, especially in terms of the practices of non-action (Tib. bya ba 
med) and non-establishment (Tib. bsgrub pa med pa). These similar terminology and 
practices, as gNubs chen states in the reasons why he composes the bSam gtan mig sgron, 
brought confusions to the Tibetans even to the degree of conflating the two systems (see 
the quotation below). 
Thus, with the assertion of instantaneous awakening and the similar practices of 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 490.3-5; ston mun ni rdzogs chen dang skad 
mthun/ bya ba med bsgrub pa med par ston yang/ gzhi mi 'byung ba yongs su grub pa la dgongs nas/ don 
dam pa'i bden pa ma skyes stong pa'i gzhi la smra ste/ de la ni brtags na da dung bden pa re mos pa dang/ 
stong pa'i ngang la 'dris par byed pa dang/ rtsol ba yod de/ bden pa gnyis med pa la spyod kyang ma 
myong ste/ rang gi lta bas bsgribs te gnyis med la bzod 'jug dgos so. See also Meinert, "Structural Analysis 
of the Bsam gtan mig sgron," 192, and Karmay, The Great Perfection, 105. 
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non-action and non-establishment, it would be difficult, at first, for early Tibetan 
recipients not to come to the conclusion that the practitioners of Mahayoga, especially in 
its highest mode of rdzogs chen or great perfection, should familiarize themselves with 
the tenets and practices of sTon mun. Subsequently, these practitioners offered the 
somewhat bewildering proposition seen in the Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts including 
ITJ 705, 709, 710, PT 116, and 818. As mentioned earlier, there were practitioners of 
Mahayoga doing just that and coalescing the two teachings together. However, this 
proposition that the practitioners of Mahayoga should practice the teachings of sTon mun, 
I would argue, could only occur in the early stage of their interactions, for further 
interactions would probably lead to either the recognition of their differences, which the 
bSam gtan mig sgron is a clear example, or the further syncretic integration that will be 
discussed in the next subsection. 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, the great Tibetan codifier of the dark age, 
composed the bSam gtan mig sgron probably in the years of the late-9th-early-10th 
centuries. Essentially, the bSam gtan mig sgron presents a fourfold hierarchical 
classification system, namely, the four vehicles of Tsen men, sTon mun, Mahayoga, and 
Atiyoga.86 As mentioned earlier, in his other writings, the same author advocates another 
nine-vehicles system that has become the standard in the later Nyingma School, yet it 
seems that these two doxographic perspectives cause no contradictions in the mind of 
gNubs chen, as he also clearly evokes the nine-vehicles system in the bSam gtan mig 
sgron. Here, we can see that, as codifying doxography developed in the hands of the 
Tibetans, Atiyoga became an independent class, rather than just a mode under the inner 
86
 For further discussions of this fourfold system and contents of the bSam gtan mig sgron, see Dalton and 
van Schaik, "Lighting the Lamp," and Meinert, "Structural Analysis of the bSam gtan mig sgron." 
163 
tantra Mahayoga. This suggests that during the codification process differences in 
doctrine, even small ones, had been noticed and developed. Similarly, the early possible 
conflation between sTon mun and the great perfection (or rdzogs chen) mode of the inner 
tantra Mahayoga, had been noticed and even criticized. We see that gNubs chen plainly 
states that one of the reasons for his composition of the bSam gtan migsgron is to clarify 
the confusions surrounding sTon mun and Dzogchen; he writes, 
In this section of the rNal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan?1 I compiled in 
detail [the teachings of sTon mun] because of the mistake [where 
practitioners were considering] sTon mun and Dzogchen to be 
similar.88 
In clarifying the misunderstandings, gNubs chen details the doctrinal differences of 
the said four vehicles and arranges them in hierarchical order based on their philosophical 
insight into the non-conceptuality (Tib. mam par mi rtog pa). He explains his 
methodology as follows: 
The differences of these [four vehicles] are like the rungs of a ladder. 
Just as there are high and low rungs on a ladder, so are there 
differences between these four non-conceptualities [of Tsen men, 
sTon mun, Mahayoga, and Atiyoga].89 
Consequently, gNubs chen arranges the four vehicles to be, in ascending order, Tsen men, 
sTon mun, Mahayoga, and Atiyoga. For him, those of Tsen men practitioners only 
understand the non-conceptuality of appearance (Tib. snang ba mi rtog pa), whereas sTon 
mun practitioners enter the non-conceptuality of non-appearance (Tib. mi snang ba mi 
Another name for the bSam gtan mig sgron. 
88
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 186.1-3; rnal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan gyi 
skabs 'dir/ ston mun dang rdzogs chen cha 'bra bas gol du dogs pa'i phyir rgyas par bkod do. See also 
Meinert, "Structural Analysis of the Bsam gtan migsgron," 185. 
89
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 60.6-61.1; de dag gi khyad par skad kyi gdang 
bu bzhin te/ dper na skad gdang la mtho dman yod par dang 'dra ste/ mi rtog pa 'di bzhi yang khyad par 
yod. See also Meinert, "Structural Analysis of the Bsam gtan migsgron," 188, and Dalton and van Schaik, 
"Lighting the Lamp," 171. 
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rtog pa). Going higher on the ladder, Mahayoga practitioners recognize the nondual 
non-conceptuality (Tib. gnyis su med pa 'i mi rtog pa), but it is only the Dzogchen 
practitioners who naturally and accurately realize the spontaneous non-conceptuality (Tib. 
Ihun gyis grub pa 'i mi rtog pa). Doctrinally and contemplatively, for gNubs chen, the four 
systems of non-conceptuality represent a progression of increasing refinement on the 
soteriological path of ultimate awakening, which essentially asks its practitioners to give 
up various attachments to discursive thinking {e.g., gradualism, subitism, and nondualism) 
and artfully strives for the spontaneous presence of their awakened (or more precisely 
awake) mind to manifest in its natural perfection of suchness.90 Because in the reality of 
suchness there is only the spontaneity of nature rather than any intentionality, including 
the intentionality of eliminating intentionality (gradualism), of no intentionality 
(subitism), or of its transcendence (nondualism). 
All in all, from the above discussion, we see that as early Tibetan Buddhists 
attempted to understand their received teachings both doctrinally and contemplatively, 
one of the strategies they took was to codify these different tenets and practices into 
doxographic systems. Clearly, the teachings of sTon mun were part of that process, as the 
above discussion has tried to demonstrate. That is to say, after the initial contacts of 
translation and compilation, Tibetan recipients further interpreted the teachings of sTon 
mun by comparison, which in turn led to the doxographic codification of these teachings 
as well. 
Nevertheless, as this story of codification and adaptation unfolded further in the 
history of Tibetan Buddhism, the name of sTon mun eventually disappeared. As for its 
90
 A similar characterization of these four approaches in the bSam gtan mig sgron can also be seen in 
Meinert, "Structural Analysis of the bSam gtan mig sgron" 188-189. 
165 
possible reasons, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes states in his bSam gtan mig sgron that 
the transmission of sTon mun lineage ended due to the lack of spiritual masters or 
qualified teachers (Tib. slob dpon)91 but the letters of its teachings went on.92 These 
teachings were recorded in Dunhuang manuscripts and other Tibetan works like the bSam 
gtan mig sgron and the Blon po bka'i thangyig. Yet, as history is always multifaceted, 
there is another side of the story. Evidence suggests that the disappearance of sTon mun 
(in terms of its name) in the later development of Tibetan history was also, in part, due to 
the fact that its teachings were syncretically integrated into other traditions, a topic we 
• t i 93 
will turn to next. 
2. The Presentation of Syncretic Integration 
In terms of assimilation schemes, generally speaking, doxography highlights 
differences, whereas syncretic integration relies on similarities. Probably due to their 
different propensities, practitioners may take one or the other or even a combination of 
the two strategies to organize and integrate what they receive so as to accomplish their 
specific religious and/or contemplative goals. With respect to the teachings of sTon mun, 
91
 In fact, according to the bSam gtan mig sgron, during the reign of gLang dar ma (r. 838-842), the 
transmission of the causal vehicles (Tib. rgyu'i thegpa) disappeared due to the fact that the transmission of 
the spiritual masters of the characteristic vehicles, another name for causal vehicles, disappeared (Tib. nub). 
Specially, in explaining the disappearance of the causal vehicles, an interlaced comment in the bSam gtan 
mig sgron says, "During the reign of gLang dar ma, Venerable Ye shes dbang po encountered [some] 
hindrance [i.e., he died], due to which the transmission of the spiritual masters of the characteristic 
[vehicles] disappeared (glang dar ma'i ring la btsun pa ye shes dbang po bar chad du gyur pas mtshan nyid 
kyi slob dpon brgyud pa nub)" (gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 15.3). See also 
Karmay, The Great Perfection, 92-95. 
92
 For a more detailed account, see gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 15.1-5. 
93
 This account concerning the disappearance of sTon mun in Tibet is different from the story recorded in 
traditional Tibetan Buddhist histories. Therein, Tibetan historians usually report that the disappearance of 
sTon mun came about because Moheyan, the representative of sTon mun teachings, was roundly defeated 
by Kamalaslla, the representative of Indian Madhyamaka teachings, in a royally sponsored debate. As a 
result, the teachings of sTon mun were banned and expunged from the soils of Tibet; see, e.g., dBa'/sBa 
bzhed (Wangdu and Diemberger (trans), dBa' bzhed: The Royal Narrative Concerning the Bringing of the 
Buddha's Doctrine to Tibet); Bu ston, Chos 'byung (Szerb, Bu ston's History of Buddhism in Tibet); and 
Houston, Sources for a History of the bSam yas Debate. 
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in addition to the hierarchical doxography discussed above, there is also the syncretic 
integration illustrated in the Dunhuang manuscripts of ITJ 689, PT 699, PT 626, and PT 
634, where the teachings of sTon mun are syncretically integrated with those of 
Mahayoga and/or proto-Dzogchen. 
As presented above, the similarities early Tibetan recipients found between sTon 
mun and Mahayoga/proto-Dzogchen probably include the soteriological assertion of 
sudden awakening and the idea of non-action to realize such a fruition. Yet, it seems that 
the "syncretic activity" early Tibetan contemplatives drew from these similarities at first 
is to practice sTon mun and Mahayoga/proto-Dzogchen side by side (i.e., not 
intermingled) with each other. Nonetheless, from the evidence below, it seems that some 
of these contemplatives did not stop there, for they went further from the "side-by-side 
syncretism" to a more integrated syncretism, in which sTon mun ideas were interpreted in 
Mahayoga/proto-Dzogchen terminology. 
While we cannot ascertain the exact reason for such a syncretic integration, it is 
possible to argue that as Tibetan contemplatives simultaneously practiced sTon mun and 
Mahayoga/proto-Dzogchen, they also found these traditions following some similar logic 
for contemplation, e.g., the principles of suddenness and spontaneity. This finding, I 
argue and will discuss more in the coming chapters, was most likely facilitated by these 
traditions' sudden-awakening soteriology that effectually puts them in the same category 
as fruitional vehicles. Accordingly, owing to this contemplative compatibility, some 
Tibetan recipients of these traditions innovatively interpreted the teachings of one 
tradition with the teachings of another tradition. This syncretic movement, I believe, for 
the Tibetan contemplative recipients, not only deepened their understanding of the 
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received teachings but also facilitated their contemplative realization of awakening by 
including as many insights from similar teachings as possible. Put simply, this syncretic 
integration of insights from different teachings, for the Tibetan recipients, must benefit 
them doctrinally and contemplatively without threatening their tradition's continuity and 
logical integrity. 
First, let me present some textual evidence to justify the above argument. As briefly 
reviewed in the Introduction and mentioned several times earlier, the contents of 
Dunhuang Tibetan manuscripts ITJ 689 and PT 699, when considered together, strongly 
suggest a syncretic integration between the teachings of sTon mun and proto-Dzogchen/ 
Mahayoga. This is seen not only from the circumstantial evidence, in which the root text 
Lung chung or the Small Treatise in ITJ 689 has been doubtlessly confirmed as a sTon 
mun text94 and its commentary in PT 699 is implied by the corresponding colophon to be 
belonging to the category of Atiyoga, another name for Dzogchen. It is also because of 
the syncretic use of terminology seen in both the root text and the commentary. For 
example, as a sTon mun treatise, the Lung chung advocates the practice of "viewing 
one's own mind" (Tib. rang gyi sems la bltas) to realize the non-substantiality and 
non-conceptuality of one's awakened mind. This state of non-conceptuality, the Lung 
chung further teaches, is self-endowed with non-conceptual lucidity, and being so, it is 
called the reflexive primordial awareness (Tib. rang rig ye shes), an important idea also 
seen in the later Dzogchen tradition.95 Furthermore, in the Lung chung, the sTon mun 
For example, the root text Lung chung is quoted several times by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in the 
sTon mun chapter of the bSam gtan mig sgron to explain the teachings of sTon mun. In addition, the text 
itself clearly states that the recorded teachings were first entrusted to Mahakasyapa and later to 
Bodhidharma, which is a unquestionable evidence indicating that the text belongs to the sTon mun lineage. 
For a summary of the sTon mun teachings in the Lung chung, see, e.g., Meinert, "Chinese Chan and 
Tibetan rDzogs-chen," 291-293. 
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fruition of revealing one's reflexive primordial awareness is also said to be the attainment 
of self-liberation (Tib. rang grol), also a well-known Dzogchen/Mahayoga contemplative 
ideal, and the commentary in PT 699 further glosses this attainment with the tantric idea 
of "attain[ing] instantaneously in the adamantine-like samadhi, the bhumi of the Buddha, 
[that of] all-encompassing light." % 
With regard to the above syncretic use of sTon mun and Dzogchen/Mahayoga 
terminologies, in her paper entitled "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs chen" Carmen 
Meinert informs us that, according to the Nyingma scholar-master Mipham Rinpoche's 
(1846-1912) commentary to the Man ngag ha ba'i phreng ba, the fruition or bhumi of 
"all-encompassing light" (Tib. kun du 'od) is said to be in accordance with the Dzogchen 
fruition, namely, the "bhumi of the great accumulation wheel of the [seed] syllables" (Tib. 
yi ge 'khor lo tshogs chen gyi so).97 Accordingly, the exegesis in the commentary of PT 
699 practically puts the sTon rnun attainment of self-liberation taught by the root text of 
ITJ 689 in the same category as the Dzogchen fruition. This fruitional connection, as 
Meinert argues in her paper,98 probably is philosophically threaded through the idea of 
non-conceptuality that is also the reflexive primordial awareness. Thus, conjoining 
elements of Chan meditation with Dzogchen fruition, Meinert concludes that the author(s) 
of ITJ 689 and PT 699 seem to reside in "an intermediary space somewhere between the 
Chinese Chan Buddhist heritage and the not-yet-systematically-formulated Tibetan 
Rdzogs chen system."99 
Regarding the above syncretic characteristics seen in ITJ 689 and PT 699, Sam van 
96
 Meinert, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen," 299. 
97
 For her detailed argument, see Meinert, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen" 301-303. 
98
 See Meinert, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen" 303. 
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Schaik and Jacob Dalton offer another interpretation. With the help of Dunhuang 
manuscripts PT 626 and PT 634, they argue that the commentary in PT 699 is better 
understood as a commentary on the sTon mun treatise Lung chung in ITJ 689 from the 
Mahayoga perspective.100 Based on their similar contents and identical phrases and terms, 
van Schaik and Dalton suggest that PT 626, PT 634, and PT 699 are almost certainly 
penned by the same author.101 Then, they show that PT 626 and PT 634 are 
commentaries on the same Mahayoga ritual text, detailing the three samddhis of the 
development stage (Tib. bskyed rim) using explicit Chan ideas to interpret its first or 
thusness samadhi (Tib. de bzhin nyid kyi ting nge dziri).102 Based on the similar 
references in PT 699, van Schaik and Dalton thus propose that the same author, when 
composing PT 699, had the same tripartite samadhi structure in mind.103 Subsequently, 
they put forth the view that the author of PT 699 was really interpreting the sTon mun 
ideas in the Lung chung in terms of Mahayoga ritual techniques toward an audience 
well-versed in the Mahayoga practices and scriptures.104 
Be it to reside in the intermediary space between sTon mun and proto-Dzogchen or 
to address a Mahayoga audience, the contents of ITJ 689, PT 699, PT 626, and PT 634 
clearly exemplify some Tibetan contemplative recipients' innovative participation in 
dealing with their received teachings, particularly those of sTon mun, Mahayoga and/or 
proto-Dzogchen. This innovative participation, I argue, when combining the conclusions 
of both Meinert's and van Schaik and Dalton's research, can be seen as a syncretic 
integration done by the Tibetan recipients to try to include as many insights from 
100
 Van Schaik and Dalton, "Where Chan and Tantra Meet," 68. 
101
 Ibid, 65. 
102
 Ibid, 66-67. 
103
 Ibid, 67-68. 
104
 Ibid, 68-69. 
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available and/or similar teachings as possible to accomplish their desired contemplative 
soteriology through the immediate and spontaneous manifestation of one's reflexive 
primordial awareness. Such a direct manifestation of one's primordial awareness has 
been seen in the teachings of Shenhui discussed in the previous chapter, and will be 
discussed in the teachings of sTon mun and Dzogchen presented in the next two chapters. 
As my above presentation has tried to show, this logic of immediacy in contemplation 
inspired the Tibetan recipients to syncretically integrate the teachings of sTon mun with 
those of proto-Dzogchen within the broader religious milieu of Mahayoga tantras, for 
such an integration not only benefited them doctrinally and contemplatively but also did 
not threaten their tradition's continuity and logical integrity. Nonetheless, as a result of 
this integration (or changing the representation), sTon mun as an independent doctrinal 
system, not to mention as an independent tradition, eventually disappeared in the later 
years of Tibetan history. 
III. Disappearance as Connection: A Missing Link between Chan and Dzogchen? 
With respect to the above syncretic development of sTon mun that eventually led to 
its disappearance in Tibet, Wilfred C. Smith's idea of a cumulative religious tradition can 
be insightful. Commenting on this idea of Smith's, Hendrik Vroom writes, "[RJeligious 
traditions are in a continual process of interpenetration. Adherents of one religion derive 
insights and practices from adherents of other religious traditions. That applies not only 
to religious traditions, but also to currents within a certain religion."105 He further 
analyzes, "Since religious traditions include many currents with divergent emphases, one 
may not place them over against one another as closed units. There is room for learning 
105
 Vroom, "Syncretism and Dialogue," 27. 
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from other traditions. Since people aspire to an interpretation of the whole of the reality 
they experience, they will be inclined to integrate as many insights from elsewhere as 
possible."106 
The Tibet of the late-S^-early-lO* centuries was a society nourishing concomitant 
currents of Buddhist traditions. sTon mun, as one of the currents, participated in the 
continual interpenetration process of Tibetan Buddhist traditions of that period. In this 
interpenetration process, sTon mun emerged with a diversified beginning, developed in a 
vibrant yet syncretic religious milieu with practitioners rather freely crossing sectarian 
boundaries, and eventually disappeared as an independent tradition in Tibetan history 
primarily due to the syncretic assimilation scheme contemporary Tibetan recipients 
undertook. 
In particular, we see that practitioners of sTon mun and Mahayoga/proto-Dzogchen, 
in Vroom's words, "derive[d] insights and practices" from each other. Probably with the 
intention of "aspirfing] to an interpretation of the whole of the reality" they experienced, 
these different groups of Tibetan contemplative recipients "integrate[d] as many insights 
from [similar traditions] as possible" in order to realize their desired soteriological 
fruition of instantaneous and spontaneous awakening through these traditions' compatible 
logic of immediacy for contemplation. In the process of this syncretic integration, sTon 
mun disappeared, but it disappeared in the Wilfred Smith's sense of the cumulative 
process of another tradition, i.e., in the continuous and cumulative creation process of the 
Dzogchen tradition. In this rationale, the disappearance of sTon mun as an independent 
tradition in Tibetan history is not just another religious sect disappearing in history, but it 
offers us something deeper to reflect upon, for example, a possible link connecting Chan 
106
 Ibid, 32. 
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and Dzogchen both historically and contemplatively. 
In terms of historical connection, what insights can we obtain from the idea that the 
disappearance of sTon mun offers us a link between Chan and Dzogchen? As reviewed in 
the Introduction, various scholars have noticed the "striking similarities [between Chan 
and Dzogchen] as well as the references to Chan in Nyingma [Dzogchen] literature."107 
Yet, the specifics of how Chan and Dzogchen may have interacted with each other have 
not been sufficiently given. Our encounter narrative informs us that the lacuna regarding 
the specifics of connection may ironically be filled through the disappearance of a 
religious tradition, especially under the condition when the traditions of encounter bear 
similar insights and practices, and the recipients are more concerned with realizing their 
contemplative or soteriological goal(s) rather than preserving sectarian boundaries. 
Generally speaking, historical studies obtained from the sociopolitical perspective 
have usually considered the development of religious traditions as sectarian schools 
rising or falling in power due to the social and/or political agenda of the participants. 
Thus, following sectarian boundaries, these studies often overlook the aforementioned 
concerns of the contemplative recipients and thereby fail to ferret out the subtle 
philosophical and/or contemplative details that associate traditions like Chan and 
Dzogchen. To ferret out those details, one must change the perspective. Consequently, 
our encounter narrative depicting the disappearance of sTon mun in Tibet has been done 
from the contemplative recipient's perspective, which is meant to obtain the necessary 
specifics. Given this understanding, as an alternative to the sociopolitical perspective 
usually taken for historical studies, the contemplative recipient's perspective employed in 
107
 Germano, "Architecture and Absence in the Secret Tantric History of the Great Perfection {rdzogs 
cheri)," 217. This passage was quoted in the Introduction of this dissertation as well. 
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our encounter narrative not only deepens our appreciation of the philosophical and 
contemplative nuances of the associated traditions, but also extends our reach beyond the 
historical so that we can better recognize the values of various changes the historical 
movements of religious traditions may yield. 
To be sure, these values of changes lie in the specifics that are being ferreted out. In 
our case, they are associated with the religious or spiritual insights derived from the 
contemplative specifics related to the teachings of Chan and Dzogchen. As these spiritual 
insights transcend sectarian boundaries, the disappearance of sTon mun certainly is then 
not just a sectarian sect falling in power due to the participants' sociopolitical agenda, but 
a result of different groups of practitioners or concerned people seeking a presence in the 
direct experience of reality by integrating as many insights from similar traditions as 
possible. For our case of study, these insights are the teachings and practices related to 
the logic of immediacy in contemplation. In this way, in addition to the specific 
contemplative teachings, the disappearance of sTon mun that links Chan and Dzogchen 
contemplatively also informs us that the logic of immediacy in contemplation, the subject 
matter of our research, is not an isolated phenomenon. It had emerged, and thus can 
emerge, with different emphases in different times and places. 
Furthermore, our encounter narrative regarding the disappearance of sTon mun, I 
would argue, also prompts us to look further into the meaning of sectarian boundary. 
Evidently, from our case study, we see that spiritual insights can be, and in fact are, 
shared by different sectarian schools (and for that matter by different religious traditions 
as well). Thereby, sectarian boundaries are not necessarily demarcated on doctrinal 
differences, for similar doctrines are shared by different sectarian schools. For example, 
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in Buddhism, we see that both Nyingma and Bon traditions teach Dzogchen, and the 
practice of Pure Land is not limited to the School of Pure Land. On the other hand, 
similar insights from different sectarian schools can also be integrated together under one 
sectarian roof, as long as these insights do not threaten the school's continuity and logical 
integrity. Therefore, in our investigation, early Tibetan recipients of sTon mun and 
proto-Dzogchen not only practiced these teachings side by side with each other but also 
syncretically integrated them together probably with the rationale of trying to make the 
best out of similar insights of different traditions. 
In regard to a tradition's continuity, the syncretic integration of insights from 
different teachings must occur centering around a native or dominant component, into 
which foreign or weak elements are integrated, and in the process, the continuity of the 
native/dominant is thereby maintained but at the cost that the original identities of the 
foreign/weak elements are thus changed.108 In the case of sTon mun being integrated into 
the teachings of Dzogchen within the broader tannic context of Mahayoga, we clearly see 
that the dominant force at the time was the tantric teachings. Insofar as the sTon mun 
The contradistinction of the native/dominant and the foreign/weak, however, is not always made in 
terms of the nationalities or origins of the traditions or doctrinal systems. If we juxtapose the development 
of Chan in China as presented in Chapter 1 with the development of sTon mun in Tibet as presented in the 
current chapter, we clearly see that in terms of their origins both were foreign to the Chinese and the 
Tibetans. But, in China, the syncretic development of Chan helped it grow out of its traditional Buddhist 
context and form a unique identity that has lasted to this very day, whereas the syncretic assimilation of 
sTon mun in Tibet only brought about the disappearance of its name. Here, we naturally ask: Why? And, 
the answer, I would say, lies in the contradistinction of the native/dominant and the foreign/weak in the 
minds of the recipients. In China, as the teachings of chan or dhyana syncretically developed with 
indigenous Chinese ideas and terminologies, what had been changed was not the identity/nomenclature of 
chan but its contents, since the minds of the Chinese participants (or developers) still revolved around the 
chan that hence occupied the dominant position. Thus, in the process, what had been assimilated into lost 
its identity, and eventually the teachings of chan were further consolidated into an independent tradition 
called Chan. On the other hand, even though both sTon mun and Mahayoga traditions were foreign to the 
Tibetans, but, with the benefit of historical hindsight, we can be sure that, after the fall of the Yarlung 
Tibetan empire, the tantric traditions were getting popular, thus becoming dominant. In this process of 
becoming dominant, the tantric teachings must have occupied the minds of the Tibetan practitioners to the 
extent that they considered them the mainstream, into which other small currents like sTon mun could only 
converge. 
175 
teachings were beneficial to the practitioners of early Dzogchen, they were still foreign 
teachings, and being foreign, they needed to be integrated under the umbrella of 
Dzogchen so that the threat of these foreign teachings can be absorbed and consolidated 
into the continuity of the native/dominant teachings. 
But how exactly did the teachings of sTon mun benefit the practitioners of 
proto-Dzogchen? Given what we have presented above, I would say, not only did sTon 
mun not threaten the continuous creation process of the Dzogchen tradition, but it also 
specifically benefited the tradition by reinforcing the integrity of its logic. This logic, for 
both sTon mun and Dzogchen, centered on their similar principles for contemplation, i.e., 
immediacy and spontaneity, as well as on their similar soteriological fruition of 
instantaneous awakening. So, both traditions advocated the attainment of self-liberation 
through the immediate and spontaneous manifestation of one's reflexive primordial 
awareness, which has been touched upon briefly above and will be discussed in detail in 
the next two chapters. Therein, I will demonstrate that, as in the case of Shenhui's sudden 
teaching in the previous chapter, their logic of immediacy in contemplation effectively 
takes the fruition as the path and thus puts sTon mun and Dzogchen in the same category 
as fruitional vehicles. In that way, sTon mun, as a tradition of encounter, not only plays 
the role of a bridging link connecting Chan and Dzogchen historically, but also connects 
the two traditions contemplatively, namely, through the contemplative principles of 
immediacy and spontaneity. 
Given the idea of syncretic integration that assimilates insights from different 
traditions but does not threaten the dominant tradition's continuity and logic integrity, 
sectarian boundaries are fluid, especially for those contemplative recipients who try to 
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assimilate as many available insights as possible to accomplish their contemplative or 
soteriological goal(s). With this rationale, no doctrines or practices belong exclusively to 
any religious or sectarian school. For the contemplative recipients, as long as they see fit 
doctrinally, contemplatively, and even genealogically, they will flexibly utilize all the 
teachings and practices available to them in order to achieve their objective.109 Hence, 
we can say that syncretic integration is a natural part of the continuous and cumulative 
creation process of any religious tradition. What is important in this cumulative process 
should not just be about whether the teachings of the tradition have been maintained to be 
"pure" or not.110 Nor should it be just about which sectarian tradition has risen or fallen 
in dominance. Rather, it should be centered on, in Vroom's words, "aspir[ing] to an 
interpretation of the whole of the reality [the participants] experience." Thus, the 
disappearance of sTon mun as an independent tradition in Tibetan history has the value as 
an event indicating special concerns of Tibetan Buddhist recipients at the time, rather 
Strangely, some Buddhologists have a certain fixed notion of sectarian boundaries; they develop the 
idea of associating certain sutras, practices, or doctrinal systems with certain sectarian schools. For example, 
in Chinese Buddhism, the Saddharmapundarika-sutra (or the Lotus Sutra) is usually associated with the 
Tiantai School, whereas the Avatamsaka-sutra is associated with the Huayan School. Yet, does the 
Saddharmapundarika-sutra belong to the Tiantai School, even though it is one of its basic scriptures? 
Certainly, one cannot say that the Saddharmapundarika-sutra exclusively belongs to the Tiantai School. 
Subsequently, from the recipient's perspective, how can one then definitively say that another tradition, say 
Chan, is influenced by the Tiantai School because it employs the teachings of the Saddharmapundarika-
sutra? Similarly, when some Chan masters take teachings from the Avatamsaka-sutra, can we then say that, 
simply by that fact, these masters are influenced by the Huayan School? Apparently, the answers to these 
questions are negative, for not only the scriptures but also various Buddhist practices and doctrinal systems, 
they are all in the "public domain" in which all recipients or participants can access and use them in the 
ways they see fit according to their understandings. From the recipient's perspective, to establish sectarian 
influence, Buddhologists cannot follow the boundaries set up by scriptures, practices, or doctrinal systems 
that are in the public domain; rather, they need to go into the "private sector" that consists of particular 
interpretations and terminologies from the targeted sectarian tradition to locate conclusive evidence. 
110
 In fact, as Rosalind Shaw and Charles Steward analyze, "The premise that 'pure = authentic' ... tends 
to be the dominant reading in discourses of nationalist, ethnic or regional identity, as well as those of 
religious movements which are categorized as 'fundamentalist' or 'nativist'. Such discourses are commonly 
anti-syncretic, involving the erasure of elements deemed alien from particular religious and ritual forms. 
Selected forms may be identified as foreign and extirpated, or alternatively recast and retained through 
claims that they have really always been 'ours', thereby deleting former religious syntheses from 
authorized cultural memory" (Shaw and Steward, "Introduction: Problematizing Syncretism," 8). 
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than just a religious sect disappearing into historical oblivion. 
To recapitulate, what I have underscored above indicates that the special concerns of 
those Tibetan contemplative recipients seem to converge onto the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation that is predicated on the immediate and spontaneous manifestation of 
one's reflexive primordial awareness. That being so, similar to what I have argued for the 
case of Chan, in which the various negotiations early Chan contemplatives participated in 
are to pursue a "pure" Chan, the disappearance of sTon mun can also be seen as a result 
coming out of contemporary Tibetan contemplatives' pursuit of a "pure" practice, albeit 
through a syncretic integration of the insights available them. In this pursuit, they 
probably did not think of the idea of "syncretism" but only tried hard to learn from their 
received teachings. So, they integrated as many insights from different traditions as 
possible and strived for the direct and spontaneous embodiment of one's awakened mind. 
In such an embodiment, the contemplative effortlessly reveals his/her reflexive awareness 
that enables him/her to embrace all possibilities with wonder, openness, insight, and 
tenderness. It is to further understand this spontaneous embodiment that we will delve 
into the teachings of sTon mun and Dzogchen in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 4. Oneness or Wholeness? 
The Contemplative Significance of Simultaneity in sTon mun, 
the "Sudden School" in Tibet 
Continuing the encounter narrative presented in the previous chapter and further 
delving into the variations of the idea of immediacy, Chapter 4 examines the teachings of 
sTon mun in detail. While various studies have furthered our understanding of the sTon 
mun teachings based on Dunhuang manuscripts and early Nyingma texts,1 I feel that the 
contemplative significance of the teachings, particularly, that of the doctrine and practice 
of simultaneity or simultaneous access (Tib. cig car 'jug pa), has not been properly 
investigated, especially from the contemplative perspective undercored in this research. 
Thus, to provide a remedy with the aid of a contemplative lens, I would like to present 
two different understandings of the sTon mun teachings, which, I hope, will, on the one 
hand, reveal the various philosophical and contemplative layers embedded in the sTon 
mun idea of simultaneity and, on the other hand, illustrate the possibility of reading 
distinctively the idea of immediacy by practitioners of different philosophical or 
contemplative orientations. 
The first rendition is given by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in his bSam gtan mig 
See e.g., Lalou, "Document tibetain sur l'expansion du dhyana chinois"; Demieville, Ze Coucile de Lhasa; 
Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts: Part II, 60-68; Kimura,, "Tonko shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshu bunken no 
seikaku" and "Tonko shutsudo chibetto-bun shahon Stein 709"; Obata, "Pelliot 116 bunken ni mieru 
shozenji no kenkyu" and "Kodai chibetto ni okeru tonmonpa (zenshu) no nagare"; Broughton, "Early 
Ch'an Schools in Tibet"; Gomez, "The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana"; 
Ueyama, "The Study of Tibetan Chan Manuscripts Recovered from Tun-huang: A Review of the Field and 
its Prospects"; Yanagida (ed), Daruma no goroku: Ninyu shigyo roku; Okimoto, "Chibetto yaku ninyu 
shigyo ron nit suite"; Karmay, The Great Perfection, 86-106; Kvaerne, '"The Great Perfection' in the 
Tradition of the Bonpos"; Tanaka and Robertson, "A Ch'an Text from Tun-huang: Implications for Ch'an 
Influence on Tibetan Buddhism"; Faber, "A Tibetan Dunhuang Treatise on Simultaneous Enlightenment: 
The dMyigs su myedpa tshulgcigpa'i gzhung"; Otokawa, "New Fragments of the rNal 'byor chen por 
bsgompa'i don from Tabo"; Meniere, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen: Preliminary Remarks on 
Two Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts"; and van Schaik and Dalton, "Where Chan and Tantra Meet: Tibetan 
Syncretism in Dunhuang"; Huang and Liu, ""Sangye lunzheng zhong de 'dasheng heshang jian': 'Dunru' 
shuo de kaocha"; and Shen, "Xizangwen wenxian zhong de Heshang Moheyan ji qi jiaofa: Yige chuangzao 
chulai de chuantong." 
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sgron {The Lamp for the Eye ofDhyana). In the presentation, I will show that basically, 
gNubs chen considers sTon mun a causal vehicle (Ch. yinsheng Hffl; Tib. rgyu 'i theg 
pa) derived from the surras of definitive meaning (Tib. nges don) and interprets its 
sudden teaching as a direct access to the unborn ultimate without alternation (Tib. re mos). 
But this direct access without alternation (of sTon mun), for gNubs chen, is eventually a 
oneness or monism, for it regards only the ultimate as true. As such, the suddenness of 
sTon mun is a mistaken understanding which not only misses the nonduality (Tib. gnyis 
su med pa) or inseparability (Tib. dbyer med) of the two truths but also creates a 
conceptual alternation, as it considers the ultimate as true but the conventional as untrue. 
In this way, the sTon mun suddenness without alternation ironically ends up in a 
conceptual alternation that separates in actuality what isn't separate. 
With gNubs chen's presentation of sTon mun in order, based on related Dunhuang 
manuscripts, both in Chinese and in Tibetan, I then present an alternative understanding 
of the sTon mun simultaneity to demonstrate the subtle philosophical and contemplative 
layers, thus hermeneutic plasticity, associated with the sTon mun idea of simultaneous 
access in particular and the idea of immediacy in general. Therein, I will show that the 
simultaneity of sTon mun is actually an access to the all-encompassing mind-source (Ch. 
xinyuan >kW), which, though it contains both the two truths, is referred to as the 
"ultimate meaning" (Ch. shengyi j$?Ji; Tib. don dam pa) particularly in Moheyan's 
teachings. I surmise that it was this ambiguous reference that led gNubs chen to interpret 
the simultaneity of sTon mun as a oneness. Given this new understanding, I further 
analyze the difference between oneness and the wholeness that derives from the sTon 
mun teaching of the all-encompassing mind-source and that gives rise to the sTon mun 
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understanding of nonduality and spontaneity. 
In exploring its deeper meaning, I will show that the all-encompassing wholeness of 
sTon mun simultaneously embraces the two truths as they interfuse each other to 
establish a nondual dynamic. Philosophically, the nondual dynamic of the two truths also 
implies a nondual, holistic dynamic of being and knowing similar to the one given in 
Shenhui's sudden Chan. However, contemplatively speaking, unlike Shenhui's 
integrating gradualness in the context of suddenness, the wholeness of the sTon mun 
simultaneity asks its practitioner to engage the conventional in the manner of the ultimate 
while embodying the ultimate in the conventional. Thus, in addition to what we learned 
from Shenhui's sudden Chan, the sTon mun simultaneity adds to our knowledge that the 
logic of immediacy in contemplation demands of its practitioner to engage all 
conventional phenomena, but the engagement must be done in the manner of ultimacy so 
that the practitioner realizes the logic of immediacy without falling into the bondage of 
conventionality. As this demand takes the whole as the path, it consequently places sTon 
mun in the camp of the fruitional vehicle (Ch. guosheng Jflffl; Tib. 'bras bu'i thegpa) 
within the suric traditions just as Shenhui's sudden Chan. As a result, together with 
Shenhui's sudden Chan, the two understandings of the sTon mun simultaneity 
demonstrate, philosophically and contemplatively, the various layers underlying, as well 
as the variations of, the idea of immediacy. 
I. gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's Understanding 
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the reasons why gNubs chen Sangs 
rgyas ye shes composed the bSam gtan mig sgron was the concern over people's 
mistaking sTon mun as Dzogchen mainly due to their similar terminology of actionless 
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(Tib. bya ba medpa) or effortless (Tib. rtsol ba medpa) meditative practices.2 To clarify 
this confusion, he detailed the doctrines and practices of four vehicles or traditions, i.e., 
Tsen men, sTon mun, Mahayoga, and Dzogchen (or Atiyoga) in the bSam gtan mig sgron. 
It is based on his presentation in this work that I explore gNubs chen's understanding of 
the sTon mun teachings 
A. sTon mun: A Causal Vehicle Derived from the Sutras of Definitive Meaning 
Writing a treatise that takes bsam gtan or meditation as a central motif, gNubs chen 
Sangs rgyas ye shes begins his bSam gtan mig sgron with discussion on some general 
meditation topics such as finding meditation places, making vows, preparing oneself 
physically and psychologically, and explaining some general antidotes for certain 
meditation situations before going into the teachings of respective vehicles.3 In the 
section on preparation activities (Tib. sngon du bya ba), he unequivocally states that the 
first task is to develop the wisdom of hearing (Tib. mnyanpa 'i shes rab), and with respect 
to this wisdom of hearing, the causal and fruitional vehicles (Tib. rgyu 'bras thegpa) are 
in complete agreement, however, their presentations of view, meditation, conduct, and 
fruition (Tib. Ita sgom spyodpa 'bras bu) are not.4 
Concerning these topics, the causal vehicle, gNubs chen explains, has the two 
branches of Cig car ba (sTon mun or the Simultaneists) and Rim gyis pa (Tsen men or the 
Gradualists) that are, respectively, for those who posses sharp and dull faculties (Tib. 
dbangpo rno rtul). He further elaborates, 
2
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 186.1-3 and 490.3-5; see also the discussion in 
The Presentation of Hierarchical Doxography of Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
3
 See chapters one and two of the bSam gtan mig sgron; gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig 
sgron, 1-45. 
4
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 13.2-3 and 14.6-15.1. 
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With respect to that [i.e., the two branches of the causal vehicle], the 
Gradualists [propound] the doctrinal position of Indian master 
Kamalaslla, [which is based on] the sutras of provisional teachings 
and the philosophical scriptures of imperfect completeness. The 
Simultaneists are the heirs of Kasyapa and Master Dharmora (i.e., 
Bodhidharma). ... The last of the lineage, Hashang Mahayan; his 
philosophical scriptures of simultaneous access are scriptures [that 
are derived from] the sutras of complete perfection.5 
Here, two points are worthy of our attention, particularly, one related to the Council of 
Tibet and the other to the two categories of causal and fruitional vehicles. I will briefly 
touch upon the former and then focus our attention more on the latter. 
On the issue related to the Council of Tibet, what is of interest is that, given his 
proximity in time to the alleged controversy between the two masters,6 gNubs chen 
Sangs rgyas ye shes would have the historical opportunity to give a close account of the 
event. But, his report in the bSam gtan mig sgron mentions nothing that may suggest an 
ugly debate between Kamalaslla and Moheyan, not to mention Moheyan's disgraceful 
departure and the expunging of his teachings from Tibet reported in the accounts of later 
Tibetan Buddhist historians and commentators.7 
Yet the fact that he uses Tsen men (literally Gradual Gate) and sTon mun (literally 
Sudden Gate), the Chinese equivalents of Tibetan Rim gyis pa and Cig car ba,8 to 
5
 Ibid, 23.5-24.6; de la rim gyis pa ni/ rgya dkar po'i slob dpon ka ma la shi la'i 'dod gzhung ste/ drang ba 
don gyi mdo sde yongs su ma rdzogs pa'i gzhung ngo/ cig char 'jug pa ni/ 'od srungs dang/ slob dpon dhar 
mo ra las brgyud pa ni/ ... /(24.5) des brgyud pa'i tha ma ha shang ma ha yan gyi gzhung cig car 'jug pa 
ste/ yongs su rdzogs pa'i mdo sde'i gzhung ngo. 
6
 Even though the dates of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes are still very much in dispute, his proximity in 
time to the Council of Tibet is however historically established. According to one historical account, gNubs 
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes was born in the year of 832 CE and lived for 111 years (Dudjom Rinpoche, The 
rNying ma School of Tibetan Buddhism, 607-614), but other accounts place his birth year to be 772 CE (van 
Schaik, "The Early Days of the Great Perfection," 178) or the late 10th century (Karmay, The Great 
Perfection, 102). If we take his birth year to be 772, it implies that gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes could 
have witnessed the Council of Tibet, if it did occur. 
7
 Thus, the fact that gNubs chen does not mention any thing suggesting an ugly debate between Kamalaslla 
and Moheyan is another evidence supporting current scholarly views that the Council of Tibet as such did 
not actually occur. 
8
 For a discussion on the equivalence between the Chinese term dun $1 (suddenness) and the Tibetan 
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represent the traditions of the two masters, strongly suggests that there must have existed 
discussions among the Tibetans concerning the issue of gradualness versus suddenness, 
regardless if the debate itself took place or not. The many Dunhuang Tibetan catechetic 
anthologies and treatises as well as KamalasTla's Bhavanakrama trilogy provide further 
evidences for such an understanding. Accordingly, could it be possible that, as argued in 
the previous chapter, the Council of Tibet actually consisted of a series of catechetic 
exchanges, in person and/or in letter, between the practitioners of the two traditions? 
There were no ugly debates, no disgraceful defeats, but only highly engaged exchanges 
attempting to clarify doctrinal differences and their associated confusions. 
In this way, we could also see that part of the purpose of gNubs chen's juxtaposition 
of KamalasTla's Tsen men and Moheyan's sTon mun teachings was to participate in that 
project of clarifying the confusion surrounding the two systems. Perhaps, to the surprise 
of later Tibetan Buddhist historians and commentators,9 gNubs chen's characterization 
of the two masters' teachings diametrically diverges from their accounts, in which not 
only Moheyan's sTon mun teachings are inferior to those of KamalasTla's Tsen men, but 
also they become the epitome of mistaken heresies. However, from the quoted passage, 
we can see, for gNubs chen, not only are the teachings of simultaneous access not a 
heresy, but they are derived from the surras of complete perfection (Tib. yongs su rdzogs 
term cig car (instantaneity or simultaneity), see, e.g., Stein, "Illumination subite on saisie simultanee, not 
sur la terminologie chinoise et tibetaine" or "Sudden Illumination or Simultaneous Comprehension: 
Remarks on Chinese and Tibetan Terminology" in Peter N. Gregory's edited volume, Sudden and Gradual: 
Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought. 
9
 Perhaps, it was partially due to gNubs chen Sangs rgya ye shes's different characterization of the two 
masters' teachings that made the later Tibetan Buddhist historians and commentators neglect the bSam gtan 
mig sgron not only in their discussions on the controversy between KamalasTla and Moheyan but also in 
their discussions on the development of Mahayoga and Atiyoga, even though this work has been at least 
known by gZhon nu dpal (1392-1481, the author of the Deb ther sngonpo or the Blue Annals). According 
to Kapstein, the text was widely transmitted through roughly the thirteenth century, after which time it 
virtually disappeared; see Kapstein,, The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism, 73. If it had not been 
rediscovered in the 1970s, this important work of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes might only be placed in 
the corners of remote monasteries and sink into eternal oblivion. 
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pa) or definitive meaning (Tib. nges don)', that is to say, they do not require interpretation 
to access a deepr or more profound perspective. Consequently, gNubs chen's above 
characterization of the sTon mun teachings can reveal another piece of "inconvenient 
truth" to the development of sTon mun in Tibet and inspire us to further reflect upon the 
issues associated with the demonization of Hvashang Moheyan in the later history of 
Tibetan Buddhism.10 
On the issue of causal and fruitional vehicles, the above quoted passage contains the 
message that, by the time of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, these two categories have 
already been applied respectively to sutric and tantric traditions in Tibet. In the Man ngag 
Ita ba 'i phreng ba {The Garland of Views, the Quintessential Instructions; hereafter ITa 
phreng) attributed to Padmasambhava, sutric and tantric traditions are classified under the 
titles of characteristic vehicle (Tib. mtshan nyidkyi thegpa) and vajra vehicle (Tib. rdo 
rje'i thegpa), and yet it does not mention the names of causal and fruitional vehicles. 
Even though we know that in the later history of Tibetan Buddhism it is almost taken for 
granted that, on the one hand, causal vehicle, characteristic vehicle, perfection vehicle 
(Tib. phar phyin gyi thegpa), and sutric traditions are seen as synonymous and, on the 
10
 On the issues associated with the demonization of Hvashang Moheyan in the later history of Tibetan 
Buddhism, see, e.g., Sven Bretfeld, "The 'Great Debate' of bSam yas: Construction and Deconstruction of 
a Tibetan Buddhist Myth"; Huang and Liu, "Sangye lunzheng zhong de 'dasheng heshang jian': 'Dunru' 
shuo de kaocha"; and Shen, "Xizangwen wenxian zhong de Heshang Moheyan ji qi jiaofa: Yige chuangzao 
chulai de chuantong." See also R. Jackson, "Sa skya pandita's Account of the bSam yas Debate: History as 
Polemic"; D. Jackson, "Sa-skya Pandita the 'Polemicist': Ancient Debates and Modern Interpretations"; 
van der Kuijp, "On the Sources for Sa skya Pandita's Notes on the Bsam yas Debate"; Broido, "Sa-skya 
Pandita, the White Panacea and the Hva-Shang Doctrine"; and Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the 
Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective, 63-92. 
1
' On the Buddhist teachings, the ITa phreng says, "As to the path that transcends the world, there are two 
categories: (a) The analytic path, (b) The Vajrayana. (a) i. Sravakayana. ii. Pratyekabuddhayana. iii. 
Bodhisattvayana. ... (b) The Vajrayana is of threefold: I. The Kriya tantra. II. The Ubhaya tantra. III. The 
Yoga tantra. ... III. The view of those who have entered the path of the Yoga tantra is twofold: i. Thubpa 
rgyudkyi thegpa, the Exoteric Yoga. ii. Thabs rgyudkyi thegpa, the Esoteric Yoga. ... ii. The view of 
those who have entered the path of the Esoteric Yoga is of threefold: I. The mode of development. II. The 
mode of achievement. III. The mode of the Great Perfection" (Karmay, The Great Perfection, 153-155). 
185 
other hand, fruitional vehicle, vajra vehicle, mantra vehicle (Tib. sngags kyi thegpa), and 
tantric traditions are also identical, the question is: What is the rationale behind the 
equivalence of these two sets of categories? Put another way, what are the definitions of 
these vehicles, especially those of causal and fruitional vehicles?12 
In the bSam gtan mig sgron, even though the name of fruitional vehicle only appears 
once in passing, the fact that gNubs chen only classifies Tsen men and sTon mun under 
the category of causal vehicle implies that he considers the tantric traditions of Mahayoga 
and Dzogchen as fruitional vehicles. Keeping this understanding in mind, does gNubs 
chen simply follow the convention in the ITa phreng associating the tantric traditions 
with one category and the sutric, or perhaps more accurately, non-tantric, traditions with 
another? Or, does he follow certain doctrinal definitions of causal and fruitional vehicles 
to make such a classification? If it is the former, then can we really say that his 
classification has done justice especially with respect to sTon mun? If it is the latter, what 
are his definitions? 
As far as we know, Klong chen pa (1308-1364) was the first to give clear doctrinal 
definitions of the causal and fruitional vehicles from the Nyingma perspective. In his 
auto-commentary to the Yid bzhin mdzod {The Precious Wish-fulfilling Treasure), one of 
his "Seven Treasuries" (Tib. mdzod bdun) on Dzogchen, Klong chen pa states,13 
12
 For discussions on the meanings/definitions of causal and fruitional vehicles in Tibetan traditions, see, 
e.g., Longchen Rabjam, The Precious Treasure of Philosophical Systems (translated by Richard Barron), 
127-260; Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha-Nature, 131-138; and Sobisch, Three-Vow Theories in Tibetan 
Buddhism, 367-369 and footnote 771. 
13
 In the Nyingma tradition, Klong chen pa has been probably recognized as the most important codifer of 
its teachings. Among the two hundred and seventy some titles Klong chen pa wrote, the mdzod bdun or 
seven treasuries are considered his crowning achievement, and each of them presents Klong chen pa's 
understanding of Dzogchen teachings said to be based on his direct experience rather than on speculative 
thought. For a biography of Klong chen pa, see, e.g., Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles, 
109-117 and Dudjom Rinpoche, The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, Vol. I, 575-596; for a brief 
introduction of the seven treasures and his other works, see, e.g., Longchen Rabjam, Kindly Bent to Ease 
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It is called the "Causal Vehicle" because of asserting temporal 
causality—due to accepting that the basic element, the Buddha-nature, 
is merely a seed that is further developed through the conditions of 
the two accumulations, by which one attains Buddhahood. [In 
contrast,] that essential nature of Mantra exists in all sentient beings 
inherently and spontaneously present—complete with vast qualities. 4 
That is to say, for Klong chen pa, an approach is called a causal vehicle if it sees Buddha-
nature only as a seed that needs to be further developed to its maturity, whereas an 
approach is a fruitional vehicle if it sees Buddha-nature to be spontaneously present and 
completely perfect in all sentient beings. Put in practical terms, a tradition is a causal 
vehicle if it advocates gradual cultivation to ripen the fruition of one's Buddhahood 
through the perfection of the two accumulations. On the other hand, a tradition is a 
fruitional vehicle if it makes the fruition of one's practice equivalent of the path.15 Here, 
by taking the fruition as the path, it does not mean that the practitioner does nothing; 
laxity is never the answer. Rather, it implies some sort of artful endeavor, e.g., one 
similar to the "equal learning" discussed in Shenhui's sudden teaching. 
Has gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes applied the same or similar definitions of 
causal and fruitional vehicles as Klong chen pa's to understand Tsen, sTon, Maha, and 
Ati in the bSam gtan mig sgrorft If he has, since he puts Tsen men and sTon mun under 
the causal vehicle, then he must have understood both Tsen men and sTon mun to be 
approaches that take gradual steps to realize one's enlightenment. Yet, this understanding 
Us, Parti: Mind (translated and annotated by Herbert V. Guenther), xiii-xxv and Germano, Poetic Thought, 
the Intelligent Universe, and the Mystery of Self, 10-38. 
14
 Klong chen rab 'byams, Padma dkar po, 1169.4-1170.1; quoted in Duckworth, Mipam on 
Buddha-Nature, 131. 
'
5
 In his Grub mtha' mdzod {The Precious Treasure of Philosophical Systems), another work among his 
"Seven Treasuries," Klong chen pa characterizes the fruitional vehicle as "making one's fruition same as 
the path" ('bras bu rang dang 'dra ba lam du byedpas); Klong chen rab 'byams, Grub mtha' mdzod, 135b.6. 
For a translation of the Grub mtha' mdzod, see Longchen Rabjam, The Precious Treasure of Philosophical 
Systems (translated by Richard Barron). The discussion on the frutitional vehicle can be seen in Longchen 
Rabjam, The Precious Treasure of Philosophical Systems (translated by Richard Barron), 239-260. 
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clearly contradicts his characterization of sTon mun as an approach that directly aims at 
"the summit of Mt. Meru so that one sees all."16 So how do we resolve this contradiction? 
Should we conclude that, in the bSam gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen's definitions of causal 
and fruitional vehicles are different from those of Klong chen pa? In that case, what are 
his definitions? Are they simply defined along the line that divides tantric traditions from 
non-tantric traditions? But, even in that case, what is the doctrinal basis to say that tantric 
traditions are fruitional vehicles? Isn't that also leading us back to Klong chen pa's 
definitions, in which a fruitional vehicle takes the fruition as the path? 
Under the conditions that gNubs chen was aware of how the ITa phreng classifies 
the two categories and Klong chen pa's definitions have been universally accepted by the 
Nyingma School, I am inclined to believe that there must exist similar definitions in the 
mind of gNubs chen when he applies the two categories of causal and fruitional vehicles 
in the bSam gtan mig sgron. Given that, how do we then construe his characterization of 
sTon mun as a causal vehicle that is based on the sutras of definitive meaning? Is sTon 
mun really a causal vehicle? If what I have presented earlier regarding the suddenness of 
the Chan traditions in general and of Shenhui's teachings in particular is valid, then their 
suddenness exhibits the quality of Klong chen pa's fruitional vehicle. Consequently, one 
naturally comes to ask: What about the suddenness of sTon mun? Does it also exhibit 
such fruitional quality that has been missed, or neglected, by gNubs chen, perhaps, due to 
a certain fixed notion17 of what he thinks as sutric (but, in fact, non-tantric) traditions? 
Let us keep these questions in mind as we explore in-depth the teachings of sTon mun, a 
causal vehicle derived from the sutras of definitive meaning in the eyes of gNubs chen 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 118.4-6. 
17
 That is, all sutric or non-tantric traditions are causal vehicles. 
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Sangs rgyas ye shes. 
B. Suddenness: A Direct Access to the Unborn Ultimate 
In the bSam gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes opens his chapter on 
sTon mun with the following words: 
As for the Simultaneists of sTon mun, they ascertain their view in the 
manner of the following example: if one [directly]18 goes to the 
summit of a very high mountain, one sees all. That is to say, they 
accept that, in the nature itself, object and subject are unborn from the 
beginning, and that this principle itself cannot be sought19 by any 
means whatsoever. If one sees this meaning, one goes [directly]18 to 
the summit of Mt. Meru, the king of mountains. [In that case,] even if 
not viewing [from] the small mountains,20 it is held that the 
understanding is vividly clear.21 
Accordingly, in juxtaposing sTon mun with the other three approaches, he uses the 
following words to represent sTon mun. 
The Simultaneists of sTon mun, from the beginning, train [them-
selves] instantaneously and simultaneously22 in the unborn ultimate 
itself without alternation. 
Even though the original does not have this qualifier, I add it based on gNubs chen's understanding 
(quoted next) that the Simultaneists of sTon mun, from the beginning, train themselves instantaneously 
and simultaneously in the unborn ultimate itself without alternation. It is becase when one equates the 
"summit" in the analogy as the "unborn ultimate," one then obtains that the statement that the Simultaneists 
of sTon mun from the beginning train themselves instantaneously and simultaneously in the unborn 
ultimate, metaphorically, can be re-stated as that the Simultaneists of sTon mun from the beginning go 
directly to the summit of the king of mountains. 
19
 The original has ma stsal ba, but I have interpreted it as ma rtsol ba, which means to make effort. 
20
 The original reads ri bran. Probably, it is an old spelling of riphran, which means small mountains. 
A
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 118.4-5; ston mun cig car 'jug pa yang/ dper ri 
rgyal rtse mor phyin na kun mthong ba'i tshul gyis lta ba'i thag bead pa yang/ gzhal bya dang 'jal byed 
gdod nas ma skyes pa'i chos nyid du/ don nyid cir yang ma stsal ba nyid kyi go bar 'dod de/ don de mthong 
na ri'i rgyal po ri rab kyi rtser phyin na/ ri bran ma bltas gsal ba bzhin go bar bzhed do. See also Karmay, 
The Great Perfection, 104. 
22
 Due to its multiple meanings, I have often interpreted cig car with the variations of the two terms, 
instantaneous and simultaneous, together to cover its both qualities; for a discussion of the Tibetan term cig 
car, see Stein, "Illumination subite on saisie simultanee, not sur la terminologie chinoise et tibetaine" or 
"Sudden Illumination or Simultaneous Comprehension: Remarks on Chinese and Tibetan Terminology" in 
Peter N. Gregory's edited volume, Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought. 
23
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, gSam gtan mig sgron, 57.1; ston mun ni cig car 'jug pa ste/ dang po 
nas re mos pa med par don dam pa ma skyes pa nyid la cig car slob te. 
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When combining the above two passages, we can see that, for gNubs chen, the 
suddenness of sTon mun is to go directly to the summit of the highest mountain; put in 
doctrinal terms, it is to instantaneously and simultaneously access (Tib. cig car 'jug pa) 
the unborn nature itself (Tib. chos nyid), the ultimate truth (Tib. don dam pa). This direct 
access that is also instantaneous and simultaneous is carried out without making the 
awareness of the two truths alternating. However, below we will see that, for gNubs chen, 
this direct access without alternation is eventually a oneness or monism, for it only 
regards the ultimate as the truth. gNubs chen criticizes this (mis)understanding as 
separating conventionality from ultimacy and thus missing the nonduality of the two 
truths. In this way, the suddenness of sTon mun without alternation ironically ends up in 
a conceptual alternation that conceptually separates in actuality what isn't separate. But I 
am getting ahead of myself. Now let me first elaborate further on how gNubs chen 
understands this direct access of sTon mun. 
After likening the instantaneous and simultaneous access of sTon mun to the direct 
ascension to the summit of the highest mountain, gNubs chen further points out three 
characteristics regarding the general teaching or view of sTon mun; he states, 
[First,] it is ascertained as that which is free from all actions (the 
intrinsic essence of the view) but has no extremes. [Secondly,] it is 
ascertained as that which takes the one ultimate truth as the 
nonduality (the essence of that ultimate truth). [Thirdly,] it is 
ascertained as that which subsumes everything in the principle, thus 
not hoping for the fruition.24 
Put simply, the above three characteristics of sTon mun can be summarized as 
actionlessness, ultimacy, and pervasiveness, respectively. When taken only as the salient 
24
 Ibid, 119.1-2; bya ba thams cad dang bral ba (lta ba rang gin go bo) la mtha' med par thag bead pa dang/ 
gnyis su med par (don dam de'i ngo bo) don dam par gcig par thag bead pa dang/ don der thams cad 'dus 
pas 'bras bu la re thag med par thag bead pa'o. 
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qualities of the final fruition, these three characteristics are not exclusively derived from a 
vehicle of suddenness or simultaneity, for these qualities can also be realized through a 
gradualist approach.25 Nevertheless, when the three characteristics are also understood as 
the characteristics of the path, then they become the unique characteristics for a vehicle 
of suddenness. That, I belive, is the reason why gNubs chen uses them to characterizes 
the vehicle of sTon mun. 
In addition, to understand and realize the above three characteristics, gNubs chen 
notes, not only do the Simultaneists of sTon mun consider spiritual teachers (Tib. bla ma) 
and surras of definitive meaning (Tib. ngespa'i mdo) indispensable, but they also rely on 
the realized sayings (Tib. rig pa) of their masters and the authoritative scriptures (Tib. 
lung) they receive. Thus, citing teachings from numerous shen shes26 (or Dhyana/Chan 
masters) and scriptural sources, gNubs chen presents his understanding of sTon mun in 
terms of its view, meditation, conduct, and fruition, and concludes his presentation with 
sTon mun's ten superior differences over Tsen men. He then closes with cautious words 
regarding the confusion that his contemporary practitioners had mistaken sTon mun to be 
the same as Dzogchen.27 
For example, the three characteristics can also be said of the direct cognition of sunyata or emptiness. 
Yet, a gradualist approach can also lead one to such a direct cognition. 
26
 The Tibetan term shen shes is a transliteration of the Chinese term chan-shi | f 60 which literally means 
Dhyana/Chan master. 
27
 In the bSam gtan mig sgron, these four sections of view, meditation, conduct, and fruition for sTon mun 
are roughly divided as follows: view (119.2-144.1), meditation (144.1-171.6), conduct (171.6-177.1), and 
fruition (177.1-186.4). For an outline of the contents of the sTon mun chapter, see Otokawa, "Zenjo tomyo 
ron kenkyu 2: Dai 5 sho (tonmonpa sho) no kosei r Wfei7aM1s JI Wr% (2) : H 5 ^ (W*MM)V>ffi$L 
(A Study of the bSam gtan mig sgron (2)~On the Structure of the Fifth Chapter (sTon mun cig 'jug pa))." 
In summary: (1) For gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, the view of sTon mun asserts the one ultimate reality 
that is separate from the conventional reality. Thus, the two truths are alternating. Sangs rgyas ye shes 
vehemently criticizes sTon mun to miss the true meaning of nonduality, not to mention the meaning of 
spontaneous presence or perfection. (2) The sTon mun meditation is to directly enter or access the unborn 
ultimate. It is done through the meditative practice of viewing the mind so that it reaches the state of 
no-thought. However, for gNubs chen, this direct access of the unborn ultimate via no-thought leans 
one-sidedly to emptiness or non-appearance. In that way, he characterizes sTon mun to be an approach or a 
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To expound the view of sTon mun, gNubs chen first quotes Bodhidarmotara's (i.e., 
Bodhidharma) teaching of liru IJt A (or "entering [the ultimate] via its principle") from 
a Tibetan translation of the Chinese Chan treatise, the Erru sixing lun H AHfrlra (The 
Treatise on the Two Entrances and Four Practices), attributed to Bodhidharma. There, 
the simultaneous access of sTon mun is taught as follows: 
If one turns to the direction of the True, abandons conceptualiztion, 
and abides in [its] luminosity, there is neither self nor others; the 
ordinary and the noble are one and the same. If one abides [in it] 
steadily without change, from then on one does not pursue after the 
words and doctrinal teachings. This is to rest in the naturalness of the 
true meaning, which is without conceptualization, peaceful and 
without action. This is [called] entering the [true/ultimate] meaning.29 
vehicle that realizes the non-appearance non-conceptuality (Tib. mi snang ba mi rtogpa). Also, gNubs chen 
understands the sTon mun samadhi to be only the imperturbable state of unborn emptiness that lacks the 
luminosity (Tib. gsal) resulted from the nonduality of great skillful means (Tib. thabs chen) and 
self-awareness (Tib. rang rig). (3) For gNubs chen, the conduct of sTon mun can be summarized in the 
Bodhidharma's four practices (Ch. sixing ESfx) or four conducts (Tib. spyodpa bzhi): (i) the practice or 
conduct of the retribution of enmity (Ch. baoyuan xing MMifj; Tib. 'khon la Ian Idonpa 'i spyodpa), (ii) 
the practice or conduct of adapting to conditional arising (Ch. suiyuan xing Utitfr; Tib. rkyen gyi rjes su 
spyodpa), (iii) the practice or conduct of non-seeking for anything whatsoever (Ch. wusuoqiu xing &t£fpJc 
f j ; Tib. ciyang tshol ba medpa 'i spyodpa), and (iv) the practice or conduct of being in accordance with 
the dharma (Ch. chengfa xing fli^rfj; Tib. chos dang mthunpa'ispyodpa). He likens these practices to 
the actions of a fox, which signifies the criticism that sTon mun does not have the quality of a lion that is 
what a Buddha would do after he rises from meditation. (4) The fruition of sTon mun practice, for gNubs 
chen, depends on the duration of their practice; the longer one practices the better fruition one realizes. 
Ultimately, for him, sTon mun strives to realize the state of complete illumination (Tib. kun tu 'od), the 11 
ground. But, in gNubs chen's view, it is still a provisional stage in comparison to the awareness-holder of 
spontaneous perfection (Tib. Ihun gyis rdzogspa'i rig 'dzin) and its enlightened deeds are thus performed 
via the strength of aspirations instead of the blessings of spontaneous perfection. See also Shen, 
"Xizangwen wenxian zhong de Heshang Moheyan ji qi jiaofa: Yige chuangzao chulai de chuantong," 
22-25. 
28
 According to the studies of Japanese scholars, the Erru sixing lun changjuanzi ^AH3fx!$J~fi:#^P (An 
Extended Book of the Treatise on the Two Entrances and Four Practices) was probably translated into 
Tibetan under the name of rGya lun chen po (The Great Chinese Treatise) or bSam gtan rgya lun chen po 
(The Great Chinese Treatise on Dhyana) that has been cited many times in the bSam gtan mig sgron; for 
details, see Okimoto, "Chibetto yaku ninyu shigyo ron nit suite." In the bSam gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen 
Sangs rgyas ye shes quotes the teaching of liru (or entering the Way via its principle) twice; see gNubs 
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 57.6-58.2 and 130.2-4. 
29
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 57.6-58.2; yang dag pa la phyogs zhing rtog* pa 
spangs te/ lham mer gnas na/ bdag kyang med gshan yang med/ ma rabs dang 'phags pa mnyam shing gcig 
ste/ mi 'gyur bar brtan par gnas na/ de phan chad yi ge dang bstan pa'i rjes su mi 'brang ngo/ 'di ni yang 
dag pa'i don gyi rnal du phab pa rnam par rtog pa med pa/ zhi** zhing bya ba med pa ste/ de ni don 
la 'jug*** pa'o"; * the original has rtogspa, but from the context (and its Chinese original), it should be 
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To understand the simultaneous access of the above Bodhidharma's liru teaching, 
one must read it with gNubs chen's above three defining characteristics of sTon mun in 
mind. These characteristics, as argued above, are not just the qualities of the fruition but 
also the guiding principles for the path. Thus, even though it is similar to other Buddhist 
schools like the Madhyamaka, the liru teaching depicts the ultimate as transcending 
dualistic separation and characterizes the nature of the true meaning, another name for the 
ultimate, as non-conceptual, serene, and actionless. Its path however is unlike the 
gradualist model of the Madhyamaka. Rather, as the literal meaning of liru suggests, it is 
to directly enter the ultimate via its principle. So, the simultaneous access of the liru 
actually asks its practitioners to take the qualities of the ultimate as the ways for them to 
directly access the ultimate. Accordingly, the practitioners of the liru, the Simultaneists 
of sTon mun, from the very beginning, turn to "the direction of the True," and when 
doing so, they firmly abide in its "luminosity" (i.e., qualities) without any wavering. 
Since the salient qualities of the ultimate include non-conceptuality, actionlessness, and 
pervasiveness, the Simultaneists thus instantaneously30 abide in the ultimate not only 
without any wavering but also with the contemplative principles of non-conceptuality, 
actionlessness, and pervasiveness. 
Put in contemplative terms, the principle of actionlessness essentially asks the 
Simultaneists to be free from all action (Tib. by a ba) or effort (Tib. rtsol ba) when 
abiding in the ultimate, for one who seeks earnestly (Tib. don du gnyer bd) for the unborn 
rtogpa; ** the original has zhing, but from the context (and its Chinese original), it has been changed to zhi; 
*** the original reads mi 'jug, but from the context (and its Chinese original), it does not make any sense to 
have the negation. Thus, the negation mi has been taken out of the final translation. For these modifications, 
see also another version of the Tibetan translation in footnote 53 (under (3) Bodhidharma) below. 
30
 This quality of instantaneity is not only derived from the above gNubs chen's general characterization of 
sTon mun but also obtained from the statement that the Simultaneists, from the very beginning, firmly 
abide in the luminosity of the True. That is to say, I interpret "a firm abidance from the very beginning" as 
"an instantaneous abidance." 
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ultimate will only corrupt one's own mind.31 Yet, this effortless abidance is never a call 
for laxity, as gNubs chen clearly states in his characterization that the actionlessness of 
sTon mun "has no extremes" such as quietism or nihilism. Instead, for sTon mun, this 
effortless abidance is a kind of artful endeavor, an instantaneous and simultaneous 
learning (Tib. slob), that is also guided by the principles of non-conceptuality and 
pervasiveness. Thus, we also see, gNubs chen unequivocally states that the Simultaneists 
insist on accessing the ultimate, the nature of all dharma, with the practice of 
non-thinking (Tib. ma bsams). Here, the mindfulness of non-thinking, for sTon mun, is 
the mindfulness of the Buddha which pervades all phenomena without beginning or 
ending. With this beginningless (and endless) awareness, the Simultaneists directly and 
effortlessly "rest in the naturalness of the true meaning," the reality of the dharmata. 
Nonetheless, it seems that even though the ultimate of sTon mun is characterized as 
It is said in the bSam gtan mig sgron, "For sTon mun, all dharmas [i.e., phenomena] of self and others 
are unborn from the beginning, yet one who seeks earnestly for that unborn-ness will corrupt the mind. As 
a result, one will never see the great meaning, just as the strength of a grey duck does not stir up the ocean. 
However, if one does not think anything whatsoever, that is said to enter the nature of the dharma. 
(Emphasis added; ston mun ni bdag gzhan chos so cog ye nas ma skyes pa la/ de ma skyes pa don du gnyer 
ba ni sems bslad pa ste/ des nam kyang don chen po mi mthong ste/ dper na bya gag gi rtsal gyis rgya 
mtsho mi 'khrugs pa dang 'dra'o/ 'on tang cir yang ma bsams na chos nyid la zhugs par 'dod de; gNubs 
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 61.3-4)." Here, my interpretation is different from that of 
Dalton and van Schaik (see their "Lighting the Lamp: An Examination of the Structure of the Bsam gtan 
mig sgron," 172). Their translation reads, "For the ston mun all phenomena of self and others are unborn 
from the beginning, and yet in striving for the ultimate to be born, their minds are corrupted. Therefore they 
never see the great meaning, just as the paddlings of a grey duck do not stir up the ocean. Even when they 
do not think at all, they still desire to enter the dharmata." I find their translation difficult to understand on 
two parts. First, I don't know how they translate "de ma skyes pa don du gnyer ba ni sems bslad pa ste" to 
"yet in striving for the ultimate to be born, their minds are corrupted" as there is no "ultimate" in the 
original Tibetan" and "ma skyes pa" means "unborn" or "unbornness." Thus, I have translated the sentence 
to be "one who seeks earnestly for that unborn-ness will corrupt the mind," which indicates that even 
though sTon mun aims at the unborn, they do not seek for it earnestly. Rather, they seek for it in the 
manner of non-thinking or no-thought that is exactly the message in the last line of the cited paragraph and 
that is also the another place where I differ from Dalton and van Schaik. Therein, somehow they read '"on 
tang cir yang ma bsams na chos nyid la zhugs par 'dod de" to be "Even when they do not think at all, they 
still desire to enter the dharmata." This interpretation does not recognize the main practice of sTon mun to 
be non-thinking or no-thought (Tib. ma bsams or mi bsam); for sTon mun, one who is in the state of ma 
bsams or non-thinking has entered the dharmata. As a result, I have translated the sentence to be "However, 
if one does not think anything whatsoever, that is said to enter the nature of the dharma." 
32
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 58.3-6. 
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pervasive, gNubs chen still understands it, most probably in the framework of the two 
truths, to be leaning to the side of siinyata or emptiness (Ch. kongxing ^ ' [4; Tib. stong 
pa nyid). Consequently, gNubs chen characterizes the fruition of sTon mun as entering 
the non-conceptuality of non-appearance (Tib. mi snang ba mi rtog pa). Perhaps, this 
characterization of gNubs chen's is not without a basis since, in the bSam gtan mig sgron, 
one can find various masters of sTon mun positively emphasizing the empty or unborn 
nature of all phenomena when teaching the ultimate. For instance, Dhyana Master Kha 
(Ch. Yuan chanshi /^H^fp; Tib. bSam gtan gyi mkhan po Kha shan shi) teaches, 
If one knows that everything is completely empty [in nature], that 
which knows and that which is known are empty, and the wisdom of 
being able to know is also empty. Therefore, dharma and wisdom all 
are empty. Thus, this is the siinyata or emptiness of being empty.33 
All in all, be it pervasive or non-appearing, the ultimate is what the Simultaneists of 
sTon mun aims at directly, like the summit of the highest mountain. So, on account of the 
scriptures and masters' realized sayings, gNubs chen concludes his assessment of sTon 
mun as follows. That is, for sTon mun, the ultimate is unborn, yet it is also the reality 
itself. Here, the uniqueness of sTon mun does not lie in how this unborn ultimate is 
characterized, since most of other Buddhist schools have similar understandings. What is 
uniquely sTon mun here is that the characteristics of the ultimate reality are also the 
characteristics of the path. Thus, even though the ultimate cannot be sought, it is however 
embraced or accessed directly by the practitioners with its own salient qualities. These 
qualities include non-conceptuality, actionlessness, and pervasiveness, which further lead 
to other "negative paths" of sTon mun such as non-action (Ch. wuzuo MfF; Tib. bya ba 
33
 Ibid, 122.4-6; gal te chos so cog yun du stong par shes na shes pa dang shes pa'i stong par shes par nus 
pa'i ye shes kyang stong pa ste/ de bas na chos dang ye shes kun kyang stong pa yin pas/ de ni stong pa 
nyid kyang stong pa yin no. 
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dang bral ba), non-thinking or no-thought (Ch. wunian fe^; Tib. bsam pa medpa, mi 
bsam, mi sems, or mi drari), non-grasping or non-reification (Ch. wusuode |&£Jff#; Tib. 
dmigs su med pa), non-abidance (Ch. wuzhu ^Sfi; Tib. gnas med pa), and so forth. In all 
these "negative paths" of sTon mun, the commonality is the direct access to the unborn 
ultimate. For gNubs chen, that is how the Simultaneists cultivate themselves, and that is 
the suddenness or simultaneous access of sTon mun. 
C. Oneness: A Mistaken Understanding 
For gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, even though the sudden approach of sTon mun 
is superior to the gradual approach of Tsen men, the sTon mun view is still defective 
because it misses the point of nonduality or inseparability of the two truths. This mistake 
of sTon mun, in the eyes of gNubs chen, results from the Simultaneists' exclusive focus 
on the ultimate thus neglecting the conventional. Therefore, even when they speak of 
nonduality, the Simultaneists subsume everything under the ultimate and thus take "the 
one ultimate truth as the nonduality." In this way, (although it rightly recognizes the 
actionlessness of the unborn ultimate), the suddenness of sTon mun is not a nonduality 
but a oneness (Tib. gcigpa) in essence. Thus, gNubs chen writes, 
Even though the [Simultaneists of] sTon mun aspire for non-action, 
they do not understand nonduality (so they are surpassed by 
Mahayoga). Even if they (sTon mun) speak of nonduality, their view, 
in which all is the ultimate truth, empty and unborn, is asserted to be 
a oneness.34 
Furthermore, gNubs chen critiques sTon mun from the vantage point of Mahayoga 
34
 Ibid, 62.2-3; de lta bu'i ston mun bya ba dang bral bar gsol ba yang/ gnyis med par ma shes so [ma haas 
brgal ba]/ gal te gnyis med par smra ba yang [ston mun]/ ril don dam pa'i bden pa stong pa ma skyes par lta 
ba der gcig par 'dod de. 
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and argues that the sTon mun oneness, which has the Simultaneists aim at the unborn 
ultimate itself without alternation (Tib. re mos or res 'jog), in effect, not only blinds 
themselves to see the inseparability of the two truths but also divides the two truths in a 
way, in which only the unborn ultimate is considered to be true but the born conventional 
is regarded to be untrue. However, this division between the two truths is only 
conceptually possible, for the ultimate and the conventional are always inseparable in 
reality. As a result, for gNubs chen, the suddenness of sTon mun that leaves no room for 
the born conventional ironically ends up in a conceptual alternation, with which the 
Simultaneists prevent themselves from seeing the nondual and inseparable reality 
epitomized in the teachings of Mahayoga, not to mention the spontaneous presence (Tib. 
Ihun gyis grub pa or Ihun grub) of dharmadhatu or the basic space of phenomena (Tib. 
chos dbying) that uniquely characterizes the teachings of Dzogchen. In the words of 
gNubs chen, this incomplete view of sTon mun is described as follows. 
Furthermore, they [the Simultaneists of sTon mun], who are endowed 
with the [conceptual] alternation (that is, the unborn [ultimate] being 
true and the born [conventional] being untrue), do not see the 
inseparability that is the true essence of the Mahayoga. Thus, they are 
blinded by their own view, just as the ones who collect the millet 
seeds {i.e., the crop) do not see the earth, or the ones who thread a 
needle, even though looking upward, do not see the sky.35 
To make the quoted passage truly a critique from the Mahayoga perspective fitting 
to gNubs chen's bSam gtan migsgron context, I made two changes to its Tibetan original. 
Ibid, 62.3-5; 'on tang res 'jog can [skye med ni bden pa/ skye ba* ni mi bden pa'o] des rnal 'byor chen 
po'i rang bzhin bden par dbyer med pa ma** mthong ste/ rang gi lta bas sgribs so/ de na dper na khre"bru 
['bras] thu bas sa gzhi mi mthong ba dang/ khab mig 'jug pa g.yen du lta yang nam mkha' mi mthong ba 
dang 'dra'o. * The original has skye med, but according to the meaning of the context, Lama Thadrel, my 
Tibetan commentator, has suggested to change skye med to skye ba, which makes more sense. ** The 
original does not have the negative particle ma, but according to the meaning of the context, Lama Thadrel 
has suggested to add ma so as to make gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's assessment of sTon mun as 
derived from the perspective of Mahayoga. See also the reasons given in the main text. 
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It is worthwhile noting them here, for they highlight the philosophical issues essential to 
gNubs chen's understanding of the conceptual mistake in the sudden teaching of sTon 
mun. The first one is pertaining to the idea of alternation. In the bSam gtan mig sgron, 
gNubs chen makes it clear (see below) that alternation (Tib. re mos) and inseparability 
(Tib. dbyer med) are contrasting ideas. As inseparability is undoubtedly pertaining to the 
two truths, alternation should therefore be similar as well. This is the main reason why I 
changed the Tibetan original, "the unborn [ultimate] being true and the unborn [ultimate] 
being untrue" to "the unborn [ultimate] being true and the born [conventional] being 
untrue." This change underscores the epistemological mistake gNubs chen is concerned 
about in the sTon mun suddenness. For gNubs chen (especially from the perspective of 
the higher vehicles such as Mahayoga and Dzogchen), the unborn ultimate and the born 
conventional are inseparable in reality; that is, both are true. Thus, when the sudden 
teaching of sTon mun puts all the emphasis on the ultimate, not only does it neglect the 
conventional (thus creating a oneness view), but more importantly it creates a conceptual 
alternation in one's awareness of the two truths, which conceptually separates what isn't 
separate in actuality and erroneously prevents one from seeing the reality of inseparable 
presence of the two truths. 
Given the above rationale for the first change, the second change follows naturally, 
for it simply points out that it is those possessing a conceptual alternation regarding the 
two truths who "do not see the inseparability that is the true essence of the Mahayoga," 
rather than, what the Titbetan original says, they "see the inseparability ... ." This change 
completely fits to gNubs chen's metaphorical criticism that follows. That is to say, for 
gNubs chen, the Simultaneists of sTon mun, due to their insistence on the direct access to 
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the ultimate thus creating the said conceptual alternation, blind themselves to see the 
inseparability by their own view. Thus, they are like the ones who collect "the millet 
seeds" (i.e., sTon mun's direct access to the ultimate) but do not see "the earth" (i.e., 
Mahayoga's nondual inseparability and Dzogchen's spontaneous presence), or the ones 
who, looking up to thread a needle, do not see the sky. Clearly, for gNubs chen, the 
Simultaneists of sTon mun are doing something right, but because of their insistence on 
the unborn ultimate, they eventually miss "the sky" of the inseparable and spontaneously 
present reality as it is.36 
To further validate my above interpretation and understand gNubs chen's idea of 
how the Simultaneists of sTon mun miss the point of nonduality or inseparability, let me 
bring our attention to how he juxtaposes Mahayoga with sTon mun and Tsen men based 
on gNyen dPal dbyangs's (c. early 9th century) teachings. 
If someone asks whether this [Mahayoga] system is alternating or 
inseparable, it has no alternation that is similar to Tsen [men] and 
sTon [mun]. While self-awareness, as the ultimate truth, is 
imperturbable from the state that is free from extremes, the 
self-awareness and [its] appearance as the deity are similar to the 
ocean and [its] waves. The mere appearance [of the deity], like the 
moon in the water, is without essence, but is inseparable [with the 
self-awareness] in the three times. Thus, at the time when meditating 
the deity on the path, one who has high acumen [understands] the 
inseparability of the two truths. To perform development and 
dissolution alternatively is [only] temporarily for the practitioners of 
My above interpretation of the quoted passage is different from that of Dalton and van Schaik (see their 
"Lighting the Lamp: An Examination of the Structure of the Bsam gtan mig sgron," 172). Particularly, they 
interpret the res 'jog or alternation to be a characteristic of the Mahayoga. However, this interpretaion can 
be refuted not only with gNubs chen's own words cited next in my main text but also with my rationale 
discussed in the main text. To contrast, Dalton and van Schaik's translation reads, "(1) Furthermore, those 
[the Mahayogins] who alternate {between the unborn being true and the unborn being untrue} see 
inseparability as the true nature of Mahayoga. (2) Yet they are obscured by their own view, just as one who 
picks the millet seeds {the crop} does not see the earth, or one who threads a needle does not see the sky 
even though looking upwards." Individually, sentences (1) and (2) are permissible, but when connecting the 
two, it makes the interpretation fallible, as the criticism of "they are obscured by their own view" clearly 
aims at the Simultaneists of sTon mun who fixate themselves at the unborn ultimate and thus are obscured 
by their own view. 
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beginner or inferior, and it is not the perfect teaching. 
From this quoted passage, several points are worth noting. First, as mentioned 
earlier, alternation is made in contrast to inseparability, thus implying both are in relation 
to the two truths. Secondly, for gNubs chen, both Tsen men and sTon mun teachings 
essentially make their followers' awarenesses of the two truths alternating, whereas 
Mahayoga, relying on the teaching of reflexive awareness or self-awareness (Tib. rang 
rig), leads its practitioners not only understand the inseparability of the two truths but 
also realizes that this inseparability is similar to how the ocean is inseparable from its 
waves. Doctrinally, in the system of Mahayoga, gNubs chen explains, self-awareness is 
like the ocean (or the moon) which gives rise to the "waves" (or the moon in the water) of 
appearance (Tib. snang ba). In contemplative terms, this appearance is shown as the deity 
(Tib. lha) in the practitioner's development stage (Tib. bskyed rim) of visualization 
meditation. In this Mahayoga meditation, gNubs chen cautiously advises, the alternating 
practice of developing and dissolving (Tib. bskyed bsdud) the deity image is only a 
temporary stage that should not be taken as the fruition. Thus, with the quoted passage, 
gNubs chen distinctly conveys the message that the Mahayoga practitioners understand 
the inseparability of the two truths and thus practice accordingly, whereas both Tsen men 
and sTon mun do not understand such inseparability and their practices are therefore 
imperfect and meant only for those of weaker or dull capacity just as the temporary 
approach of developing and dissolving the deity image in the system of Mahayoga. 
37
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 208.3-5; 'o na de re mos pa'am dbyer med pa 
yin no zhe na/ 'dir tsen ston ltar re mos pa med de/ don dam par rang rig pa mtha' dang bral ba'i ngang las 
ma g.yos bzhin du/ rgya mtsho dang rlabs ltar rang rig lhar snang la/ snang tsam na chu zla ltar ngo bo med 
de dus gsum du dbyer med pas/ lam la lha bsgom pa'i dus nyid bio rab bden pa rnam gnyis dbyer med de/ 
re mos bskyed bsdud byed pa ni re zhig lam pa gsar bu tha shal gyi ngor ste/ gzhung rdzogs pa ni ma yin 
no. 
200 
Not only in relation to Mahayoga but to Dzogchen as well, gNubs chen expresses 
his concern about the conceptual alternation in the system of sTon mun. Below is one of 
the examples illustrating how gNubs chen, while pointing out some similarities between 
the two traditions, criticizes the teachings of sTon mun from the Dzogchen perspective; 
he writes, 
The terminology of sTon mun is similar to that of Dzogchen. While, 
[similar to Dzogchen], it [i.e., sTon mun] teaches [the practices of] 
non-action and non-establishment, having in mind the ground that is 
not arising and completely perfect, it [only] speaks of the ultimate 
truth as the ground that is unborn and empty. If one examines with 
respect to that [i.e., the teachings of sTon mun], there are still [the 
problems of] exerting in [making one's awareness of the two] truths 
alternating and getting accustomed [only] to the state of siinyata. [As 
a result,] they [i.e., the Simultaneists of sTon mun] never experience 
in reality the nonduality of [the two] truths. Obscured by their own 
[mistaken] view, they need yet to enter into nonduality.38 
Here, we see, for gNubs chen, even though the Simultaneists of sTon mun also teach 
the practices of non-action (Tib. bya ba medpa) and non-establishment (Tib. bsgrub pa 
med pa), they derive these practices only from the understanding that the ground, the 
ultimate truth, is unborn and empty. This characterization of gNubs chen's implies that 
the Simultaneists do not realize the reality of spontaneous presence that fundamentally 
gives rise to the said practices in the system of Dzogchen. In addition, gNubs chen clearly 
states that, by focusing only on the ultimate being unborn and empty, the Simultaneists 
develop the problems of making one's awareness of the two truths alternating and getting 
accustomed only to the state of siinyata. In this way, gNubs chen concludes the 
Ibid, 490.3-5; ston mun ni rdzogs chen dang skad mthun/ bya ba med bsgrub pa med par ston yang/ gzhi 
mi 'byung ba yongs su grub pa la dgongs nas/ don dam pa'i bden pa ma skyes stong pa'i gzhi la smra ste/ 
de la ni brtags na da dung bden pa re mos pa dang/ stong pa'i ngang la 'dris par byed pa dang/ rtsol ba yod 
de/ bden pa gnyis med pa la spyod kyang ma myong ste/ rang gi lta bas bsgribs te gnyis med la bzod 'jug 
dgos so. See also Meinert, "Structural Analysis of the Bsam gtan mig sgron" 192, and Karmay, The Great 
Perfection, 105. 
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comparison saying that, due to their own mistaken view, the Simultaneists of sTon mun 
never, in actuality, experience the state of nonduality (let alone the Dzogchen state of 
spontaneous presence). 
All in all, in gNubs chen's understanding, the suddenness or simultaneous access of 
sTon mun that doctrinally leads to a mistaken oneness and the misunderstanding of the 
two inseparable truths essentially makes sTon mun inferior to higher vehicles like 
Mahayoga or Dzogchen on account of twelve aspects.39 In short, for gNubs chen, due to 
their misunderstanding, the Simultaneists conceptually divide the two truths and thus do 
not discern (Tib. ma dpyad) the true meaning of nondual suchness (Tib. gnyis su medpa'i 
de bzhin nyid) or spontaneous presence.40 When developing the bodhicitta (Tib. sems 
bskyed), they do not develop it to the level of nondual bodhicitta that simultaneously 
embraces the great compassion of doing altruistic deeds to all sentient beings and the 
unborn nature of the awakened mind.41 Their method of non-action not only leans 
one-sidedly to the unborn ultimate without the evenness of the nonduality,42 but it is in 
fact a gradualist method (Tib. rim gyis) even though they claim it to be able to remove, 
instantaneously and simultaneously, all defilements by non-abandonment (Tib. spang du 
med pa). gNubs chen contends that, from the vantage point of natural perfection, the 
simultaneist approach of sTon mun is gradualist because its removal of defilements is due 
These twelve aspects are: (1) the development of bodhicitta or mind of enlightenment (Tib. sems bskyed), 
(2) the upaya or skillful means for realization (Tib. rtogs pa'i thabs), (3) right view (Tib. Ita bd), (4) 
samadhi or deep concentration (Tib. ting nge 'dziri), (5) conduct (Tib. spyodpa), (6) the ways of making 
rectification (Tib. skyon bcos), (7) the ways of accumulations (Tib. tshogs), (8) the methods for removing 
defilements (Tib. sgribpa sbyong bd), (9) how to benefit sentient beings (Tib. 'gro don spyod pa), (10) how 
to enter the Way (Tib. jug lugs), (11) fruition (Tib. 'bras bu), and (12) the deeds after realizing the 
Buddhahood (Tib. mdzadpa'iphrin las). With respect to these aspects, gNubs chen's discussion can be 
found in gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 280.3-290.4. 
40
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 283.1-284.3. 
41
 See Ibid, 281.1-282.1. 
42
 See Ibid, 282.1-283.1 and 287.4-287.6. 
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to the "momentary power of completing a [cleansing] act" (Tib. bya ba rdzogs pa'i skad 
cig tsam gyi dbang) rather than the self-purity (Tib. rang dag) of one's illuminating 
primordial wisdom (Tib. ye shes gsal ba) or the natural luminosity (Tib. rang gsat) of 
one's nondual awareness (Tib. gnyis medkyi rig pa). 
In addition, for gNubs chen. the Simultaneists ultimately abide in the samadhi that is 
the imperturbable state of unborn sunyata but lacks the profound wisdom illuminating the 
nonduality between great upayas (or skillful means; Tib. thabs) and self-awareness.44 
Even though the sTon mun fruition is said to be the state of complete illumination (Tib. 
kun tu 'od), gNubs chen clearly states that, in comparison to the awareness-holder of 
spontaneous perfection (Tib. Ihun gyis rdzogs pa 'i rig 'dzin), the sTon mun fruition of 
complete illumination is still a provisional stage, a resting place (Tib. bsti gnas) rather 
than the final fruition.45 Finally, gNubs chen contends that the enlightened deeds (Tib. 
phrin las or rgyal ba'i mdzadpa) in the system of sTon mun are performed with great 
compassion only after the realization of the samadhi and by the strength of aspirations 
(Tib. smon lam gyi shugs kyis), which, for him, is categorically different from those 
performed instantaneously through the manifestations of peaceful and wrathful deities 
(Tib. zhi sprulpa yis) or through the blessings of one's innately spontaneous perfection 
(Tib. Ihun gyis rdzogs pa 'i byin gyis rlabs).46 In sum, informed by the teachings of 
Mahayoga and Dzogchen, gNubs chen understands sTon mun as a causal vehicle and its 
teaching of direct access to the unborn ultimate eventually makes its doctrinal system a 
mistaken oneness that obscures its view, meditation, conduct, and fruition to the effect 
43
 See Ibid, 286.5-287.1; 285.4-286.1; and 286.1-286.5. 
44
 See Ibid, 284.3-284.6 and 284.6-285.4. 
45
 See Ibid, 287.6-289.6. 
46
 See Ibid, 287.2-4 and 289.6-290.4. 
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that its followers cannot contemplatively realize the Mahayoga essence of nonduality, let 
alone the Dzogchen perfection of spontaneous presence. 
II. An Alternative Understanding of sTon mun 
If my above presentation of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's reading of sTon mun 
is correct, one can certainly interpret his critique of the sTon mun suddenness as 
indicating that the idea of immediacy for contemplation, if misunderstood doctrinally or 
philosophically, can result in an incomplete cognition of reality at best, if not a 
completely distorted one. Yet, is gNubs chen's understanding the only reading of the 
sTon mun system? Is his understanding completely in agreement with the sTon mun 
teachings found in the related Dunhuang manuscripts? If there are differences, what are 
they and how do we construe them, particularly in relation to the two categories of causal 
and fruitional vehicles? 
Building upon the previous studies as well as my own readings of related Dunhuang 
Chan/sTon mun manuscripts, both in Chinese and in Tibetan, I will present below an 
alternative understanding of sTon mun. But my alternative reading is not meant to prove 
gNubs chen's understanding mistaken. Rather, it intends, on the one hand, to reveal the 
various philosophical and contemplative layers embedded in the sTon mun idea of 
simultaneous access and, on the other hand, to illustrate the hermeneutical plasticity 
underlying the idea of immediacy. That is, the idea of immediacy can be interpreted with 
different emphases by authors or practitioners of different philosophical or contemplative 
orientations. Yet, due to their close connection, one cannot completely separate what is 
philosophical from what is contemplative or vice versa. Thus, as I discuss related issues 
below, I will fluidly move between the two dimensions not only to conform to the proper 
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context but also to recognize their import simultaneously. 
A. Suddenness: A Simultaneous Access to the Mind-Source 
When the simultaneous access of sTon mun is understood as a direct access to the 
unborn ultimate without any wavering, one may naturally wonder what the unborn 
ultimate really refers to in doctrinal or philosophical terms. Is it the unborn siinyata, as 
explained in the teachings of the Madhyamaka? Is it the tathagatagarbha or Buddha-
nature advocated by some Yogacara followers? Or are there some other possibilities? 
Even though gNubs chen identifies the referred unborn ultimate as the ultimate truth 
within the two-truths framework, evidence derived from the previous studies of 
Dunhuang Chan manuscripts seems to suggest that the unborn ultimate to which sTon 
mun practitioners try to directly access is what they call the all-encompassing xinyuan >ij. 
M or mind-source.47 Yet, what is this mind-source philosophically speaking? How does 
it encompass all? Furthermore, why does sTon mun ask its followers to simultaneously 
access this mind-source and how is this simultaneous access of sTon mun implemented 
contemplatively? To address these questions, let us delve into the sTon mun teachings 
presented in the Dunhuang manuscripts for possible answers. 
Recently it has been sufficiently demonstrated by several authors that the Chan idea 
of "tracing the luminosity back to its mind-source" (Ch. fanzhao xinyuan MM'IJM), or 
simply "tracing back the luminosity" (Ch. fanzhao JUM),4 8 is the basis for the sudden 
47
 I take xinyuan foM- as an appositional compound that emphasizes the "originating" property of the 
mind. That is, the mind is the source and the source is the mind, thus my translation, mind-source. 
48
 In his study of the teachings of Chinul (1158-1210), the founder of the Korean tradition of Zen, Robert E. 
Buswell translates this Chinese term fanzhao MM as '"tracing back the radiance"; see Buswell, Tracing 
Back the Radiance. 
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teaching of sTon mun. This idea of "tracing back the luminosity" is plainly named as 
the sudden teaching of the Mahayana in the Zhujing yaochao g|j!M§c:fe!> (An Anthology 
of Various Sutras), one of the important Dunhuang Chan anthologies that were translated 
into Tibetan around the 8th-9th centuries.50 It says, 
This is the dharma gate [i.e., approach] of Mahayana sudden teaching: 
Since all sentient beings originally possess Buddha-nature, the 
myriad sutras and treatises, the written words and speeches of 
Mahayana and Hinayana teachings, only point to the original nature 
of the sentient being, [directly] seeing which one realizes 
Buddhahood. This [sudden] approach is also called returning to the 
source, tracing back the luminosity, tracing upstream, turning back 
the direction, no birth, the uncontaminated, the non-arising, or the 
dharma that is free from seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing.51 
From the quoted passage, we see clearly that the "source" to which the practitioner 
is asked to return is the Buddha-nature each of the sentient beings originally possesses. 
While the "suddenness" of the approach is not so obvious, the idea of "tracing back the 
luminosity" suggests that the suddenness may come from directly applying the source's 
"luminosity" (i.e., enlightening qualities) as the guidance for one's practice. This is 
evidently reminiscent of how gNubs chen characterizes the approach of sTon mun 
discussed earlier. Then, in essence, "tracing back the luminosity" requires the practitioner 
to take the enlightening qualities of the source (also the final fruition, Buddha-nature) as 
the path, i.e., as the contemplative principles for the path. 
The idea of "returning to the source" is doctrinally associated not only with 
Buddha-nature but also with one's awakened mind. In the Zhenglijue, a Chinese record 
See e.g., Obata, "Kodai chibetto ni okeru tonmonpa (zenshu) no nagare," 66-73 and Meinert, "Chinese 
Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen," 291-297. 
50
 For a discussion of the Tibetan translation of the Zhujing yaochao, see e.g., Otokawa, "New Fragments 
of the rNal 'byor chen por bsgom pa 'i don from Tabo," 115-117. 
51
 Zhujing yaochao, T. 85 (2819): 1196c; r fcJGm&lffl^ ' &—W3L±*HZ&:%ffi& ' ^SHIiffl • 
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of the Council of Tibet, Moheyan is said to teach that "tracing back the luminosity" is to 
directly view the awakened mind in contemplation; he explains, 
Tracing the luminosity back to its mind-source is to view the mind. If 
the mind gives rise to a thought, being or nonbeing, purity or 
impurity, emptiness or non-emptiness, and so forth, all these should 
not be considered. Even non-examination should not be considered. 
Thus, in the VimalakTrti-sutra, it is said, "non-examination is Bodhi 
[i.e., awakening]."52 
Here, one can make the following observation. That is, the Chan/sTon mun communities 
in the border areas like Dunhuang basically follow the main ideas of Chan teachings in 
Central China. So, they identify Buddha-nature as the original nature, further associate it 
with the mind-source, and then instruct their followers to view directly into the nature of 
the mind so that its enlightening qualities can be seen and used as the guidelines for 
practice. 
Yet, philosophically speaking, as the source, how is the mind all-encompassing and 
what does it mean to the sTon mun practitioners that the mind is so? In general, in the 
Dunhuang Chan manuscripts, sTon mun teaches that the mind, as one's True-nature (or 
Buddha-nature), is naturally perfect and replete with all merits without any lacking.53 
52
 Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhenglijue, 25; r MM'L^M'b ' 'frSMgft > ^M ' >#T># ' ^f^M ' M 
I ^ F S ' ^ l & f ^ J g ' ^ C ^ I M ^ t f t : ^ t l S ^ J i ' JJI This passage has also been translated into 
Tibetan and preserved in Dunhuang manuscript PT 823. For comparison, the Tibetan translation is given as 
follows: "It is to turn back the six sense doors and then look into the mind. If concepts stir, one does not 
consider whether they exist or not, whether they are pure or not, whether they are empty or not, etc., and 
one does not consider even one's state of non-examination and non-consideration. In the Vimalalarti it is 
also said: 'Non-examination is awakening.' (sgo drug bzlogs ste/ slar sems la blta ste/ 'du shes g.yos na/ 
yod pa dang myed pa dang gtsang pa dang myi gtsang pa dang/ stong pa dang myi stong pa la stsogs pa cir 
yang myi bsams/ myi rtog myi bsam par yang myi bsams ste/byi ma kir ti'i nang nas kyang/ myi rtog pa ni 
byang chub ces 'byung'o; PT 823, 1.4-2.2)"; the English translation of the Tibetan passage is taken from 
Gomez, "The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana," 126. Also, see Meinert, 
"Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs-chen," 293-294. 
53
 Among the Dunhuang Chan/sTon mun Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, for example, (1) the Zhujing 
yaochao teaches, "This very real dharma gate [i.e., approach] is that all sentient beings [possess] the pure 
mind of self-nature that is called the wisdom of the [great] complete mirror. Up from the Buddhas and 
down to the sentient beings, [their respective pure mind of self-nature] is completely equivalent; there is 
nothing to add or subtract. It is only due to the cover of ignorant, delusory thoughts that its dharma essence 
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The only problem sentient beings or mundane people have is that they let delusory 
"dusts" or thoughts cover this True-nature so that its natural luminosity (Tib. lham me or 
rnal du), wherein there is neither self nor others and the ordinary and the noble are one 
is not able to manifest. ( ' j t b J E * ^ • ft-tJU&^gffit^fr . ^ [ ^ H f e ! 1 • ±f£t#f$ « T M ^ 
£ ' mmmrn * mnmn • uumm^mmm • ^mzm^mmm ° * zhujmgyaochao, T. 85 (28i9>: 
1193c)." Interestingly, this teaching is said to be taught by Jingangzhi ^HUla or Vajrabodhi (6717-741), a 
Buddhist tantric master who came to China to teach tantric Buddhism in the Tang Dynasty. (2) Moheyan is 
said to teach, "Just detach oneself from conceptual thoughts, delusory thoughts. Then, [dharmas such as] 
the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment will naturally be fulfilled, and all merits will also be completely 
equipped. ( r{H£>fj&SH ' SP =+ tMn D n • § # P I S ' - ^ { f • ^ I M f f ° J Wang, Dunwu dasheng 
zhenglijue, 25)"; he also teaches, "If the delusory mind does not arise and one detaches oneself from all 
delusory thoughts, the originally existent true nature and all-knowing wisdom will naturally manifest. ( '" ^ 
S ' C ^ jffi ' M.—W&W& ' K1±*W ' R—WWM ' g ^ I P l ° j Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhenglijue, 
28)"; (3) Bodhidharma is said to teach in his teaching ofliru (entering the Way via its principle or entering 
the ultimate meaning), "Regarding entering the [ultimate] meaning, the scriptures are understood by means 
of the teachings, and ordinary beings and the true nature are one and not different. However, because it is 
obscured by the adventious dusts of untruth, the true nature is not directly realized. If one abandons the 
untruth, turns to the direction of the true, abandons conceptualiztion, and abides in [its] luminosity, there is 
neither self nor others; the ordinary and the noble are one and the same. If one abides [in it] steadily 
without change, from then on one does not pursue after the words and doctrinal teachings. Now one has 
come to rest in the naturalness of the true, which is without conceptualization, peaceful and without action. 
That is entering the [ultimate] meaning, (don la 'jug pa ni bstan(d) pas gzhung go ba ste/ so so'i skye bo 
dang/ yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid gcig cing/ tha myi dad pa yin na/ myi bden pa'i glo bur gyi srdul gyis 
bsgribs pas/ yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid mngon bar ma rtogs so/ gal te myi bden pa spangs te/ yang dag pa la 
phyogs shing/ rtog pa spangs te/ lham mer gnas na/ bdag kyang myed/ gzhan yang myed/ ma rabs 
dang 'phags pa yang mnyam zhing gcig ste/ myi 'gyur bar brtan bar gnas na/ de phan cad yi ge dag bstan 
pa'i rjes su myi 'brang ngo/ da ni yang dag pa'i rnal du bab pa/ rnam par rtog pa myed pa/ zhi zhing bya pa 
myed pa ste/ de ni don la 'jug pa'o; PT 116, 164.3-165.4; this teaching of Bodhidharma's liru apparently 
was well-known among the Tibetan Buddhists, for it has also been quoted twice by gNubs chen Sangs 
rgyas ye shes in his bSam gtan mig sgron; see the discussion under Section LB and footnotes 28 and 29 
above)"; (4) mKhan po Bu cu (or Chan master Wuzhu fiftfi^^ip) also teaches the primordial perfection of 
all sentient beings: "All sentient beings are primordially pure and primordially perfect. Therefore, [with 
respect to their nature,] there is neither increase nor decrease. [However,] because they follow after [their] 
thinking, in the three realms, [their] afflictive minds take (or incarnate in) all kinds of aggregate bodies. 
When seeing one's [true] nature through [the guidance of] a spiritual teacher, one realizes Buddhahood. If 
one is attached to phenomenal characteristics, one sinks in transmigration. Because sentient beings have 
thoughts, the designation of no-thought [as a provisional method] is taught. When thoughts are absent, then 
even no-thought should not be added [i.e., should be let go]. Regarding the mind of the three realms, one 
should not reside in the place of complete tranquility, should not abide in phenomenal characteristics, nor 
should perform any karmic action, but should be free of illusion. That is the complete liberation, (sems can 
thams cad ni/ thog ma nas rnam par dag/ thog ma nas yosu rdzogs pas/ bsnan du yang myed/ dbrir yang 
myed/ bsam ba'i rje su gzhol bas/ khams gsum du sems zag pas/ phung po'i lus sna tshogs blangs te/ dge 
ba'i bshes nyen la bltos/ rang bzhin mthong na sangs rgyasu 'grub bo/ mtshan ma la chags na 'khor/ sems 
can bsam ba yod pas/ bla dags su bsam ba myed par bshad de/ bsam ba myed na bsam ba myed pa 'ang myi 
gzhag go/ khams gsum gyi sems ni/ bdag zhi ba'i sa la yang myi gnas/ mtshan ma la yang myi gnas/ las 
myi byed pa 'ang ma yin te/ sgyu ma dang bral ba ni rnam par grol ba'o; PT 116, 188.3-189.4)"; and (5) 
mKhan po Shin ho (or Master Shinho) also has similar teachings; see the quotations referred to in footnotes 
81, 82, and 83 below. 
208 
and the same, cannot spontaneously manifest itself. Thus, given this philosophical 
understanding that the mind-source is naturally perfect and complete without any lacking, 
sTon mun adamantly insists that, as long as one realizes the emptiness or empty nature of 
delusory thoughts and let one's spontaneous self-awareness (Ch. ziran zhi §$$fl ; Tib. 
rang gis rig pa) or fundamental wisdom or original awareness (Ch. genben zhi fl!^^; 
Tib. phyi mo'iye shes) manifest in suchness, one is then self-liberated (Ch. zixing jietuo 
!=r[4fPi=IM; Tib. rang grot) as a Buddha.55 Accordingly, sTon mun asks its followers to 
neither grasp nor relinquish but simply embrace all appearances with the wise 
discernment or wisdom of nondual non-conceptuality (Ch. wuer wufenbie zhi itezifit^ 
MHO- Moheyan explains this teaching as follows. 
All Buddhas and Tathagatas, since countless eons ago, have been free 
of three poisons, delusory thoughts and afflictive conceptualizations. 
Therefore, they have realized the nondual, non-conceptual wisdom. 
With the nondual, non-conceptual wisdom, they wisely discern the 
appearances of all phenomena, rather than conceptualize them with 
ignorant, delusory thoughts. Based on this understanding, prqjha and 
upaya are not separate. Regarding grasping and relinquishing, how 
can there be any grasping or relinquishing in nonduality?56 
Thus, with the idea of embracing all, sTon mun understands the "ultimate meaning" 
Moheyan has repeated quoted the Vajracchedika-sutra and other Mahayana sutras to assert his audience, 
"When absent of all delusory thoughts and habitual tendencies, one is then called a Buddha. ( r HI—tJJ5e$l 
HfR ' M^SHSf^  ° j Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue, 20)" and "All sentient beings, due to having 
delusory thoughts and conceptual discrimination, attach themselves to the delusory thoughts of arising and 
non-arising. Therefore, they wander in the cycle of life and death [i.e., samsara]. If they do not attach 
themselves to the delusory thoughts of arising and non-arising, they will then attain liberation. ( r—i2JxjA 
£ • ym^mftw • mm^±^m • m®.^^ • mm^mm^pf^^m • mmm • j wang, 
Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue, 25)"; see also the related teachings by other Chan/sTon mun masters such as 
Bodhidharma, Wuzhu, and Shenhui discussed in the previous footnote. 
55
 For details, see the discussion on Master Shinho's teachings (i.e., the quotations referred to in footnotes 
81, 82, and 83) below. 
56
 Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue, 33; f miMU^UMWiB^ • H = # ' $ S • ^ tl^SO ' £ft1§ 
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(Ch. shengyi JHH; Tib. don dam pa) not simply as non-action or non-cultivation, but 
as that which is beyond the duality of action or non-action (Ch. xing buxing fr-^fr), o r 
cultivation or non-cultivation (Ch. xiu buxiu flR^flf?)-58 Yet, while the sTon mun idea of 
ultimacy transcends all dualistic categories such as being and nonbeing, purity and 
impurity, emptiness and non-emptiness, and so forth,59 its transcendence is also inclusive. 
Specifically, the transcendence is achieved by embracing all categories, including 
dualistic categories, with the non-conceptual equalness of the mind-source. 
In fact, it is most conspicuously with the non-conceptuality of the mind-source that 
sTon mun associates its all-embracive or all-encompassing doctrine. This can be clearly 
seen in the Dunhuang Chan manuscripts. For example, in the dMyigs su myedpa tshul 
gcig pa'i gzhung (A Treatise on the One Principle of Non-Reificatiori) of PT 116, the 
author(s) cites from various surras to expound how Mahayana non-conceptuality (Tib. 
theg pa chen po rnam par myi rtog pa) embraces (Tib. 'dus pa) bodhicitta, paramitas, 
upayas or conventional truth (Tib. kun rdzob), ultimate truth (Tib. don dam pa), middle 
way (Tib. dbu ma), nonduality (Tib. gnyis su med pa), outer and inner awarenesses, 
self-awareness (Tib. rang gis rig pa), all-knowing wisdom, the enlightened activities of 
the Buddha, and so forth.60 This all-encompassing understanding of the sTon mun 
non-conceptuality is distinctively not in agreement with gNubs chen's characterization of 
Even though the sTon mun idea of shengyi has been translated as don dam pa or the ultimate meaning or 
truth, it is not in its usual sense as that in the framework of the two truths. Rather, it is all-encompassing; 
for a more detailed analysis, see my discussion below. To be sure, if one fails to recognize this subtle 
difference, one would reach the conclusion that direct access to the unborn ultimate which sTon mun 
propounds reduces everything to the one ultimate reality, as gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes has done in 
his bSam gtan mig sgron. 
58
 See e.g., Wang, Dunwu dashengzhengli jue, 39. 
59
 That is to say, the ultimacu of sTon mun is not just pertaining to purity or emptiness, which is usually 
the case in the traditional two-truths framework. See below for a more detailed discussion. 
60
 See e.g., PT 116, 146.2-163.4; for an English translation, see Faber, "A Tibetan Dunhuang Treatise on 
Simultaneous Enlightenment," 63-70. 
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the sTon mun non-conceptuality as non-appearance that leans one-sidedly to nonbeing or 
emptiness.61 
At this point, based on gNubs chen's non-appearance characterization, a skeptic may 
ask, "If the Simultaneists indeed advocate the all-encompassing mind-source as the 
unborn ultimate, why do they so heavily emphasize 'negative' ideas such as non-action 
(Ch. wuzuo Mfp; Tib. bya ba dang bral ba), no-thought (Ch. wunian £&it; Tib. bsam 
pa medpa, mi bsam, mi sems, or mi dran), non-examination (Ch. buguan ?fWL', Tib. mi 
rtogpa), non-grasping or non-reification (Ch. wusuode $&Pf\^\ Tib. dmigs su med pa), 
non-abidance (Ch. wuzhu Iptfi; Tib. gnas med pa) or no-locus (Ch. wusuo $Rjff; Tib. 
myed pa 'i gnasyl" A Simultaneist may respond that these so-called via negativa or 
"negative paths," contemplatively speaking, are not meant to negate or exclude 
something like actions or thoughts. Rather, these "negative paths" are to contemplatively 
lead the practitioner to directly bring forth the qualities or characteristics of the 
mind-source, to which these "negative paths" correspond. For example, the practice of 
"non-action" does not mean to simply do nothing. But it is to directly bring forth the state 
of non-action or effortlessness that is a defining characteristic of the mind-source.62 In 
this way, the so-called "negative paths" are not "negative" in the sense of negating or 
61
 In fact, in the Dunhuang Tibetan manuscript of ITJ 709 discussed in the previous chapter, there is a 
passage warning against the grasping or reification of non-being; it is said, "Those who have objective 
grasping or reification, while being completely under control, are in darkness that covers their own supreme 
wisdom. Therefore, even though the small [afflictions?] have been completely cleansed, that is still the 
conceptualization of non-being. Other practices or stages are [still] needed to clean it. (... dmyigs pa can de 
dag/ mngon du khugs su zin kyang/ rang gi mchog gi ye shes la sgrib pa'i mun par 'gyur bas/ chung du 
yongs su byang du zin kyang/ de ma yin ba'i rtog pa/ gzhan rims kyis sbyang dgos pas; ITJ 709/9, 
38v.l-3.)" 
62
 Similarly, the practice of "no-thought" does not mean to remove conceptual thoughts through the act of 
purification or ceasing. Rather, it removes them by directly bringing forth the state of no-thought, a 
defining characteristic of the mind-source. In the same fashion, all other "negative paths" are meant to 
bring forth their corresponding qualities so as to reveal the mind-source. 
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excluding something. Rather, they show the practitioner to positively embrace all 
phenomena or activities with the mind in the manner of their corresponding properties 
such as effortlessness, non-conceptuality, or non-reification. 
Given this contemplative understanding that the "negative paths" in the system of 
sTon mun are to manifest the all-encompassing mind-source, the sTon mun idea of 
shengyi or ultimacy must thus be understood philosophically as all-encompassing, for 
ultimacy is the goal these "negative paths" are devised to achieve. This philosophical 
understanding effectively gives rise to an ultimacy of wholeness (discussed more below) 
that encompasses all, ultimate and conventional. Here, for sTon mun, if one's realization 
still retains any conceptualization of the categories of ultimacy and conventionality, that 
realization is not ultimate and still has faults. Thus, when asked, "Is it or is it not 
necessary to practice the six paramitas and other dharma gates [i.e., approaches]?", 
Moheyan responds, 
In the manner of the conventional truth, six paramitas, and so forth, 
are upayas to reveal the ultimate truth; they are not unnecessary. 
With respect to the ultimate truth, it is beyond speech and thought. 
[Thus,] six paramitas and other dharma gates are not said to be 
necessary or unnecessary. This has been extensively explained in the 
surras.63 
Put simply, the above passage really signifies that for the Simultaneists of sTon mun, 
conventionality comprises skillful means, whereas ultimacy comprises skillful means 
performed ultimately. In other words, ultimacy is conventionality actualized as such 
without conceptual superimposition whatsoever. After all, ultimacy bears no conceptual 
frameworks. Even nonduality or emptiness, under this realization, should be given no 
63
 Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhenglijue, 26; r flffifKS ' /\}#S®# ' MIJW. ' MBM®. ' It&fW ° 
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designation, for all things should be just as such and the wisdom of suchness embraces 
the entirety of all that exists.64 
Furthermore, as they are the practices to manifest the all-encompassing mind-source, 
the "negative paths" are actually the "cure-all medicine." This is because, as one directly 
manifests the all-encompassing mind-source, one also brings forth one's innately 
all-knowing wisdom (Skt. sarvathajnana; Ch. —"£083=?; Tib. thorns cad mkhyen pa nyid) 
that helps him or her to see all things as they are. This is like the sun emerging from the 
clouds, illuminating every corner of the world, or a mirror, innately luminous, reflecting 
the objects in front of it without any discrimination.65 In its original nature, the mind is 
just as it is, nothing to add or subtract; it is spontaneously complete and perfect. As one 
manifests one's original nature, one thus self-liberates oneself.66 So, in the final analysis, 
the "negativity" of the "negative paths" is not an act to "break" the darkness of ignorance, 
So, Moheyan is said to teach, "Thus, the dharma is just as such. The wisdom of suchness embraces all 
the teachings of the Buddha. ( "'H$0'£#D#n • #D$D;£1i • M-~WW/£ ° j Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhengli 
jue, 20-21)"; mKhan po Yen also explains, "The very place that is seen by the eyes is the limit of reality. 
All dharmas are the limit of reality. Other than that what else to seek for? (mig gis mthong ba'i gnas nyid 
bden pa'i mtha' yin te/ chos so cog kyang bden pa'i mtha' yin no/ de las gshan du btsal du ci yod; gNubs 
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 123.2-3)". 
65
 See, e.g., Moheyan teaches, "If the delusory mind does not arise and one detaches oneself from all 
delusory thoughts, the originally existent true nature and all-knowing wisdom will naturally manifest. It is 
like what the sutras of the Avatamsaka, the Lankavatara, and so for have said: 'Like the Sun comes out of 
the clouds, muddy waters become clear, a mirror reveals its brightness; like the silver is taken out from its 
ore, and so forth.' ( r i § ^ M ^ £ B • « | — K J S ^ • K f 4 * W ' R-^WS ' g ^ H S ! • fflffiMII 
H H I S S : r #D B iHm • >S7}C>g>i • m%mn ' mmmW ° j j Wang, Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue, 28)"; 
the bSam gtan gi yi ge (in the Dunhuang manuscript ITJ 709) alos has the following, "Even the children, 
who are fully immersed in the dhyana of the Tathagata, will not have mind, thought, and consciousness, but 
abide in the benefits of noble supreme wisdom and self-discriminating awareness. Thus, neither 
establishing the cause nor wishing for the fruition, this itself is the activity of becoming the intrinsic 
Buddha. As a result, one will not fall down to the other realms of Sravakas, Non-Buddhists, and so forth, 
(de bzhin gshegs pa'i bsam gtan gi rjes su 'jug pa'i sras rnams kyang/ sems dang yid dang/ yid kyi rnam par 
shes pa la ma yin gyi/ mchog gi ye shes 'phags pa/ so so rang gis rig pa'i bed ba la gnas pas/ rgyu las myi 
sgrub/ 'bras bur myi re mod kyi/ de nyid chos nyid kyi sangs rgyas su 'gyur ba'i las yin te/ de las nyan thos 
dang/ mu stegs can las stsogs pa'i sa gzhan du myi ltung ngo; ITJ 709/9, 37v.3-38r.l)." See also the 
teachings of Shenhui's discussed in Section II. C below. 
66
 Chan/sTon mun masters teach that the dharmas neither bind nor liberate the dharmas; as such, they are 
in the state of self-liberation (Ch. zixing jietuo |=if:3:$¥I&; Tib. ranggrol tharpa); for similar teachings, see, 
e.g., gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 124.4-125.1 and 125.2. 
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but a realization to let the innate brightness of the mind-source shine naturally without 
any obscuration. In this way, the "negative paths" are the contemplative implementation 
for the Simultaneists of sTon mun to trace the "luminosity" back to its mind-source, and 
should not be read as something affirming gNubs chen's characterization, in which the 
Simultaneists lean one-sidedly to the nonbeing or empty nature of the non-conceptuality. 
Clearly, my above interpretation of the sTon mun unborn ultimate is very different 
from that of gNubs chen's understanding presented in Section I of this chapter. Therein, 
gNubs chen understands the unborn ultimate as the ultimate truth in the traditional 
two-truths framework. Consequently, he interprets the suddenness of sTon mun as an 
approach that only emphasizes the non-appearance aspect of the non-conceptuality and is 
essentially a vehicle of oneness utterly misconstruing the nonduality or inseparability of 
the two truths. Perhaps that is not without reason, for the mind-source is referred to as the 
"ultimate meaning" by the Simultaneists themselves, and its Tibetan translation, don dam 
pa, certainly warrants gNubs chen to read it in the framework of the two truths. Yet, in 
spite of this ambiguous reference, evidence shows that gNubs chen may be familiar with 
the sTon mun use of the "ultimate meaning" as the all-encompassing mind-source 
demonstrated above.67 
While we cannot ascertain the exact reason why gNubs chen chose to read sTon 
mun in the way he did, there is however the possibility, especially from the contemplative 
perspective underscored in this dissertation, to understand gNubs chen's reading of sTon 
mun as his genuine warning to all practitioners, not just sTon mun practitioners. In the 
message, gNubs chen informs us that when contemplatively applying the teachings or 
67
 In his bSam gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen is familiar with, e.g., Bodhidharma's reference of the True-
nature (i.e., Buddha-nature) as the ultimate, and he also refers to the materials in the Dunhuang manuscript 
PT 116 which indicate that the sTon mun non-conceptuality is all-encompassing. 
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instructions of directly accessing the unborn ultimate, there is the possibility of falling 
into a doctrinal oneness, a mistaken understanding of nonduality that needs to be avoided. 
This reading, I believe, not only offers us a perspective going beyond the usual polemical 
rendering taken for this kind of scenario; such rendering usually collapses the meaning of 
the exchange. But it also enriches the conversation between gNubs chen's reading and 
my alternative interpretation by providing a context for further reflections into 
philosophical as well as contemplative issues associated with the idea of immediacy. 
Above I have shown that when the unborn ultimate is understood as the all-encompassing 
mind-source with all its philosophical nuances, not only could gNubs chen's criticism of 
sTon mun be mended, but it further brings us insights into the teachings of sTon mun 
such as the contemplative significance underlying the approaches of "negative paths." 
Below let us journey further into this philosophically and contemplatively rich field to 
explore related ideas such as nonduality based on my above rendering of the sTon mun 
suddenness or simultaneity. 
B. Nonduality: Oneness or Wholeness? 
To be sure, for gNubs chen, even if the Simultaneists speak of nonduality, their idea 
of nonduality is in actuality a oneness because he considers the fundamental philosophy 
of sTon mun to be "all is the ultimate truth, empty and unborn." However, given my 
rendering of the sTon mun suddenness as a simultaneous access to the all-encompassing 
mind-source, I would argue that a better way to characterize the fundamental philosophy 
or view of sTon mun is that, for sTon mun, "the ultimate is all-encompassing and beyond 
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designation." The subtle difference between the two characterizations gives rise to two 
interpretations, in which the former is a oneness (or monism), whereas the latter can be 
called a wholeness that simultaneously embraces the two truths. 
In the oneness characterization, as one considers that all is the ultimate truth, unborn 
and empty, all appearances in their phenomenal arising and ceasing thus become illusory 
untruth in conception. As a result, there is a conceptual alternation in one's awareness of 
the conventional being untrue and the ultimate being true. This conceptual alternation 
consequently not only creates a nonexistent separation, but also disrupts the nonduality or 
inseparability, between the conventional and the ultimate. Hence, the statement that all is 
the ultimate truth effectively leaves no room to the conventional. Thus, gNubs chen is 
correct to characterize it as a oneness and identify it as a mistaken understanding which 
all practitioners should properly avoid. 
On the other hand, in what I call the wholeness characterization (i.e., the ultimate is 
all-encompassing and beyond designation), there exists a different dynamic between the 
ultimate and the conventional. Namely, they are inclusive or more precisely interfusing of 
each other.69 In this interfusing dynamic, not only are the two truths interconnected, 
unlike how they are conceptually separated in the above oneness characterization, but 
they are also inseparable in a specific way. That is, the conventional is the upaya or 
Even though I still use "the ultimate" here in this characterization, it is not "the ultimate" in the 
framework of the traditional two truths. Rather, I am emphasizing that what has to be understood depends 
on its context. The ultimate, under the contextualization of the all-encompassing mind-source, is also 
all-encompassing, whereas the ultimate, under the contextualization of the traditional two-truths paradigm, 
is complementary to the conventional. To be more specific, the ultimate, within the contextualization of the 
all-encompassing mind-source, embraces both the ultimate and the conventional in the contextualization of 
the traditional two-truths paradigm. 
69
 For various relationships between the conventional and ultimate truths, see e.g., Gregory, Tsung-mi and 
the Sinification of Buddhism, 103-104; Swanson, Foundations ofT'ien-T'ai Philosophy, especially 18-37; 
Newland, The Two Truths in the Madhyamika Philosophy of the Ge-luk-ba Order of Tibetan Buddhism, 
especially 59-75; andThakchoe, The Two Truths Debate, especially 7-44. 
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skillful means taught to facilitate the realization of the ultimate, whereas the ultimate is 
the nondual principle (Ch. wuerfa flSZl)^) or prajnd governing the conventional upaya 
so that the upaya is actualized without any dualistic designation that may strengthen even 
an iota of conceptual or mental superimposition.70 As a result, any conventional upaya 
does not stay on the conventional level anymore, for it is "interfused" with the ultimate 
prajnd and thus is free of any conventionality, or more precisely, conceptualization. This 
"pro/no-interfused" upaya is then called a valid upaya in the sTon mun sense. In this way, 
the two truths are said to embrace each other to the extent that they are "neither one nor 
distinct" (Ch. buyi buyi ^f—^J|).71 They interfuse each other to form a wholeness that 
characterizes their inseparability as well as nonduality. 
The interfused wholeness of conventional upaya and ultimate prajnd, for sTon mun, 
philosophically, needs to be distinguished from a doctrinal oneness, for the conventional 
upaya and the ultimate prajnd, even though their designations are essentially eliminated, 
are neither one nor distinct. They are paradoxically nondual, interfusing or permeating 
each other without collapsing each other.72 Contemplatively, the interfused wholeness, it 
seems, inspires the Simultaneists to cultivate themselves with everything but grasp 
When discussing the teachings of Moheyan, Gomez also writes, "If the distinction between means and 
wisdom, relative and absolute, error and truth, is the pristine error, then it follows that the goal must be a 
state of freedom from these dualities, rather than any strengthening of the mental habits that they 
presuppose"; see Gomez, "The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana," 99. 
71
 Regarding this nondual principle, Master Moheyan is said to teach, " The conventional and ultimate 
truths are neither one nor distinct [e.g., two or many]. Why are they not one? It is because [sentient beings 
still have delusory thoughts, due to which they reify the conventional truth. What are they not distinct? 
When they are free of all delusory thoughts and habitual tendencies, one and many (or sameness and 
distinctness) should not be conceptualized or discriminated. ("" [tSPB^XII-l$t^] ; ;F—-'Ffl ° Sf^J^—? 5f 
ffi&m ' E ^ H W i S t f t • S H ^ g ? m-W^WSUm • - H ^ B J ^ O • j Wang, Dunwu dasheng 
zhengli jue, 26)". 
72
 In the Tibetan translation of the Yaojue, a Chan/sTon mun treatise briefly discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Tibetan interpretation of the sTon mun nonduality is given as follows: "As both one and many, 
it is called nonduality"; mying gcig du na gnyis su myed ces kyang bya'o (PT 116, 200.2); see Ueyama, 
"Chibettoyaku Tongo shinshu yoketsu no kenkyu," 73-74; 82; and 97. 
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nothing. So, in the bSam gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen gives several quotations that 
include 
When the eye sees all the forms, the eye should not acquire [i.e., reify] 
the forms. Similarly, all the six senses should follow [the same 
principle]. Therefore, from the surra, it is said, 'If one does not reify 
anything whatsoever, [one will then receive] the prophecy of the 
Buddha [for enlightenment].' Also, all dharmas should not be reified, 
and the non-reification itself should not be reified, either.73 
Accordingly, the Simultaneists interact with all the conventional phenomena, but interact 
with them ultimately, i.e., in the manner of non-reification or non-grasping-and-non-
relinquishing. This contemplative practice of sTon mun, in effect, is a simultaneous 
access to, or a simultaneous embrace of, the two truths, attempting to realize the nondual 
inseparability of the ultimate prajha and the conventional upaya in their no-designation 
state. 
Understanding the simultaneous embrace of the two truths as a strategy to pass 
beyond the oppositions that what he calls the Chan "twofold truth" has set up, Bernard 
Faure cites Derrida to argue that not only is the claim to pass beyond the oppositions 
"bound to fall short of its goal," but its failure is as much due to its marked one-sidedness 
as due to the ideological or metaphysical asymmetry between the two levels of truth.74 
There, Faure further concludes, 
[T]he attempt, however, to maintain the viability of both sides of the 
opposition equally, to be simultaneously on both sides of the divide 
or to grasp simultaneously the two truths, may reflect a will to 
mastery that keeps falling back on one side and turning into another 
rhetorical effect. Perhaps there is no way out of this predicament, and 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 123.1-2; mig gis gzugs so cog mthong na/ mig 
gis gzugs so cog thob par mi rung/ tshogs drug char ded pa 'dra bas/ mdo sde las/ ci yang thob pa med pa 
ni/ sangs rgyas kyi lung ston to/ yang chos so cog thob par mi rung ba nyid kyang thob par mi rung ngo. 
'
4
 For his detailed argument, see Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 59. 
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this is the true paradox of the twofold truth.75 
To the above philosophical predicament, a contemplative response may be possible 
for, if the simultaneous embrace is to contemplatively eliminate the divide and inform us 
that there are actually no sides but an interconnected whole, then these are no oppositions 
to pass and no sides to fall back. After all, oppositions and sides are simply results of 
conventional and conceptual reification, which can be contemplatively dissolved. Thus, 
what the simultaneous embrace of the two truths really tries to inform us about is that the 
conventional cannot be true on its own; it must be suffused with the ultimate so that its 
dualistic and conceptual falsity can be rectified. On the other hand, the ultimate is only a 
kind of conceptual abstraction if it is not in association with the physical relativity of the 
conventional; after all, there is no siinyata that is not the siinyata of some phenomenon. 
Understood in this way, the simultaneous embrace of the two truths would not be marked 
with one-sidedness, nor would it signify any ideological or metaphysical asymmetry 
between the two levels of truth. Rather, it is an effective means to experience the reality 
of wholeness that sTon mun tries to elaborate. In the experience, the two truths must be 
co-nascent and interfused to the extent that all designations or reifications must be 
dissolved, even the designations of the conventional, the ultimate, or the wholeness 
themselves. 
Regarding the interfusion of the two truths, Faure raises another valid concern 
stating, "What was in Indian Mahayana a nonduality became in Chinese Mahayana an 
identity, or at least an interpenetration."76 This interpenetration, Faure claims, has led 
Chan (and our sTon mun too) "to reinterpret in a unilateral way the Madhyamika notion 
75
 Ibid. 
76
 Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 57-58. 
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of Two Truths and to assert [one-sidedly] the ultimate reality."77 This one-sided assertion 
is problematic because it may inevitably lead Chan/sTon mun followers to an abstraction 
that ignores the "density, depth, the plurality of planes, [and] the background worlds"78 
in reality. Ironically, this insightful criticism of Faure's, I argue, signifies exactly what 
Chan or sTon mun means to counter through the contemplative practice of simultaneous 
access to the wholeness of the two truths. The crucial point, perhaps, is that, for sTon 
mun, the nonduality of the Madhyamaka is philosophically sound but contemplatively 
insufficient, for its gradualist model of realization, while facilitating the contemplative to 
establish conceptual apprehension, inevitably leaves a small trace of dualistic residue that 
strengthens unwanted mental habits of conceptualization and, as a result, prevents the 
contemplative from directly experiencing the two truths in their nondual state. 
Accordingly, sTon mun advocates the practice of direct or simultaneous access to 
the wholeness of the two truths, which, as shown above, does not collapse the two but 
makes them a whole with interfusion. This interfusion is soteriologically necessary for it 
breaks the divide that reifies the two truths as conceptual categories and creates mental 
superimposition to prevent the contemplative from experiencing reality as it is. As the 
contemplative interfuses the two truths into a wholeness, he or she also realizes that the 
wholeness is self-pregnant with indefinite possibilities, for it is the open field devoid of 
any conceptual framework or limitation. With its indefinite possibilities, not only is this 
wholeness not a oneness that collapses everything into an ideological or metaphysical 
abstraction (such as the undifferentiated ultimate reality or the Godhead), but it is actually 
filled with "density, depth, the plurality of planes, [and] the background worlds." 
Ibid, 58. 
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The indefiniteness of the said wholeness can be further exemplified in the sTon mun 
practices of "negative paths." As discussed earlier, the "negative paths" are not meant to 
negate or exclude something but to reveal the mind-source with their corresponding 
properties. A close look at these properties can reveal that they all exhibit a kind of 
"openness" or "indefiniteness." For example, "non-action" does not mean no actions but 
all actions that are accomplished in the manner of neither-grasping-nor-relinguishing; 
"no-thought" does not mean no thoughts at all but the awareness spontaneously arising 
from one's mind-source; "no-locus" does not mean no dwelling but the dwelling in what 
is called the state of one-wholeness (Ch. yihexiang —-f^fS; Tib. gzugs gcig du) that 
combines many into one, on the one hand, and is both one and many, on the other.79 
After all, a method of indefiniteness is to realize something similar. With this rationale, 
the indefiniteness of the "negative paths" essentially testifies to the indefiniteness of the 
wholeness under investigation. Otherwise, if the wholeness is definite and thus finite, 
how can it then encompass the infinite-all? 
In doctrinal terms, the indefiniteness of the sTon mun wholeness can be also 
understood as the non-abidance of the all-encompassing mind-source. In the Dunhuang 
Tibetan manuscript PT 116, mKhan po Shin ho (or Master Shinho)80 characterizes the 
mind as follows. 
Realize the defining characteristic of the truth that has no thinking or 
79
 Literally, the Chinese term yihexiang —cffll (or one-wholeness) can be glossed as "the form that 
combines many into one." Its Tibetan translation gzugs gcig du has the literal meaning of "the form that is 
both one and many." Both suggest that one-wholeness is both singular and plural. Even though it 
challenges our Cartesian logic and common sense, perhaps, it is its purpose to ask us to break the usual 
logic boundaries so that we can access the non-logic contemplatively and thus bring the two (i.e., one and 
many) together. For the teaching of one-wholeness in the Yaojue, see Ueyama, "Chibettoyaku Tongo 
shinshuydketsu no kenkyu," 73-74; 82; and 97. 
80
 Both Obata Hironobu and Okimoto Katsumi identify mKhan po Shin ho as Chan master Shenhui, whose 
teachings have been studied in Chapter 2 of this dissertation; see Obata, "Pelliot 116 bunken ni mieru 
shozenji no kenkyu" and Okimoto, "bSam yas no shuron (2): Tonko seizo bunken ni okeru sho zenshi." 
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thoughts at all times. If one asks what that is, [it is] the primordial 
self-nature of the mind, the state of non-abidance itself, that should 
not be reified. The mind is pure, and it is not a referential object of a 
samadhi. Regarding the mind, [there is no reification concerning] its 
being, nonbeing, wholesomeness, or unwholesomeness, nor is there 
reification concerning its colors or shapes. Regarding the mind, there 
is also no reification concerning it having limits or not having limits, 
being measurable or not being measurable, being localized or not 
being localized. All the phenomenal characteristics of mental actions 
should not be reified.81 
Being indefinite, the mind cannot be categorized in any way and thereby is not 
reifiable. This characteristic is not only the self-nature of the mind but also the state of 
non-abidance. Being the self-nature, this state of non-abidance, Master Shinho further 
explains, is the spontaneous self-awareness (Tib. rang gis rig pa) of the mind discerning 
everything as it is without any stopping {i.e., bondage), just as a bird flies without 
stopping in the air. In Master Shinho's words, we have, 
Thus, as the mind is non-abiding, the equalness of the mind is 
primordially non-abiding too. That is the spontaneous self-awareness. 
The so-called "awareness" is to come to the place or state of 
non-abidance. For example, a bird flies without stopping in the empty 
space. If it [stops and] resides in the empty space, it will fall. For that 
reason, non-awareness is not proper. If there is no awareness, it will 
fall from the empty sky. Consequently, non-abidance, primordially, is 
the state of ultimate rest itself, and through [one's] fundamental 
wisdom, it is possible [for one] to know the difficult state of ultimate 
rest itself.82 
Evidently, for the Simultaneists like Master Shinho, the state of non-abidance is not 
81
 PT 116, 183.4-184.4; rtag du dran ba myed pa'i bden ba'i mtshan ma bsgrub bo/ de yang gang zhe na/ 
sems kyi rang bzhin ye nas myi gnas pa'i ngo bo nyid ni/ thob par bya ba myed de sems dang ba dang/ ting 
nge 'dzin du dmyigs pa myido/ sems la yin pa dang/ ma yin ba dang/ bzang ba dang/ ngan pa dang/ sems la 
kha dog dang dbyibs su yang dmyigs pa myed/ sems la mtha' yod pa dang/ mtha' myed pa dang/ tshad yod 
pa dang/ tshad myed pa dang/ gnas yod pa dang/ gnas myed pa 'ang dmyigs pa myed de/ yid la bya ba'i 
mtshan ma thams cad myi dmyigs so. 
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 PT 116, 184.4-185.4; de ltar sems la gnas myed par gyur na/ sems kyi mnyam ba'i ngo bo nyid yi nas 
myi gnas pa de ni/ rang gis rig pa yin no/rig pa zhes bya ba ni myi gnas pa'i gnas su phyin pa'o/ dper na 
bya ni bar snang nam ka la myi gnas par 'gro ste/ gal te nam ka bar snang la gnas par gyur na ni lhung 
bar 'gyur vol de'i phyir rig pa myed pa yang ma yin no/ rig pa myed na stong pa'i mthar lhung ngo/ de bas 
na myi gnas pa ni ye nas zhi ba'i ngo bo nyid de/ phyi mo'i ye shes kyis na zhi ba dka' ba'i ngo bo nyid rig 
par nus so. 
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restlessness. On the contrary, it is the state of ultimate rest itself (Tib. zhi ba 'i ngo bo 
nyid), for non-abidance is the self-nature of the mind. In other words, as long as one acts 
in accord with the nature of the mind, one rests ultimately, for one never burdens the 
mind by acting against its nature. To fully realize this paradoxical (thus difficult) state, as 
Shinho instructs, one finds recourse in one's "fundamental wisdom" (Tib. phyi mo'iye 
shes), a sTon mun equivalent of the spontaneous self-awareness. In the manifestation or 
direct perception (Tib. mngonsum) of one's spontaneous self-awareness, one knows and 
sees all, but without the duslistic actions of knowing and seeing, for one acts in complete 
accord not only with the nature of the mind or dharmakaya (Tib. chos kyi sku) but also 
with the nature of all phenomena or dharmadhatu (Tib. chos kyi dbying). In this way, as 
one realizes non-abidance, one perfects and completes all myriad qualities. Regarding 
this understanding, Master Shinho expounds, 
Even if one knows with direct perception, there is the non-action of 
the mind as a knower. Even if one sees with direct perception, there 
is the non-action of the mind as a seer. That is the dharmakaya of 
complete perfection and equivalent with the empty space in accord 
with the dharmadhatu [or the sphere of dharmas]. Because the 
essential nature is non-abiding, its immeasurable qualities are 
spontaneously perfected and completed.83 
Consequently, both philosophically and contemplatively, the above Shinho's 
teaching regarding the state of non-abidance is significant in terms of understanding the 
nature of the sTon mun wholeness, for it tells us that as one realizes the state of non-
abidance, one realizes all. Philosophically, for the state of non-abidance to cover the 
entirety, it must be indefinite; as it is indefinite, it embraces the infinite-all that is the 
83
 PT 116, 185.4-186.2; ... mngon sum du shes na yang/ shes par yid la bya ba myed/ mngon sum du 
mthong na yang/ mthong bar yid la bya ba myed pa de ni yongs su rdzogs pa'i chos kyi sku ste/ chos kyi 
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wholeness. Given this philosophical understanding, the contemplative effectiveness of 
the "negative paths" like non-abidance really comes from realizing the "indefinite" (or 
"non-abiding") nature of the mind-source; they are not meant to negate but to embrace 
the indefiniteness that, according to Shinho, is the manifestation of one's spontaneous 
self-awareness. In this way, indefiniteness also implies spontaneous presence or embrace, 
for what is indefinite can only be embraced spontaneously or without any condition. In 
this spontaneous or unconditional embrace, one embraces the whole, the immeasurable, 
just as it is. 
In the above presentation, we see that, based on my alternative understanding of the 
unborn ultimate as the all-encompassing mind-source, the sTon mun view of the two 
truths can be epitomized in a wholeness that simultaneously embraces the two. This 
simultaneous embrace of the two truths informs us not only how the Simultaneists 
philosophically understand the inseparability and nonduality of the two truths, but also 
how they contemplatively realize the nondual inseparability of the two truths. In both the 
understanding as well as the practice, the two truths interfuse each other to the effect that 
the conventional is engaged in the manner of ultimacy, whereas the ultimate is embodied 
in conventional appearances. With this interfusing dynamic, the wholeness paradoxically 
is both singular and plural, for the two truths are "interfusedly" inseparable yet without 
being collapsed into one (thus they are nondual). In this wholeness that warrants the 
principle of nonduality, there also exist infinite possibilities that give rise to variety or 
plurality endowed with density, depth, and extensiveness. This indefiniteness, as argued, 
is philosophically and contemplatively associated with the "negative paths" of sTon mun. 
Exemplified through the idea of non-abidance, we see that what supports these "negative 
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paths" to tally with the said indefiniteness is one's spontaneous self-awareness. In these 
ways, the wholeness under investigation not only embodies the principle of nonduality 
but also exhibits the logic of spontaneity. 
Along with gNubs chen's oneness understanding, the above wholeness rendering 
evidently demonstrates some of the various philosophical and contemplative layers 
underlying the sTon mun idea of simultaneity in particular and the idea of immediacy in 
general. So, we see, the contemplative idea of simultaneous access can be, on the one 
hand, interpreted as derived from a philosophy of oneness that misses the nonduality of 
the conventional and the ultimate and collapses everything into an ideological abstraction. 
Yet, on the other and, it can also be read as derived from a philosophy of wholeness that 
not only simultaneously embraces the two truths but also exhibits the principles of 
nonduality and spontaneity. Furthermore, contemplatively speaking, in addition to what 
we learn from Shenhui's sudden Chan, in which the logic of immediacy in contemplation 
must integrate gradualness in the context of suddenness so that the logic of immediacy 
can be contemplatively implemented, the above wholeness rendering of the sTon mun 
simultaneity adds to our knowledge that the logic of immediacy in contemplation asks its 
practitioner to engage conventional phenomena, but the engagement must be done in the 
manner of ultimacy so that the practitioner artfully fulfills the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation without falling into the bondage or deviation of conventionality. 
C. sTon mun: A Fruitional Vehicle Within the Sutric Traditions 
In spite of the fact that gNubs chen classifies sTon mun as a causal vehicle,84 he 
As I suggested above, it is reasonable to assume that in the bSam gtan mig sgron gNubs chen's 
classification of sTon mun as a causal vehicle is a result of following the convention in Padmasambhava's 
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also clearly characterizes the simultaneous access of sTon mun as a way to directly 
access the unborn ultimate without any wavering. This direct access, as I have shown 
above, exhibits the property of Klong chen pa's definition of the fruitional vehicle that 
takes the characteristics of the fruition directly as the path, i.e., as the contemplative 
principles for the path. However, according to gNubs chen's exegesis, such a logic of 
immediacy {i.e., direct application of the characteristics of the fruition) in contemplation 
can be flawed if it is based on a doctrinal oneness that creates a conceptual separation 
between the ultimate and the conventional. Given this understanding, insofar as the idea 
of immediacy is a defining characteristic of the fruitional vehicle, it is not everything the 
fruitional vehicle is all about, for it, if misconstrued philosophically, can result in an 
incomplete cognition of reality and conceptually separate what isn't separate in actuality. 
Such a rendering can be the deeper message behind gNubs chen's classification of sTon 
mun as a causal vehicle. Yet, without contrary evidence we cannot rule out the possibility 
that he follows the convention in Padmasambhava's ITaphreng to put all sutric traditions 
in the category of the causal vehicle, as many, if not all, later Tibetan commentators have 
done. 
However, my alternative interpretation of the sTon mun simultaneity strongly 
suggests that sTon mun is a fruitional vehicle embedded within the sutric traditions, for 
its direct access is to simultaneously access the all-encompassing mind-source. This 
direct access is understood as a wholeness that embraces the two truths simultaneously in 
ITa phreng, which associates the tantric traditions with the fruitional vehicle and the non-tantric (or sutric) 
traditions with the causal vehicle. This assumption is plausible especially given the fact that gNubs chen 
was familiar with Padmasambhava's work and offered no objections to the association of the two 
categories shown in the ITa phreng. Thus, when it is clearly established in the bSam gtan mig sgron that 
sTon mun is a vehicle derived from the sutras, accordingly gNubs chen considers it a causal vehicle based 
on the convention in the ITaphreng. 
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a way they interfuse each other to establish a nondual dynamic. Given this understanding, 
the practitioner, as presented above, is instructed to engage the conventional in the 
manner of ultimacy while embodying the ultimate in conventional appearances. In this 
simultaneous embrace, conventionality or ultimacy alone can never do the job; they must 
be, and are in actuality, inseparate. Nor should they be collapsed into one, for the ultimate 
and the conventional are not mutually inclusive.85 Accordingly, they can only be 
revealed in their wholeness, and by taking this wholeness (i.e., the simultaneous presence 
of the two truths) as the path, sTon mun is readily qualified as a fruitional vehicle. 
This qualification can be further substantiated when one realizes that the sTon mun 
wholeness is not only nondual but also pregnant with infinite possibilities devoid of any 
conceptuality. As I have shown above, philosophically and contemplatively, not only is 
this indefiniteness related to the sTon mun practices of "negative paths," but it also leads 
to a logic of spontaneous presence, namely, that of one's spontaneous self-awareness. In 
the spontaneous presence of one's self-awareness, the reality of wholeness, nondual and 
indefinite, singular and plural, conventional and ultimate, is taken just as it is. Complete 
and perfect from the very beginning, the final fruition is spontaneously realized in the 
all-encompassing wholeness. In this way, without the conceptual flaw shown in gNubs 
chen's critique, my alternative wholeness characterization effectively places sTon mun, 
similar to Shenhui's sudden Chan, in the camp of the fruitional vehicle within the sutric 
traditions. 
The sTon mun wholeness that simultaneously embraces the two truths in a nondual 
dynamic also implies another nondual dynamic. That is the nondual, holistic dynamic of 
85
 The fact that the ultimate and the conventional are not mutually inclusive can be easily seen as follows: 
Since the conventional on its own has forms, whereas the ultimate is formless. Evidently, they cannot be 
mutually inclusive. 
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one's being and knowing similar to the one seen in Shenhui's sudden Chan. That is, 
similar to Shenhui's "equal learning" of samadhi and prajfid, the sTon mun wholeness 
that embraces the two truths in mutual interfusion also involves both ontological and 
epistemological aspects. Namely, in the simultaneous embrace of the two truths, as the 
conventional is engaged in the manner of ultimacy, an ontological state (or being) of 
non-reification or non-abidance is implied in "the manner of ultimacy." On the other 
hand, as ultimacy is embodied in conventional appearances, an epistemological knowing 
with one's spontaneous self-awareness or original awareness must be present to wisely 
discern all the appearances. 
Moreover, as the two truths mutually interfuse each other, the ontological being of 
non-abidance and the epistemological knowing of one's original awareness also mutually 
permeate each other so that the state of non-abidance is the presence of one's original 
awareness and vice versa. That is why Master Shinho gives the statement quoted above, 
i.e., "The so-called 'awareness' is to come to the place or state of non-abidance." As a 
result of this brief analysis, one can arguably report that the sTon mun wholeness that 
simultaneously embraces the two truths is also a wholeness, in which one's being and 
knowing are thoroughly interfusing in a dynamic of nonduality; here, being knows and 
knowing is. In this ultimate relationship of ontology and epistemology, all conventional 
appearances unfold in a unique manner of knowing, in which the spontaneous presence of 
one's original awareness is the ultimate being. 
Given the understanding that the sTon mun wholeness of the two interfusing truths 
also characterizes a nondual, holistic dynamic of being and knowing, what I have argued 
for the wholeness of Shenhui's "equal learning" is also applicable here. First, simiar to 
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Shenhui's "equal learning" of samadhi-being and prajna-knowmg, the sTon mun 
wholeness of being and knowing also integrates Klein's three types of nondualism into an 
integral whole and thereby embodies a holography of nondual relationships depicting the 
nonduality between objects, between self and others, and between one's present status 
and future ideal.86 This is mainly due to the understanding that all conceptual categories 
and reifications, oppositions and sides, are utterly dissolved in a state of nonduality under 
the mutual interfusion and permeation of the ultimate and the conventional discussed 
above. 
In addition, like Shenhui's "equal learning," the sTon mun wholeness of being and 
knowing also offers us a hermeneutic tool to explain the possibility of an artful endeavor 
for the realization of a fruitional practice. In Shenhui's case, to recapitulate succinctly, his 
"equal learning" of samadhi and prajna depicts a nondual dynamic, or offers a kind of 
"kinetic energy," with which his integration of gradual cultivation within the context of 
sudden awakening can, on the one hand, avoid the gradualist's fault of dualistic 
conceptuality with the "no-thought" of samadhi-being dissolving (or transcending) all 
conceptual reification and, on the other hand, artfully implement the logic of immediacy 
in contemplation (thus the fruitional practice) with the wise discernment of 
prajna-knowing applied to all activities. Similarly, in the sTon mun wholeness of being 
and knowing, the simultaneous embrace of the two truths avoids the limitation of 
conventionality with the ultimate being of non-abidance resonating with the pervading 
nature of all phenomena (or dharmadhatu), while artfully accomplishing the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation (thus the fruitional practice) with the spontaneous presence 
86
 See my discussion in Chapter 2, Section III.B of this dissertation. See also Klein's discussion on the 
three types of nondualism (Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen, 151-158). 
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of one's self- or original awareness embracing all conventional appearances. 
Practically, the actualized artful endeavor of the sTon mun simultaneous embrace of 
the two truths is embodied in a constant and living, or holistic, practice that pervades 
one's being and is personified in one's present awareness as it experiences the everyday 
reality in its wholeness. Similar to Shenhui's sudden Chan, this holistic practice of sTon 
mun involves no exhortations to do this or not to do that. Its practitioner spontaneously 
acts according to need and responds as spoken to. To be sure, this spontaneous practice 
implies no laxity, indifference, or the wild spontaneity of an indulgent and rationalizing 
ego. Rather, it demands a holistic and open awareness from its practitioner, and with this 
holistic and open awareness, the practitioner profoundly and subtly engages all 
conventionality without falling into the dualistic trap of conventionality. Such a delicate 
endeavor is the essence of the sTon mun simultaneous embrace of the two truths, which, 
on the one hand, qualifies sTon mun to be the same as Shenhui's sudden Chan as a 
fruitional vehicle within the sutric traditions and, on the other hand, offers an insight 
different from Shenhui's integration of suddenness and gradualness. Namely, the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation must allow conventionality for it to be practically 
implemented, but it can only allow conventionality in the context of ultimacy so that the 
dualistic implication in conventionality can be mended. 
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Chapter 5. Spontaneous Presence ad Open Awareness: 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's Presentation of 
Spontaneity as a Central Feature of Dzogchen Practice 
Tracking the traces left by the Simultaneists of sTon mun and further demonstrating 
other innovative manifestations of the idea of immediacy, Chapter 5 presents the early 
teachings of Tibetan Dzoxgchen codified by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in his bSam 
gtan mig sgron.' As the highest rung in the doxographic ladder of the bSam gtan mig 
sgron, Dzogchen, as a subject of our investigation, not only bears a historical connection 
with Chan and sTon mun as shown in the previous chapters, but also associates with them 
doctrinally, particularly in regard to the original perfection of one's mind-nature (Ch. 
xinxing 'LVfe Tib. sems nyid) and its instantaneous and spontaneous presence. Below, 
based on gNubs chen's presentation of Dzogchen teachings, let us further explore this 
doctrinal affinity and examine how gNubs chen's emphasis of spontaneity as a central 
feature of Dzogchen practice advances our understanding of the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation, in addition to Shenhui's sudden Chan and the simultaneity of sTon mun. 
Following gNubs chen's exposition, I begin the chapter investigating the main 
teachings of Dzogchen that emphasize primordial perfection (Tib. ye nas rdzogs pa) and 
spontaneous presence (Tib. Ihun gyis grub pa)? In the discussion, we will see how 
1
 Even though Samten G. Karmay has a chapter on gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes's Dzogchen teachings 
in his The Great Perfection (107-120), his presentation is different from mine at least in two aspects. First, 
his presentation is not as extensive as mine both in terms of how much he includes gNubs chen's Dzogchen 
teachings and how extensive he analyzes these teachings. Secondly, his presentation does not address our 
subject matter, the logic of immediacy in contemplation, in relation to gNubs chen's presentation of 
Dzogchen teachings. In addition to Karmay's The Great Perfection, for introductory materials on Buddhist 
and Bon Dzogchen teachings and history, see, e.g., Pettit, Mipham's Beacon of Certainty; Dalai Lama, 
Dzogchen; Wangyal, Wonders of the Natural Mind; Schmidt, The Dzogchen Primer; Tulku Thondup, The 
Practice of Dzogchen by Longchen Rabjam; van Schaik, Approaching the Great Perfection; Klein and 
Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness. 
2
 The Tibetan term Ihun gyis grub pa or Ihun grub can be rendered as spontaneous presence, spontaneous 
accomplishment, spontaneous performance, or spontaneity. I have chosen "spontaneous presence" 
primarily due to the reason that it gives a sense of natureness or suchness with the term "presence." In 
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gNubs chen' s Dzogchen teachings of primordial basis (Tib. gdod ma 'i gzhi or simply gzhi) 
and open awareness (Tib. rigpdf give rise to a nondual, holistic dynamic of being and 
knowing that is similar to the ones seen in the cases of Shenhui's sudden Chan and the 
simultaneity of sTon mun. But, with a much stronger emphasis on primordial perfection 
and spontaneous presence (than the previous cases), gNubs chen's Dzogchen depicts a 
fruitional path on which one resumes one's original Buddhahood (Tib. yang sangs rgyas) 
rather than becomes a new Buddha (Tib. sangs rgyas gsar ba). 
Based on gNubs chen's presentation of nine Dzogchen views (Tib. Ita ba), I further 
explore the various aspects of Dzogchen teachings and their insights into the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation in relation to what we have learned from the cases of Chan 
and sTon mun. Emphasizing ideas including non-referentiality, spontaneity, self-nature, 
bliss, nonduality, wholeness, and suchness, not only do these Dzogchen views provide 
important characteristics to facilitate our understanding of Dzogchen as a whole, but they 
also concur with and further extend what we learned from Shenhui's sudden Chan and 
sTon mun regarding the logic of immediacy in contemplation. Yet, unlike Shenhui's 
integration of suddenness and gradualness and the sTon mun simultaneous embrace of 
the ultimate and the conventional, gNubs chen's presentation of these Dzogchen views 
especially brings a unique aroma of simplicity and naturalness to the logic of immediacy 
in contemplation. 
Finally, as gNubs chen turns philosophical or doctrinal principles into instructions 
for contemplative practice, I conclude this chapter with gNubs chen's explication of early 
Dzogchen, reality is primordially complete and perfect; nothing needs to be accomplished or established. 
See also Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 129-130. 
3
 In the presentation, self-arisen reflexive awareness (Tib. rang byung rang rig), self-awareness (Tib. rang 
rig), and open awareness (Tib. rig pa) are treated as synonyms. 
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Dzogchen methods for letting the mind be (Tib. bio bzhag) in its natural state. In essence, 
these early Dzogchen practices, unlike their later counterparts, do not stress a fixed set of 
ritual or procedures such as how to sit or visualize the deity step by step. Instead, they 
place an unequivocal emphasis on how Dzogchen followers should act in accord (Tib. 
mthun pa 'i spyod pa) with the "ascertained principles" (Tib. thag chod pa 'i don) of 
Dzogchen in the manner of neither-grasping-nor-relinquishing at all times. In such a way, 
the contemplatives embody a Dzogchen living practice that not only takes all phenomena 
as the path to enlightenment but also actualizes the logic of immediacy in contemplation 
with the central feature of gNubs chen's Dzogchen, namely, spontaneous presence. 
I. Spontaneous Presence in Dzogchen: How It Makes a Fruitional Path Possible 
After his initial homage to the glorious Samantabhadra and a brief opening, Klong 
chen pa (1308-1364) begins his Chos dbyings mdzod {The Precious Treasure of the Basic 
Space of Phenomena), one of his seven treasuries (Tib. mdzod bdun) on Dzogchen, with 
the verse nicely translated by Richard Barron as follows: 
Within the expanse of spontaneous presence is the ground for all that 
arises. 
Empty in essence, continuous by nature, 
it has never existed as anything whatsoever, yet arises as anything at 
all. 
Within the expanse of the three kayas, although samsara and nirvana 
arise naturally, 
They do not stray from basic space—such is the blissful realm that is 
4
 In the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, Klong chen pa has been probably recognized as the most 
important codifer of its teachings. Among the two hundred and seventy some titles Klong chen pa wrote, 
the mdzod bdun or seven treasuries are considered his crowning achievement, and each of them presents 
Klong chen pa's understanding of Dzogchen teachings said to be based on his direct experience rather than 
on speculative thought. For a biography of Klong chen pa, see, e.g., Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation 
and Miracles, 109-117 and Dudjom Rinpoche, The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, Vol. I, 575-596; 
for a brief introduction of the seven treasures and his other works, see, e.g., Longchen Rabjam, Kindly Bent 
to Ease Us, Part I: Mind (translated and annotated by Herbert V. Guenther), xiii-xxv and Germano, Poetic 
Thought, the Intelligent Universe, and the Mystery of Self, 10-38. 
the true nature of phenomena.5 
After some detailed explanation, Klong chen pa then concludes this first section of his 
Chos dbyings mdzod with the following verse (again translated by Barron): 
In brief, within the ultimate womb of basic space, spacious and 
spontaneously present, 
whatever arises as the dynamic energy of its display—as samsara or 
nirvana— 
in the very moment of simply arising has never known existence as 
samsara or nirvana. 
Whatever arises in a dream due to the dynamic energy of sleep does 
not actually exist. 
There is only self-knowing awareness, the blissful place of rest, 
extending infinitely as the supremely spacious state of spontaneous 
equalness.6 
In these two poetic verses of Klong chen pa lies a succinct description of reality 
from the Dzogchen perspective. That is, all phenomena of samsara and nirvana, albeit 
without really existing as samsara and nirvana, arise spontaneously as the dynamic 
display (Tib. rtsat) of their ground (Tib. gzhi) or primordial basis (Tib. gdod ma 'i gzhi). 
This primordial basis is empty in essence (Tib. ngo bo stongpa) and continuous by nature 
(Tib. rang bzhin ma 'gags pa). It never exists as any object but arises as everything. This 
arising occurs for the direct perception (Tib. mngon sum) of one's self-awareness or 
reflexively open awareness (Tib. rang rig) that not only is the blissful place of rest (Tib. 
bde ba 'i mat) but also extends infinitely as the supreme state of spontaneous equalness 
(Tib. Ihun mnyam). 
Yet, Klong chen pa's poetic description of Dzogchen reality had long been 
recognized and written down in prose by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in his bSam 
5
 Longchen Rabjam, The Precious Treasure of the Basic Space of Phenomena (translated by Richard 
Barron), 3, 5. 
6
 Ibid., 11. 
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gtan mig sgron, which we are about to explore. The doctrinal continuity between gNubs 
chen and Klong chen pa over the time period of three centuries attests to, I think, not only 
the consistency of this particular teaching but also its centrality in the system. With this 
centrality, what gNubs chen intends with such a description of Dzogchen reality as his 
introductory outline could be to stress that this introduction both summarizes the essence 
of Dzogchen teachings and encompasses Dzogchen in its wholeness. Perhaps, in effect, 
gNubs chen attempts to tell us that the introduction is also the completion, as the path is 
also the fruition. 
A. The Ground: Primordial Basis and Open Awareness 
How can the introduction be the completion and the fruition be the path? gNubs 
chen explains that it is because everything is already in the state of great perfection (Tib. 
rdzogs chen) since the primordial beginning; that is the meaning of Atiyoga, the peak of 
all yogas, and that is also the reason why it is named Dzogchen, the Great Perfection or 
Completeness. In this natural perfection and completeness, one is liberated in one's pure 
nakedness (Tib. gcer grol), that is, to experience all phenomena, samsara and nirvana, 
within the direct perception of one's reflexively open awareness (or simply open 
awareness). As it is in Klong chen pa's poetic expression, this open awareness, for gNubs 
chen, is also the only subject to realize the "great objective" (Tib. don chen po) of 
Dzogchen. Specifically, gNubs chen begins his chapter on the teachings of Dzogchen 
with the following words. 
Now, as for demonstrating the meaning of Atiyoga, the supreme 
vehicle, the highest yoga, the mother of all conquerors, is named 
Dzogchen, i.e., the Great Perfection. If one asks why, it is because it 
teaches in detail how to realize the naked liberation, in which all the 
inconceivable phenomena exist in the state of effortless, spontaneous 
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perfection. The meaning of this state of spontaneous presence in 
essence, which is the treasure of all similar vehicles and the great 
universal ancestor, is to be experienced in direct perception by open 
awareness, but not to be placed in [conceptual] mind. [Moreover,] 
this great meaning is lucidly clear to the open awareness.7 
From the above, for gNubs chen, the open awareness that directly experiences all 
phenomena in their state of primordial perfection and that lucidly realizes the reality of 
spontaneous presence is not a conceptual mind (Tib. bio). To be specific, this open 
awareness does not "measure or examine" (Tib. gzhal ba) like that of one's own 
discriminating wisdom (Tib. rang gi so sor rtogs pa 'i shes rab) taught in the scriptures 
of tantras, authoritative statements, and quintessential instructions (Tib. rgyud lung man 
ngag gi gzhung). With respect to the necessity of this non-examination, gNubs chen 
explains that this is because all phenomena "have never molted or altered their colors" 
(Tib. spu ma brjes mdog ma bsgyur ba) from the very beginning; they are primordially 
complete and perfect. Indeed, if everything is always in the state of completion and 
perfection, how can there be any object of comprehension (Tib. gzhal bya) as it in itself 
indicates a gap between awareness and understanding? For, to comprehend or measure 
(Tib. 'jal ba) something is inherently dualistic and incomplete because a measurement is 
predicated upon (1) an objective reference (Tib. dmigs pa) or individual substance (Tib. 
ngo bo so so) and (2) a fixed line of logic (Tib. gtan tshigs) or tenet system (Tib. grub 
7
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 290.6-291.3; de nas theg pa'i mchog rnal 'byor 
gyi phul yang tog/ rgyal ba ril gyi yum a ti yo ga'i don bstan pa ni/ mtshan rdzogs pa (291) chen po zhes 
bya ste/ ci'i phyir zhe na/ bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i chos thams cad ma brtsal lhun rdzogs pa'i don/ gcer grol 
go bar bya ba'i phyir zhib tu bstan te/ de lta bu'i theg pa thams cad kyi yang mdzod spyi mes chen po 'di'i 
ngo bo lhun gyis grub* pa'i ngang nyid kyi don/ rang rig pas mngon sum khong du chud nas bio bzhag par 
byar yang med pa'i don chen po rang gi rig pa la gsal bar bya ba yang/ * the original only has lhun gyis pa'i; 
grub is added based on the context. 
8
 This implies that, for gNubs chen, the reflexively discriminating wisdom (Tib. rang gi so sor rtogs pa'i 
shes rab) is different from the wisdom of reflexively discriminating awareness (Tib. rang rig so sor rtogs 
pa 'iye shes) that is important in the later traditions of Dzogchen. 
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pa 7 mthar). While the former makes the measurement dualistic,9 the latter, according to 
Godel's theorems, makes any measurement in a closed system incomplete.10 Thus, as 
presented, the said primordial completion and perfection can only be self-arisen (Tib. 
rang byung), as the nature of ultimate awakening (Tib. sangs rgyas pa 'i rang bzhiri) in the 
sphere of the "great wholeness" (Tib. thig le chen po),n the reality of all being in its 
totality and myriad diversity. In gNubs chen's words, we have: 
If one asks how one knows it [i.e., the reality of spontaneous 
presence], in this vehicle of highest yoga, not a single phenomenon 
can be measured by one's own discriminating wisdom, as the 
scriptures of tantras, authoritative statements, and quintessential 
instructions [have taught]. If one asks why, it is because all the 
so-called phenomena have never molted or altered their colors from 
the very beginning. [Rather,] they are the self-arisen primordial 
wisdom, the nature of enlightenment in the sphere of the "great 
wholeness," with respect to which, who has seen it as an object of 
comprehension? Who has shown its logic? To what tenet system can 
one entrust it? With what can one measure [i.e., comprehend] it? All 
phenomena are non-graspable because they do not have any 
individual substance.12 
In essence, what the above two passages of gNubs chen convey is very much the 
same as what Klong chen pa articulates in the poetic verses quoted above. Succinctly put, 
it is the reality of Great Completeness, in which all phenomena, primordially in the state 
9
 While it is true that a measurement predicated upon an objective reference and a fixed line of logic is 
dualistic, thus invalid in the Dzogchen sense, it is also true that a valid meaure (Skt. pramana; Tib. tshad 
ma) is completely possible in the system of Dzogchen. The Bon Dzogchen textgTan tshigs galmdo rigpa'i 
tshad ma {Authenticity of Open Awareness) particularly addresses this subject; for a detailed study of the 
text, see Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness. 
10
 On the incompleteness of a closed logic system, see Godel's theorems of incompleteness, which are 
nicely presented, e.g., in Smith, An Introduction to Godel's Theorems. 
11
 For a discussion on the reasons why thig le is translated as "wholeness" rather than "drop" or "semen" 
commonly used in other contexts, see Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 69 (footnote 38). 
12
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 291.3-292.1; ji ltar shes par bya zhe na/ shin tu 
rnal 'byor gyi theg pa 'di la/ rgyud lung man ngag gi gzhung ltar/ dang po gzhal bya'i chos gcig la/ rang gi 
so sor rtogs pa'i shes rab kyis gzhal bar byar yang med pa ste/ de ci'i phyir zhe na/ chos so cog tu grags pa 
thams cad/ ye gdod ma nyid nas spu ma brjes mdog ma bsgyur bar rang byung gi ye shes thig le chen po'i 
klong du sangs rgyas pa'i rang bzhin la/ dngos po gzhal byar su yis mthong/ gtan tshigs su (292) yis bstan/ 
grub pa'i mtha' ci zhig chol/ 'jal byed gang gis byas te/ de dag gi ngo bo so so ba med pa'i phyir ma dmigs 
so. 
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of spontaneous perfection, arise as the dynamic display of their primordial basis and are 
only authentically experienced in the direct perception of one's open awareness. When 
understood correctly, this synoptic description of Dzogchen reality shows us the basic 
structure of Dzogchen, its base, path, and fruition (Tib. gzhi lam 'bras bu). Particularly, 
its base is the primordial basis that dynamically displays all existence, named the "great 
universal ancestor" (Tib. spyi mes chenpo), the "great wholeness," the "great being" (Tib. 
bdag nyid chen po), the "awakened mind" (Tib. byang chub kyi sems), and the 
"mind-nature" (Tib. sems nyid) in various places.13 Its path is to invoke one's innately 
open awareness which is not a dualistic measurer (Tib. 'jal byed), but the "self-arisen 
primordial wisdom" (Tib. rang byungye shes) as well as the awakening nature of one's 
primordial basis. Its fruition is to realize the spontaneous presence of all phenomena, the 
whole being of one's primordial basis, in the direct knowing of one's reflexive 
awareness. 
Yet, if one's primordial basis, being complete and perfect, cannot be an object of 
comprehension, as gNubs chen has stated, then in what way does one's reflexively open 
awareness experience the primordial basis in its direct knowing? Even though gNubs 
chen does not give a full answer to this question in the above introduction, he does imply, 
as I have explained above, that one's open awareness is not a dualistic measurer but the 
self-arisen primordial wisdom and the awakening nature of the primordial basis. In that 
way, what open awareness signifies is the innate gnosis or epistemic mechanism of one's 
primordial basis itself; the basis is not only the matrix of all being but also the knower 
that knows itself. Thus, open awareness is simply the basis's reflexivity. Accordingly, 
13
 For a more detailed discussion on the theory of primordial basis, see Karmay, The Great Perfection, 
175-190. 
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with this reflexive understanding, open awareness is indeed not a dualistic measurer with 
respect to the primordial basis. Rather, it is its own nature, like air in air or water in water 
without an iota of separation or incompatibility. In this way, one's own open awareness 
naturally experiences one's primordial basis in its direct knowing by nature, an 
'im-mediate' knowing epitomizing the reality of spontaneous presence. 
This brief analysis of the relationship between open awareness and primordial basis 
effectively puts Dzogchen in the same category of Chan and sTon mun in terms of having 
a similar holistic dynamic between being and knowing, in which being {i.e., primordial 
basis) is epistemological and knowing (i.e., open awareness) is ontological. Moreover, 
they interfuse each other with a nondual dynamic (yet they are not "collapsed" into a 
oneness). In this interfusing nondual dynamic of being and knowing, the fruition of 
realizing "the spontaneous presence of all phenomena, the whole being of one's 
primordial basis, in the direct knowing of one's open awareness" coincides with the 
manifestation of one's open awareness, for this very manifestation also reveals the 
abiding state of one's primordial basis that dynamically displays all phenomena, in both 
its totality and diversity. In this way, as I have reported above, gNubs chen's introductory 
outline not only summarizes the essence of Dzogchen teachings while encompassing 
Dzogchen in its wholeness, but also readily points out that the path of Great Perfection is 
nothing but its fruition. 
B. The Path: The Spontaneous Presence of Open Awareness 
To further expound the aforementioned fruitional path of Dzogchen that in practice 
emerges from one's own open awareness or self-arisen primordial wisdom, gNubs chen 
Sangs rgyas ye shes goes on tc say that since Dzogchen, like other Buddhist schools, 
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understands everything to be without essence or substance (Tib. ngo bo), one should not 
engage in examination or evaluation (Tib. gzhal), for it deludes one's mind through 
developing the grasping of subject and object as two distinct phenomena (Tib. 
gnyis 'dzirt).14 Even though the idea of essence-less-ness or non-substantiality is usually 
not a primary Dzogchen feature, especially considering its emphasis of primordial 
perfection and spontaneous presence, gNubs chen however uses non-substantiality as the 
reason to propose the practice of non-investigation, as shown in the previous quotation. 
Perhaps, this strategic move helps gNubs chen to emphasize the distinguishing feature of 
Dzogchen by contrasting its fruitional practice with other non-fruitional practices. So, 
playing the role of an imaginary interlocutor, he asks, "If the three realms (Tib. khams 
gsum) are investigated to understand their nature, then how could there be no object of 
comprehension (Tib. gzhal bya) in the system of Dzogchen?" To that, gNubs chen 
replies, 
[This shows] the unawareness of tathata or suchness [on the part of 
the interlocutor]. The meaning of the so-called non-abandonment and 
non-establishment is that everything is naturally clear in the state of 
spontaneous presence. [So,] when investigating the nonduality, it is 
not that there is a distinct designation {i.e., a distinct entity) that 
measures [and another that is being measured], [but that] the 
straightforward path is to arrive at the immediate state of one's own 
open awareness [measuring] anything whatsoever without thinking, 
without investigation, and without analysis. This is asserted to be the 
most superior way of measuring.15 
Above, we see, without mentioning non-substantiality, gNubs chen clearly points 
out that the Dzogchen ideas of non-abandonment (Tib. ma spangs) and non-establishment 
See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 292.1-292.5. 
15
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 293.1-293.4; de kho na nyid kyi ma rig pa ste/ 
ma spangs ma bsgrubs zhes pa'i don gyis/ thams cad lhun gyis grub pa'i ngang du gsal ba la gnyis med la 
brtags na zhes pa'i sgra yang tha dad pas 'jal ba ni ma yin te/ rang rig pas ci yang ma bsams la ma brtags 
ma dpyad pa nyid thog tu phebs pas drang po'i lam ste de ni gzhal ba dam pa 'dod do. 
240 
(Tib. ma bsgrubs) are straightforwardly derived from the spontaneous presence of tathata 
or the suchness of reality. This argument implicitly indicates that other approaches have 
missed the mark as they do not directly access this suchness. Being spontaneously perfect, 
nothing is to be either abandoned or established {i.e., grasped or reified), and similarly, 
there is no need of an investigating subject if everything has already been shown (and 
known) to be in the state of spontaneous presence. What needs to be understood is the 
nonduality of one's open awareness and its primordial basis, for open awareness knows 
primordial basis, the matrix of all being, without the need of thinking (Tib. bsams pa), 
investigation (Tib. brtagspa), or analysis (Tib. dpyadpa)}6 Thus, in Dzogchen, there is 
still knowing (or measuring), but it is not a dualistic measuring, in which an investigating 
subject or knower measures an investigated object. Rather, it is a direct knowing by 
self-nature, a reflexive knowing, which, for gNubs chen, is the most straightforward path 
{e.g., as it goes straight to the fruition) and the most superior knowing of Great Perfection 
{e.g., as it is an unmediated knowing). 
At this point, one may wonder that, no matter whether it is the straightforward path 
or the most superior knowing, how can one liberate the mind without investigation or 
analysis, as investigation has been emphasized by most other Buddhist schools such as 
the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara?17 To that, gNubs chen uncompromisingly expresses 
the Dzogchen stance of liberation by non-action (Tib. bya ba medpa), for everything is 
perfect as it already is and the bondage we investigate and analyze is only conceptually 
16
 Here, there is even a note by gNubs chen quoting the Sems bsgom rgyud (the Tantra on Mind Cultivation) 
to warn that investigation is deceptive (Tib. brtags pa 'khrul); see Ibid, 293.3. The full note reads: "The 
Sems bsgom rgyud says: Various texts have said that the Victorious One arises from non-investigation; 
investigation is deceptive (sems bsgom rgyud las/ la la ma brtags pa las rgyal ba 'byung gi brtags pa 'khrul 
zhes 'byung phyir)." 
17
 For the role of investigation or analysis in the realization of Buddhist liberation, see, e.g., Klein, 
Knowledge and Liberation. 
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imputed but actually inconceivable or non-graspable; he explains, 
It is a liberation [attained] by simply being effortless. If one asks why, 
it is because it goes beyond conceptualization and analysis, and 
bondage itself is non-graspable. The so-called liberation is only an 
appellation. Furthermore, the rDo rje sems dpa' nam mkha' che says, 
"Everything is just as such and immutable. Liberation is [only] 
liberation by non-action. Through the non-sought self-arisen 
primordial wisdom, even the path of liberation from [the idea of] 
liberation is emptied." When realizing the meaning of non-action 
according to that, one is liberated by this very non-action.18 
Undoubtedly, for Dzogchen practitioners like gNubs chen, when all existence is 
characterized to be always in the state of spontaneous perfection, neither arduous effort 
nor laxity is the answer to this spontaneity. Rather, it is to artfully allow oneself to be in 
the spontaneous presence with one's open awareness or self-arisen primordial wisdom 
that, not sought, arises effortlessly when one is completely free of conceptualization and 
analysis. However, for practitioners who have worked diligently in Buddhist practices 
such as the "Three Studies" or the "Six Perfections," one would surely think that they are 
entitled to ask how Dzogchen can demonstrate that this principle of effortless non-action 
(Tib. bya rtsol medpa or bya ba medpa) accomplishes its fruitional path. To address this 
inquiry, gNubs chen emphasizes the following three elements: (1) the necessity of 
scriptural transmission (Tib. lung) and quintessential instructions (Tib. man ngag), (2) the 
uniqueness of "negative paths" in the manifestation of the supreme direct cognizer (Tib. 
mngon sum tshadpa), and (3) the deceptive nature of conceptualization and analysis (Tib. 
rtog dpyod). 
It should be worthwhile noting that, by emphasizing the above three elements, I 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 295.1-295.5; ... grol bar byar med pa nyid kyis 
grol ba ste/ ci'i phyir zhe na/ rtog dpyod las 'das pa la beings pa nyid ma dmigs pa'i phyir tha snyad tsam 
du grol zhes bya 'o/ de yang rdo rje sems dpa' nam mkha' che las/ don rnams ji bzhin mi bskyod do/ bya ba 
med pas grol bas grol/ rang byung ye shes btsal med pas/ grol nas grol ba'i lam yang stong/ zhes gsungs te/ 
don bya ba med pas de ji lta bar rig par bya ba med pa nyid kyis grol to. 
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believe, gNubs chen also implicitly suggests that Dzogchen followers must understand 
that the artful endeavor they take to reveal their open awareness must involve some 
"skillful effort" which may include practices similar to the "preparatory or foundational 
practices" (Tib. sngon 'gro) developed by later Dzogchen traditions.19 It is because such 
"skillful effort" is needed at least initially (if not for the entire path) for them to either 
receive scriptural transmission or to apprehend quintessential instructions to even begin 
the journey towards the state of spontaneous perfection. This idea of involving "skillful 
effort" in the context of spontaneity is, in essence, similar to Shenhui's integration of 
gradualness in the context of suddenness and the sTon mun embracing or engaging the 
conventional in the manner of ultimacy; they are all meant for the followers to artfully 
actualize the logic of immediacy in contemplation but in a way with which the followers 
will not fall into the bondage or deviation of arduous effort, gradualness, or 
conventionality. Earlier we have shown how Shenhui and the Simultaneists establish their 
cases. Here, to understand how gNubs chen addresses this particular issue from the 
Dzogchen perspective, let us further delve into the contents of the above three elements 
which gNubs chen identifies to be essential for the Dzogchen path of spontaneous 
presence. 
First, regarding how to realize the Dzogchen principle of effortless non-action, 
gNubs chen unequivocally underscores the necessity of scriptural transmission and 
quintessential instructions. In the bSam gtan mig sgron, not only do we see plenty of 
evidence showing that early tantric scriptures including some Mahayoga tantras and 
quintessential instructions of various masters (partially illustrated below) are a major 
19
 For an introduction to these foundational practices, see, e.g., Patrul Rinpoche, The Words of My Perfect 
Teacher. 
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source for gNubs chen's presentation of Dzogchen teachings. But he also quotes the sPyi 
bcangs {The Universally Held)20 telling us their unique importance; he states, 
The sPyi bcangs says, "The great ocean of Secret Mantra cannot be 
understood through examples, valid logic, or knowledge of inference. 
Therefore, the vast Secret Mantra, bearing clear and powerful 
spiritual attainment but deeply inconceivable, is very difficult to 
fathom. It can only be achieved by those who have obtained 
scriptural transmission and quintessential instructions."21 
Accordingly, with the quoted passage, gNubs chen, on the one hand, classifies 
Dzogchen as part of the Secret Mantra or Mantrayana (Tib. gsang sngags), thus 
separating it from what he considers the causal vehicles of sutric traditions. On the other 
hand, he also further underlines the necessity to have valid scriptural transmission and 
quintessential instructions to practice a fruitional vehicle like Dzogchen. As a result, the 
message gNubs chen offers, I think, is that not only is the fruitional principle of effortless 
non-action or spontaneous presence in Dzogchen beyond logic and reasoning, but it also 
requires the sanction of a lama or guru.22 Arguably, what the need for this sanction may 
signify is that a fruitional vehicle like Dzogchen, being powerful yet difficult to fathom, 
must be guided and demonstrated by someone who has gone before. And, in addition to 
this guidance of a guru, its practitioners must also recognize that preparation such as 
foundational practices done in a skillful manner is a necessity for realizing the fruitional 
According to Samten G. Karmay, the sPyi bcangs is one of the 18 root texts in the Mind Series (Tib. 
sems sde) of the Dzogchen tradition (Karmay, The Great Perfection, 110). For a brief introduction of the 
three series, namely, Mind Series, Space Series (Tib. klong sde), and Esoteric Precept Series (Tib. man 
ngagsde) of the Dzogchen tradition, see Anspal, "Lost in Space: Tibetan Formulations of the rDzogs-chen 
klong-sde," 117-120, and for a more detailed discussion, see Karmay, The Great Perfection, 206-215. 
21
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 295.5-296.296.1; spyi bcangs las kyang/ gsang 
sngags rgya mtsho chen po ni/ dpe dang tshad ma gtan tshigs dang/ rjes su dpag pa'i shes rab kyis/ rtogs par 
nus pa ma yin te/ de bas gsang sngags bdag nyid che/ dngos grub rlabs chen 'phrigs pa can/ bsam yas gting 
ni dpag dka' bas/ lung dang man ngag thob pas 'grub/ ces 'byung. 
22
 gNubs chen also quotes the Sems bsgom rdo la gser zhun attributed to ManjusrTmitra, another one of the 
18 root texts in the Mind Series, to support the need of a guru for practitioners on the path. See gNubs chen 
Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 296.1-296.3. 
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vehicle or path as well. 
Following the necessity of scriptural transmission and quintessential instructions, 
gNubs chen further asserts to his audience that, in Dzogchen, what scriptural transmission 
and quintessential instructions point out is the "negative path" such as non-examination 
(Tib. gzhal du medpa), non-comprehension (Tib. rtogs par byar medpar), non-studying 
(Tib. bslab tu medpa), or non-thinking (Tib. bsam spyod medpa). These "negative paths" 
are meant to cease all conceptual activities by sympathetically resonating with the 
suchness logic of unmistaken reality (Tib. ma nor ba yang dag pa 'i gtan tshigs). In this 
way, similar to those in the cases of Chan and sTon mun, these so-called "negative paths" 
are not "negative" in the sense of trying to negate or exclude something. Rather, they try 
to directly bring forth the spontaneous nature of unmistaken reality. Here, gNubs chen 
further reasons, the deeper implication of the "negative paths" is that one cannot realize 
the meaning or state of being free from conceptualization through the use of the language 
of conceptualization, as it is the means of mental analysis or investigation.23 To do so is 
just like trying to find gold in the pebbles (Tib. bong ba); no matter how long one looks at 
them, one will not find any gold. Instead, in order to find real gold, one needs to directly 
see the gold. 
Consequently, gNubs chen concludes that on the fruitional path of Dzogchen one 
has to, from the beginning,24 rely on a direct cognizer that is in accord with the nature of 
effortless reality.25 So, in Dzogchen, the supreme direct cognizer, one's open awareness 
23
 On how Dzogchen deals specifically with issues related to mental analysis or authentication, see Klein 
and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 25-51; see also 137-165. 
24
 Even though other Buddhist vehicles also recognize the nature of effortless reality, it is understood that 
they do not aim at it from the beginning of the practice. For example, the Madhyamaka understands that, by 
the path of seeing (Tib. mthong lam), one's practice is effortless. But, before it, from the Madhyamaka 
perspective, effort is required. 
For a more detailed discussion on the theme of effortlessness in the teachings of Dzogchen, see Klein 
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or self-arisen primordial wisdom, is revealed through the practice of effortless non-action, 
for it is only through effortless non-action that the all-encompassing wholeness of 
enlightenment (Tib. byang chub) can ever be realized. Just as gNubs chen quotes the 
rNal 'byor grub pa 'i lung chen po {The Great Instructions on the Realization of Yoga) 
saying that, if everything is the quintessence (Tib. snyingpo) of enlightenment, and thus 
being everywhere, resides nowhere, then how can a wholeness of no locus be found by 
any purposeful and directionally limited effort?27 
At this point, gNubs chen acknowledges the objection of some tannic practitioner 
(Tib. sngapspa), who challenges, even if the basis of all phenomena is effortless and as 
such, a person still bound to the habit of thinking can never be like that. Therefore, even 
in understanding quintessential instructions, the conceptualization and analysis of one's 
discriminating wisdom is still essential. To that, gNubs chen replies with several counter 
examples. While these arguments must allow the "skillful effort" discussed earlier, they 
also forcefully reject the idea of making arduous effort, even the effort of making things 
nondual. In gNubs chen's words, we have, 
Having examined the dharma of dualistic things, the very action of 
making them nondual is dualistic. If one asks why, it is because [as 
long as] the making of nonduality exists, duality will arise.28 
With respect to the spontaneous presence of one's open awareness, any intentional 
action is dualistic, for the very thought of "intentional making" involves a grasping 
and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 119-136. 
This tantric text is also named, sPyi mdo dgongs 'dus (The Great Condensed Meaning), which is 
considered a fundamental scripture in Anuyoga Tantra. 
27
 This paragraph is written based on the material in gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 
296.1-297.2. 
28
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 299.3-299.4; dngos po gnyis pa'i chos gzhal nas 
gnyis med du byas pa nyid gnyis pa'o/ de ci'i phyir zhe na/ gnyis med bya ba yod pas/ gnyis pa 
yang 'byung ngo. 
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(Tib. 'dzinpa) that falsely divides reality into the subject that grasps and the object that is 
grasped. Here, only some artful endeavor that is delicately performed in accord with the 
principle of effortlessness is allowed, for effortlessness or spontaneity is the characteristic 
of reality. Accordingly, in a style similar to a Chan gongan fe^ or koan, gNubs chen 
advises his audience that as long as there is one, there will be another one;29 that is, as 
long as there is even an iota of conceptualization and analysis, there will be some other 
more. In this way, gNubs chen strongly warns his audience that conceptualization and 
analysis are really delusional or deceptive (Tib. 'khrul bd), and, in effect, prevent one 
from ever seeing the reality of spontaneous presence. Because of that, a great person (Tib. 
mi chen po), who walks on the fruitional path of Great Perfection with open awareness, 
will not practice in such a manner.30 
C. The Fruition: The Resumption of Original Buddhahood 
Succinctly but sufficiently, the above exposition has attempted to delineate the 
fruitional path of Dzogchen that is rooted in the spontaneous perfection of all phenomena. 
Such a fruitional path asks its practitioner to "nakedly" present, or more precisely, be, 
him/herself in the perfection with one's open awareness revealed through the "negative 
paths" such as the practice of effortless non-action. In a way, this exposition is enough to 
illustrate the basic outline of Dzogchen. However, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes 
further plays the role of an imaginary interlocutor asking for more clarification. Thus, he 
asks, "If these [conceptualizations and analyses] are all mistaken, what is the correct 
Ibid, 302.1. gcig yod na gcig yodpa. 
See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 303.4-304.6. 
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principle really like?"31 Regarding that, gNubs chen once again emphasizes the 
spontaneous presence of everything that requires no designations or labels; he writes in 
response, 
From the beginning there is not [even] the designation of nonduality. 
As there is just a spontaneous rest in effortlessness, there is not even 
an imputed label for effortlessness. From the very beginning there is 
not the name of spontaneous presence. In the original state of 
rDzog-pa-chen-po [i.e., Great Perfection] there does not exist the 
mental label of Great Perfection. From the very beginning self-arisen 
primordial wisdom has not ever been labeled as self-arisen primordial 
wisdom whatsoever.32 
By emphasizing that everything is just as it is in the state of spontaneous perfection 
without any conceptual designation or labeling, gNubs chen clearly indicates that from 
the beginning of the path, mental conceptualization and investigation have no place, not 
to mention that, as all other Buddhist schools agree, there are no such conceptual 
activities in the final fruition. The correct principle is just as it is; it is in the spontaneous 
perfection of all things from the very beginning. Having known this, don't conceptualize 
it or try to grasp it via designations. Such is the delicacy of the artful endeavor Dzogchen 
followers must realize, for any bit of grasping or reification will separate one from the 
original state of Great Perfection. Here, one has to be brave enough and artful enough to 
simply assume this original perfection of oneself so that one's primordial wisdom will 
then self-arise and effortlessly take its course in the inexpressible (Tib. brjod du med) 
suchness of living reality. 
With respect to this living reality or the realm of phenomenal reality (Tib. chos kyi 
31
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 304.6-305.1; de dag 'khrul na don ma nor ba de 
nyid ji lta ba yin ce na. 
32
 Ibid, 305.1-305.4; ... ye gnyis su med pa'i tha snyad med pa/ ngang gis brtsal ba dang bral zin pa la rtsal 
ba bral bar yang sgro gdags su med pa/ gdod nas lhun gyis grub pa'i ming med pa/ ye nyid rdzogs pa chen 
po la rdzogs pa chen po'i bio gdags bral ba/ gdod nas rang byung gi ye shes rang byung gi ye shes su'ang 
gdags su med pa. 
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dbyings) that is inexpressible and beyond words, gNubs chen farther points out that just 
as neither oneself nor others exist primordially, Dzogchen followers, from the beginning, 
take the principle, "there is neither object to be known (Tib. shes bya) nor subject as the 
knower (Tib. zhes byed)," as the path. Given this fruitional path, it is not seeing the 
inherent nature of everything that is called 'seeing the truth of the authentic meaning' 
(Tib. yang dag pa7 don gyi bden pa mthong) with one's open awareness, for nothing 
possesses inherent nature to begin with. In this seeing of "no seeing" (Tib. ma mthong) 
gNubs chen tells us, nothing is left unseen. Yet, what is this seeing of no seeing with 
one's open awareness? gNubs chen quotes the rNal 'byor grubpa'i lung chenpo again to 
clarify: 
Whatever visual forms are seen have no inherent nature. This "no 
seeing" is ascertained to be the [true] seeing itself. Thus, one 
experiences in actuality the inexpressible open awareness and the 
"attainment" of seeing is merely a designation; ... the appearances of 
seeing and no seeing have no inherent nature. That which embraces 
all is the profound and hidden intention and action. When one's 
self-arisen open awareness directly manifests, it is called the very 
seeing of self-arisen primordial wisdom.33 
So, essentially, gNubs chen's seeing of no seeing, in sutric terms, is to see {i.e., to realize 
non-conceptually and in a vibrantly experiential manner) that everything is devoid of 
inherent nature (Tib. rdzas rnyed medpa). Yet, this realization is only a gate-way to let 
one's inexpressible open awareness, which embraces and suffuses all but reifies nothing, 
to directly manifest. It is this direct manifestation that is called true seeing in Dzogchen. 
Here, we surely see something very much reminiscent of Shenhui's "no-thought" and the 
"negative paths" of sTon mun discussed in the previous chapters. 
Ibid, 308.1-310.4; gzugs snang gang mthong rdzas rnyed med/ ma mthong de mthong nyid nges pas/ 
brjod med rang rig nyams rnyed la/ mthong rnyed tha snyad tsam du 'byung/ ... [310.3] mthong dang ma 
mthong snang la rang bzhin med/ kun 'dus gsang ba'i dgongs spyod zab mo ni/ rang byung rang rig mngon 
sum snang dus na/ rang byung ye shes de nyid mthong zhes bya. 
249 
The above true seeing of Dzogchen, gNubs chen warns however, should not be done 
intentionally; he explains, 
When connected with these principles, if the seeing is done 
intentionally, it then deviates from both the tantras and the 
authoritative scriptures. For, it has the fault of not understanding its 
very own nature. So, in this great system [of Dzogchen], seeing the 
meaning is not done intentionally. Everything is due to the great 
being. Though not sought, it is the supreme eye that self-illuminates 
itself without being seen. This meaning is ultimately expressed as the 
sole intention of the Majestic Ones.34 
Thus, in Dzogchen practice, one's own spontaneous presence is not only the fruition but 
also the means of its own illumination. This is one's own self-radiance. Even one iota of 
intentionality is incompatible with this spontaneity, including the intention of trying to 
see the ultimate truth. As gNubs chen himself has insightfully pointed out before, as long 
as there is one (i.e., some trace of intention, no matter how little it is), there will be 
another one (i.e., more intention to arise). 
As a vehicle of effortless non-action, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes explains to 
his audience, Dzogchen is the antidote to making effort or exertion (Tib. rtsol ba) that, by 
definition, involves intention. With its spontaneous presence, Dzogchen is really the 
mother who gives birth to all Buddhas. This firm conviction even allows him to write, 
"Whatever method or path one takes, without realizing this [teaching of Great Perfection], 
one will not attain Buddhahood."35 All lower vehicles up to Anuyoga, he emphatically 
states, do not see the meaning of suchness, because they are unable to be free from 
making effort. With this remark, gNubs chen not only informs us how deeply we are 
Ibid, 310.4-311.1; don de dag dang sbyar na/ mthong ba ched du byed na/ rgyud lung gnyis su gol de/ 
bdag nyid du ma shes pa'i skyon yod pas chos lugs chen po 'dir don mthong ba ched du byar med pa nyid 
kyi phyir/ thams cad bdag nyid chen po pas/ ma btsal yang mthong ba med par rang gsal ba nyid spyan gyi 
mchog yin pas/ don de ni rgyal ba'i dgongs pa mngon du phyung ba kho na'o. 
35
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 312.3-312.4; thabs dang lam gang nas bsgrubs 
kyang/ 'di ma rtogs par sangs mi rgya. 
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entangled in the idea of contrived effort, but also, by contrast, shows that how subtle the 
principle of effortless non-action can be. 
Consequently, gNubs chen urges his audience to recognize the fault of contrived 
effort and closely follow the effortless principle. He thus explains metaphorically that the 
effect of making effort is like that of a disturbance that makes an ocean muddy and rough 
with waves. Just as the way to restore the original tranquility of the ocean is to let go of 
the disturbance, the way to re-assume one's original perfection is to stop making exertion 
and find recourse in the practice of effortless non-action. Accordingly, gNubs chen 
proclaims that the original Buddha (Tib. phyi mo 'i sangs rgyas) manifests only in the 
spontaneous presence of non-seeking (Tib. ma btsal ba), a synonym of effortless 
non-action.36 And, this spontaneous non-seeking arises from the primordial basis, the 
awakened mind. So, he cites the rMad du byung ba to tell us: 
Even Vajrasattva himself re-assumes his Buddhahood on the vajra 
seat through the miraculous awakened mind.37 
Being the primordial basis, our awakened minds inform, or in-spirit, us that we are 
original Buddhas. On the fruitional path of Dzogchen, we re-assume our original 
Buddhahood (Tib. yang sangs rgyas) rather than become new Buddhas (Tib. sangs rgyas 
gsar ba). With the support of the scriptures gNubs chen declares that this is the only path 
to Buddhahood. He quotes the rMad du byung ba again telling us, 
... There is no other beneficial medicine [than the awakened mind]. 
When realizing the meaning of awakened mind, there will be no 
cause for the phenomenon of cyclic existence. Then, immediately, all 
will attain awakening.38 
36
 See Ibid, 312.5-313.2. 
37
 Ibid, 313.4-313.5; rmad du byung ba las/ rmad byung byang chub sems 'di yis/ rdo rje sems dpa' bdag 
nyid kyang/ rdo rje gtan la yang sangs rgyas/ zhes 'byung. 
38
 Ibid, 314.5-314.6; phan pa'i sman ni gzhan med de/ byang chub sems kyi don rig na/ 'khor ba'i chos ni 
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But, to attain this immediate awakening, gNubs chen advises, sentient beings must 
escape the "dungeon of making efforts" (Tib. rtsol grub kyi khri muri). Otherwise, they 
will not have the opportunity to "dry up the ocean of samsara" (Tib. 'khor ba 'i rgya 
mtsho bskams pa), not to mention to rejoice in nirvanic bliss. On the fruitional path of 
Dzogchen, all practitioners must give up adventitious efforts and take refuge in their own 
original perfection that only comes forth when one does not create something that needs 
no creation (Tib. ma bkodpar bkodpa). In the direct perception of one's open awareness, 
one embraces the whole that has no beginning or end. After all, a fruitional path like 
Dzogchen, I believe, is telling its practitioner to recognize that the journey to home is that 
no matter where one is, one is always home; it is a distance-less journey, what Anne C. 
Klein and Geshe Tenzin Wangyal Rinpoche have poetically called, "a dynamic 
stillness,"39 which, I would say, also vividly captures in essence the Dzogchen logic of 
immediacy in contemplation I have attempted to extract from gNubs chen's introductory 
as well as synoptic teachings of Dzogchen presented above. 
II. The Various Principles of Dzogchen 
After the above introductory exposition illustrating the spontaneously perfect reality 
rgyu med de/ myur dub yang chub kun gyis thob. 
39
 In their Unbounded Wholeness, on the logic of a fruitional path like Dzogchen, Anne C. Klein and 
Geshe Tenzin Wangyal Rinpoche insightfully write, "Dzogchen often states that the path is the goal and 
that both are reality. The goal, being self-authenticating, bestows this authenticity also on what is 
designated as 'path.' The practitioner, after all, is only on the path in the sense that she is already in full 
possession of the goal she erroneously feels the need to seek. Although this is not necessarily impeccable 
logic, it is a convincing and galvanizing metaphor. In other words, it is religiously affective language, 
strengthened by reasoned statements without being utterly beholden to them: 
The basis of both Buddhas and sentient beings is the great self-arisen primordial 
wisdom, enlightenment mind; therefore, sentient beings are the cause of Buddhas 
and Buddhas are the cause of sentient beings. Hence one speaks of 'the Buddha 
wherein cause and effect are of one taste.' 
Thus, cause and effect, sentient beings and Buddhas, subjects and objects, path and goal are ultimately 
revealed to be of one taste: Movement from one to the other is no movement at all, really, but a dynamic 
stillness." (Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 48). 
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of Dzogchen and its fruitional path, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes goes on in the bSam 
gtan mig sgron to further present nine different teachings, or more precisely views (Tib. 
Ita ba), propounded by both Indian and Tibetan masters. Categorically different from the 
nine vehicles (Tib. thegpa rim pa dgu) in the Nyingma doxography briefly discussed in 
Chapter 3, these nine views represent the different aspects of the highest vehicle, 
Dzogchen, in the doxography. Just as gNubs chen has stated, there is not even an iota 
more than one Dzogchen reality, but, due to the different capacities of ordinary people 
and the different skillful means of the teachers, these different views illustrate the 
dynamic display (Tib. rtsal) of the primordial basis. Be that as it may, they all reveal the 
same essence (Tib. ngo bo 'dra bd). In gNubs chen's words, it is said, 
Generally speaking, there is just simply one. However, it [i.e., that 
one] is beyond ordinary thinking. At times, there have been different 
approaches and expositions given by different spiritual teachers, 
some of which are shown here. With respect to these different 
perspectives, whatever systems they teach, they are of the same 
40 
essence. 
Particularly, the principles expressed by the nine perspectives or views are: (1) the 
view that takes "non-referentiality" (Tib. gza'gtaddang bral bd) as the main principle, (2) 
the view that takes "spontaneous presence" (Tib. Ihun gyis grub pa) as the main principle, 
(3) the view that takes "great being" (Tib. bdag nyid chen po) as the main principle, (4) 
the view that takes "self-arisen primordial wisdom" (Tib. rang byung gi ye shes) as the 
main principle, (5) the view that takes "effortless non-action" (Tib. bya btsal dang bral bd) 
as the main principle, (6) the view that takes "great bliss" (Tib. bde ba chen po) as the 
main principle, (7) the view that takes "nonduality" (Tib. gnyis su medpa) as the main 
40
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 315.1-315.5; de ni spyir gcig las kyang med/ 
bsam las kyang 'das na/ re zhig dge ba'i bshes gnyen gyi bzhed gzhung 'ga' 'dir bstan te/ lugs mi mthun pa 
ni/ ji skad bstan kyang ngo bo 'dra ba la. 
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principle, (8) the view that takes "great wholeness" (Tib. thig le chen po) as the main 
principle, and (9) the view that takes "the-basis-of-all-existence-just-as-it-is" (Tib. chos 
thams cad gzhiji bzhinpaf1 as the main principle. 
As it is neither my intention nor a practically feasible task to present these nine 
teachings in detail in the remaining pages of the chapter, I will however follow gNubs 
chen's presentation as closely as possible to give a summary of each teaching. These 
summaries are intended not only to enhance our earlier discussion that highlights the 
spontaneity and fruitional path of Dzogchen reality but also to offer us other important 
characteristics of Dzogchen so as to facilitate our understanding of Dzogchen as a whole. 
In the process, it is also hoped that with the contribution from the Dzogchen teachings of 
non-conceptuality, spontaneous presence, self-arisen primordial wisdom, effortlessness, 
nonduality, and wholeness, we will come to a deeper and fuller understanding of the logic 
of immediacy in contemplation, in addition to what we have learned from the teachings 
of Chan and sTon mun. 
A. The View That Takes Non-Referentiality as Principle 
This first view, according to a note in the bSam gtan mig sgron, is taught by 
Vimalamitra and O rgyan Maharatsa (or Maharaja of Oddiyana). We don't know much 
about O rgyan Maharatsa,42 but Vimalamitra has been positively recognized, along with 
Padmasambhava and Vairocana, as one of the first three masters who brought the 
41
 This view is first named "the view of the great naturalness that transcends all extremes" (Tib. mtha' ril 
ma spangs bral ba 'i rang lugs chen por Ita ba; gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 
316.2-316.3), but in the main body where it is explained, gNubs chen calls it "the view as "the-basis-of-
all-existence-just-as-it-is" (Tib. chos thams cad gzhiji bzhin par Ita ba; gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, 
bSam gtan mig sgron, 375.5-375.6). 
His name is found among the early masters holding the lineages of Atiyoga transmissions. See e.g., 
Karmay, The Great Perfection, 19-21. 
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teachings of Dzogchen to Tibet in the end of the 8 century. Essentially, this Dzogchen 
view emphasizes the non-intentional or non-conceptual nature of reality, for the reality is 
primordially devoid of any referentiality or reference points (Tib. gza' gtad). Specifically, 
gNubs chen succinctly explains the view with the following words: 
The unmistaken meaning is: Buddhas, sentient beings, samsara, and 
nirvana all are just designations. [Their] essences appear to be in 
diversity but do not abide. The entire domain of experience of 
self-arisen primordial wisdom is free of [the need for] purification 
due to its very nature. It is not to make awakening an aim, as to find it 
at the outside, or to make the realization of the meaning a fixed 
concept, as to desire it in the activity of [intellectual] elucidation. 
How can this one [Dzogchen] nature have any fixed reference points? 
It is not that this [Dzogchen principle] arises by removing fixed 
reference points. From the very beginning, there have never been any 
reference points, not even their designated names. Rather, this very 
meaning itself is just one's [great] being. [However,] it is not to be 
sought intentionally. It is like the sun would not seek the light of the 
firebug.44 
Here, three points should be worth of recapitulating to facilitate our understanding 
of the above densely packed passage. First, even though things have different names and 
appear to be in diversity, their essences (Tib. ngo bo) are, in fact, non-abiding, and due to 
this non-abiding nature, nothing is fixed. Therefore, from the very beginning of the path, 
Dzogchen practitioners should not conceptually fixate upon anything. This contemplative 
idea of non-fixation, evidently similar to the Chan and sTon mun ideas of non-reification 
(Ch. wusuode MP/ff#; Tib. dmigs su medpa) and non-abidance (Ch. wuzhu Mfi; Tib. 
For an account of Vimalamitra's life story, see e.g., Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles, 
68-73. For the role Vimalamitra may have played in the early history of Nyingma transmissions, see, e.g., 
Germano, "The Seven Descents and the Early History of Rnying Ma Transmissions," 241-248. 
44
 gNubs chen Sangsrgyas ye shes, bSamgtan migsgron, 316.4-317.3; don ma nor ba ni/ sangs rgyas sems 
can 'khor ba dang mya ngan las 'das pa ril kyang tha snyad kyi bla dvags stam ste/ngo bo sna tshogs snang 
la gnas pa med pa/ rang byung ba'i ye shes kyi spyod yul thams cad ngang nyid kyis ma bsal bral ba la/ 
byang chub logs shig nas gnyer bar bya ba'i bza' ba dang/ don rig pas gsal byar 'dod pa'i gza' ba'ang med 
pas/ gcig gi rang bzhin la dmigs gtad ga la yod de med do/ 'di ni gza' gtad gsal ba las byung ba ma yin te/ 
ye nyid gza' gtad med de zhes bya ba'i ming tsam du yang bsnyad du med pa la don de nyid kyang bdag 
yin pas/ ched du gnyer du med de/ dper na nyi mas srin bu'i 'od mi tshol ba dang 'dra'o. See also Karmay, 
The Great Perfection, 113. 
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gnas medpa), is the basic Dzogchen meaning of non-referentiality, whose Tibetan gza' 
gtad dang bral ba could also be rendered as "free from all conceptions," "free from 
reference points," or "free from conceptual fixation." 
Yet, why is the reality free from all conceptions? Does one realize this reality by 
removing all conceptual reference points? Vimalamitra and Maharaja, gNubs chen tells 
us, teach that because it is the nature of reality itself, there have been no conceptual 
reference points from the very beginning. gNubs chen characterizes this reality as "the 
entire domain of experience of self-arisen primordial wisdom" (Tib. rang byung ba 7 ye 
shes kyi spyod yul thams cad) that is undefiled due to its very nature (Tib. ngang nyid 
kyis). Hence, the reality needs no purification; it is originally perfect. And, in this way, 
the idea of "non-referentiality" or "free from conceptual fixation" is actually a synonym 
of spontaneous perfection (Tib. Ihun rdzogs) or spontaneous presence (Tib. Ihun gyis 
grub pa). Given this Dzogchen understanding that integrates non-referentiality (or non-
conceptuality) with spontaneity, not only do we come to better appreciate gNubs chen's 
characterization of Dzogchen as a vehicle of spontaneous non-conceptuality (Tib. Ihun 
gyis grub pa 'i mi rtogpa), but, I would argue, it also gives us a vantage point to see how 
the idea of immediacy is spontaneous in terms devoid of any referentiality. In other 
words, one does not intentionally aim for anything, but must simply be without any 
reference to limit the openness of one's being. 
Yet, the idea of "without reference" does not mean without guidance. The intention 
is that, if the nature of reality is free from conceptual fixation, the practitioner then cannot 
make the fruition of awakening an intentional aim of his/her spiritual cultivation, for the 
idea of aiming, no matter if it is gradual, sudden, or nondual, always involves fixation. 
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Accordingly, the fruition must be neither something to be sought intentionally nor a fixed 
concept to be intellectually understood. Rather, it is realized through an artful endeavor 
predicated on the original perfection of oneself, the fruition itself, that manifests in the 
spontaneous presence of one's self-arisen primordial wisdom. Given this idea of original 
perfection that is like the sun, as gNubs chen characterizes, why would anyone then need 
to seek other sources of light, for compared to the sun other sources are nothing more 
than lightning bugs? 
To further expound the practice of non-referentiality,45 gNubs chen cites scriptures, 
emphasizing that for one to thoroughly understand the meaning of non-referentiality, one 
deeply delves into the idea of effortlessness, through the power of which one liberates 
oneself from the domain of objective or conceptual experience. This self-liberation comes 
from the fact that in reality everything is subsumed in the awakened mind. With this 
awakened, or more precisely awake, nature, how can there be any reference points for 
conceptual fixation? If one does not see this non-conceptualization and tries to realize 
awakening via fixation, it is like the blind looking for darkness, unable to see that the 
fruition is just oneself, or like a wild animal chasing after a mirage, unable to realize that 
the chase will bring nothing but exhaustion. In this way, one must understand that there is 
no awakening in the desire for awakening; similarly, there is no immediacy in the desire 
for immediacy, because any fixation is delusional and deceptive.46 Thus, similar to the 
Chan/sTon mun practices of non-reification and non-abidance, the practice of effortless 
non-fixation is how the Dzogchen principle of non-referentiality, in essence, embodies 
45
 The paragraph is written based on the material presented in gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan 
migsgron, 317.3-320.1. 
46
 So, the Victorious Samantabhadra has taught, "The natural, uncontrived awakened mind itself has no 
meditation in connection with conceptual fixation." (ji bzhin ma bcos byang chub sems nyid la/ gza' gtad 
bcas nas bsgom du med pa ni; gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 319.5-319.6). 
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the logic of immediacy in contemplation. 
B. The View That Takes Spontaneous Presence as Principle 
The second Dzogchen view gNubs chen introduces in the bSam gtan mig sgron is 
taught by dGa' rab rdo rje, who, according to the Nyingma tradition, received Dzogchen 
teachings from Vajrasattva and Vajrapani in person and became the first human 
awareness- or knowledge-holder (Skt. vidyadhara; Tib. rig 'dziri) in the lineage. Based 
on gNubs chen's report, synoptically, dGa' rab rdo rje teaches that the nature of reality, 
including all beings, is the state of enlightenment (Tib. sangs rgyas) itself, and one 
simply manifests in spontaneous presence to realize it. gNubs chen characterizes the 
teachings with the following words: 
The unmistaken meaning is: The nature of the entire domain of 
experience, from [that of] Buddhas to [that of] sentient beings, is the 
state of enlightenment itself, which is the all-inclusive nature of the 
great state, the spontaneously perfect nature of things [i.e., dharmata], 
that has neither beginning nor end. If someone asks what the defining 
characteristic of this is, metaphorically, it is like the precious 
wish-fulfilling jewel, in which ... whatever exists, when examined 
and shown, is difficult to speak of, but appears as whatever one needs 
and desires.48 
To further explain the "wish-fulfilling jewel" of spontaneous presence, gNubs chen, 
after citing a few scriptural quotations, adds the following characterization; he writes, 
Even though the meaning of this [great] state cannot be defined, 
everything is pervaded by it but without being enslaved. It is difficult 
For a biography of dGa' rab rdo rje (Prahevajra in Sanskrit), see Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation 
and Miracles, 55-58. 
48
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 320.1-320.6; don ma nor ba ni/ sangs rgyas 
dang/ sems can dang/ de'i spyod yul ril gyi rang bzhin nyid ni*/ yong ye gdod ma med pa nas tha ma med 
par lhun gyis grub pa'i chos nyid ngang chen po'i rang bzhin du lhag ma med par sangs rgyas so/ de'i 
mtshan nyid ci 'dra zhe na/ dpe yid bzhin gyi nor bur in po che la ... (320.5) so so na yod ces brtag cing 
bstan pa'ang/ smra bar yang dka' na/ dgos 'dod cir yang snang ngo. * The original has ni ngo bo nyid ni, 
which, from the context, is redundant and thus edited to be nyid ni. See also Karmay, The Great Perfection, 
114. 
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to touch it with an ordinary mind, but whatever things co-arise are, in 
fact, not one. For this reason, it is called "the [great] state of 
, i49 
spontaneous presence. 
Accordingly, in this teaching, due to its own nature, whatever exists in reality, even 
though being inexpressible, manifests itself continuously with the great blessing that is 
the state of spontaneous presence. This state pervades everything but does not "enslave" 
anything by fixing them into a monistic unity. They still enjoy diversity in the great state 
of spontaneous presence. As it is said, they appear "as whatever one needs and desires," 
but sentient beings who operate with ordinary minds (Tib. bid) will not be able to 
understand it. 
So how does one understand this Dzogchen principle of spontaneous presence? dGa' 
rab rdo rje, according to gNubs chen, teaches us to realize this principle using "the 
method of non-realization" (Tib. rtogs par byar med pa 'i tshut) or "the method of no 
awareness" (Tib. rig pa med pa 'i tshut), for reality is just as such from the beginning.50 
Similar to those in Chan and sTon mun, these "negative paths" should not be taken as 
trying to negate or exclude something. Rather, they are to contemplatively lead the 
practitioner to directly and artfully tap into the reality of spontaneous presence by letting 
go of the urge or compulsion to realize (Tib. rtogs pa) or cognize (Tib. rig pa) such a 
spontaneous reality. In the spirit of spontaneity, when there is not even a single shred of 
urge or compulsion, what is left is just the display of natural dynamics in their complete 
openness and unmediated immediacy. That, I think, is fundamentally the way in which 
the aroma of spontaneous presence tinges the logic of immediacy in contemplation. 
49
 Ibid, 323.1-323.2; ngang gi don ni mtshan nyid kyang bstan du med pa/ thams cad kyang ma bkol bar 
khyas pa'o/ bio reg dka' ba/ gang dang yang lhan mi gcig pa'o/ de'i phyir lhun gyis grub pa'i ngang zhes 
bla dags su brjod do. 
50
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 326.2-326.4. 
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To further bring to light the unquestioned necessity of spontaneous presence, gNubs 
chen plays the role of an interlocutor, challenging, "Even if the [primordial] basis is like 
that [i.e., in the great state of spontaneous presence], there are no benefits [if one 
practices like that and does not learn other skillful means.] The skillful means of 
performing practices have wholesome instructions which can be taken as a supporting 
object."51 To that, gNubs chen unequivocally states that the instructions given as a 
grasping support (Tib. dmigs 'dzin gyi man ngag) deviate from the intent (Tib. re ba) or 
message of spontaneous presence, because from the very beginning there is only the great 
method of spontaneous presence, with respect to which practices that strive for fruition 
are not considered great.52 Here, one may get the impression that gNubs chen does leave 
some room for other practices, even though they may not be "great methods" (Tib. thabs 
chen). But one may also be dumbfounded by how he adamantly underscores the idea of 
spontaneous presence and how this great state is intricately nuanced, especially when one 
contrasts it with the necessity of some "skillful effort" for the practitioner to take the path. 
Nonetheless, in conforming to gNubs chen's spontaneous teaching, this "skillful effort" 
should not be taken as a grasping support or effort to strive for fruition but simply as 
something artfully employed within the context of spontaneous presence. 
C. The View That Takes Great Being as Principle 
According to the bSam gtan mig sgron, this third view, which takes great nature or 
being (Tib. bdag nyid chen po) as the principle, is taught by Vairocana, who has been 
known as a great lo-tsa-ba (translator), one of Padmasambhava's twenty-five prominent 
51
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 328.1; de ltar yin yang gzhi la thai bas phan med 
de/ nyams su blangs pa'i thabs dmigs pa'i man ngag bde po yod. 
52
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 328.2-328.4. 
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disciples, and one of the first three masters introducing Dzogchen to Tibet. Concerning 
this Vairocana's teaching, gNubs chen succinctly states: 
If one asks its unmistaken meaning, it is: All phenomena, without 
exception, that comprise oneself and others and all those that appear 
as "I" and "mine" are neither altered nor corrupted. From the very 
beginning, they are naturally clear to the nature of one's open 
awareness, the non-abiding primordial wisdom. This is designated as 
"great being." However, one is not to be hindered by this designation, 
for one is to go beyond the designation that is expressed in words and 
letters.54 
Thus, being unaltered and uncorrupted, all things from the very beginning are just as 
they are, i.e., spontaneously present in their original perfection. This spontaneous 
presence is just the self-manifestation of oneself. As such, all phenomena, gNubs chen 
characterizes, is "naturally clear to the nature of one's open awareness, the non-abiding 
primordial wisdom." This self-appearing and self-clear reality is called the great being of 
oneself. In the realm of this great being, all other phenomena simply subside without 
being employed (Tib. ma bkol ba). So, gNubs chen cites the sPyi beings to further 
support this idea: "There is the self. There are no others. There is [just] the great being of 
oneself in spontaneous presence. In the realm of All Good Samantabhadra, there is the 
singular but no others."55 As a result, one abandons the fixation on the appearances of 
self and others, for the great I that is without the I (Tib. nga medpa 'i nga chenpo) is the 
For a biography of Vairocana, see e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection, 17-37 and Tulku Thondup, 
Masters of Meditation and Miracles, 102-105. For the role Vairocana may have played in the early history 
of Nyingma transmissions, see, e.g., Germano, "The Seven Descents and the Early History of Rnying Ma 
Transmissions," 238-241. 
54
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam glan mig sgron, 328.6-329.3; don ma nor ba ni gang zhe na/ bdag 
dang gzhan gyis bsdus pa'i chos ma lus pa dang/ bdag dang bdag tu snang ba thams cad/ ma bsgyur ma slad 
par ye nas rang rig pa mi gnas pa'i ye shes kyi bdag nyid du rang gsal ba la bdag nyid chen po zhes bya ba'i 
tha snyad kyis kyang mi thogs te/ yi tshig dang yi ges brjod pa'i tha snyad las 'das so. See also Karmay, 
The Great Perfection, 114. 
55
 Ibid, 329.5-329.6; bdag ni yod do/ gzhan ni med do/ bdag nyid* chen po lhun gyis grub pas yod do/ kun 
tu bzang po'i ngang du gcig pas gzhan med. * The original has gzhan, which means others. But from the 
context, I have changed it to nyid to make the teaching coherent. 
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great being in its spontaneous presence beyond all appearances, words and letters. 
In addition, according to gNubs chen, Vairocana teaches that it is not that there are 
first others and then they are subsumed into the great being of oneself. Simply, there is 
only the great being to begin with.56 Thus, in this perspective of Dzogchen teachings, the 
path and fruition (Tib. lam dang 'bras bu) are no different from the primordial wisdom 
that is the nature of the great being.57 In this great being, not only is there no I, for this 
"I" is the tomb (Tib. duf) of all Buddhas,58 but there should not be any intention of 
making effort to attain Buddhahood, either, for Buddha is just oneself (Tib. sangs rgyas 
bdagyin pa). If one wishes (Tib. re ba) it from others, there will never be the time of 
achievement (Tib. rnyedpa).59 In this way, similar to the Chan/sTon mun idea of directly 
seeing into one's nature, the Vairocana teaching of seeking from no others but directly in 
one's own great being informs us of another practical mechanism about how the logic of 
immediacy works in contemplation. 
D. The View That Takes Self-Arisen Primordial Wisdom as Principle 
This fourth view, which takes self-arisen primordial wisdom (Tib. rang byunggiye 
shes) as the principle of Dzogchen, is taught by a relatively obscure master, dGe slong 
ma (Bhiksun!) Kun dga' ma, the only female among the early Dzogchen teachers gNubs 
chen Sangs rgyas ye shes introduces.60 According to gNubs chen, she teaches. 
The approach, which is the view of self-arisen primordial wisdom, is 
that all phenomena that arise and perish, from the very beginning, are 
[in] the state of enlightenment. While this state of enlightenment is 
56
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 331.2. 
57
 See Ibid, 331.5. 
58
 See Ibid, 332.5. 
59
 See Ibid, 339.5. 
60
 Her name is indeed found among the early masters holding the lineages of Atiyoga transmissions. See 
e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection, 19-21. 
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the essence of self-arisen primordial wisdom intrinsically free from 
causes and conditions, all the phenomena are inherently lucid to the 
great [self-arisen] primordial wisdom like the light of the sky without 
outside or inside.61 
So, in this particular view, the main principle is one's self-arisen primordial wisdom 
that, being self-arisen (or born of oneself), is free from all causes and conditions. In this 
all-inclusive sphere of self-arisen primordial wisdom, all existence in the universe, 
objects and beings, are already enlightened. Thus, they shine naturally like the light in the 
sky. In this natural illumination, what things need to be grasped? What efforts need to be 
made? From the very beginning, one's great self-arisen primordial wisdom, while 
transcending the entire domain of experience (Tib. spyodyul), suffuses all existence with 
its enlightening essence. Having the same essence, why would one then arouse grasping 
thought with respect to them? It is as though the sky would try to grasp itself.62 
One may wonder that if self-arisen primordial wisdom is naturally free from causes 
and conditions, then how is the teaching of dependent arising (Tib. rten 'brel), considered 
to be synonymous with the ultimate reality of emptiness (Tib. stongpa nyid) in Buddhist 
schools like Madhyamaka, seen in the system of Dzogchen? To that, gNubs chen does 
not give any direct answer, but he does imply one with the following: 
When understanding the essence of causes and condition, one would 
not abandon causes and conditions themselves, even though they are 
like the light rays versus the sun in comparison to self-arisen 
primordial wisdom. Whatever arises from causes and conditions, 
because [its] essence is non-arising whatsoever, is the vajra 
wisdom.63 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 340.3-340.5; rang byung gi ye shes su lta ba'i 
lugs ni skye 'jig gis bsdud pa'i chos thams cad kyang gdod ma nas rang byung gi ye shes rgyu rkyen ngang 
gis bral ba'i ngo bor sangs rgyas pa'i phyi nang med par nam mkha'i 'od bzhin ye shes chen por rang gsal 
lo. See also Karmay, The Great Perfection, 114-115. 
62
 See also gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 340.5-341.2. 
63
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 342.2-342.4; rgyu rkyen gyi ngo bo nyid rtogs 
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Here, it should be clear that dependent arising is considered to be secondary to 
self-arisen primordial wisdom. As the analogy tells us, it is the "light rays" (Tib. zer) 
coming from the sun of self-arisen primordial wisdom. Be that as it may, one should not 
(and cannot) abandon causes and conditions. Rather, one should utilize and understand 
them to be of one essence with the self-arisen primordial wisdom that is utterly free from 
other causes and conditions, and arises solely from oneself. Having this understanding, 
one then suffuses whatever arises from causes and conditions with one's vajra wisdom, a 
synonym of self-arisen primordial wisdom. 
Nonetheless, given the centrality of self-arisen primordial wisdom in the teaching of 
dGe slong ma Kun dga' ma, gNubs chen unwaveringly warns his audience that there 
should be no striving for its realization or manifestation. To do so would be like using 
one's self-arisen primordial wisdom to search for itself, which is absurdly like the 
medicine itself aspiring for a doctor.64 In the spirit of self-arising, one spontaneously 
presents one's primordial wisdom in dynamic display as it manifests in the various forms 
of causes and conditions.65 Being so, self-arising not only dictates the dynamic display of 
spontaneous presence but also determines the logic of immediacy in contemplation, as all 
phenomena that arise and perish are inherently transparent to one's self-arisen primordial 
wisdom. 
E. The View That Takes Effortless Non-Action as Principle 
The Indian Pandita Buddhagupta is said to have taught this view. According to the 
dang rgyu rkyen nyid nyi ma dang zer bzhin rang byung ye shes pas spang du med/ rgyu rkyen las skyes so/ 
de tsam ngo bo nyid gang du yang skyes pa med pas ye shes rdo rje. 
64
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 344.2. 
65
 For a more detailed discussion on the relationship between spontaneous presence and dependent arising, 
see Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 119-136. 
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Nyingma tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, Buddhagupta was one of the early twenty-three 
Dzogchen masters recorded in the Vairo 'dra 'bag {The Resemblance of Vairocana), 
and it has been suggested that this Buddhagupta (Sangs rgya sbas pa in Tibetan) is the 
same as another famous tantric master, Buddhaguhya (Sangs rgyas gsang ba in 
Tibetan).67 Generally speaking, gNubs chen reports this view given by Buddhagupta to 
emphasize that everything is already in the state of completeness (Tib. zin pa). In 
completeness, there is nothing to search or strive for. Instead, one should remain in 
effortless non-action (Tib. bya btsal dang bral ba) to enjoy the original perfection of all 
existence. gNubs chen describes this principle as follows. 
What is accepted as effortless non-action is taught like this: In the 
system of the great unsurpassable yoga, the world is an uncontrived 
palace. The six kinds of sentient beings, through the light of 
self-arisen vajra, are already enlightened. The three realms are in 
themselves the nature of Buddha-body, Buddha-speech and Buddha-
mind. Afflictions are sowed and carried as the nature of phenomena. 
Suffering spontaneously presents [itself] as the great bliss. 
Obscuration shines itself as primordial wisdom. Birth and death is of 
everlasting nature without old age, decay or change and in the state of 
enlightenment from the beginning. Thus, what is there to search 
for?68 
With respect to the above controversial equivalence of opposite categories like 
sentient being and Buddha, suffering and bliss, or obscuration and wisdom, gNubs chen 
does not spend any effort trying to clarify it. Rather, he gives twenty examples to justify 
A hagiography of Vairocana, the Vairo 'dra 'bag is said to be composed in either the 11 or the 13 
century. For a summary of its content, see Karmay. The Great Perfection, 18-31. 
67
 See Karmay, The Great Perfection, 61-63. For the role Buddhaguhya has played in the early history of 
Nyingma transmissions, see, e.g., Germano, "The Seven Descents and the Early History of Rnying Ma 
Transmissions," 229-232 and Snellgrove, Into-Tibetan Buddhism, 446-450. 
68
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 344.4-345.2; bya btsal dang bral bar 'dod 
pa'ang 'di ltar bzhed de/ lhag pa'i rnal 'byor chen po'i lugs kyis/ snod kyi 'jig rten ma bcos pa'i gzhal yas 
khang/ bcud kyi 'jig rten 'gro drug rang byung rdo rje 'od kyis sangs rgyas/ khams gsum sku gsung thugs 
kyi bdag nyid la/ nyon mongs pa chos nyid du bskyal btab/ sdug bsngal bde ba chen por lhun gyis grub/ 
sgrib pa ye shes su rang 'bar/ skye shi g.yung drung tsher gyur/ rgas rgud 'pho 'gyur med pa'i ngo bor ye 
sangs rgyas pa la/ de 'phral du btsal du ji yod. See also Karmay, The Great Perfection, 115. 
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the perfect completeness in all things, which he means to further illustrate Buddhagupta's 
teaching of effortless non-action.69 Among them, gNubs chen states that "Because of 
spontaneous perfection, all other meanings without exception have been accomplished."70 
Accordingly, what is the need of striving? Here, to validate this position, gNubs chen 
again cites from early tantric scriptures, evidently a major source for his presentation. 
Particularly, he gives a quotation from one of the eighteen root texts in the Mind Series 
(Tib. sems sde) of the Dzogchen tradition,71 the Rig pa'i khu byug {The Cuckoo of Open 
Awareness),12 saying, "Abandon the illness of striving, for everything is already 
completed."73 
Although striving or making effort will not bring one to awakening, laxity surely is 
not the answer either. To make sure that his audience would not misunderstand, gNubs 
chen reports that in this teaching of Buddhagupta, 
even though meritorious and striving actions are faulty, if abandoned, 
how could one not give up the world [as well]? If one asks why, it is 
because, in this great teaching, effortless non-action does not mean 
that one should abandon everything nor should one strive for 
anything intentionally. [Rather,] one stays with the principle without 
any effort. If one understands in this way, one does not stop whatever 
one does nor is there any cause for striving. Moreover, in this great 
teaching of the ancients' practice, not one thing is either abandoned 
or accepted. Even the implication of effortless non-action is neither to 
be aspired for nor to be separated from. Those who are fortunate 
enough to practice this religious tradition in the future must know it 
accordingly. It is called the manner of laying down the great principle. 
One sleeps naturally within the basic space of phenomenal reality 
69
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 345.2-347.1. 
70
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 346.1; lhun gyis rdzogs pas/ don gzhan du ma 
lus pas/ bsgrub pa byas zin. 
71
 For more information on the three series, namely, Mind Series, Space Series, and Esoteric Precept Series, 
of the Dzogchen tradition, see footnote 20 above. 
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 For a study of this text, see Karmay, The Great Perfection, 41-59. 
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 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 347 .4; zin pas rtsol ba'i nad spang te. 
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without losing the king of awareness. (Emphasis added.) 
So, as discussed previously in Section I, effortless non-action is the antidote to effort 
or striving for something intentionally. As one lets go of that compulsion, one should not 
fall into the other extreme of laxity, but remain effortlessly within the principle of 
spontaneous presence. In the principle of spontaneity, one should also understand that 
even effortless non-action is not to be aspired for intentionally. Precisely, one only 
remains aware in the direct perception or spontaneous presence of one's open awareness. 
This tranquil balance, as gNubs chen colorfully characterizes, is that one sleeps in 
resonance with the nature of reality to cease all intentionality while not losing the king of 
awareness, one's open awareness, to directly perceive and interact with all that occurs. 
Here, in relation to the idea of immediacy, the delicacy of effortless non-action in terms 
of a natural sleep in one's open awareness signifies that a contemplative immediacy not 
only requires a transcendence of all things "awake," for they disturb effortlessness and 
thus make immediacy mediated, but also demands an artful continuation of one's open 
awareness to keep oneself in continuous "sleep," thus maintaining the logic of 
immediacy. 
Last but not least, we earlier identified that one of the reasons gNubs chen composes 
the bSam gtan mig sgron is to clarify some tantric practitioners' mistaking sTon mun to 
be Dzogchen. One of the confusing points centers on the idea of effortless non-action, as 
74
 Ibid, 351.2-352.1; dge ba dang rtsol ba'i bya ba yang skyon no zhes bya na/ yal bar 'dor bar tang ga la 
srid de mi 'dor ro/ de ci'i phyir zhe na/ lugs chen po bya ba dang bral ba ni/ yal bar bor ba min/ ched du 
rtsol ba yang min/ don dang bral ba med par/ brtsol ba med pa'o/ de ltar shes na ci byas kyang mi 'gog ste 
bya brtsal gyi rgyu yang med do/ 'on tang gna'i mi lugs chen po spyod pa ni/ gang la yang 'dor ba'ang 
med/ len pa'ang med/ tha na bya bral gyi don nyid gnyer ba'ang mi byed/ bral ba'ang mi byed do/ de bzhin 
phyi nas chos lugs spyod pa'i skal ldan rnams kyang byos shig/ de ni don chen nyal mo'i tshul zhes bya ste/ 
chos kyi dbyings kyi ngang la rig pa'i rgyal po mi 'dor bar mnal ba'o. See also Karmay, The Great 
Perfection, 116-117. 
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both traditions have taught this practice. However, for gNubs chen, because sTon mun 
practitioners aim directly at the ultimate truth, their non-action is done with the intention 
of "purposefully striving for something" (Tib. rtsol ba ched du gnyer). This purposeful 
striving, consequently for gNubs chen, not only makes sTon mun inferior to Dzogchen 
but also causes its practitioners to be "distracted and carried away by the river of 
striving" (Tib. rtsol ba 'i chu bo rgyun phyogs su khyer te g.yengs pa), thus preventing the 
Simultaneists of sTon mun from seeing the reality of spontaneous presence.75 However, 
my alternative interpretation in the previous chapter presents a much deeper similarity 
between sTon mun and Dzogchen and, as a result, amends gNubs chen's above criticism. 
Nonetheless, gNubs chen, by contrasting Dzogchen with his understanding of sTon mun, 
effectively conveys the message that the Dzogchen practice of effortless non-action must 
be performed in complete accord of spontaneity, for any bit of striving distracts and 
deviates the practitioner from seeing the true face of one's spontaneous nature. 
F. The View That Takes Great Bliss as Principle 
It is said that Kukuraja and Sri Simha taught the view that takes great bliss (Tib. bde 
ba chenpo) as the main principle of Dzogchen. While Kukuraja is a relatively unknown 
Specifically, to distinguish the non-action of sTon mun from that of Dzogchen, gNubs chen writes, 
Those, whose intelligence for understanding this principle has subsided and who 
are distracted and carried away by the river of striving, are like a person born blind. 
They accept the teaching of Dzogchen and talk about effortless non-action, yet 
inside they are purposefully striving for something. To search for the meaning of 
effortless non-action by its meaning itself is like a woman who wishes to be loved 
by dancing around. (bSam gtan mig sgron, 352.2-352.4; de dag gi don rig pa'i ye 
shes ni nub/ rtsol ba'i chu bo rgyun phyogs su khyer te g.yengs pa yi/ mun long 
dang 'dra ba'i gang zag/ rdzogs chen khas len pa'i rab gcig/ rtsol med kyi tshig 
smra zhing khong rtsol ba ched du gnyer zhing/ don gyis byar med kyi don bya bas 
tshol ba ni/ bro brdungs pas thugs zin du re ba'i mi mo dang 'dra'o. See also 
Karmay, The Great Perfection, 116-117.) 
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figure,76 Sri Simha, who has been said to be originally from China,77 has been 
recognized as one of the lineage holders by all transmissions of Dzogchen traditions.78 
Generally, this view of great bliss advocates that, having realized the nature of one's 
awakened mind as the basis of everything, one experiences all things in the one taste of 
great bliss that is inexpressible but nominally given the designation of great bliss. In 
gNubs chen's words, this view of Kukuraja and Sri Simha's is described as follows. 
The approach, which is the view of great bliss, is that the inherent 
nature of "that" which experiences any and all phenomena 
comprising actions, afflictions, and their suffering effects, when 
investigated, is non-existent, because, when left naturally, it [i.e., 
"that" which experiences] gives rise to everything. In this regard, it is 
the awakened mind that has no inherent entity from the beginning, 
and it is the pure space of great bliss. [Therein,] while pain is not 
abandoned, great bliss self-arises. This "great bliss" is imperishable 
and inexpressible. Even the ordinary mind is primordially unable to 
perceive this great bliss. In this way, it [i.e., the great bliss] manifests 
itself. It cannot be found in others [but only within oneself].79 
Regarding the above point that great bliss self-arises within oneself, gNubs chen 
provocatively quotes the Khyung chen {The Great Garudd) attributed to SrT Simha to 
His name is found among the early masters holding the lineages of Atiyoga transmissions; see e.g., 
Karmay, The Great Perfection, 19-21. In addition, his name is also found among the masters holding the 
lineage of Mahayoga teachings; see, e.g., Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles, 25-26. 
77
 According to modern scholars like David Germano, the association of SrT Simha with China is most 
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puzzling association of him with China, which has led some to speculate he was linked to Chinese Central 
Asia, is most likely a fabrication that may have originated in snying thig chronicles in the 12* century, 
namely the Lo rgyus chen mo. The motivation may have been to express the international nature of the 
early Great Perfection as the quintessence of all Buddhism, and hence both legitimize it as well as divert 
questions for its low profile in India" (Germano, "The Seven Descents and the Early History of Rnying Ma 
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his role in the transmission of Dzogchen in Tibet, see Germano, "The Seven Descents and the Early History 
of Rnying Ma Transmissions," 238-241. 
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 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 352.5-353.3; bde ba chen por lta ba'i lugs kyis 
ni/ las dang nyon mongs pa dang 'bras bu sdug bsngal gyi bsdus pa'i chos ji snyed/ byed cing myong ba'i 
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ltar snang ba nyid de/ gzhan du btsal du med do. See also Karmay, The Great Perfection, 117. 
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indicate that even the five inexpiable transgressions (Tib. mtshams med lnga)m are the 
"juice" (Tib. rtsi) of completely perfect phenomena, for there is nothing external to, or 
other than, this great blissful nature.81 gNubs chen asserts here that if one realizes this 
essential meaning, one's open awareness will naturally shine as the great bliss.82 In that 
way, the light of great bliss will spontaneously illuminate all of samsara. For in the great 
bliss of one's awakened mind, body, and speech, how could there exist any transgressive 
actions or thoughts? By whom could such transgressions be committed? In the realms 
of the great three thousand-fold universe (Tib. stong gsum gyi stong chen po 'jig rtan gyi 
khams), the names of samsara and afflictions do not even exist, for everything is by 
nature purified (Tib. sangs) and perfected (Tib. rgyas), and this palace of purity and 
perfection is just the being of great bliss.84 Here, one can certainly say that, given the 
being of great bliss suffuses all, the logic of immediacy in contemplation would also be 
tinged with a blissful savor. 
In addition, gNubs chen tells us, when one does not see the import of great bliss as 
just one's nature, one generates the desire to purposefully strive for great perfection in the 
hope of eradicating suffering and obtaining happiness.85 But, in that way, one turns one's 
back on this great bliss. This is like searching for the elephant you are riding on. Not only 
is the effort done in vain, but also there will be no chance for realizing the goal.86 In this 
Dzogchen principle of great bliss, the path is once again recognized as the spontaneous 
presence of the fruition itself; any bit of contrived effort takes one away from this 
80
 The five inexpiable transgressions in Buddhism are: (1) patricide, (2) matricide, (3) arhat-cide, (4) 
creating schism in the sahgha, and (5) causing a Tathagata to bleed with evil intent. 
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 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 353.3-353.4. 
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 See Ibid, 353.4-353.5. 
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path-less yet blissful journey within oneself. But again, to be free of contrived effort is 
not the same as to be lax. Rather, "uncontrived effort" is to perform everything in the 
manner of neither-grasping-nor-relinquishing. In this complete openness, one thus acts 
spontaneously in accord with the quintessential instructions of one's open awareness and 
it is only in this spontaneity that one traverses this fruitional and blissful journey within 
oneself. 
G. The View That Takes Nonduality as Principle 
The seventh view gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes introduces is Manjusrimitra's 
teaching that takes nonduality as the main principle of Dzogchen.87 In the Nyingma 
tradition, it is said that Manjusrlmitra received the teachings of Dzogchen from dGa' rab 
rdo rje, the first human Dzogchen master, and classified the teachings into three series, 
namely, the Mind Series (Tib. sems sde), the Space Series (Tib. klong sde), and the 
Esoteric Precept Series (Tib. man ngagsde)^ Afterwards, he passed the teachings to Sri 
Simha of China. According to the bSam gtan mig sgron, Manjusrlmitra essentially 
teaches that, with the awakened mind as the blissful and effortless reality of all things, all 
extremes are naturally nondual. Particularly, gNubs chen begins the presentation of this 
nonduality view with the following description: 
In the great unsurpassable yoga, the view of nonduality is that the 
awakened mind, which exists from the very beginning, is the reality 
of great bliss and effortlessness. As far as this reality is concerned, all 
on 
known extremes are nondual. 
For a description of Manjusrimitra's life, see e.g., Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles, 
59-61. 
88
 For more information on these three series, see footnote 20 above. 
89
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271 
To illustrate this nondual reality, gNubs chen further gives fifty some examples. 
Among them, the first seven examples are translated below to demonstrate his reasoning; 
he writes, 
When investigating the self-nature of the awakened mind, it is 
non-existent, but if one reflects, it appears to be everything. Thus, 
existence and non-existence are nondual. One's true nature is 
indefinite anywhere yet naturally rests in all enlightened attributes. 
Thus, permanence and annihilation are nondual. The state of great 
bliss without extremes transcends all defining characteristics, 
calculation, and designation. It does not grasp anything whatsoever. 
Thus, unity and multiplicity are nondual. Similarly, one's open 
awareness, by nature, appears as anything but does not reify 
[whatever appears]. Thus, arising and non-arising are nondual. From 
the very beginning the sun of open awareness, one's self-arisen 
primordial wisdom, permeates light everywhere without any 
limitation. Thus, brightness and darkness are nondual. The six realms 
of sentient beings from the very beginning are in the awakened state 
of self-arisen vajra lights and are free from any designation or 
labeling. Thus, Buddhas and sentient beings are nondual. From the 
very beginning the basic space of spontaneously perfect phenomena 
self-arises as the fruition of the [four] Buddha bodies and the [five] 
primordial wisdoms. Even the name of fruition is indescribable. Thus, 
cause and fruition are nondual.91 
Essentially, the above nondual examples all testify to the idea that the spontaneous 
nature of the primordial basis that has many names and qualities transcends all extremes 
while encompassing them as well, and in this non-grasping yet all-encompassing 
spontaneous perfection, all dualistic extremes, such as being and nonbeing, samsara and 
mtha' ji snyed du grags pa thams cad gnyis med de. See also Karmay, The Great Perfection, 117. 
90
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nirvana, sameness and variety, are all nondual in actuality. Here, to be sure, even the 
designation of nonduality is just a name without any inherent nature. It is just a skillful 
means to aid the practitioner in going beyond the grasping of any partial, phenomenal 
appearance. As a result, under this nondual reality of spontaneous perfection, one realizes 
not to conceptualize or purposefully strive for anything.92 Even striving for the ultimate 
truth, gNubs chen warns us, is also one-sided, for this striving prevents the spontaneous 
presence of one's open awareness and, even worse, facilitates the apprehension of the 
deceptive, phenomenal appearance as authentic, like a person who mistakes a pile of 
stones in human shape for a real person. In this way, sentient beings, who are born even 
in degenerate times, should, paradoxically, artfully strive in the manner of effortless 
non-action to realize the nondual reality in the uncontrived manifestation of one's open 
awareness, the self-arisen primordial wisdom of one's awakened mind.93 
As discussed in the cases of Chan and sTon mun, nonduality being neither-one-nor-
two exhibits a delicate dynamic within a wholeness of being and knowing. This delicate 
dynamic, both philosophically and contemplatively, encompasses cause (or path) and 
effect (or fruition), gradualness (or mediation) and suddenness (or immediacy), so that 
they are integrated into a wholeness without being collapsed into a oneness. Surely, this 
dynamic is as artful and as intricate as that of spontaneous presence discussed earlier. In 
fact, nonduality and spontaneity should be understood as ideas/practices both reinforcing 
each other and contributing to the logic of immediacy. In actualizing and continuing the 
logic of immediacy, in a way, spontaneity creates a stabilizing easiness or effortlessness 
that releases one from the compulsion to act or strive without falling into stagnation or 
See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSamgtan migsgron, 364.1-364.3. 
See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgrort, 369.1-369.3. 
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laxity, whereas nonduality gives rise to a kinetic energy or momentum that inspirits one 
to embody oneself in conditional forms without destabilizing the formless field of 
openness. 
Consequently, nonduality and spontaneity together establish the aforementioned 
"dynamic stillness" that depicts a fruitional path or a distance-less journey, in which the 
traveler (i.e., practitioner) never leaves home but experiences everything possible. Here, 
what the traveler experiences certainly should not be understood as illusion or delusion. 
Rather, what the traveler perceives is not only meaningful to him/herself but also 
meaningful or beneficial to his/her fellow travelers. Contemplatively speaking, this 
meaningful reality, nondual and spontaneous, is uniquely realized in the uncontrived 
manifestation of one's open awareness, and it is also with this uncontrived manifestation 
that the logic of immediacy in contemplation is not only fulfilled but also sustained 
unceasingly. 
H. The View That Takes Great Wholeness as Principle 
Another obscure master by the name of Sras Thubo Ratsahata (Prince Thubo 
Rajahasti) is said to teach this eighth Dzogchen view that takes one great-wholeness (Tib. 
thig le chen po gcig) as the main principle. As far as history is concerned, we know 
practically nothing about this master except that he was the uncle of dGa' rab rdo rje.94 
According to the bSam gtan mig sgron, this eighth perspective principally teaches the 
nature of one great-wholeness (Tib. thig le chen po gcig gi rang bzhiri); gNubs chen 
depicts this eighth view as follows. 
94
 For this story, see e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection, 19. Sras Thubo Ratsahata's name is also found on 
several lists of early masters holding Atiyoga lineages. For these lists, see Karmay, The Great Perfection, 
19-21. 
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If one asks what it [i.e., reality] is like, conceptual elaboration is an 
aspect of the phenomenal world. It [i.e., conceptual elaboration] 
appears to those who misunderstand [reality] and to those who are 
still learners of various kinds. But, the open awareness that is [also] 
the awakened mind is naturally free of all conceptual elaboration; in 
the nature of great wholeness, it [i.e., open awareness] is the state of 
enlightenment so that it neither avoids nor grasps duality. In 
designation, it can only be called "the one [great-wholeness]" as it is 
matchless. In its very essence, it transcends any labeling.95 
Thus, as an aspect of phenomenal reality, conceptual elaboration has led sentient 
beings to apprehend insubstantial appearances in their diversity, but this apprehended 
diversity is naturally observed by the "enlightening eye" of open awarensss, for it is the 
state of enlightenment itself. As the state of enlightenment, the open awareness that is 
also the awakened mind is uniquely called the "one great-wholeness." In this one 
great-wholeness, which is also personified as the All Good Samantabhadra in the 
Dzogchen tradition, everything spontaneously presents itself without the need of labeling. 
In this way, one naturally neither avoids nor grasps nonduality. After all, in spontaneous 
perfection, why should one avoid or grasp anything? Simply, in this original state, there 
is no dualistic grasping (Tib. gnyis su 'dzinpa), no speculative imputation (Tib. sgro) or 
veneration (Tib. bskur), no self or others whatsoever. It is only the self-realization (Tib. 
rang rnyed) of the one great-wholeness in one's artful endeavor of non-analysis (Tib. mi 
dpyad). 
In the spirit of a fruitional vehicle, this one great-wholeness is said to have no path 
of liberation (Tib. grol ba'i lam) leading to it but itself, because of its singular or 
gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 369.4-369.6: ji lta yin zhe na/ spros pa ni chos ril 
gyi rang bzhin nyid/ log rtog dang lam pa la tha dad par snang tsam nyid na/ rang rig pa byang chub kyi 
sems spros pa thams cad dang ngang gis bral ba thig le chen po'i rang bzhin du sangs rgyas pa la gnyis 
spros kyi chos thams cad ma spangs ma dmigs pa'i phyir/ tha snyad tsam du zla med pas gcig ces brjod du 
zad kyi/ ngo bo nyid ming dang bral lo. See also Karmay, The Great Perfection, 118. 
96
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan migsgron, 370.1-370.4. 
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all-encompassing nature. In this wholeness, it transcends the duality of unity and 
multiplicity. Even the conceptual elaboration that gives rise to diversity is subsumed as it 
is, that is, as the spontaneous play of the awakened mind. In this spontaneous presence, 
non-reification (Tib. mi dmigs) or non-abidance (Tib. mi gnas) is taken as the abode of 
nirvanic fruition that can only be reaped in the cosmic womb (Tib. bha ga) of the 
indivisible and spontaneously perfect sphere (Tib. dbyer med Ihun rdzogs thig le). 
Consequently, in this non-abiding manner, the practitioner does not withdraw oneself 
from anything; the mind that is free of forms makes all forms perfect and complete. Here, 
gNubs chen emphatically reminds his audience that the above principle is the ultimate 
intention of the Victorious One.97 
But gNubs chen also warns his audience that the one great-wholeness should not be 
turned into the one principle (Tib. chos gcig) to pursue. In doing so, the practitioner only 
pursues the darkness to get to the sun, which will only end in complete failure and give 
rise to obscuration. Thus, the great-wholeness can never be established or realized 
through conceptualization or purposeful actions. The great-wholeness, gNubs chen 
further explains, encompasses six kinds of wholeness or spheres (Tib. thig le), each of 
which embodies some specific qualities or attributes.98 Those who possess objective 
grasping will never see this great-wholeness that, while it seems to appear as sixfold, 
See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 370.5-373.6. 
98
 These six kinds of wholeness or sphere are characterized as follows: (1) having no extremes and being 
the source of everything, it is the sphere of ultimate space (Tib. dbyings kyi thig le); (2) naturally purifying 
all extremes without being utilized (Tib. ma bkot), it is the sphere of completely pure space (Tib. dbyings 
mam dagpa'i thig le); (3) free from all partiality without contrivance and adulteration, it is the sphere of 
fundamental reality (Tib. chos nyidkyi thig le); (4) self-arising without causitive conditions, it is the sphere 
of great primordial wisdom (Tib. ye shes chenpo 'i thig le); (5) neither grasping the samsara of lower realms 
nor abandoning it, it is the sphere of All Good Samantabhadra (Tib. kun tu bzangpo 'i thig le); and (6) as 
the sphere, in which everything, from the Buddhas to the hell beings, is spontanelusly perfect without 
extrems or centers, it is the sphere of spontaneous presence (Tib. Ihun gyi grub pa'i thig le); see gNubs chen 
Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 374.6-375.5. 
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does not even have one." After all, the one great-wholeness, being unparalleled and 
indescribable, exhibits a non-analytic logic that goes beyond the Aristotelian logic or 
conventional language.100 Specifically, instead of Aristotelian "either-or" logic, the 
non-analytic logic of the great wholeness embraces all categories including all dyadic 
positions or contradictions such as unity and multiplicity, being and nonbeing, Buddhas 
and sentient beings. Not only does it embrace them, but it embraces them to the degree 
that these categories, no matter if they are oppositional or not, are thoroughly dissolved 
into conditionally arising aspects or qualities of the wholeness. In this way, the great 
wholeness of Dzogchen embodies no categories yet is self-pregnant (i.e., in the sense of 
self-arising) with non-abiding or indefinite possibilities. Such a paradoxical wholeness, as 
mentioned earlier, can only be realized through one's artful endeavor of non-analysis that 
is in accord with the principle of effortless non-action. 
The Dzogchen wholeness that can only be realized in its entirety, as discussed above, 
is the matrix underlying the delicate dynamics of nonduality and spontaneous presence, 
given which the Dzogchen logic of immediacy is actualized. In actualizing the logic of 
immediacy, the Dzogchen wholeness must allow the discussed "skillful effort" just as 
Shenhui's "equal learning" allows gradual cultivation and the sTon mun simultaneity 
allows conventionality in their respective contexts. In addition, similar to what I have 
argued for the wholeness of Shenhui's "equal learning," in which samadhi-being and 
prajna-knowing integrate the three types of nondualism in Klein's typology into an 
integral whole,101 the Dzogchen wholeness of primordial basis and open awareness also 
99
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 374.2-375.5. 
100
 For a further analysis of the great wholeness in relation to reasoning, see Klein and Wangyal, 
Unbounded Wholeness, 53-85. 
101
 See my discussion in Chapter 2, Section III.B of this dissertation. See also Klein's discussion on the 
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embodies such a holography of nondual relationships depicting the nonduality between 
objects, between self and others, and between one's present status and future ideal. This 
is primarily due to the mutual interfusion and permeation of one's open awareness and 
primordial basis demonstrated in Section I of this chapter. 
Moreover, as in the case of the sTon mun wholeness, in which the conventional is 
engaged in the manner of ultimacy, whereas the ultimate is embodied in the conventional, 
the Dzogchen wholeness, as a result of mutual interfusion and permeation, dissolves the 
boundaries of all dyadic categories in the spontaneous presence of one's open awareness 
but reveals the conditional appearances of all phenomena in the dynamic display of the 
primordial basis, both in their totality and diversity. In this way, not only is the Dzogchen 
wholeness both singular and plural, but its spontaneous presence, in the form of one's 
open awareness, insightfully informs us that there can be no "abstract truth," for nothing 
is divorced from the subjective engagement of one's open awareness. Nonetheless, the 
usual qualm of cultural or moral relativism should not be associated with this subjective 
engagement, for the spontaneous presence of one's open awareness is said to be in 
complete accord with the appearing conditions of physical reality. 
I. The View That Takes the-Basis-of-All-Existence-Just-as-It-Is as Principle 
The last Dzogchen view gNubs chen introduces in the bSam gtan mig sgron takes 
the-basis-of-all-existence-just-as-it-is (Tib. chos thorns cad gzhiji bzhin pa) as the main 
principle. It is said that this view is taught by dGa' rab rdo rje, rGyal bo 'Da' he na ta lo, 
and gNubs chen himself. As the only master who has been mentioned twice in gNubs 
chen's presentation of Dzogchen views, dGa' rab rdo rje seems to occupy a unique place 
three types of nondualism (Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen, 151-158). 
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in the transmission of Dzogchen since its early years.102 As for rGyal bo 'Da' he na ta lo, 
a king of Oddiyana, he is said to be the grandfather of dGa' rab rdo rje.103 And, the fact 
that gNubs chen mentions himself as a propounder of this view indicates that, in his mind, 
this ninth view encompasses all the Dzogchen teachings that have been discussed. He 
explains, 
The view, i.e., the-basis-of-all-existence-just-as-it-is, is especially 
unmistaken. If one asks why, it is because the essential nature of all 
things is uncontrived and incorruptible. It is the Great Completeness 
of Atiyoga. Names synonymous with this, which accord with its 
manifesting qualities, are innumerable. The reality of suchness has no 
reification and grasping. Consequently, it is also known as "non-
referentiality." With respect to it, all fruitions are originally perfect 
and complete. Thus, it is also known as "spontaneous presence." The 
reality of suchness does not even have the name of suffering. Thus, it 
is also known as "great bliss." There are no other phenomena. Thus, 
it is also known as "great being." There are no [matchless] 
companions and conceptual elaboration. Thus, it is known as "great 
wholeness." There are no extreme phenomena. Thus, it is also known 
as "nonduality." This very suchness naturally illuminates everything. 
Thus, it is also known as "self-arisen primordial wisdom." Because it 
involves no efforts, it does not wish for any fruition. Thus, it is also 
known as "effortless non-action." Even though there are these 
different designations, their essences are not different. As a result, 
one is all and all is one. They are all the synonymous names of 
the-basis-just-as-it-is.104 
As everything is uncontrived and incorruptible from the primordial beginning, be it 
As mentioned earlier, dGa' rab rdo rje has been recognized as the first human Dzogchen master in the 
Nyingma tradition. Thus, all Dzogchen lineages are traced back to him. For a biography of dGa' rab rdo rje, 
see, e.g., Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles, 55-58. In addition, dGa' rab rdo rje also 
appears in Bon narratives; see, e.g., Klein and Wangyal, Unbounded Wholeness, 195 and footnote 132. 
103
 See e.g., Karmay, The Great Perfection, 19. 
104
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 375.5-377.1; chos thams cad gzhi ji bzhin par 
lta ba ni/ khyad par du'ang ma nor ba ste/ de ci'i phyir zhe na/ dngos po rnams kyi de kho na nyid kha na 
ma bcos ma bslad pa nyid pas a ti yo ga rdzogs pa chen po'o/ de'i mtshan gyi rnams grangs ni yon tan gyi 
cha las snang ba grangs las 'das so/ de kho na nyid la dmigs 'dzin med pas/ gza' gtad bral zhes bya ba yang 
grags/ de la 'bras bu ril rdzogs pas lhun gyi grub pa zhes bya bar yang grags/ de kho na sdug bsngal ming 
med pas bde ba chen po zhes bya bar yang grags/ gzhan pa'i chos med pas bdag nyid chen por yang grags/ 
zla dang spros pa med pas thig le chen por grags/ mtha'i chos med pas gnyis su med par yang grags/ de 
nyid du thams cad du gsal bas rang 'byung ye shes su yang grags/ 'bras bu la re ba med pas mi rtsol ba'i 
phyir/ bya rtsol bral ba zhes bya bar yang grags te/ de dag rtags tha dad kyang ngo bo la tha dad med pas/ 
gcig kyang thams cad yin la/ thams cad gcig pas/ gzhi ji bzhin pa'i mtshan gyi rnams grags so. See also 
Karmay, The Great Perfection, 118. 
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one or all, all particularized manifestations are of the same nature, nominally called the 
Great Completeness (or Dzogchen) of the supreme yoga, and ultimately, all phenomena 
demonstrate the nature of the-basis-just-as-it-is or what we have called earlier, primordial 
basis. Even though the-basis-just-as-it-is is indescribable, there are characteristics, such 
as the eight discussed views, that can demonstrate its principles so that the practitioner 
can realize it with some guidance. Regarding these guiding skillful means, gNubs chen 
also reminds his audience that, in the spirit of innate non-contrivance and spontaneous 
incorruptibility, skillful means should not be reified, for if primordially there is no 
conceptual reference point to begin with, then how could there exist a reified view of 
non-referentiality? In addition, if everything is already in the state of spontaneous 
presence, then how could there be a concrete view of spontaneous presence? If the-basis-
of-all-existence-just-as-it-is should not even be "viewed as suchness" (Tib. de nyid 
du 'ang mi /to),105 then how could there exist the viewers and the views?106 
The-basis-just-as-it-is, if understood correctly, is just the nature or great being of 
onself (Tib. bdag nyid). gNubs chen tells us, when one understands it mistakenly, one 
strives (Tib. 'bad pa) and pursues after (Tib. rjes su 'breng) spontaneous presence, 
self-arisen primordial wisdom, great bliss, and so forth without realizing that they are just 
the great being of oneself.107 Being the nature of oneself, these qualities or states are not 
to be pursued. Rather, the practitioner neither conceptualizes nor wishes for them (Tib. 
sems pa med 'dodpa med). As a result, a Dzogchen adept 
does not engage in reasoning, does not examine, does not 
conceptualize, does not actualize, does not investigate, does not 
measure; he does not [purposefully] do anything whosoever. Rather, 
105
 This "viewed as suchness" is in a sense of grasping suchness to have a substantial essence. 
106
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 377.1-377.5. 
107
 Ibid, 378.1-379.4. 
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in the manner of non-postulation he posits. To the suchness just as it 
is, in non-knowing he knows, in non-acquirement he acquires, in 
non-achievement he achieves, in non-seeing he sees, in non-
realization he realizes, in non-attainment he attains, in non-
visualization he visualizes, and in non-experience he experiences.108 
Thus, in the manner of non-conceptualization or non-reification, the Dzogchen adept sees 
the nature of oneself just as it is; it is just like, gNubs chen illustrates, one will see the 
planets and stars in the sky by the self-settling or pacification of the covering clouds 
rather than by illuminating them. In this way, the practitioner stays with the unmistaken 
principle of reality and reveals the state of awareness-holder (Tib. rig 'dzin gyi gral) from 
within.109 
Although the-basis-of-all-existence-just-as-it-is has innumerable names, these names 
are simply designations. As designations, they should not be grasped or reified. Rather, 
they have provisional functions to help the practitioner neutralize or let go of all grasping. 
The-basis-just-as-it-is is not anything but suitable for everything (Tib. ci yang min no 
gangyang rung). Accordingly, how could one grasp or relinquish what is not anything? 
In this manner of neither-grasping-nor-relinquishing, all designations, albeit devoid of 
inherent nature, are utilized spontaneously as antidotes to whatever situations they fit. So, 
permanence is taught to neutralize the grasping of impermanence and vice versa; 
nonbeing is taught to neutralize the grasping of being and vice versa; and effortless 
non-action is taught to neutralize the grasping of arduous striving and vice versa.110 
In the clear light of the basis that is one's awakened mind, nothing whatsoever is 
108
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 379.5-380.1; gtan tshigs ma btsug/ ma gzhig 
bas ma bsam/ mngon du ma byas/ ma brtags/ ma gzhal/ de ci yang bya ba med par/ ma bzhag par bzhag pa/ 
ji bzhin pa de kho na nyid/ mi rig par rig/ mi rnyed par rnyed/ ma bsgrub par grub/ ma mthong bar mthong/ 
ma rtogs par rtogs/ ma thob par thob/ mi gsal bar gsal/ ma myong bar myong bar 'gyur ro. 
109
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 380.1-380.3. 
110
 See Ibid, 384.3-387.1. 
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obstructed; even "to be" (Tib. yinpa) is not suitable to be held as "to be." In this supreme 
Atiyoga, gNubs chen proclaims, the-basis-just-as-it-is spontaneously appears in the non-
stopping of all dwelling or thinking, and the key is, he unequivocally writes, "not to 
conceptualize it" (Tib. mi rtog)\ After all, all is oneself and oneself appears as everything. 
Understood in this way, perceived experience and non-grasping simultaneously self-
manifest to be without their respective conceptual reference points (Tib. dmigs gtad med 
par). 
Here, one can certainly say that, in an explicit tone of simplicity and naturalness, 
gNubs chen integrates all teachings into the-basis-just-as-it-is. In the integration, he does 
not simplify the diversity of dynamic manifestations. Rather, he reminds his audience to 
let them be, to embrace them without reifying them. In the manner of non-reification, one 
perceives everything in their nakedness {i.e., without any conceptual reference) and uses 
them freely and fittingly without any conceptual limitation. That being so, there are no 
views or perspectives to begin with; non-referentiality, spontaneity, nonduality, bliss, or 
wholeness are just nominal designations, the provisional means, for the practitioner to 
engage in a kind of "skillful effort" to traverse the path. As it is an artful endeavor, it thus 
should not be just philosophically understood but contemplatively actualized. For the 
actualization, the uncompromising logic, as this "last view" shows us, lies in the manner 
or mechanism of "just-is-ness" (Tib. ji bzhin nyid). In this regard, this "just-is-ness" is the 
ultimate logic of immediacy in contemplation, to which the contemplative teachings of 
Chan, sTon mun, and Dzogchen all converge. 
111
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III. Dzogchen Methods for Letting the Mind Be 
To complete our journey into gNubs chen's presentation of Dzogchen teachings, the 
practical aspect of his presentation should also be touched upon, especially given the 
understanding that, in the last view, he essentially turns the philosophical discussions of 
the previous views into instructions for contemplative practice. Particularly, he points out 
the provisional function of these views (e.g., as antidotes) to help the practitioner let go of 
different aspects of conceptual grasping. Yet, how does the practitioner specifically let go 
of conceptual grasping through the contemplative instructions based on the presented 
Dzogchen principles? Did these Dzogchen practitioners of the tenth century also perform 
the methods of "cutting through" (or "setting free"; Tib. khregs chod) and "sudden leap" 
(or "soaring on"; Tib. thod rgat) as the later Dzogchen practitioners of the Nyingma 
School have done?"2 Did they also utilize the "intermediate state or bardo" (Tib. bar do) 
for the access of awakening and liberation?113 
Exhibiting strong characteristics of what David Germano calls "pristine Great 
112
 The methods of "cutting through" (or "setting free") and "sudden leap" (or "soaring on") are, in general, 
considered the special practices in the Nyingma Dzogchen traditions, especially associated with the 
Esoteric Precept Series. Regarding these unique Dzogchen practices, the fourteenth Dalai Lama 
characterizes them in the following words: "On the basis of that key point, when we talk about the path, 
and if we use the special vocabulary of the Dzogchen tradition, and refer to its own extraordinary practices, 
the path is twofold, that of trekcho and togal. The trekcho approach is based upon the primordial purity of 
mind, kadag, while the togal approach is based upon its spontaneous presence, lhundrup. This is the 
equivalent in the Dzogchen tradition of what is more commonly referred to as the path that is the union of 
skilful means and wisdom" (Dalai Lama, Dzogchen, 32). For an introduction of these two techniques, see 
Dudjom Rinpoche, The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, Vol. I, 334-345 and Tulku Thondup, The 
Practice of Dzogchen by Longchen Rabjam, 67-76. As these two techniques are mostly associated with the 
Esoteric Precept Series, according to David Germano, they are probably introduced into the different 
genres of Dzogchen after the eleventh century: see Germano, 'The Funerary Transformation of the Great 
Perfection (Rdzogs cheri)." 
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 The idea of "bardo" was first introduced to the West in the book entitled Tibetan Book of the Dead 
compiled and edited by W. Y. Evans-Wentz. Ever since its publication in 1927, the book has fascinated 
numerable readers. For a general introduction of the bardo teaching, see, e.g., Sogyal Rinpoche, The 
Tibetan Book of Living and Dying, 106-130 and the references on bardo in the Index. For a history of early 
Dzogchen transformations including the emergence of the bardo theory, see Germano, "The Funerary 
Transformation of the Great Perfection {Rdzogs cheri)." 
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Perfection" that are "marked by the absence of presentations of detailed ritual and 
contemplative technique,"114 the practical aspect of gNubs chen's Dzogchen can be said 
to be epitomized in the methods of letting the mind be (Tib. bio bzhag) in its natural state. 
In line with Germano's characterization, these early Dzogchen methods, unlike their later 
counterparts, take no definite forms; namely, they do not have a fixed set of ritual or 
procedures to follow or require the practitioner to sit in a particular posture or to visualize 
the deity.115 Instead, they direct the practitioner to act in accord (Tib. mthun pa'i spyod 
pa) with Dzogchen principles in the manner of neither-grasping-nor-relinquishing at all 
times. Thus, the practitioner takes all phenomena as the path and engages in a living 
practice that is never separate from the guiding principles of Great Completeness (Tib. 
don dang bsgom pa por rgya ma chad). Now let us see how gNubs chen explicates these 
methods to his audience. 
A. The Dzogchen Principle of "Acting Accordingly " 
In the beginning of his Dzogchen meditation (Tib. bsgom pa) section in the bSam 
gtan mig sgron, gNubs chen first states that Dzogchen meditation is composed of two 
aspects: (1) the methods regarding how to discipline the body (Tib. lus kyi bzhag thabs) 
and (2) the methods regarding how to access or engage the mind (Tib. sems kyi 'jug 
114
 Germano, "The Funerary Transformation of the Great Perfection (Rdzogs chert)," 3. Generally speaking, 
the meditation section of the bSam gtan mig sgron, as comprehensive as it is, lacks detailed discussion on 
most of the dominating Dzogchen practices in the later centuries, which include tantric sadhana-based 
rituals, the unique practices of "cutting through" and "sudden leap," and practices derived from the bardo 
theory. Be that as it may, it still gives us a valuable glimpse of how Dzogchen meditation might have been 
practiced in the tenth century. In addition, it does include a brief discussion on a practice that seems to be a 
precursor of the later 'pho ba or transference of consciousness practice; see gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye 
shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 423.6-425.3. For an introduction of the 'pho ba practice, see, e.g., Patrul 
Rinpoche, The Words of My Perfect Teachers (translated by the Padmakara Translation Group), 351-365. 
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"The Funerary Transformation of the Great Perfection (Rdzogs chen)" 2-3. 
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thabs).116 With respect to the former, gNubs chen writes, 
[In this system] there is no [specific] bodily discipline like [that of] 
the lower yogas of development, because it is free of any notion of 
bodily grasping or attachment. Thus, there are no definite methods 
regarding how to position the body. However, if one asks, "Does one 
then reject [all the bodily discipline,] such as cross-legged sitting and 
so forth, of the lower [vehicles]," [my response is that] one does not 
reject them as long as one does not grasp [or attach oneself to] the 
body. Nor does one accept them intentionally. [In that way,] there is 
no contradiction in sitting cross-legged, lying down facing up or 
down, or stretching in whatever way whatsoever. The practice of 
yoga itself makes anything into bliss, and laziness is [surely] a wrong 
action.117 
This general principle of neither-grasping-nor-relinquishing regarding sitting posture 
and so forth is evidently in accord with the Dzogchen spirit of spontaneous presence with 
which nothing is reified nor abandoned. As the practitioner truly realizes this effortless 
principle, he or she, on the one hand, attaches to no definite physical discipline and, on 
the other hand, will not fall into laxity, either. Rather, the practitioner engages in bodily 
discipline without any bit of contrivance, for contrivance is a result of conceptualization 
and leads one away from the suchness of reality. In the primordial perfection of 
everything, how can there exist any contradiction in the things or actions themselves? It 
is the intention of the doer that can give rise to contradiction. Hence, as long as there is 
grasping, sitting postures, staying at solitary or household places, or any action 
whatsoever will all not be in accord with the suchness of reality. It. is only in one's 
self-arisen primordial wisdom itself that the practitioner finds the true "solitary place" 
(Tib. dben pa 'i gnas) and transforms the arduous practice of yoga into the bliss of 
'
16
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 403.3. 
117
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 403.4-403.6; bskyed pa'i rnal 'byor man chad 
ltar lus bcos la bzhag pa med de/ lus 'dzin pa'i 'du shes dang bral ba'i phyir/ lus la 'dug thabs nges par 
bzhag pa med do/ 'o na 'og ma'i skyil mo krung la sogs pa dgag gam zhe na/ lus su ma dmigs phan chad 
dgag tu med de/ ched du dang du len pa med na/ skyil mo la sogs pa gan rkyal khas bub gang du 'bre 
yang 'gal med do/ rnal 'byor nyid gang bde bar bya ste/ snyoms las kyis ni bya ba ma yin no. 
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spontaneous perfection.118 Again, we see here that, in Dzogchen, it is only in the context 
of spontaneity that one finds the validity of effort, for such effort will not be arduous 
anymore. Rather, it is a kind of "skillful effort" in-spirited with the presence of 
spontaneity. 
Yet the general principle of neither-grasping-nor-relinquishing regarding the bodily 
discipline takes another form when it comes to the methods of how to engage the mind. 
With respect to that, gNubs chen explains, 
On the methods of how to engage the mind, it is an engaging without 
engagement. It is the suchness of reality that does not reify anything 
whatsoever and that naturally illuminates the essence of the great 
non-conceptual nature or being. Consequently, the realization of non-
engaging itself is known as the engaging.119 
So, why is the mind only engaged in the manner of non-engaging? For gNubs chen, 
it is because the awakened mind is the suchness of reality; it is non-reifiable and does not 
reify anything whatsoever. It is the enlightened nature of oneself, thus self-illuminating in 
its own non-conceptuality. As discussed earlier, this non-conceptual great being is also 
the wholeness that encompasses all and is indivisible as well. In this all-encompassing, 
indivisible whole, how can there be an engagement, for such an idea implies 
incompleteness and division? As a result, the methods regarding how to "engage" the 
awakened mind can only be a non-engaging that is nominally called an engaging. As 
gNubs chen exemplifies, a master magician, who knows the illusory nature of all things 
created by magic, will not be stunned by them.120 Similarly, with authentic knowing, the 
practitioner will not be stunned by all the phenomenal appearances; he or she knows them 
118
 See gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 404.1-405.6. 
115
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 405.6-406.2; sems kyi 'jug thabs ni/ 'di 'jug pa 
med par 'jug pa'o/ de ni ji bzhin pa de kho na nyid de la/ gang yang ma dmigs te/ bdag nyid mi rtog pa 
chen po'i ngo bor gsal bas/ de 'jug tu med par shes pa nyid zhugs par bzhed do. 
120
 See gNubs ehen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 402.1-402.3. 
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just as they are. In the spirit of non-engaging, the practitioner engages all conventionality 
with the openness of one's open awareness that resides nowhere but permeates 
everywhere. 
For those who are looking for specific instructions on how to discipline the body and 
how to engage the mind, the above gNubs chen's presentation of Dzogchen meditation 
will probably not be satisfactory. It is however this kind of dissatisfaction that is worth 
questioning from the Dzogchen perspective. Even though it seems that the above 
instructions give no real methods regarding how to meditate, the bona fide significance is 
in the formlessness of these ;<nethods as it "resides nowhere but permeates everywhere." 
As such, various instructions developed by later Dzogchen traditions are however not in 
contradiction with this formlessness as long as these instructions are meant to prepare 
practitioners for this "formless" type of Dzogchen meditation. 
In gNubs chen's presentation, the pervasiveness of the formless particularly requires 
its practitioner to act (Tib. spyodpa) or, more precisely, to be, in accord with the nature 
of phenomenal reality at all times. Regarding this Dzogchen principle of "acting 
accordingly,"121 what gNubs chen writes about how to perform actions for the sake of 
oneself and others is just befitting; he states, 
Without contriving or adulterating the three doors [of body, speech, 
and mind], one sees [all] phenomena with one's [awakened] mind 
and then acts accordingly. Neither doing nor stopping doing, one 
simply acts without attachments.122 
Indeed, in the spirit of primordial perfection and spontaneous presence, one should 
121
 Even though it is more accurate to characterize gNubs chen's "formless" Dzogchen meditation as "to be 
in accord with the nature of reality," I coin the term "acting accordingly" primarily based on gNubs chen's 
own words, namely, "one sees [all] phenomena with one's [awakened] mind and then acts accordingly." 
122
 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, bSam gtan mig sgron, 12.6-13.1; sgo gsum bcos slad med par sems 
kyis chos lta ba dang rjes su mthun pa'i spyod pa'ang/ bya ba med bya ba mi 'gog ma chags par spyod do. 
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simply act (i.e., simply be) without any attachment whatsoever. To do so, as gNubs chen 
teaches, is to act in accord with what one's awakened mind (or open awareness) sees. As 
the above brief discussion demonstrates, this principle of "acting accordingly without 
attachments," for gNubs chen, is applicable to all functions, including disciplining the 
body, engaging the mind, performing altruistic deeds, etc. Given this understanding, the 
Dzogchen meditation following such a principle can be characterized as a living practice 
that is in accord with the teachings of Great Completeness. 
One thing should be worthwhile noting here. That is, even though the above brief 
discussion on the "negative paths" and living practice of gNubs chen's Dzogchen are 
reminiscent of the "negative paths" and holistic practices seen in the cases of Shenhui's 
sudden Chan and the sTon mun simultaneous access, one should not however equate these 
traditions based on these similarities. Rather, one should also look into the respective larger 
contexts of these "similarities," namely, how each tradition conceptualizes its entire 
system of teachings and practices. That is the reason why we have seen earlier that each 
tradition implements the logic of immediacy in contemplation in a differet way and thus 
brings different emphases or attributes out of the logic of immediacy.123 
B. Letting the Mind Be in Its Natural State 
But, how is the said Dzogchen living practice possible? Doesn't it depend on having 
the access to the awakened mind so that one can see it or, actually, be it? Here, gNubs 
chen's instructions on how to "let the mind be" (Tib. bio bzhag) may offer a possible 
123
 I am referring to my above discussions that Shenhui's sudden Chan integrates gradualness in the 
context of suddenness; sTon mun embraces conventionality in the manner of ultimacy; and gNubs chen's 
Dzogchen engages skillful effort in the presence of spontaneity. 
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solution, as his instructions are to reveal the awakened mind through the skillful means of 
letting-it-be. Yet, in the spirit of non-engaging, gNubs chen also reminds us, the true 
meaning of letting-it-be lies in realizing the suchness of reality, in which there is actually 
no letting (Tib. gzhag tu med pa) at all. It is just as it is. Specifically, gNubs chen 
explains, 
There are also nominally the methods of letting the mind be. 
Generally, there are: the method of attaining [the mind,] the method 
of stabilizing [the mind,] and the method of completely non-grasping 
[the mind]. Employing these methods in the depth of [one's] view, a 
supreme yogi meditates according to the ascertained principles 
[shown] above. The meditator should never be separate from these 
principles that, due to the one [great wholeness], are the essence of 
fundamental reality just as it is. Therefore, one lets the mind be 
without the intention of letting it be; it is just as it is.124 
Ultimately, it is just as it is. Nevertheless, conventionally, there are designations and 
skillful means. So, with respect to the above three methods for letting the mind be, gNubs 
chen annotates, the method of attaining (Tib. thobpar byedpa'i thabs) the mind is that 
even though everything is nominal, a mere designation, the practitioner nonetheless 
engages each of the things as the path of enlightenment (Tib. byang chub kyi lam), for 
everything is uncontrived and incorruptible from the primordial beginning; they are 
already in the state of completeness and perfection. Given this understanding that 
everything is the path to enlightenment, the practitioner thus engages them accordingly in 
order to reveal his/her awakened mind. This is nominally called "attaining the mind," and 
in the attainment, one spontaneously lets the mind be in its awakened state. 
As for the method of stabilizing (Tib. brtanpar byedpa'i thabs) the mind, gNubs 
124
 Ibid, 408.4-409.2; ... bio tha snyad tsam du bzhag pa'i thabs kyang/ spyir thob par byed pa'i thabs/ 
brtan par byed pa'i thabs/ yongs su mi 'dzin pa'i thabs te/ lta ba'i khong gis khol te/ de la lhag pa'i 
rnal 'byor pas/ bsgom pa'ang gong du thag chod pa'i don ji bzhin te/ don dang bsgom pa por rgya ma chad 
de/gcigpa'i phyirchos nyidji bzhin pa'i ngo boyinpas/bloji bzhin par ched du ma bzhag par bzhag go. 
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chen states that, with respect to all phenomena, the practitioner does not stop using the 
"six doors" (Tib. sgo drug), namely, the six perceptual senses (Tib. tshogs drug). But, he 
or she uses them in a way that, even though objects appear in perception, the practitioner 
does not conceptualize them (Tib. bsampa) so that the mind is relaxed (Tib. Ihugpa) in 
its natural, non-conceptual state. In this state of natural relaxation, the practitioner indeed 
perceives all things with the awakened mind so that he or she can then act accordingly. 
Such a state of total harmony in relaxation is the unsurpassable stabilization, for all things 
are perceived just as they are without any contrived distortion. 
Finally, gNubs chen explains, the method of completely non-grasping (Tib. yongs su 
mi 'dzin pa 'i thabs) the mind teaches that for one to be free from all objects (thus 
attachments), one needs to go beyond the three extremes (Tib. mtha' gsum) of self, others, 
and the things involved. To do so, one must understand (Tib. rtogs) the words (i.e., 
teachings) of Dzogchen, meditate (Tib. bsgom) on them, and experience (Tib. nyams) 
them until one's open awareness naturally arises from within. In the self-arising of one's 
open awareness, the practitioner rests effortlessly in the spontaneous presence of the 
awakened mind completely free from any grasping or reification. 
Given these annotated instructions, as gNubs chen clearly indicates in the quoted 
passage, the practitioner must employ these methods of "letting the mind be" in the "depth 
of [one's] view" (Tib. ha ba'i khong) so that he or she internalizes these methods to the 
effect of being a supreme yogi who meditates or acts in complete accord with all the 
"ascertained principles" of Dzogchen. In this way, the practitioner is never separate from 
the Dzogchen principles that, for gNubs chen, are the essence of suchness, the reality as it 
is. Consequently, the practitioner lets the mind be just as it is. In this suchness, as the 
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practitioner acts in accord with the principles of Great Completeness, he or she 
essentially embodies a Dzogchen living practice or life, in which nothing is intentionally 
done, yet everything spontaneously presents the primordial perfection of itself. In other 
words, in this Dzogchen life, the practitioner acts effortlessly and lets himself/herself 
simply be in the state of natural perfection. That, I believe, is the quintessence of gNubs 
chen's Dzogchen meditation, the logic of immediacy in contemplation in the form of 
spontaneous presence, performed in a living practice of profound simplicity. Thus, 
different from Shenhui's integration of suddenness and gradualness and the sTon mun 
simultaneous embrace of the ultimate and the conventional, gNubs chen's presentation of 
Dzogchen especially brings out the aroma of spontaneity in the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation. 
PART III 
Final Conclusions and Remarks 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and Significance for the Study of Religion 
American writer Ursula K. LeGuin once wrote, "It is good to have an end to journey 
toward; but it is the journey that matters in the end." As we journey toward the end, let us 
also reflect back upon where we started and what we have obtained from the various 
areas we traveled. Evidently, the issue of our departure, namely, building upon Deutsch's 
proposition of "knowing religiously" to find an alternative to onto-theo-centric paradigms 
for religious studies, has brought us to traverse the historical, philosophical, 
contemplative, and even polemic terrains of Chan, sTon mun, and Dzogchen. During our 
expeditions, we discovered that the three traditions all offer a logic of immediacy that 
integrates being and knowing into a wholeness also suffused with joy, spontaneity, and 
deep presence. Not only do descriptions of this wholeness offer a philosophical discourse 
delineating ideas including suddenness, nonduality, simultaneity, and spontaneity, but 
they also embody contemplative instructions that help practitioners to embrace all but 
reify none. With such an all-embracing awareness, the practitioners realize that only 
existence in total integration, being and knowing in wholeness, is the state of 
consummation. 
As a category of philosophical analysis, the wholeness that integrates being and 
knowing can be an alternative to onto-theo-centric paradigms for religious studies. While 
there are still many issues to clarify in this early stage of the research, I would like to 
offer, as a tentative conclusion to our current discussion, some initial thoughts regarding 
some possible applications of the alternative paradigm and reflect upon how the 
discovered logic of immediacy that entails a nondual, holistic dynamic of being and 
knowing can be a source of inspiration for our everyday living experience. But before I 
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offer my thoughts on these topics, let me also make some final remarks regarding what 
we have learned of the three Buddhist traditions and reflect upon the significance of the 
contemplative perspective underscored in this research for the study of religion in 
general. 
I. Chan, sTon mun, and Dzogchen: Fruitional Vehicles Embodying the Logic of 
Immediacy 
To show the various issues related to, as well as the various aspects of, the idea of 
immediacy, I presented narratives and teachings developed over time, enriched through 
encounter, and informed by diverse thinkers and practitioners from different sectors of 
the religio-philosophical spectrum. In the presentation, not only do we see philosophical 
and contemplative variations of the logic of immediacy, but we also witness the complex 
historical trajectories of these variations and the ways their contemplative participants, 
both Chinese and Tibetan, shaped them independently and/or in conversation. In addition, 
we observe some possible polemic encounters as well. 
In particular, starting from early Chinese dhydna teachings, I traced the possible 
contribution of these teachings to the emergence of the distinguishing features of Chan 
Buddhism. Seen as a result of the mutual influence of local and foreign chan teachings, 
the three features that characterize Chan Buddhism as a tradition centering on the 
contemplative actualizing of sudden awakening essentially offer us a historical footing, a 
possible origin narrative for the logic of immediacy in contemplation.1 On this historical 
footing, an exemplar, namely, the contemplative structure of Shenhui's sudden teaching, 
' This, of course, is not saying that the origin narrative derived from the emergence of Chan Buddhism is 
the only origin narrative for the logic of immediacy; there certainly could be other antecedents and/or 
contemporary parallels. 
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was then given to illustrate a possible mechanism of how the logic of immediacy may 
work philosophically and contemplatively. 
Therein, we see, with his integration of sudden awakening and gradual cultivation, 
Shenhui embodies the logic of immediacy in a holistic practice that is realized through 
the "equal learning" of samadhi and prajna. Characterizing a nondual dynamic of being 
and knowing via their mutual interfusion and permeation, Shenhui's "equal leaning" also 
offers us a hermeneutic tool to understand the logic of immediacy in contemplation as an 
artful endeavor of taking the fruition as the path. In this way, Shenhui's sudden Chan is 
qualified as a fruitional vehicle, whose approach observes the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation. Nonetheless, Shenhui uniquely enlightens us, this logic of immediacy in 
contemplation paradoxically involves gradualness, but it integrates gradualness in the 
context of suddenness so that the logic of immediacy can be practically implemented 
without the dualistic or conceptual faults implied by the idea of gradualness. 
Following the historical footsteps of Chan monks westwards, I then presented the 
syncretic development of sTon mun in Tibet. As an encounter narrative, this syncretic 
development conveys the message that the idea of immediacy is not an isolated 
phenomenon and its variations with distinct emphases can exist in different times and 
places. Accordingly, I next contrasted two understandings of the sTon mun simultaneity, 
which, instead of a usual polemic rendering, are understood as demonstrating the subtle 
philosophical and contemplative layers, thus the hermeneutic plasticity, associated with 
the idea of the sTon mun simultaneity in particular and the idea of immediacy in general. 
Specifically, in the contrast we see, the contemplative idea of simultaneous access 
can be interpreted as derived from a philosophy of oneness that misses the nonduality of 
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the conventional and the ultimate, for it only upholds the ultimate as true. Yet, it can also 
be read as derived from a philosophy of wholeness that simultaneously embraces the two 
truths in a way through which the two truths interfuse each other to establish a nondual 
dynamic. Philosophically, this nondual dynamic also implies a nondual, holistic dynamic 
of being and knowing similar to the one given in Shenhui's sudden Chan. However, 
contemplatively, unlike Shenhui's integrating gradualness in the context of suddenness, 
the wholeness of the sTon mun simultaneity asks its practitioner to engage the 
conventional in the manner of the ultimate while embodying the ultimate in the 
conventional. Thus, in addition to what we learned from Shenhui's sudden Chan, in 
which the logic of immediacy in contemplation is said to require its practitioner to 
artfully employ gradual cultivation, the sTon mun simultaneity adds to our knowledge 
that the logic of immediacy in contemplation demands of its practitioner to engage all 
conventional phenomena, but the engagement must be done in the manner of ultimacy so 
that the practitioner realizes the logic of immediacy without falling into the bondage of 
conventionality. As this demand takes the whole as the path, it thus places sTon mun in 
the same camp as Shenhui's sudden Chan, namely, as a fruitional vehicle within the suric 
traditions. 
Tracking the doctrinal traces left by the Simultaneists and demonstrating other 
manifestations of the idea of immediacy, I delved into the teachings of early Dzogchen 
codified by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes in his bSam gtan mig sgron. Emphasizing 
the principles of primordial perfection and spontaneous presence, gNubs chen's 
Dzogchen depicts a fruitional path on which one resumes one's original Buddhahood in 
the wholeness of primordial basis and open awareness exhibiting the nondual, holistic 
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dynamic of being and knowing seen earlier. In this resumption, what one needs is neither 
laxity nor arduous effort but a delicate presence of spontaneity that also allows a kind of 
"skillful effort" for the pracitioner to traverse the path. But, similar to the spirit of 
Shenhui's integrating gradualness in the context of suddenness and the sTon mun 
engaging the conventional in the manner of ultimacy, the Dzogchen inclusion of "skillful 
effort" must be done in the context of spontaneity so that the logic of immediacy in 
contemplation is actualized without the deviation of purposeful effort. 
To illustrate the various aspects of the Dzogchen teachings, gNubs chen presents 
nine different views or principles to bring light to the essence of Great Completeness. 
With ideas including non-referentiality, spontaneity, self-nature, bliss, nonduality, 
wholeness, and just-is-ness, we learned that these Dzogchen principles provide important 
characteristics to facilitate our understanding of Dzogchen as a whole. They also concur 
with and further extend what we learned from Shenhui's sudden Chan and sTon mun 
regarding the logic of immediacy. Yet, different from the characteristics of Shenhui and 
sTon mun, gNubs chen's presentation of these Dzogchen principles especially brings to 
the logic of immediacy a fine touch of spontaneous presence. 
Evidently, various issues have been touched upon in this research, and the above 
synoptic recapitulation of our investigation of the histories and teachings of Chan, sTon 
mun, and Dzogchen has particularly highlighted what we have learned. That is, while all 
three traditions converge on the idea of interfusing being and knowing, ontology and 
epistemology, into an unbounded field of wholeness, they also bring different emphases 
or attributes out of the logic of immediacy. Fundamentally, these different emphases 
inform us that the logic of immediacy does not reject nominal intermediaries. Rather, it 
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employs these so-called "intermediaries" such as gradual cultivation, conventional means, 
or skillful effort, in specific ways so that immediacy is realized without the dualistic 
bondages and conceptual limitations implied in their original contexts of mediation, i.e., 
the contexts of gradualness, conventionality, and effort. As a result, Shenhui's sudden 
Chan integrates gradualness in the context of suddenness; sTon mun embraces 
conventionality in the manner of ultimacy; and gNubs chen's Dzogchen engages skillful 
effort in the presence of spontaneity. 
Hermeneutically, in the logic of immediacy, nothing of, or in, one's knowing is 
intermediary if one does not make it so. That is to say, it is how an "intermediary tool" 
such as a thought, a speech, or an action is employed rather than what it appears to be that 
truly defines what it is, for there is no mediation between one's being and knowing, 
between one's essence and manifestation. If there were, the proponents of immediacy 
contend, it is as if there were mediation between an ocean and its waves. Thus, while, as 
Bernard Faure correctly warns, the claims of immediacy should not be taken at face value, 
the findings of our investigation suggest that the key to understanding these claims of 
immediacy does not lie in Faure's proposal to '"think out the intermediary,' that is, 'the 
mid-point and the mediation, the middle term between total absence and the absolute 
plentitude of presence.'"2 Rather, it lies in understanding the manner through which the 
intermediary is engaged. 
Essentially, Faure's idea is derived from Jacques Derrida, who argues, "immediacy 
is derived" and "all begins through the intermediary." In terms of cultural critique, 
Faure's approach is valid to bring light to potential sociopolitical issues underlying what 
L
 Faure. The Rhetoric of Immediacy, 66. 
3
 Ibid. 
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he calls the "rhetoric of immediacy." However, his approach is problematic when he 
extends its premise to investigate contemplative issues, for such extension signifies a 
preconceived projection of sociopolitical concerns onto the contemplative dimension. In 
the projection, not only are contemplative concerns distorted, but it only allows dualistic 
epistemologies that divide everything into subject and object and thus accept the 
intermediary "at face value" without questioning its mediating nature. Consequently, 
excluding nondual epistemologies, Faure, similar to Steven Katz, categorically rejects the 
possibility of "'pure (i.e., unmediated) experiences" even before the possibility has been 
seriously examined. For these scholars assume, due to "the sorts of beings we are,"5 our 
experiences are always mediated through cultural and/or linguistic factors. 
Against such prejudgment. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's thoughtful words ask us to 
revise our methodology and "recommence everything"; he writes, 
If it is true that as soon as philosophy declares itself to be reflection 
or coincidence it prejudges what it will find, then once again it must 
recommence everything, reject the instruments reflection and 
intuition had provided themselves, and install itself in a locus where 
they have not yet been distinguished, in experiences that have not yet 
been "worked over," that offer us all at once, pell-mell, both 
"subject" and "object," both existence and essence, and hence give 
philosophy resources to redefine them.6 
Indeed, revealing new resources to redefine, rather than prejudging, the meaning of 
intermediaries such as gradual cultivation, conventional means, and skillful effort is what 
our investigation of the logic of immediacy has done. In the locus of non-locus, the logic 
of immediacy is embodied in the wholeness of one's being and knowing, where 
experiences have not yet been "worked over" and both subject and object, both existence 
4
 Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," 26. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (translated by Alphonso Lingis), 130. 
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(or manifestation) and essence, are offered at once, or more precisely, integrated as a 
whole. 
Not only has our investigation of the logic of immediacy provided us resources to 
redefine intermediaries, but it has also shown that the logic of immediacy is one of the 
defining characteristics of the fruitional vehicle. Nonetheless, we also learned that 
immediacy is not what the Buddhist vehicle of fruition is all about, for a direct access 
based on a mistaken understanding of reality only accesses an incomplete fruition, if not 
a distorted one. To access the complete and perfect fruition, the logic of immediacy must 
be in accord with such fruition. In that way, the logic of immediacy in contemplation is 
how the fruitional vehicle carries out its principle of taking the fruition as the path. 
During our investigation, I have shown individually that each of the three teachings 
expounds its own philosophy of how to directly access the complete and perfect fruition 
(i.e., a sympathetic resonance with one's awakened mind; a simultaneous access to one's 
all-encompassing mind-source; a spontaneous presence of the primordial basis in one's 
open awareness). Consequently, I conclude that the three teachings of Shenhui's sudden 
Chan, sTon mun, and gNubs chen's Dzogchen, albeit associated with their respective 
sutric and tantric traditions, are all fruitional vehicles embodying the logic of immediacy 
in contemplation. 
The idea that a sutric tradition can be a fruitional vehicle is potentially contentious, 
especially for Buddhist tantric thinkers and practitioners. Traditionally, for them, the line 
that separates sutric and tantric traditions coincides with the line that separates causal and 
fruitional vehicles. It is however this "coincidence" that is being questioned by the above 
conclusion. That is to say, why are all sutric traditions causal and all tantric traditions 
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fruitional? In fact, to be able to answer that question, one would have to define what a 
sutric tradition really is and similarly what a tannic tradition really is. Yet, such definition 
can only be roughly given as saying, if a tradition is derived from the Buddhist sutras, 
then it is a sutric tradition. Similarly, a tantric tradition can be thus defined as well. 
However, these definitions are problematic not only because a scripture can be both a 
sutra and a tantra such as the Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo {Sutra of the All-Creating King) 
but also because the contents of sutras and tantras are philosophically overlapping, if not 
contemplatively overlapping as well.7 Given these difficulties involved in clearly 
defining sutric and tantric traditions, the aforesaid "coincidence" is even more 
problematic. 
Thus, as I have done in the investigation, whether a tradition is a fruitional vehicle 
or not should not be defined or confined by its association with the sutras and/or the 
tantras. Instead, one should look at the nature of its philosophical and contemplative 
teachings to make such a judgment. My above conclusion regarding the three traditions 
under investigation, especially the contrast of gNubs chen's understanding and my 
alternative reading of the sTon mun teachings, clearly attests to the need and the values of 
such a methodology, for it not only deepens our understanding of the nature of a 
particular tradition but also gives Buddhist studies a more delicate treatment on the use of 
categories of analysis like causal and fruitional vehicles. After all, in the spirit of the 
logic of immediacy, categories should not be reified and boundaries should not be rigid. 
The unbounded wholeness of our being and knowing simultaneously embraces 
suddenness and gradualness, ultimacy and conventionality, effort and spontaneity. In the 
Similar arguments can be seen, e.g.. Sobisch, Three-Vow Theories in Tibetan Buddhism, 348 and D. 
Jackson, Enlightenment by a Single Means, 14-35. 
301 
mutual interfusion of these opposites, one weaves a tapestry of wholeness, on which 
myriad categories of analysis (e.g., what is causal or fruitional, sutric or tantric, etc.) or 
fields of knowledge (e.g., what is historical, philosophical, contemplative, or polemic, 
etc.) interfuse each other to form its diverse and vibrant patterns. 
II. The Significance of the Contemplative Perspective for the Study of Religion 
Throughout the discussion in this dissertation, I have underscored the contemplative 
perspective both to understand the concerns of the contemplatives as they developed their 
religious traditions and to ferret out subtle philosophical and contemplative layers and 
distinctions within and between the teachings under investigation. These special concerns 
and nuances are significant in terms of improving our understanding of how religious 
practitioners shape the spiritual or contemplative elements of their traditions as well as 
how different teachings are practically related to each other. In fact, the above conclusion 
that the three traditions investigated are all fruitional vehicles embodying the logic of 
immediacy in contemplation is mainly owing to the use of the proposed contemplative 
perspective. Yet, perspectives such as the sociopolitical perspective usually taken in the 
field may distort or overlook the said concerns and thereby fail to ferret out the needed 
nuances because of their strong emphasis on the social and/or political agenda of the 
participants. Accordingly, the application of the proposed contemplative perspective 
provides an approach to remedy the situation so that we can better appreciate the 
religious concerns of the participants, the subtleties of the teachings, and the relationship 
between traditions. In addition to what is shown above, let me further illustrate the 
significance of the proposed perspective for the study of religion. 
For example, my investigation of Shenhui's sudden teaching has revealed an 
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important contemplative structure that has been deemphasized or missed by various past 
studies done mostly from the sociopolitical perspective. As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
without recognizing Shenhui's delicate integration of sudden awakening and gradual 
cultivation that demands of its practitioner a holistic practice, these past studies generally 
(mis)construe Shenhui's sudden awakening only as an instantaneous experience of 
insight, or even less accurately, as a rhetorical strategy for the purpose of sectarianism or 
proselytism. Consequently, Shenhui's sudden teaching has been unfortunately 
characterized as having no or little significance for ongoing spiritual or contemplative 
practice, and his assessment of the Northern Chan practices, i.e., "focusing the mind to 
enter samadhi; abiding the mind to view the pure; activating the mind for outward 
illumination; absorbing the mind for inner realization,"8 has been only considered as a 
polemic criticism. 
However, when the contemplative structure of Shenhui's sudden teaching is ferreted 
out with our proposed contemplative perspective, not only do we provide an alternative 
reading of Shenhui's teaching and thus better appreciate its nuances and values, but we 
also come to realize that his assessment of the Northern Chan practices may not just be 
polemic or "self-aggrandizing" but offer a genuine warning to Buddhist practitioners to 
look out for mistaken or one-sided understandings of Buddha's teachings. 
That is, for Shenhui, even if the Northern Chan practices are subitist in nature, if the 
practitioners do not take the wholeness of the awakened mind as a constant and holistic 
guide, their arduous effort will be done in vain for they are only climbing some "dirt 
mound and barbarian tomb." In other words, Shenhui instructs practitioners to consider 
gradual cultivation within the context of sudden awakening, without which gradual 
8 fM'L-Afc ' fekS># • l&LWffi. ' M'LWWt - j (Hu, Shenhui hesangyiji, 133-134). 
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cultivation is faulty as it aims at a wrong direction. Furthermore, for Shenhui, due to the 
holistic being of the awakened mind, not only must the Northern Chan meditation be 
expanded to include all everyday actions and experiences, but it must also incorporate 
effortlessness (e.g., in the form of "no-thought") into the practice to dissolve the dualistic 
or conceptual reification implied by the idea of gradualness. Such is the insight into 
Shenhui's above assessment, which is possible only when Shenhui's sudden teaching is 
better understood with our proposed contemplative perspective. 
Similarly, with the aid of a contemplative lens, gNubs chen's characterization of the 
sTon mun simultaneity as a doctrinal oneness need not just be a polemic criticism, either. 
Rather, as I showed in Chapter 4, it can be construed as an honest critique of the teaching 
given out of concern for the potential impact of such oneness teaching on practitioners. 
Reminiscent of Shenhui's message, gNubs chen tells us that a direct access to the unborn 
ultimate can be flawed if it is derived from a mistaken understanding of reality, 
specifically the oneness that only considers the ultimate as true and the conventional as 
untrue. This contemplative rendition, on the one hand, offers us a vantage point going 
beyond the polemic so that we can better comprehend gNubs chen's concerns. On the 
other hand, it also gives us an opportunity or a context to further reflect on other possible 
philosophical and contemplative nuances embedded in the teachings under investigation, 
which we may otherwise miss or neglect. Indeed, my alternative reading of the sTon mun 
simultaneity has attested that the idea of the sTon mun simultaneity, and the idea of 
immediacy in general, is a rich field filled with layers of philosophical and contemplative 
subtleties. Nonetheless, to dig out these "hidden treasures," our proposed methodology 
has shown that one must be willing to first change one's perspective, e.g., from the 
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perspective of a theorist or scholar to the perspective of a practitioner or contemplative. 
Then, without reifying either of the perspectives, one weaves them into "a tapestry of 
wholeness" so that its "diverse and vibrant patterns" can be better appreciated. 
Furthermore, when the concerns of the contemplatives are taken into account, as I 
exemplified in Chapters 1 and 3, the emergence of Chan in developmental negotiations 
and the disappearance of sTon mun in syncretic assimilation are not just different 
religious traditions rising or falling in power, but different groups of practitioners seeking 
a contemplative realization or "presence" by integrating as many insights from similar 
teachings as possible, even if the presence may result in the disappearance of a religious 
sect. Here, what is important to these religious people is not necessarily to preserve their 
sectarian identities, or at least not only that. Rather, they aspire to experience the reality 
their teachings describe. In the process, by giving up sectarian identity, these 
contemplatives are not religious maniacs who persecute, or exclude the rights of, other 
religious practitioners. On the contrary, as I have argued, they are in the pursuit of an 
authentic practice, trying to realize the "ultimate concern" or the highest spirituality of a 
being. This "ultimate concern" in our logic of immediacy in contemplation is for one to 
reveal one's reflexively open awareness so that one embraces all possibilities with 
effortlessness and tenderness. This understanding, in effect, helps us to include as well as 
extend our reach beyond the polemic, the sectarian, and the historical so that we can 
better recognize the spiritual nuances of teachings under investigation as well as the 
values various changes in the historical movements of religious traditions (e.g., rising or 
falling in power) may yield. Such are the functions and significances of the proposed 
contemplative perspective I have tried to demonstrate via our investigation for the study 
of religion in general. 
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III. Being and Knowing in Wholeness: A New Paradigm for Religious Studies 
Given the above recapitulation of what we have learned of and from the histories and 
teachings of the three Buddhist traditions and the reflection upon the significance of the 
proposed contemplative perspective, on the last stop, let us visit the issue of departure to 
conclude our journey motivated by finding an alternative to onto-theo-centric paradigms 
for religious studies. As a preliminary consideration, what I propose is twofold. The first 
is to offer a new paradigm derived from the discovered wholeness of being and knowing 
to understand the nature of religious knowledge, whereas the second (presented in the 
next section) reflects upon how the logic of immediacy informed by the religious 
knowledge of being and knowing in wholeness obtained through our study can be a 
source of inspiration to vitalize our everyday experience. 
What is the nature of religious knowledge? Religious theories derived from onto-
theo-centric paradigms usually center on a transcendental being or metaphysics that is 
embodied in a personal God or a metaphysical Godhead. These theories ultimately regard 
religious knowledge as a means to understanding the relationships between oppositional 
categories such as the unconditional and the conditional, the infinite/divine and the 
finite/mortal, or the sacred and the profane. As opposites, these categories exhibit some 
inherent tension, the resolution of which is one of the central issues of these religious 
theories. 
Generally speaking, to resolve the tension between the oppositional categories, these 
theories either place the aforementioned opposites in different realms or collapse them 
into the Transcendental One or the Infinite God. For example, in ontological formation, 
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the unconditional, the infinite, or the sacred are characterized as the "Wholly Other" (to 
the conditional, the finite, or the profane), as Rudolf Otto characterizes the holy in his 
The Idea of the Holy. Being the "Wholly Other," the unconditional, the infinite, or the 
sacred are, as if they were literally and metaphorically, high up in a distant heaven, a 
transcendental realm, that is only accessible to the conditional, the finite, or the profane 
through some kind of "medium." As a variation to the above ontological formation, the 
oppositional categories are also characterized as only existing in different spaces and 
times, as Emile Durkheim and Mircea Eliade characterize the sacred and the profane in 
their respective works of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life and The Sacred and the 
Profane. Therein, the separation between the opposites disappears through the power of a 
specific ritual held at a certain time and/or a certain place. 
When collapsing the oppositional categories into the Transcendental One or the 
Infinite God, the theories based on onto-theo-centric paradigms always privilege the 
unconditional, the infinite, or the sacred. That is, it is always the conditional, the finite, or 
the profane that must be dissolved and returned to the unconditional, the infinite, or the 
sacred. So, Plotinus understands the conditional or the finite as the emanation of the One 
that is unconditional and infinite. Nicholas of Cusa coincides the "opposites" just to 
highlight the pervasive nature of the Infinite God. In monotheistic formation, the mortal 
or the profane has original sms or impurities, and consequently they must atone and 
accept grace from the divine or the sacred so that they can return and be in the presence 
of the divine or the sacred again. 
The above understandings, in which the opposites are either placed in different 
realms or collapsed into the Oneness or Godhead, evidently value a distant metaphysical 
307 
or transcendental realm over our present phenomenal or immanent existence. By valuing 
a transcendental ideal, these understandings, in effect, inspire their adherents to strive for 
such an ideal, but at the risk of degrading or dejecting our phenomenal or immanent 
reality. In this way, as the adherents strive to establish a connection with the highest 
being, they potentially lose the connection with their ongoing being, which alienates 
oneself from others as well as from the highest being, for the highest being without other 
beings can never be the highest being that is unconditional, infinite, or sacred. 
As an alternative, we learn from our investigation that the wholeness which 
embraces the principle of nonduality offers a new paradigm to resolve the tension 
between the oppositional categories. Going beyond the above ontological and/or 
reductionist solutions, the discussed wholeness brings the seemingly metaphysical 
categories into a holistic field, in which ontology and epistemology, being and knowing, 
are thoroughly interfusing in a dynamic of nonduality. With this nondual interfusion of 
being and knowing, immediacy is immanent. Accordingly, there is no need for any 
"medium," including spiritual or conceptual intermediaries,9 and the so-called 
"oppositional categories" are regarded as demonstrating epistemic diversity while having 
no ontic fixity or rigidity. 
In other words, when being and knowing, ontology and epistemology, belong to two 
categories and are thus dualistic, it is natural to claim, "immediacy is derived" and "all 
begins through the intermediary." Given this, one is then conceptually bound to "think 
out the intermediary." On the other hand, when one's states of being and knowing 
completely interfuse and permeate each other, there is no intermediary to know oneself, 
9
 Yet, the fact that immediacy is immanent does not reject "nominal intermediaries" as manifestations. It 
only rejects intermediaries that are reified as such and thus lead one to conceptually separate what are not 
separate in reality. 
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for one already manifests oneself in the knowing and one's knowing embodies oneself in 
that particular temporal-spatial continuum. 10 As a result, in this nondual 
ontological-epistemological continuum, finite or conditional manifestations, in terms of 
one's everyday actions and experiences, are not intermediaries for one to realize the 
infinite or unconditional being, but the embodiments of the infinite or unconditional 
being in the continuum, whereas the infinite or unconditional being is the open matrix 
underlying the finite or conditional manifestations. 
This is similar to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's idea of the visible being the active 
expression of the invisible and the invisible being the openness that sustains the visible. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the visible is a "field of being," expressing "a certain style, a certain 
manner of managing the domain of space and time over which it has competency, of 
pronouncing, of articulating that domain, of radiating about a wholly virtual center—in 
short a certain manner of being, in the active sense, a certain Wesen, in the sense that, 
says Heidegger, this word has when it is used as a verb."1' As the manner of being, the 
visible, the conditional, is not confined in the here or in the now; rather, it is in the 
present announcing and at the same time concealing the "immense latent content of the 
past, the future, and the elsewhere."12 This immense latent content, the invisible, 
however is not "the positing of a content, but the opening of a dimension that can never 
again be closed."13 As an openness, this invisible "is therefore not a de facto invisible, 
like an object hidden behind another, and not an absolute invisible, that would have 
nothing to do with the visible. Rather it is the invisible o/this world, that which inhabits 
10
 This however does not deny the validity to "think out the inteimediary" as far as cultural critique is 
concerned. 
11
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (translated by Alphonso Lingis), 115. 
12
 Ibid, 114. 
13
 Ibid, 151. 
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this world, sustains it, and renders it visible, its own and interior possibility, the Being of 
this being."14 
In the wholeness of being and knowing, the conditional is an embodiment of the 
unconditional in a particular temporal-spatial continuum, but, in Merleau-Ponty's sense, 
the conditional is not in time or in space, but a dynamic display in (and of) the present 
moment. As a dynamic display of the present, the conditional is an active expression that 
reveals the "immense latent content of the past, the future, and the elsewhere." But, this 
"immense latent content," the unconditional, is not an unknown invariant. Rather, it is a 
basis-just-as-it-is, the primordial basis, "that which inhabits this world, sustains it, and 
renders it visible, its own and interior possibility, the Being of this being." In this way, 
the conditional and the unconditional, and all the aforementioned opposites, are neither 
one nor two, but a nondual pair constantly and mutually informing each other in the 
wholeness of reality, of which both are expressions further attesting to the multiplicity in 
its totality. This wholeness of reality however is not simply an objective reality; it is 
one's being and knowing in wholeness, for the wholeness, in Merleau-Ponty's words, is 
the horizon, rather than the production of nothingness. Being the horizon, the wholeness 
does not frame the subject and the object as ontological opposites, for the horizon 
includes the seer; "he who sees is of it and is in it."15 
The above preliminary discussion, even though sketchy, still presents a possible new 
paradigm based on the proposed wholeness of being and knowing for us to discuss the 
relationship between oppositional categories like the conditional and the unconditional. 
In this new paradigm, rather than formulating the opposites dualistically or monistically, 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid, 100. 
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one considers them as interconnected or nondual pairs that are the expressions of reality 
in wholeness. This reality of wholeness is closely related to one's being and knowing. In 
this way, the search for the highest being would not be oriented toward transcendence or 
dissolution; thus it does not emphasize a transcendental or monistic ideal. Instead, it is to 
turn inwardly to one's nondual wholeness. As it is a wholeness, the without is not 
excluded as one searches the within, for they form the gestalt in unity and in diversity. In 
this reality of wholeness, not only will there be no degradation of our immanent existence, 
but there will be no "abstract truth" divorced from one's subjective engagement, either. 
Yet, this subjective engagement is not arbitrary, for it is an engagement in and of the 
being. Thus, being is not being to be grasped or reified, but being to know. In 
Merleau-Ponty's words, perhaps, it is that "I am a knowing" (italics added),16 even if I 
don't know everything of myself. 
Noticeably, in presenting the new paradigm for religious studies, I have borrowed, 
and compared the proposed wholeness with, Merleau-Ponty's idea, especially, his idea of 
the visible and the invisible. To further understand the applicability of the new paradigm 
and advance the comparison, more research is certainly needed. Is the wholeness that 
embraces the principles of nonduality and spontaneity applicable to monotheistic and/or 
monistic traditions? Does the wholeness that thoroughly integrates being and knowing 
necessarily bring down the highest being from the heaven and consequently reduce its 
irreducible mystery to the order of beings, as Heidegger criticized onto-theology? In 
terms of comparison, how is Merleau-Ponty's idea of the Gestalt related to the proposed 
wholeness of being and knowing? Is the interfusion of one's being and knowing in any 
way compatible with Merleau-Ponty's chiasm? These questions, as interesting and as 
16
 Ibid, 32. 
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important as they are, can only be left for future research. 
IV. The Logic of Immediacy: A Vitalization of Everyday Experience 
Regarding the changing world, Merleau-Ponty positively states that "the existing 
world exists in the interrogative mode."17 As one questions, "What do 1 know?", he 
remarks, one should also understand that this questioning 
extends to the idea of knowing itself; it invokes some intelligible 
place where the facts, examples, ideas I lack, should be found; it 
intimates that the interrogative is not a mode derived by inversion or 
by reversal of the indicative and of the positive, is neither an 
affirmation nor a negation veiled or expected, but an original manner 
of aiming at something, as it were a question-knowing, which by 
principle no statement or "answer" can go beyond and which perhaps 
therefore is the proper mode of our relationship with Being, as though 
it were the mute or reticent interlocutor of our questions.18 
Similar to Merleau-Ponty's "question-knowing" that has an "original manner of 
aiming at something," the logic of immediacy asks its practitioner to participate in the 
changing world with a spontaneous and open knowing directly aiming at the nature of 
reality. Here, not only is the direct aiming "the proper mode of our relationship with 
Being," but also it is an artful endeavor that must involve gradual cultivation, 
conventional means, as well as skillful effort in their proper contexts. As if it were to 
climb an ascending spiral, the spontaneous and open knowing of the direct aiming, with 
the power of gradual cultivation, conventional means, and skillful effort, pervades one's 
"view," that is, the holistic being of one's "knowing and seeing" discussed in Chapter 2. 
Here, the logic of immediacy is crucial, as it sets not only the compass for the practitioner 
to find the "nine-story platform" rather than some "dirt mound and barbarian tomb," but 
17
 Ibid, 103. 
18
 Ibid, 129. 
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also the context for all the "intermediary" practices to be employed without the dualistic 
and conceptual bondages and limitations implied in their original contexts (i.e., in the 
contexts of gradualness, conventionality, and arduous effort). 
As one follows the logic of immediacy to simultaneously embrace suddenness and 
gradualness, ultimacy and conventionality, effort and spontaneity, one deconstructs their 
boundaries and interfuses them into an integral whole. This existence in total integration 
is, on the one hand, the state of consummation and, on the other hand, a tapestry of 
wholeness, on which myriad categories of analysis or fields of knowledge are woven 
together to form its diverse and vibrant patterns which we call "everyday experiences." In 
this way, the logic of immediacy grounds one's existential consummation in everyday 
life, but it grounds the consummation with a vitalization that is rooted in one's "unique 
style or manner" of knowing, namely, a subjective engagement that is directly in and of 
the being. Here, the reality is not so much characterized by the statement, "I think, 
therefore I am." Instead, it is that "I am a knowing," a knowing that is ever-lively in 
openness and love as long as one does not limit it with habitual tendency or conceptual 
reification. Insofar as it is ever lively, this open and compassionate knowing also helps its 
practitioner untangle habitual tendency and conceptual reification. In mutual interfusion 
and permeation, the logic of immediacy makes a disentanglement a no-entanglement, 
with which everything unfolds itself in non-abiding becoming. 
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